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Abstract 
It is broadly accepted that there is a need for better security management and 
protocols for hostage incident management, there is currently a lack of basic 
empirical knowledge about the existing security management protocols with 
reference to existing policies, knowledge and the capability of International 
Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) to handle hostage incidents.  Many 
INGOs have successfully managed high-profile hostage crises, but there is still a 
considerable level of uncertainty about the way these crises have been solved 
and the way their success can be seen in relation to other crises. This study 
aimed to understand how INGOs prepare themselves for hostage incidents, 
whether policies, procedures are in place, how they manage hostage situations, 
and also how INGO staff are trained and prepared. 
The methodology adopted for this study was qualitative and comprised of in-
depth interviews with sixteen INGOs and ten industry experts and a review of 
INGO documents, policies and plans.  
The study sheds light on some of the less talked-about aspects for INGO security 
management in general, as well as preparedness and responsibility towards their 
staff. The study suggests that while most organisations have a level of 
preparedness in place, enhancing each agency’s respective policies may assist 
the organisation in better management. The study also found that there is a 
higher use of ransom payment than expected, and that there is an increasing 
willingness to engage external expertise to assisting in managing a hostage 
crisis. 
The study makes several recommendations that may have policy implications, 
including pre-deployment hostile environment training, reviewing potential 
cooperation between INGOs and United Nations, and the use of external resources 
to assist in managing a hostage crisis. It also recommends a revision of existing 
negotiation models, as the current models are lacking in addressing protracted 
hostage cases. The establishment of an accurate database of incidents to allow for 
improved interpretation of trends and scope of hostage cases is also recommended.  
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Hostage is a crucifying aloneness.  There's a silent, screaming 
slide into the bowels of ultimate despair.  Hostage is a man 
hanging by his fingernails over the edge of chaos and feeling his 
fingers slowly straightening. 
Hostage is the humiliating stripping away of every sense and fibre 
of body and mind and spirit that make you what you are. Hostage 
is a mutant creature, full of self-loathing, guilt and death wishing. 
But he's a man, a rare, unique, and beautiful creation of which 
these things are no part. 
Brian Keenan, on Friday, August 24, 1990 at his post-release press conference after 1,574 days as a hostage 
in Beirut, Lebanon. 
 
This study is based on hostage management as a subset of crisis management 
within the field of conflict management, while exploring the role of international 
non-governmental organisations in it. 
Hostage taking is covered by a number of conventions and declarations, of 
which the most important is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
guarantees inter alia the right to life, liberty and security of 
person, freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, freedom of movement, protection from 
arbitrary detention (United Nations, 1948).  
The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages is also a key 
document. It was adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 34/146 of 
17 December 1979, and provides that ‘everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of person’ and further that ‘that the taking of hostages is an offence of 
grave concern to the international community’ (United Nations, 1979). Later, on 
18 December 1985, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a 
resolution against Taking Hostages by a 15 to 0 vote. United Nations (UN) 
2 
conventions require that each country use its own legal system to put into effect 
and enforce the agreement. However, UN resolutions are merely agreements on a 
specific set of goals or principles. Hence, conventions are legally more binding 
than resolutions, since resolutions do not imply a commitment to enforce the 
resolution. Nevertheless, the UN has no direct power to force a nation to abide 
by any of its agreements (Enders and Sandler, 2006, p. 121). Other international 
instruments are also in place, such as the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, which states that ‘hostage-taking constitutes a war crime’ and 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 both state 
that hostage taking a breach of the protection of victims of war (United Nations, 
2005). 
The history of hostage taking is also studied in a chronological order, starting 
from over 2000 years ago and how it has evolved in the 21st century. Next, the 
trend of hostage-taking in various countries and the days in captivity have been 
compiled to better understand how, over time, this has become an effective 
measure for perpetrators, be it organized criminals or terrorists. The categories 
of hostage-takers are also explored in the scope of this study in light of their 
motivations and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) classifications, 
including: escape from legal action in case of a crime gone wrong or family 
dispute; promoting terror; gaining political support from the INGO and 
detachment of the same from enemy state. Other categories have also been cited, 
such as those of Fuselier (1981, p. 10-15) and Gray (1981, p. 14-18), who 
categorise hostage-takers into mentally unstable people, or those wanting 
monetary gains. No matter what category, motivation of the hostage-takers may 
change over time, and so can the goal. 
Hostage taking is not a new phenomenon, but has been used as a tactic for 
exerting geopolitical and domestic power since ancient times (Hammer, 2007, p. 
39) when it was a common and legitimate strategy of government diplomacy. 
The Roman Empire used hostage taking to ensure the conquered populations did 
not rebel against the occupation (Poland and McCrystle, 1999, p. xi), and 
perhaps the earliest recorded hostage incident is described in Genesis 14 of the 
3 
Old Testament of the Bible, where Lot was taken hostage (Soskis and Van 
Zandt, 1986, p. 423-435).  
In more recent times, hostage taking has increasingly been used as a tactic to 
achieve political aims, such as the abductions at the Munich Olympics in 1972, 
the 1980 Iranian Embassy siege in London, and a number of abductions of 
foreigners in Lebanon in the late 1980s. Hostage taking as a tactic has been 
popular among terrorists groups in Europe, especially Ireland and Italy, in 
Central and South America, and the Middle East. In particular second generation 
terrorist groups have adopted the tactic of hostage taking. While such groups can 
trace their origins to national freedom or political causes, they have later lost 
their ideological orientation, but often maintained the rhetoric, and have since 
become criminals under cover of a political cause (Bolz, Dudonis, and Schulz, 
2001, p. 119). In the past decade, the tactic of hostage taking has continued at an 
amplified level, such as the events in the Moscow Theatre siege in 2002 
(Anderson, 2009, p. 102), and the Beslan School siege (Anderson, 2009, p. 74). 
While a number of terrorist groups consider hostage taking and kidnapping as 
part of their mission (Yun, 2007, p. 23-26), others are involved only in order to 
gain financial support (Auerbach, 1999; Murphy, 2004). This is supported by 
Maceda (2003), Murphy (2004), and Ramachandran (2005), whom shows that 
terrorists have gained substantial financial support through hostage taking..  
Management of a hostage crisis, a core topic of this study, is also examined in 
detail. A hostage incident usually carries significant impact on the ability or 
interest to deliver humanitarian assistance, as such assistance is often suspended 
until the incident is resolved (Stoddard et al, 2012). Hence, the programmatic 
impact is wider than that of the individual(s) taken. In many ways, the impact of 
a hostage crisis can have a higher impact on INGO programme delivery than the 
death of a staff.  
If the hostage situation ends up with negotiation, there are different strategies 
which can be used by the negotiator to plan the process. It is important to map 
the conflict, and outline and identify the negotiation components like 
establishing rapport, gaining time, calm the situation down, and obtain 
4 
information. These are essential to have in place, no matter what strategy is 
chosen to resolve the crisis. All major known models have been described in 
detail and their application and limitations outlined. Following this, the 
psychological effects of captivity, both short and long-term, have been explored.  
The use of kidnap and ransom (K&R) insurance is a topic not often openly 
discussed in the INGO world, but needs to be understood nonetheless. Private 
entities, including individuals, corporations, and INGOs pay millions of dollars 
in ransom money every year, and a large number of insurance providers sell 
specialised K&R insurance policies to reimburse ransom payments (Chubb 
Group of Insurance Companies, 2012). K&R insurance has its pros and cons, 
like any policy. The opponents of K&R insurance argue that ransom payment 
has led to a criminal industry where many elements profit from extortion of 
international corporations through hostage taking, and that insurance companies 
are financing this industry by paying ransoms to hostage takers.   
The research has been designed keeping in mind all facets of the hostage 
management phenomenon globally. The following section focuses on the 
problem statement of the research. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Although it is broadly accepted that there is a need for better INGO security 
management and protocols, there is currently a lack of basic empirical 
knowledge about security management protocols with reference to existing 
policies, knowledge and capability of INGOs to handle hostage incidents. Hence 
with this background, research will be carried out to understand how INGOs 
prepare themselves for hostage incidents, whether policies, procedures are in 
place, how they manage hostage situations, and also how INGO staff on an 
individual basis are trained and prepared. If these factors could be better 
understood, successful strategies could be developed for INGOs to improve the 
management of a hostage ordeal, with the very realistic prospect of meaning the 
difference between life and death. 
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Some NGOs lack adequate resources to manage a hostage crisis; despite working 
in high volatile areas and knowing that incidents are imminent and highly 
possible. The response of INGOs to such incidents is what makes the core 
problem of the study. The problem statement for the study is as follows: 
The number of hostage-taking incidents in INGOs has seen an 
upward trend over time. While the motives and goals may be 
different for each incident, the sheer scale and consequences of 
this phenomenon has made the existence of a protocol for handling 
such a situation, imperative. Many INGOs have such procedures 
established which encompass multiple facets, e.g. adequate 
resources like incident managers; the funding to support them, and 
also the training given to them for dealing with incidents, but 
others do not have such a system in place.  
1.2 Research Questions 
The following research questions were explored through the selected 
methodology:  
 What capacity do INGOs have in terms of human and financial resources to 
manage and contain a hostage situation?   
 What are the levels of training and knowledge of hostage incidents and 
survival with which INGO staff are prepared when they are deployed in 
environments prone to hostage situations? 
 What policies and procedures do INGOs have in place for hostage incident 
management?      
 What do INGOs consider to be sufficient duty of care towards staff for 
preventing and managing hostage incidents? 
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1.3 Statement of the Study’s Aims and Objectives 
The study was aimed at understanding how INGOs prepare for and deal with 
hostage incidents. The past decade has seen a significant increase in number of 
hostage incidents and hostage incidents are becoming a matter of utmost concern 
for many INGOs. 
The objectives of the study comprised delving into some specific aspects of the 
hostage management function. The objectives of the study were as follows: 
 To determine what resource capacity INGOs have for dealing with 
hostage incidents.  
 To assess what kind of training and knowledge INGO staff are equipped 
with before they are deployed in volatile environments where hostage 
taking is likely. 
 To analyse what policies and procedures INGOs have in place for hostage 
incident management. 
 To determine what INGOs consider to be adequate duty of care towards 
staff for preventing and managing hostage incidents. 
1.4 The Significance of Study 
The researcher chose this particular topic and worked on it both formally and 
informally so as to help in the development of successful strategies for INGOs 
in improving hostage management situations. In order to achieve this, the 
researcher transcribed interviews and identified themes from the patterns coming 
from each participant. The researcher’s own database of hostage cases shows 
that humanitarian workers were held in captivity for more than 6,000 days in 
total in 2012 a fact that substantiates the scope of the problem. In the absence of 
a global watchdog group, many kidnappings are unreported, and therefore it is 
difficult to estimate the exact global rates. Auerbach (1999, p. 435) believes that 
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only 30 per cent of kidnappings on a worldwide basis are reported and that ‘in 
some countries, the reporting rate is as low as 10 per cent’. 
The literature survey shows an increasing trend in humanitarian workers’ 
abduction rates (Stoddard et al., 2006; 2009) and that NGO workers who operate 
in war areas are subjected to increased intentional violence (Rowley et al., 
2008).  This calls for some action to be taken in response to these abductions.  
Such an increasing trend in a dangerous phenomenon like hostage taking poses a 
great threat for aid workers globally. In order to put a stop to them or even 
curtail the number of incidents, it is important that such a research be conducted 
and some light is shed on the preparedness of the many INGOs around us. There 
should be a comprehensive and documented compilation of reality and this study 
aims to provide just that. 
This study will touch upon the policies and procedures for hostage incident 
management, including: 
 The human and financial resource capacity to manage and contain a 
hostage situation. 
 The training and knowledge provided to the INGO staff in environments 
where hostage situation is likely.  
 The duty of care INGOs consider sufficient towards their staff in order to 
prevent and manage hostage situations. 
This study further covers INGO hostage management strategies to a great extent 
and will help many prospective aid workers make informed decisions, especially 
when working in highly volatile areas. 
1.5 Definition of Key Terms 
The word ‘hostage’ is derived from the Latin word hospes, which means 
‘hospitality’. Hence, it is understood that there is a relationship between the 
hostage taking concept and the origin of this phrase. This term reflects the 
recurrent political and military utilisation of hostages in ancient times, when one 
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or more hostages would be handed over by political authorities as an assurance 
of trust in the observance of obligation (Strentz, 2012, p. 3). 
This concept has evolved immensely in both meaning and matter since the term 
originated (Faure, 2003, p. 469). Today, a hostage is someone who is captured 
or held as security for the accomplishment of a certain condition (Oxford 
Dictionary, 2013), and a hostage event is an incident in which one or more 
people are captured against their will by a group or by individuals, generally by 
force, after which the hostage takers make demands (Giebels, Noelanders, and 
Vervaeke, 2005, p. 241-253). 
Hostage taking has also been described as ‘a way of setting up a bargaining 
position that cannot be as conveniently or well achieved by other means… [it] is 
a naked power play’ (Cooper, 1981, p. 1). Gary Noesner, the former head of the 
FBI Hostage and Crisis Unit, gives another definition whereby  
A hostage incident is carried out by a suspect involved in 
determined behaviour for the accomplishment of certain results 
that signifies substantive gain for the suspect. In this context, 
hostages serve as true bargaining chips that can be traded for 
something (Hammer, 2007, p. 39). 
Tom Hargrove, a former hostage held by Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - FARC) in Columbia for 
334 days, defined a hostage succinctly as ‘the deliberate creation and marketing 
of human grief, anguish, and despair’ (Lopez, 2011, p. i). The International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations in its Resolution 34/146 of 17 December 1979, states   
Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or 
to continue to detain another person (hostage) in order to compel a 
third party, namely, a state, an international intergovernmental 
organisation, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, 
to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit 
condition for the release of the hostage commits the offense of 
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taking hostages within the meaning of this Convention (United 
Nations).   
There exists a scientific difference of meaning between the terms ‘hostage 
taking’ and ‘kidnapping’. James M. Poland (1988, p. 137) differentiates 
kidnapping and hostage taking by defining the former as ‘[seizing and] 
restraining the victim to some secret location and making demands’, while 
hostage taking entails a direct argument with officials of a government or an 
organisation at a known location while the victims are kept secure in that 
location. These definitions do entail some problems and Poland acknowledges 
that the distinction is often not very clear.  
Attempts have been made within the NGO community to reach common 
definitions in the security field. Anna Dick’s paper Creating Common Security 
Terminology for NGOs examined security documents from a total of 32 
organisations, and it contributes successfully towards providing such 
commonalities. Dick’s is the definit ive work in defining security terminology 
among NGOs. As security documents are generally sensitive within an 
organisation, complete anonymity was maintained in the collection of data. It is 
therefore not possible to determine whether the INGOs participating in this 
research took part in Dick’s research. The definitions below are those that are 
identified in Dicks’ research (2010, p. 17-20) and adapted as relevant to this 
study: 
 NGO: A non-governmental organisation, according to the United Nations, 
is ‘any organization which is not established by a governmental entity or 
international agreement’ (Iriye, 2002, p. 2). According to the World Bank 
(1992), NGOs are defined as ‘many groups and institutions that are 
entirely or largely independent of the government and that have primarily 
humanitarian or cooperative rather than commercial objectives’. 
 INGO: An international non-governmental organisation, the conventional 
requirements of which being that is has members and financial support 
from at least three different countries and the intention to cover 
operations in as many. 
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 Conflict: Defined in accordance with Pruitt and Kim (2004, p. 8) as a 
‘perceived divergence of interest, a belief that the parties' current 
aspirations are incompatible’. 
 Hostage taking: An incident which is carried out by a suspect involved in 
determined behaviour for the accomplishment of certain results that 
signifies substantive gain for the suspect. 
 Abduction: The act of an individual or group of people taking someone 
unwillingly without providing any demands. The process of abduction 
precedes detention (Dick, 2010, p. 18). 
 Detention: An individual or group of people holding the detained person 
involuntarily with no intention to harm, as well as with no clear condition 
to release the hostage (Dick, 2010, p. 17). 
 Kidnapping: Kidnapping is used for monetary gain or other concessions, 
generally referred to as ransom (Dick 2010, p. 19). 
 Terrorism: It has been impossible to reach a global definition of 
terrorism, so this study will use the word ‘terrorism’ based on the 
following common denominators:  
 Intended to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population. 
 Utilised for furthering political or social objectives. 
 Directed towards the civilian population, and not security forces. 
 A crime. 
 In the form of either a threat or force. 
Using this description of terrorism, we find that it  is never accidental; all 
terrorists have a cause, motive, or reason for their acts, and all terrorist 
acts involve violence or the threat of violence.  It should be noted that 
this excludes any particular political belief or religion as a factor in the 
definition of a terrorist. 
11 
 Negotiation: For the sake of this study negotiation is defined as ‘a 
communication process whereby the parties through a process of give and 
take, and collaborative problem-solving, seek a mutually acceptable 
solution’ (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Folger et al., 2001; Mayer 2000).   
1.6 Summary statement 
The all-encompassing question for this study was ‘What makes up international 
non-governmental organisations’ preparedness for and response mechanisms to 
hostage situations?’ The objectives of this study were to make valuable 
contributions to the way INGOs develop their policies and practices, and to 
make some recommendations for hostage managers. 
Overall the researcher is confident that the attempts to find information were 
successful and shed light on the present security management methods. While 
most organisations have a level of preparedness in place, going into further 
details on the policies may assist organisations in better management. The 
researcher also found that there is a higher use of ransom payment than what 
was expected, and that there is an increasing trend and willingness to engage 
external expertise in assisting in managing a hostage crisis.  
While the data collected is a small sample, it is nevertheless significant since 
this is the first time an attempt has been made to combine and integrate all 
factual information in order to make the above-mentioned determinations.  
The study is divided into six chapters. Each chapter is organised along relevant 
topics and sub-headings. 
 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION – This chapter provides the 
introduction to the study. It outlines the background (context) of the 
study, the research problem, the objectives of the study, the research 
questions, the significance of the study, the theoretical framework, the 
research methodology, the scope of the study, and the structure of the 
study. 
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 CHAPTER 2: INGO OPERATIONS AND SECURITY MECHANISMS 
– This chapter explores relevant literature and introduces the operating 
environment, regions in which active INGO operations are in progress, 
and the relevance to NGO security mechanisms put in place to operate 
there. 
 CHAPTER 3: HOSTAGE MANAGEMENT – This chapter explores 
three distinct aspects of hostage management; introduction, definit ions 
and history, hostage taking as terrorism, and managing a hostage crisis. 
This chapter also explores the literature on international instruments and 
frameworks surrounding hostage taking, drawing conclusions about their 
relevance for INGOs.  
 CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY – This chapter describes 
and explains the research methods utilised in the study. These consist of 
the approach, methodology, plan, and data collection technique employed, 
bringing together into a coherent whole the procedures followed in the 
research project.  
 CHAPTER 5: PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS – This chapter explains 
the findings of the study, providing an extensive analysis of the responses 
of each of the participants in the study for comparison and discussion.  
 CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY OF STUDY, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS – This chapter provides a brief overview of the 
study, with a summary and discussion of the pertinence of the findings for 
hostage management for INGOs. The importance of the research is 
explained, and recommendations for future research studies in the field of 
hostage management are provided.  
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CHAPTER 2: INGO OPERATIONS AND SECURITY MECHANISMS 
2.1 Introduction 
The literature review will explore works that are relevant to understanding the 
development of, and the interpretation of, the findings of this study. The scope 
of this study, hostage management for INGOs, spans several disciplines and sub-
topics. For this reason, the researcher found it necessary to divide the review 
into two chapters, each focusing on a specific topic. This chapter will introduce 
the operating environment, regions in which active INGO operations are in 
progress, and the relevant to NGO security mechanisms put in place to operate 
there. 
The review will survey the literature and previous studies in order to analyse, 
synthesise and evaluate knowledge on each of these specific topics. This process 
was designed to increase the knowledge of the researcher, provide background 
and context for this study, and offer perspective for the research. As such, 
materials on existing conceptual frameworks, theories, techniques, processes, 
styles and instruments related to the topic under research will be reviewed, 
allowing the researcher to identify the literature that makes important theoretical 
contributions to the field. A large quantity of documents have also been 
reviewed, and a list of these can be found in Appendix 2. 
The literature review for this chapter accounts for accredited scholars’ and 
researchers’ publications on the NGO operating environment; it aims to enhance 
knowledge and understanding of researchers’ perspectives on the topic by 
offering a historical perspective of NGOs, discussing the current situation as it 
relates to security, and summarizing the strengths and weaknesses of the 
arguments presented. In order to promote understanding of the security 
mechanisms used by INGOs to manage the security of their staff, assets, and 
programmes, the researcher will present the literature available on NGO security 
and, for comparison, the security of other international organisations.  
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Particular attention will be paid to traditional security approaches, such as the 
acceptance model, and whether they are still relevant approaches to security 
management. The researcher will also survey literature on risk management, as 
this appears to be an increasingly common approach taken by NGOs. Finally, the 
review will examine potential challenges to effective security management and 
security coordination. 
Before starting the review, the researcher will lay out the theoretical framework 
that guides this study. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
Darlington and Scott (2002, p. 46) states that to propose theory design, the 
researcher must have a thorough understanding of the theory. This study is 
within the field of conflict management, and managing a hostage crisis can be 
described as conflict resolution in a crisis situation (Vecchi et al., 2005, p. 533-
539). Wilmot and Hocher (2007, p. 117) defined conflict as ‘the perceived 
blocking of important goals, needs, or interests of one person or group by 
another person or group’. These definitions of conflict are certainly most 
relevant for hostage cases as well. A hostage situation is certainly a crisis, and a 
crisis is the result of a conflict gone wrong. It is therefore clear that a hostage 
crisis falls under a conflict resolution framework. 
Further in conflict theory we find that a crisis is a situation that an individual 
perceives as presenting impossible hindrances to achieving their desired goals 
(Carkhuff and Berenson, 1977). Further, the individual may have the feeling that 
the hindrances or obstacles are too great to be controlled through normal 
problem-solving methods (James and Gilliland, 2001).  
A number of factors influence whether a situation is perceived as a crisis, 
including experience in crisis management, coping mechanisms, and public 
perceptions. Rosenbluh (2001, p.35) found that the reaction to conflict can either 
be constructive or destructive. In a hostage case, the behaviour is always 
destructive in the early stages. 
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2.2.1 Conflict at macro and micro levels 
Modern conflict theory has gained increasing importance in theoretical studies, 
and the concepts, models and theories are diverse and found across all the social 
science disciplines.  Conflicts differ in their scale and significance and can 
range from a simple angry verbal exchange between individuals to the violent 
ethnic clashes witnessed worldwide.  An important distinction can be made 
between focusing on the macro conflicts, such as wars and revolutions, and the 
micro conflicts, such as conflicts within smaller groups and between individuals 
(Snodgrass, 2005, p. 14). 
 Macro conflict involves not just two but multiple groups or organisations. 
Thus, it  generally occurs in the societal level and focuses more on the 
interrelationships of the social processes, the social structures and their 
inter relationships. Often several micro level conflicts could lead to 
macro level conflicts.  
 Micro conflict is on a much simpler level. It mainly focuses on the 
behaviour of individuals or groups. In other words it is the study of small 
scale structures and processes in the society. This study is positioned in a 
very narrow scope within the field of conflict resolution, and is at a micro 
level, exploring conflict between smaller groups; the INGO and the 
hostage takers.  
The study is based on three theoretical areas; crisis management, conflict 
resolution, and negotiation theory. These three areas will be explored further 
below: 
2.2.2 Crisis management frameworks 
Crisis management scholars tend to approach crisis management from a single 
discipline, and only a minority approach it from a multi-discipline perspective. 
Crisis management, including hostage management, intersects with several 
conflict management and resolution disciplines, such as psychology, 
communications, public policy, reputation (image) management, risk 
management, public relations, strategic management, ethical issues, 
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international relations, relationship management, mass media management, and 
stakeholder management.   
This study visualizing hostage crisis management through the lens of a 
particular viewpoint, and the study builds upon the work of several crisis 
management scholars. Pearson and Claire (1998), arguably the most cited 
scholars in crises management literature, strongly support the multi-discipline 
approach but recognise that ‘it could lead to a chaotic approach with several 
different disciplinary voices talking in different languages to different issues 
and audiences’.  This multitude of topics and issues is most certainly the case 
with hostage management, so the researcher has followed the approach of 
scholars like Shrivastava (1993, p. 23-25) that analyse from a single disciplinary 
setting.    
There are several types of crisis management frameworks that have been 
explored as part of this study. The earliest models defined a crisis according to 
types.  Marcus and Goodman (1991) identified three types of crises in their 
research: accidents, product safety and health incidents, and scandals. Pearson 
and Mitroffs’ (1993) framework identified altogether seven crisis families:  
financial or economic attacks, occupational health diseases, environmental 
accidents, terrorism, damage to reputation, IT attacks, and defects such as 
recalls, product defects, and computer breakdowns. Myers (1993) likewise 
offered a framework of crises consisting of natural disasters, environmental 
events (aircraft accidents, contamination events, explosions), and incited 
incidents (arson, sabotage, vandalism). Coombs (2007) offered the most recent 
framework and classified crises as follows:  
 Attacks on organisations: This can be hacking, negative rumours, 
product tampering, workplace violence, and terrorism. All of these are 
attacks that originate from outside the organisation.  
 When things go wrong: These are situations such as when products have 
to be recalled, key staff leaving the organisation, accidents, and logistical 
challenges. 
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 When the organisation misbehaves: This is the organisation failing to 
address known potential problems, such as not mitigating known risks, 
sub-standard job performance, system failures that leads to accidents, and 
regulatory violations.  
This study follows the framework of Coombs, where hostage taking is 
categorised as an attack on the organisation from the outside. However, the most 
useful framework for this study in terms of crisis management is an approach 
that accounts for the various stages of a crisis.  Modern frameworks began to 
emerge in the 1990s and generally followed a staged approach to analysing the 
crisis. Smith (1990) developed a three-stage approach; a pre-crisis, crisis, and 
post-crisis format. For this study, this will be preparedness in terms of policy 
and practices, how to respond to a crisis, and how to provide post-release 
assistance to former hostages.  
2.2.3 Conflict resolution framework 
Perhaps the most extreme form of conflict resolution an INGO may be involved 
in is managing a hostage crisis.  As governments tend to not provide 
concessions, it is often left to the INGO to negotiate a solution. M. K. Kozan 
(1997) describes three conflict management models – harmony, confrontational, 
and regulative ones which are practiced in societies of different cultural 
background. Hostage negotiation fits well within Kozan’s confrontational 
model. This model is based on conflict conceptualization by dividing it into sub 
issues. Kozan believes that ‘a sense of reasonable compromise aids resolution 
despite a confrontational style’ (1997, p. 338). A confrontational conflict 
solving model means governing conflicts by norms of mutual concessions and 
compromises, and an increased role of preventive instruments of dispute 
resolution; better communication, and stronger norms of collaboration.  
Two features of conflict theory are directly relevant to hostage management. 
The first is that conflict involves a level of incompatibilities. Geist (1995, p. 46) 
defines conflict as ‘disagreements, differences of opinions, divergent 
interpretations, struggles for control, and multiple perspectives’. This is most 
certainly the case in a hostage crisis.  The second feature is the involvement of 
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interference from another party. Folger, Poole and Stutman (2009, p. 7) see 
conflict as ‘the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible 
goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals’. It is the 
combination of these two factors, incompatibilit ies and interference, which 
produce a conflict situation that in turn produces a cognitive appraisal of the 
perceived threat and an affective reaction. To resolve the conflict, the process 
must ‘revolve around the perception of threat and the emotional realities’ 
(Hammer and Rogan, 1997, p. 10-12). 
INGO hostage cases are almost entirely well planned abductions, indicating an 
instrumental focus. In other words, it is a rational action with the aim of 
delivering substantive demands. In a crime-gone-wrong, family dispute, or a 
siege, the hostage case is often dominated by expressive behaviour, which is 
often about venting emotional opinions, and with no clear goal. Figure 2.1 
further illustrates this behavioural continuum. 
 
Figure 2.1: The behavioural continuum model 
Source: Hammer and Rogan (1997). 
However, even instrumental cases will have a high level of emotions, especially 
during the chaos of the early stages of the incident (Romano, 2002). This means 
that both hostages and hostage takers can experience a crisis which needs 
suitable measures to manage the situation.  
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2.2.4 Negotiation framework 
A hostage crisis is organised around a set of interlinked paradoxes, all of which 
have to be resolved for the hostage crisis to end. To better understand the 
paradoxes in crisis bargaining, they will now be described in greater detail. 
Competitive paradox 
The first paradox to be resolved, and in essence the underlying paradox 
especially in political abductions, is the competitive paradox (Donohue and 
Hoobler, 2002, p. 149). The competitive paradox is a product of ‘high 
interdependence and low affiliation’ (Bercovitch et al., 2008, p. 440). The 
paradox is that to achieve their goal, the parties must increase their 
interdependence by init iating dialogue, while at the same time ensuring distance 
by being threatening. In other words the hostage takers need the INGO to 
achieve its objectives, but will often threaten to take the life of the hostage to 
achieve this. This is a complex stage of negotiation, and where communication 
could break down with inexperienced hostage incident managers, as both parties 
attempt to assert their rights and achieve their goals. The only way, however, to 
reach agreement is through increasing expressions of trust and affiliation, and 
reduce interdependence. Research exploring the linguistic style of hostage 
negotiation found that for a crisis to be resolved peacefully, the hostage takers 
and hostage negotiators had to be synchronous (Taylor, 2008, p. 265-266); there 
has to be cooperation. 
Paradox of dispossession 
The next paradox is that of dispossession, or the less one has the less one has to 
lose. The paradox is that the hostage taker is simultaneously powerful and 
powerless. The hostage taker is powerful through the value put on the hostage’s 
life, but powerless in the sense that hostage taking can be seen as an act of 
desperation; the hostage takers are so powerless that they have to resort to 
taking hostages. 
If the hostage taker feels there is nothing to lose, then the negotiator loses all 
potential leverage. The only way for the negotiator to regain leverage is to 
identify something the hostage taker values, and the negotiators can control the 
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balance the power. Only when both parties value something can they negotiate 
in good faith. 
Paradox of detachment 
This paradox holds that the parties are both detached and attached at the same 
time. They are attached in the sense that they are forced together to solve a 
difficult situation, but detached in the sense that they have their own objectives 
and at times may have to act indifferent to the outcome. 
Paradox of face 
Scollon and Scollon (2001, p. 48) address the paradox of face. This is a major 
issue in hostage negotiations, and several models of negotiations specifically list 
saving face as a key component. The paradox lays in the fact that if either party 
shows too much involvement, they are likely to feel the interdependency 
threatened. However, with a lack of involvement, the party will often feel their 
counterpart has managed to restrict their involvement.  Scollon and Scollon 
therefore state that ‘there is no faceless communication; any communication is a 
risk to face’ (2001, p. 49). Another side of the paradox of face is that the more 
ruthless your reputation, the more ruthless you will have to be. This is seen in 
cases where a group of hostage takers has previously killed a hostage. In these 
cases, serious threats are not often needed; the hostage takers have the attention 
of the negotiators. 
Paradox of irrationality 
This paradox is complicated in a hostage case. Machiavelli once said that 
‘anyone compelled to choose will find greater security in being feared than 
loved’ (Barnett, 2004 p. 695). To be irrational, or at least to appear irrational, 
enlarges the seriousness of the threat. The threat to kill an innocent hostage can 
appear so irrational that only an insane person could do it. In essence, the more 
delirious the person making the threat, the more serious the threat; the more 
delirious the victim, the less serious the threat. However, once the hostage taker 
has convinced the negotiation team that he is irrational, the need to appear so 
disappears. 
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2.2.5 Emotions and hostage crisis 
A crisis situation is often very emotionally laden, and a hostage situation is no 
different, involving ’subjects that are motivated primarily by emotional needs 
and exhibit mainly expressive behaviour’ (Noesner and Webster, 1997, p. 13).  
In a hostage crisis, both the hostage takers and the hostage negotiators 
experience a heightened level of emotions and stress, and one could argue that 
hostage negotiation is ‘an entirely emotion-laden event that is created through 
the interaction of the parties involved’ (Rogan, 1997, p. 25). In short, conflict 
dynamics coupled with a hostage crisis creates a pattern of contentious 
behaviour of high emotions mixed with face issues (Rogan, 1997, p. 26). 
Scholars agree that emotions, especially deep-seated emotions, are more of an 
obstacle to resolution and reconciliation than material interests and traditional 
frameworks of negotiation (Maiese, 2006; in Snodgrass, 2012, p. 1). 
Much of a hostage negotiator’s success depends on their ability to explore and 
understand what emotional influences the hostage takers have. Because of this, 
emotions is a key element that can determine how the negotiation will end. The 
most important point in negotiating for the life of a hostage is to decrease 
emotions to a degree that allows rapport to be established and through that 
increase the rationale of the hostage takers. Reducing emotions makes 
communication easier, develop legitimacy of the negotiator, and can help in 
establishing a positive relationships. It is unlikely that significant progress can 
be made when emotions are elevated on both sides of the negotiation.  
Traditional instrumental bargaining and problem solving approaches may not 
work in hostage cases, and this study explores existing models for hostage 
negotiation, especially with emphasis on emotion and face issues. In one study 
of 137 hostage cases, the hostage takers made no demand at all in twenty-five 
per cent of the cases (Head, 1990, p. 50). In these cases, negotiation models 
such as the principled negotiation model developed by Fisher and Ury (1981) are 
inefficient. The basic strategy of this model is that you can separate the people 
from the problem and in this way get parties to focus on issues, negotiate 
interests and collaborate to achieve a ‘win-win’ outcome all the while managing 
the ‘people problems’. The approach is underscored by the rationalist or rational 
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choice model of costs and benefits which assumes that humans makes rational, 
conscious decisions and can employ logical, problem solving strategies to 
address all problems (Snodgrass, 2012, p. 1).  However, when dealing with a 
hostage crisis, the people are most often the problem, and can therefore not be 
separated from the issues. As seen above, a hostage case is full of paradoxes, 
and managing emotions becomes a key to resolving the crisis. 
Snodgrass states that ‘social conflict does not exist without emotion because to 
be involved in conflict, especially destructive conflict, is to be emotionally 
charged, and emotionally driven’ (2012, p. 2). She continues to list four reasons 
emotion and conflict are linked, and the researcher will explore how these are 
also relevant for hostage cases. 
 Triggering events elicit emotions: Hostage taking will release a high 
level of emotions. The hostage takers will experience a level of power; 
they control life and death of another human. The INGO will experience 
anger and sadness, and the hostage a level of despair and fear. In the 
initial contacts between hostage takers and the INGO, the levels of 
emotional intensity can lead to escalation if not managed. 
 Emotional experience frames the conflict: Certainly, the hostage takers, 
especially in political or terror driven cases, will use the hostage to right 
a perceived wrong. The INGO, on the other hand, will likely feel moral 
superiority, as they are in place to deliver assistance to a population or 
state. Both parties will likely feel they hold the ‘moral high ground’, and 
insist their demand be met.  
 The emotional-relational component: A hostage case has a strong 
emotional-relational component through the contacts between the hostage 
takers and INGO crisis managers. As seen in the paradox of 
dispossession, the hostage taker is simultaneously powerful and 
powerless, and emotional communication conveys this. Key relational 
elements of status and power are elicited where disputants sense their 
power vis-á-vis the ‘other’ (Bodtker and Jameson, 2001: in Snodgrass, 
2012, p. 1).  
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 A sense of identity:  Emotional experience requires a sense of self which 
relates to the core concept of identity for both individuals and groups. 
This is linked to the issue of ‘face’. ‘Face’, is the self-image of the 
hostage taker, and to resolve the crisis the negotiator must attempt to 
identify and address the face needs of the hostage takers. This may lead to 
recognition that face has been respected, and a subsequent de-escalation 
of the situation. 
Similarly, Moisie (2009) lists three primary emotions core to confidence in what 
he describes as clash of emotions; fear, hope, and humiliation. Fear is the 
absence of confidence, hope is an expression of confidence, and humiliation is 
the injured confidence of those who have lost faith in the future. All of these 
emotions must be recognized and managed in a hostage crisis. It is therefore not 
surprising that emotions have been increasingly recognized in hostage crisis, and 
this is reflected in the negotiation models through time. The earliest models 
were based on the principled negotiation model developed by Fisher and Ury 
(1981), where emotions do not play a substantial role. The later hostage 
negotiation models have emotions and especially ‘face’ as the core of reaching a 
positive solution to the crisis. 
2.2.6 The history of hostage negotiation 
It is important to stress that while some level of negotiation is involved in most 
hostage cases, it remains but one of the options in a hostage scenario. Other 
options include payment without negotiation, ignoring the demands, and a 
‘tactical option’: a rescue attempt.  
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the vast majority of the 
literature in this area is focused on identifying negotiation strategies or the 
various psychological orientations of those involved. This segment will examine 
the background of hostage negotiation and the various models that have either 
influenced negotiation tactics or have constituted the framework for the 
negotiation tactics in use. 
It was an unusual love story that gave birth to the New York 
Police Department’s (NYPD) hostage negotiation team, the first 
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formal hostage negotiation unit in the world. Would-be robber 
John Wojtowicz wanted cash to cover his boyfriend’s sex-change 
surgery when he burst into a Brooklyn bank on 22 August 1972. 
He ended up holding the bank employees hostage, but the police 
noticed that ‘he was not ready to die [...] he was looking for a way 
out’ (Kemp, 2012).  
Harvey Schlossberg, at the time a recent graduate with a Ph.D. in psychology, 
noted the officers’ techniques in brokering a deal to protect the bank workers 
and became convinced that there was a way to talk a person out of a hostage 
situation, eliminating the need for tactical force and saving lives. The NYPD 
was interested is Schlossberg’s proposal, influenced by a disaster that had 
occurred a year earlier when the Attica prison riots left 34 dead. Two weeks 
later, the world would stop to watch the horrifying events unfold in Munich, 
(West) Germany, where Israeli Olympic team members were taken hostage and 
later killed. This spurred the formal development of a set of guidelines for 
dealing with hostage negotiations. Schlossberg established a working 
relationship with Lt. Frank Bolz in order to identify an approach to conversing 
with people threatening to harm themselves or others (Kemp, 2012). 
The massacre at the Munich Olympics in 1972 had a profound impact on the 
world and on future police operations against terrorists. The failed, poorly 
coordinated rescue attempt by the German security forces was the impetus for 
many countries to establish elite units to handle such situations, which were 
recognised as beyond the reasonable expectation of skills of an ordinary police 
officer or soldier. German police sharpshooters opened fire and the terrorists 
threw hand grenades into the helicopter holding the Israelis. Eleven Israeli 
athletes, one police officer, and five terrorists were killed. 
The German police were subjected to stark criticism of the failed rescue attempt 
(Simonsen and Spindlove, 2009, p. 184-185; Purpura, 2006, p. 60). It was also 
noted that the police did not have sufficient options in terms of negotiating. 
Upon the hostage takers’ rejection of the offer from the German police, the 
police had no alternate ‘plan b’. The need for a technique or strategy in 
managing crisis scenarios in an organised manner to save the lives of the 
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hostages was clearly exposed and emphasised by this incident. The NYPD 
hostage negotiation approach developed by Schlossberg was implemented by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation by 1974. Once the methodology had been 
established, the FBI expanded it and conducted hostage negotiation training for 
FBI Special Agents. Both state and regional police officials were subsequently 
trained in the same way (Strentz, 2012, p. 3). 
Soskis and Van Zandt (1986, p. 423-435) illustrated that the necessity of useful 
crisis management methods in terms of hostage scenarios had been realised by 
global law enforcement organisations after observing the Munich hostage 
incident. As a result, law enforcement started to explore novel methods to 
manage hostage crises. Lanceley (2010), and McMains and Mullins (2001) 
explained that global law enforcement agencies began to introduce various 
approaches on hostage negotiation for the purpose of hostage management.  
Johnson (1978, p. 797-803) points out that it is clearly not in the best interest of 
those who have been taken as hostages to have someone negotiating for them on 
the basis of manipulation. Rather than trying to manipulate, negotiators should 
handle incidents from the point of view of management. Negotiators must 
recognise that they are working with unique individuals and with joint sets of 
goals, and that while people generally do not mind being managed, they 
definitely resent being manipulated. 
This awareness has formed a basis for the negotiation approach, and the 
methodology has continued to develop. McMains and Mullins (2010, p. 5) 
posited that hostage negotiation has reached its current level due to the analyses 
and studies that have been conducted over the past thirty years by various 
knowledgeable negotiators, psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, and clinical 
social workers.  
2.2.7 Generic components of hostage negotiations 
While it is recognised that each case is different, crisis intervention and 
negotiation follow a fairly systematic pattern. Many negotiations are carried out 
with at least one side of the negotiation in what can be described as a state of 
crisis, which means that normal thinking and functions are disrupted. Decisions 
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and activities that would appear easy to carry out under normal circumstances, 
can in a crisis be much more difficult due to emotional or affective level. 
Consequently, establishing an environment where a person can cope through is 
perhaps the most important element of a crisis intervention (Roberts, 2005, p. 
66). To reach this environment, the negotiators must establish rapport with the 
hostage taker. This is often achieved by delaying issues, referred to as buying 
time, and obtain information to gain the best possible negotiation strategies and 
tactics (Romano and McMann, 1997, p. 1-3). Each of these elements are briefly 
discussed below: 
 Establishing communication and developing rapport: In negotiation, a 
skill called active listening is essential. The reason for active listening is 
to be able to reflect the hostage taker’s emotions, and therefore be seen as 
being understanding. If this can be achieved, rapport becomes solid, and 
the hostage taker can be influenced towards a positive outcome of the 
crisis. 
 Buying time: Time is very important for the negotiator (Romano, 2002, 
p. 12). Time has an impact on all involved, and will normally reduce the 
high emotions often seen in the earliest stages of a hostage case. 
Negotiators refer to buying time as verbal containment, with the objective 
of engaging the hostage taker in discussions.  
 Defusing intense emotions: Discussions between negotiator and hostage 
taker takes place on two separate levels. The obvious one is the verbal 
level, or the words spoken. The second level is the emotions behind the 
words. How the hostage taker feels is influencing his behaviour, so 
actively listening for emotions is very important. 
 Gathering intelligence: In a crisis situation information is always 
insufficient. The crisis manager will seek information on the chances of 
the hostage being harmed, medical condition, and as much information 
about the hostage takers as possible.  
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2.2.8 Conflict mapping 
One way to describe relationships in conflict is to use a method called conflict 
mapping. This is a technique used to describe a conflict graphically, placing the 
parties in a conflict in relation to each other as well as to the problem (Fisher, et 
al., 2007, p. 22). Conflict mapping can form a useful tool during a hostage 
crisis, especially in hostage cases that are protracted, in some cases lasting for 
more than a year. As actors come and go and dynamics change, conflict maps act 
as a ‘framework that expand our thinking about conflict, challenge our 
assumptions and … [they] are readily and practically usable’ (Snodgrass, 2005, 
p. 14).  The map becomes a visual guide that allows alternative approaches to be 
tested as ‘we can more easily see to what extent conflict is caused by the 
structure i.e. organization setting and resources and to what extent it is caused 
by the individuals i.e. values, communication and conflict handling styles’ 
(Snodgrass, 2006).  
Mapping in the 2008 Somalia hostage case 
The figure below (Figure 2.2) shows the lines and flow of relationships which 
were in existence during the hostage taking of a United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) staff in Somalia in 2008, a case which the 
researcher was actively involved in.  
The figure shows the parties to the conflict, the sources of conflict, and the 
dynamics of the relationships. The hostage was originally abducted to be 
executed, but the hostage takers instead decided to ask for ransom. The fact that 
the hostage takers were willing to kill from the start made it a very delicate 
negotiation process. Both before and during the period of captivity other UN 
staff were executed by Al Shabaab, again emphasizing the criticality of the case. 
Parties 
The main parties indicated on the map are the hostage takers, the hostage taker 
negotiator (Zubair), UN hostage negotiators, the family of the hostage, the 
family liaison, Al-Shabaab, the Islamic Court Union, and UN headquarters. All 
of these parties are depicted on the map by different size circles and colours, 
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reflecting their relative significance (power) and by connectors which indicate 
the nature of these relationships.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Conflict mapping of Somalia hostage case 
Source: Lauvik (2008). 
 
Relationship Dynamics  
The hostage takers had a professional negotiator on their end who called himself 
Zubair. It became clear that Zubair was working for the hostage takers, and not 
with them. There was obvious tension between the negotiation cell and Zubair, 
as Zubair needed ransom to be paid. 
29 
The hostage takers were Al-Shabaab, but this was not an ‘official’ Al-Shabaab 
abduction. There was clearly a significant influence from Al-Shabaab towards 
the hostage takers however, as the negotiation cell had intermittent contact 
(through intermediaries) with Al-Shabaab leaders which were aware of the case 
but not willing to assist in securing a release. 
The negotiation cell had a strained relationship with the spouse of the hostage. 
Naturally, the spouse wanted the hostage released immediately. The negotiation 
cell had a family liaison, a psychologist, working with the spouse, and they had 
a very good relationship between themselves. Hence, the negotiation cell used 
the family liaison as the intermediary with the spouse, and the specialist 
function proved invaluable in this case. 
The spouse of the hostage also had very good contact with the clan elders of the 
Sheikhal clan; that of both the hostage and the spouse. The clan elders again had 
access to elements in Al-Shabaab, so this was an avenue to influence decisions 
of the hostage takers. Likewise, the negotiation cell engaged religious leaders in 
the Somali community to declare hostage taking as a negative, and asking for 
the release of the hostage. 
The negotiation team naturally enjoyed good relationships with the UN 
headquarters in New York, as well as UNHCR headquarters in Geneva, and 
through these large networks could reach out to the Somali diaspora, which 
again could exert influence over the process. 
In the end, the largest influencer was that of the Islamic Court Union, of which 
the negotiation cell had managed to get access to the top leadership. These 
leaders intervened and demanded the release of the hostage, which subsequently 
happened after 67 days in captivity. 
Using mapping in this case was useful, as it clearly laid out relationships, and 
prompted the negotiation cell to explore alternative approaches. New influencers 
could be sought, and equally important, it highlighted avenues that should not be 
approached as it could increase risk to the hostage. 
30 
2.2.9 Negotiation strategies  
Various strategies can be used to reach the objective. Should the INGO 
concerned have some a policy that allows for negotiations, it should have 
distinguishable negotiable and non-negotiable demands in its policy. It could be 
argued that, to a degree, all demands can be negotiated. However, most 
negotiators will assess demands based on the safety and feasibility of conceding 
to the demands, the consequence if they are not met, and the benefit of meeting 
the demands. 
As stated above, anything can technically be negotiated, but the following 
guidelines are generally seen as the norm by hostage negotiation professionals 
(Miller, 2005, p. 277-281):  
 Negotiable demands: These include food, drinks, cigarettes, and 
environmental controls, such as heat, air conditioning, electricity, 
plumbing, blankets, and so on. 
 Non-negotiable demands: These include illegal drugs, weapons, release 
of friends or relatives in prison, or the exchange of hostages. 
 ‘Grey area’ demands: These may depend on the special circumstances 
and judgment of the negotiating team, and include alcohol, money, media 
access, transportation, or freedom.  
The items listed above are rarely relevant in a prolonged INGO hostage case, so 
an INGO should establish its own parameters.  
A strong feature of any hostage negotiation is a struggle for control between the 
hostage takers and the negotiator. Both sides will try to use their positions to 
gain an advantage. This typically means that the hostage taker will threaten the 
life of the hostage, often using very threatening language, such as ‘time is 
running out for this hostage’. The use of threats is an indication that hostage 
takers with material goals, take hostages to use as leverage (Borowsky, 2011, p. 
3-6). The researcher has therefore reviewed the most common approaches to 
negotiation.  
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The Principled Negotiation model 
This model is perhaps the earliest model of negotiation to gain broad 
acceptance. The ‘Principled Negotiation’, was developed by Fisher and Ury in 
1981 and expanded upon by Fisher, Ury, and Patton in 1991. The model focuses 
on an ‘interest-based’ approach to resolving a conflict, and promotes four 
fundamental principles:  
 Separate the person from the problem. 
 Focus on mutual interests instead of individual positions. 
 Generate options for mutual gain. 
 Insist on using objective criteria to judge the effectiveness of the 
agreement. 
 
Figure 2.3: Principled Negotiation model 
Source: Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991) 
The principle of separating the person from the problem is based on the fact that 
people tend to become personally and emotionally involved with the problem, 
and therefore see the problem as a personal attack. The next principle rely on the 
32 
premise that good solutions focus on the interests of the negotiating parties, 
rather than their positions. If the focus stays on position, there will always be a 
‘losing side” to the negotiation, but if the focus is on interest, the chances of 
finding a solution that is satisfactory is higher. The third principle aims to 
generate options for the parties, so that both sides of the negotiation can benefit. 
The last principle focuses on setting out objective criteria so progress can be 
measured and an effectiveness of a potential agreement can be evaluated.  
This model provided an early framework for hostage negotiators, but it has some 
limitations in a crisis setting. The primary weakness is that the model assumes 
that both sides to the conflict wants a solution and that the parties are rational. 
The high state of emotions on all sides of the negotiations makes it practically 
impossible to separate the people from the problem, which forms the core 
recommendation of the model. 
The ‘Getting Past No’ model of negotiation 
Ury (1991, p. 147-153) built upon the ‘Getting to yes’ model when he developed 
a five-step model specifically for difficult negotiations, including that of 
hostage negotiation. The first step, ‘Don't react—go to the balcony’, is aiming to 
have the negotiator move from a role as a participant in the process to an 
observer. The aim is to have the negotiator free of any heated emotions, such as 
anger, and this is best achieve by some emotional distance.  
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Figure 2.4: The ‘Getting Past No’ model 
Source: Ury (1991) 
The second step of the model is ‘Stepping to their side’, which is the negotiation 
equivalent of ‘walking in their shoes’. Stepping to their side will allow the 
negotiator to provide the perception of working together to solve the crisis. The 
use of active listening skills, described in more detail later in the chapter, is the 
best tool available to achieve the perception of a joint effort through the use of 
tools such as mirroring, paraphrasing, emotional labelling and summarising. 
‘Change the game’ is the next step and is focused on reframing demands from 
the hostage takers, so to avoid rejecting them, at least at an early stage of 
negotiation. At this step open-ended questions are used to keep the hostage 
takers talking and explaining different options and alternatives.   
The fourth stage of Ury’s model is all about making it easy for the hostage 
takers to agree to the negotiator. At this stage as many ideas as possible are 
generated together with the hostage takers, making them an active contributor 
towards resolving the situation. At this stage options geared towards saving face 
is also introduced to increase the likelihood of a successful resolution of the 
crisis (Mullins, 2002, p. 63-64). 
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The fifth and final stage is ‘Make it hard to say no’. This takes step four forward 
by finding reasons for the hostage taker to say ‘yes’ as in step four, but also 
begin to put reasons in place for why saying ’no’ is difficult.   
This model is an improvement for crisis managers over the ‘Getting to yes’ 
model, but especially step four and five rely on rational parties to the conflict. 
Step five should only be engaged if the parties have established rapport, and 
emotions have normalised.  
The Crisis Bargaining model 
Donohue, Kaufmann, Smith, and Ramesh (1991, p. 133-154) developed a model 
specifically for crisis bargaining. This model focuses on the type of bargaining 
that takes place, and distinguishes between crisis (distributive) and normative 
(integrative) bargaining. The crisis bargaining model incorporates the idea of 
both relationship (expressive) and substantive (material) issues being addressed 
at separate stages in the model.  
This model is perhaps useful in kidnap for ransom cases, as the model start by 
building rapport and discuss matters such as power, trust and status between the 
negotiator and hostage take, and that only when these matters have been 
resolved, and rapport has been established, can more attention be placed on 
substantive issues to resolve the problem. In essence, crisis bargaining is about 
relationships while normative bargaining is more focused on resolving material 
issues. 
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Figure 2.5: The Crisis Bargaining model 
Source: Donohue, Kaufmann, Smith, and Ramesh (1991) 
Donohue et al. (1991, p. 133-154) suggests the hostage negotiator should 
attempt to shift the hostage taker from a predominately expressive stand to a 
more substantive position, but recognise that this may not always be possible. 
The Crisis Bargaining model focuses less on specific techniques and more on 
adapting the style of negotiation to the appropriate needs of the perpetrator. 
The S.A.F.E. model of crisis negotiation 
The S.A.F.E. model (‘Substantive demands’, ‘Attunement’, ‘Face’, and 
‘Emotion’) was developed by Hammer and Rogan (1997, p. 39-53) and quickly 
gained popularity among negotiators. The model was developed after research 
into behavioural science, and mixed with practitioner’s experiences.   
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Figure 2.6: The S.A.F.E. model of crisis negotiation 
Source: Hammer and Rogan (1997). 
The S.A.F.E model is designed to de-escalate and resolve crisis situations by 
using a number of negotiation and communication strategies to influence the 
hostage taker to a positive resolution to the crisis. 
The first element makes reference to ‘Substantive demands’, where the 
instrumental interests of the hostage takers and their needs are identified. The 
S.A.F.E. model indicates that when the subject is in a substantive demands 
frame, the negotiator’s goal is to bargain or problem-solve with the subject to 
achieve a peaceful surrender. The second frame, ‘Attunement’, refers to the 
relational trust which has been established between the subject and the 
negotiator. The S.A.F.E. model states that the negotiator’s goal in this frame is 
to engage in cooperative behaviour to build trust and liking (without 
compromising safety or security concerns). This frame is in other models 
referred to as rapport building. The third frame, ‘Face’, refers to the projected 
self-image of the subject. The model proposes that, in this frame, the negotiator 
attempt to validate the face needs of the subject in order to promote face 
honouring and therefore de-escalate the situation. 
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The final frame, ‘Emotion’, refers to intense, negative emotions that 
compromise an individual’s ability to cope with the stress of a crisis situation. 
The goal of the negotiator in this frame is to help the subject cope with 
emotional distress in a way that permits the negotiator to re-assess the situation 
and then inﬂuence the subject towards a cooperative resolution.  
Rogan and Hammer (1997, p. 39) posit that the S.A.F.E. model offers a 
comprehensive approach for assessing, evaluating and developing effective 
response strategies to subject behaviour in crisis incidents. They propose that 
the model be incorporated into the toolbox utilised by crisis negotiation teams. 
The Behavioural Influence Stairway Model 
One of the most recent models of crisis negotiation is the Behavioural Inﬂuence 
Stairway Model (BISM) developed by Vecchi, Van Hasselt, and Romano (2005). 
This is the model currently favoured by the UN. The BISM is a model of 
behaviour change grounded in the principles of active listening; it was adapted 
from a model developed by the FBI (Vecchi et al., 2005, p. 533-539).  
 
 
Figure 2.7: The Behavioural Influence Stairway Model (BISM) 
Source: Vecchi, Van Hasselt, and Romano (2005). 
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The BISM highlights the importance of the relationship-building process 
undergone between the negotiator and the subject in order to achieve a peaceful 
resolution to the crisis situation (Noesner and Webster, 1997, p. 13-18). This 
relationship has been found to be a key element for the successful resolution of 
both sieges and hostage situations (Vecchi et al., 2005, p. 535-536). The BISM 
shares parallel concepts with models of motivational interviewing, with 
emphasis placed on skills such as empathy, rapport and active listening in order 
to facilitate behaviour change. In line with this, the BISM consists of four 
elements, those of active listening skills, empathy, rapport, and behavioural 
inﬂuence. Progression from through the stages occurs through utilising these 
skills (underpinned by active listening throughout) with the aim of building a 
relationship with the subject in order to facilitate behaviour change. The key 
element of active listening has been shown to facilitate behaviour change and 
crisis resolution (Lanceley, 2004; Noesner and Webster, 1997) and hence 
justifies this underpinning. Research indicates that when this process is 
undertaken effectively the probability of positive behaviour change increases, 
rendering it a building block for the successful resolution of the crisis situation 
(Vecchi et al., 2005). 
The Cylindrical Model of Crisis Communications 
The Cylindrical Model of Crisis Negotiation was devised by PJ Taylor (2002, p. 
7-48), who highlighted the complex nature of negotiation focusing on levels of 
interaction, motivational emphases, and behaviour intensity within negotiations. 
The model was compiled by examining qualitative data from nine resolved cases 
of hostage negotiation with results of analysis via non-metric multi-dimensional 
scaling solution, revealing clear empirical support for the cylindrical nature of 
communication behaviour. The model proposes three general levels of 
interaction behaviour during negotiations; these begin with avoidance, progress 
to distributive, and finally move to integrative. This concept is analogous to the 
crisis vs. normative bargaining conceptualisation proposed by Donohue et al. 
(1991, p. 133-154) and Donohue and Roberto (1996, p. 209-229).  
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Figure 2.8: The Cylindrical Model of Crisis Communications 
Source: PJ Taylor (2002). 
Taylor’s model proposes that the negotiator aim to move the subject through 
these levels progressively in order to direct subjects away from non-active 
participation (avoidant) interaction and towards a degree of cooperation which 
may be based on self-interest (distributive) through to eventual normative and 
cooperative communication (integrative) that will result in reconciliation of the 
parties’ respective divergent interests. The model also proposes the existence of 
three different motivational emphases within negotiation behaviour, classifying 
these as instrumental, relational, and identity themes. The first theme refers to 
behaviour linked to the subject’s instrumental needs, which can be described as 
tangible commodities or wants. The second theme refers to behaviour linked to 
the relationship or affiliation between the negotiator and the subject; the third 
theme refers to the negotiating parties’ concern for self-preservation and ‘face’ 
(Goffman, 1967, p. 36). 
Finally, the model proposes the existence of a third variable within negotiations, 
which Taylor refers to as the intensity of negotiation behaviour. This concept 
relates to the degree to which intense behaviours appear within negotiations; 
research indicates that a speaker’s attitude towards a concept under discussion is 
revealed as deviating more from neutrality with more frequent use of strange 
examples, intensive swearing, and frequent and substantive changes in 
intonation. Similar research has shown that the appearance of such intense 
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behaviours has a detrimental effect on negotiation, increasing the tendency for 
conflict and for negotiation break-down (Lewicki et al., 2010, p. 84). 
The strength of Taylor’s model lies in its conceptualisation of negotiation 
behaviour as inter-related communication components rather than as discrete, 
mutually exclusive categories. As such, the cylindrical model avoids the 
limitations of early, static style-based frameworks for negotiation; it enables 
both researchers and negotiators to consider the changing pattern of 
communication behaviour across the entire negotiation process (Taylor, 2002, p. 
44-48). Taylor’s model provides a detailed micro-level analysis of crisis 
behaviour and provides a detailed and unique insight into the multi-dimensional 
existence of negotiation behaviour. 
Structured Tactical Engagement Process (STEP) model 
The Structured Tactical Engagement Process (STEP) model devised by Kellin 
and McMurtry (2007, p. 29-51) provides a framework for both understanding 
and inﬂuencing a hostage taker’s behaviour in order to reach a peaceful 
resolution by adopting principles from the Transtheoretical Stages of Change 
Model (Prochaska and DiClemente, 1986, p. 3-27). Kellin and McMurty propose 
that a crisis situation has to go through four stages in order to reach successful 
resolution. The stages consist of ‘Precontemplation’ (Step 0), ‘Contemplation’ 
(Step 1), ‘Preparation’ (Step 2) and ‘Action’ (Step 3), with the final stage 
resulting in behavioural change that leads successful and peaceful resolution.  
The authors affirm that a variety of skills and techniques can be utilised in order 
to help guide subjects through these four stages. The initial stage of any 
negotiation is characterised by the ‘Precontemplation’ stage, whereby the 
subject is unwilling to acknowledge that either the situation or his or her 
behaviour needs to change. The subject tends to be uncooperative and unrealistic 
at this point in the negotiation and it is the role of the negotiator to steer the 
subject away from this stage and into the ‘Contemplation’ stage whereby he or 
she can begin to contemplate a change in behaviour or situation. 
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Research has implicated the role of rapport in facilitating behaviour change 
(Miller and Rollnick, 2002, p. 5), and application of this finding to the 
negotiation procedure indicates the benefits of the formation of a connection 
between the subject and the negotiator. As this connection grows, the subject is 
less likely to be defensive and more open to suggestion (Kellin and McMurtry, 
2007, p. 34-36); behaviour change thus becomes more likely.  
 
Once rapport has been established and the subject has moved from Step 0 to 
Step 1 (Precontemplation to Contemplation), the subject is likely to become 
aware that his or her behaviour and the current situation both need to change, 
but he or she is not quite sure how to go about implementing this change. It is, 
therefore, the negotiator’s job at this stage to gently affirm the need for a 
peaceful resolution while increasing the subject’s confidence to move into Step 
2 (Contemplation to Preparation). Once the subject is committed to working 
with the negotiator and his or her confidence has increased, the subject moves to 
the penultimate phase of Step 2. At Step 2, the subject has identified that there 
is a problem and that his or her behaviour needs to change, and the subject 
begins to consider and possibly commit to a resolution. During Step 2, the 
negotiator’s role becomes more proactive and directive with the key role being 
Figure 2.9: The Structured Tactical Engagement Process (STEPS) model 
Source: Kellin and McMurty (2007). 
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problem-solving in order to develop an appropriate exit strategy. The negotiator 
must then try to maintain a degree of motivation and confidence in the subject in 
order for him or her to progress to the final step (Preparation to Action). During 
this final stage, the subject should be carrying out the agreed-upon plan for 
peaceful resolution of the situation. It is vital that the negotiator remain 
supportive and directive throughout the final step, until resolution has been 
achieved. 
2.2.10 Active listening 
Most of the later models above use the term ‘active listening’ as a key concept 
for managing change in the hostage takers. Listening is not a passive approach, 
as research shows that active listening is the most effective tool to influence 
change in behaviour. The idea is that listening actively to someone introduces 
change in attitudes toward themselves and others, as when people are listened to 
sensitively they ‘tend to listen to themselves with more care and to make clear 
exactly what they are feeling and thinking’ (Newman et al., 1987, p. 24). Figure 
2.10 shows a model used in UN communication training explaining active 
listening. 
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Figure 2.10: Degrees of active listening 
Source: UNHCR 
2.3  The INGO Community 
The researcher faced challenges in interpreting previous research with regard to 
determining which data were relevant to INGOs and only INGOs. This stems 
from the fact that the many member organisations of the NGO community refer 
to their staff with different titles, which makes it difficult to define exactly who 
is an aid worker.  Relying on media sources exposes this issue, as media often 
mix a number of terms, such as the terms ‘foreigner’ and ‘aid worker’. In one 
example the headlines about the Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) kidnapping 
case in 2005, where four volunteers within Iraq were abducted, referred to the 
four people as ‘peace workers’, ‘aid workers’, and ‘human rights activists’ (Fast, 
2010, p. 365-389). For the sake of the data presented in this literature review, it 
is assumed that the INGO data correlates with that of the broader category of 
‘aid worker’ and that it is thus representative in describing trends. 
While we can refer to such a thing as the ‘INGO community’, it nevertheless 
represents a group of individual or loosely connected INGOs, with the vast 
majority holding their own security policy and practices. The sheer number of 
INGOs, as well as the diversity of their mandates, roles, and structures, is such 
that few studies have captured data representative of all INGOs. There has been 
only a limited amount of research focused on NGO security in general, and most 
of it addresses primarily the differences between NGO and UN agencies; the 
research thus fails to provide adequate explanations as to the process by which 
aid organisations adopt one security posture or another. However, literature 
directly related to the security management of INGOs has developed gradually 
as violence against these organisations has increased.  
The first major work on this subject was published in 2000 by Koenraad Van 
Brabant in the form of a security manual (Van Brabant, 2000). Since the 
appearance of Van Brabant’s work, most of the literature on humanitarian 
security has been oriented towards practitioners. As a result, it  is generally 
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published in professional journals rather than in academic ones. Exceptions to 
this rule include the works of Larissa Fast (2010, 2011), Adele Harmer, (2006, 
2009, 2011, 2012), Dennis King (2002), Mani Sheik et al. (2000) and Abby 
Stoddard (2006, 2009, 2011, 2012); in various studies, these researchers have 
compiled data about security incidents and provided subsequent analysis.  
The safety of humanitarian workers is inextricably connected to their mandate 
and directly affects workers’ ability to assist the beneficiary population, which 
ranges from displaced populations, children in need of assistance, and students 
to trafficked women and starving populations. This is particularly true in 
complex operations, where security decisions made by INGOs largely shape the 
way they operate and interact with their surroundings.  
Because of their mandate of delivering assistance, humanitarian workers are 
often forced to operate in areas with high vulnerability. The raison d’être of any 
aid organisation is to assist a given beneficiary population, so in some form or 
another, access to beneficiary populations is an essential condition. There can be 
no assistance without at least some direct contact and relation with beneficiary 
populations and individuals. An INGO delivering assistance to refugees cannot 
simply sit in an office removed from its beneficiaries, as its staff are often 
obliged to work in remote areas. While a safe and secure means of operation is 
always sought, security restrictions may hamper the delivery of protection and 
assistance to the people the INGO is seeking to help. By operating in isolated 
areas and/or high-risk environments, an organisation’s staff members, assets, 
and reputation, as well as their donors’ investments, are placed at risk (ECHO, 
2004, p. 46).   
Humanitarian workers increasingly find themselves in the midst of internal 
disputes or in fragile or failed states where they could be targeted in the course 
of their activities. Groups specializing in targeting aid workers operate mainly in 
post conflict countries where the central law enforcement authority can be weak, 
corruption is common, and the social fabric of the nation has unravelled to a 
considerable degree. We may call these groups ‘anomic terrorists’, as they 
attempt to thrive and operate in an environment of lawlessness or anomie with 
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weakened central control (Bjørgo, 2005, p. 23). It is in these same environments 
that many international NGOs operate.  
In addition, aid workers and military forces are increasingly found to be 
operating in the same spaces (ECHO, 2004, p. 7). An increasingly common 
strategy for the military is to try to engage with the local population through 
‘hearts-and-minds’ programmes, in which they trade goods and services as part 
of force protection or counter-terrorism strategies (Fast et al., 2011, p. 24). 
Consequently, local populations may have difficulty differentiating between 
military forces and aid organisations, both of which may be engaged in 
delivering developmental and humanitarian assistance. This can erode the 
perception of neutrality and impartiality of NGO workers, compromising their 
status and hence increasing the likelihood of their being targeted in such areas 
(Bickley, 2010, p. 63). It is therefore not surprising that both published studies 
and anecdotal information reveal that operating in conflict zones leads to 
increased casualty rates of NGO workers as a result of intentional violence 
against them (Rowley et al., 2008). An overview of the complexity of the INGO 
operating environment is offered later in this chapter in the form of detailed 
descriptions of the highest risk countries. 
2.4 NGO Guiding Principles and Codes of Conduct 
Many humanitarian organisations rely on their guiding principles as a key 
element of their overall security posture against threats such as robbery or 
aggressive attacks. These principles can be found in the General Assembly 
Resolution 46/182 as well as in the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. This code of conduct has been 
signed by 515 aid agencies, and states: 
 The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a 
fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all 
citizens of all countries. This right is referred to the as the ‘humanitarian 
imperative'. 
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 Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients 
and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated 
on the basis of need alone; aid is impartial. 
 Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious 
standpoint; the provision of aid is neutral. 
 Signatories shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government 
foreign policy; the provision of aid is independent. 
2.5 NGOs as Actors 
Though NGOs are similar to a degree, the term NGO resists definition to some 
extent; these organisations vary in terms of size, purpose, organisational 
structure, and resources. For instance, a small local NGO named Widernet, 
situated in Iowa, USA, provides a digital library to developing countries in 
Africa. Its motive is to vanquish the digital gap between the developed and 
developing countries even though its staff and volunteers are limited. On the 
other end of the spectrum is World Vision International, which functions like a 
multinational corporation in order to implement its projects in more than 100 
countries throughout the world. It is important to understand and classify the 
differences among NGOs before setting out to analyse them. 
2.6 Definition of NGOs  
The term non-governmental organisation (NGO) entered common parlance in 
1945 after the end of World War II when it was used in the United Nations 
Charter to clearly distinguish between governmental and private organisations. 
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which services 
the 3,735 non-governmental organisations enjoying consultative status with the 
United Nations, defines an NGO as ‘any international organisation which is not 
established by a governmental entity or international agreement’ (Iriye, 2002, p. 
2). According to the World Bank (1992), NGOs are defined as ‘many groups and 
institutions that are entirely or largely independent of government and that have 
primarily humanitarian or cooperative rather than commercial objectives’. 
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Naturally, academic scholars have also endeavoured to define NGOs. Clarke 
(1998, p. 38), defined NGOs as ‘private, non-profit, professional organisations, 
with a distinctive legal character, concerned with public welfare goals’.  
Professor Peter Willetts of the University of London argues that the definition of 
NGOs can be interpreted differently by various organisations and depending on 
situational context. Willetts defines an NGO as ‘an independent voluntary 
association of people acting together on a continuous basis for some common 
purpose other than achieving government office, making money or illegal 
activities’ (Willetts, 2013). He posits that though ‘there are no acceptable 
definitions of NGOs, there are three general characteristics which enable 
exclusion of some organisations from being considered as NGOs’. The first of 
those stipulates that political parties or government agencies should not be 
considered NGOs; NGO-running institutions should not be directly associated 
with any government organisations, nor should NGOs indulge in seeking 
political support from or through their activities. The second characteristic is the 
production of any profit, as NGOs are not profit-making companies. The third 
characteristic is engaging in criminal activity; criminal groups do not belong to 
any government or private companies, and yet they cannot be considered NGOs 
(Willetts, 2013). Additionally, all INGOs participating in this study meet the 
above definitions. 
2.7 Types of NGOs  
Though there are various kinds of NGOs, they can be classified according to 
their organisation, geographical location, and main purpose. According to 
Willetts (2013) ‘NGOs are local, provincial, national, regional, and global 
depending on their areas of project coverage’. The difference between local and 
national NGOs is that the former includes organisations that have community-
based programmes and focus on smaller regions, while the latter covers an entire 
country.  
Since the projects of international NGOs, like regional and global NGOs, cover 
more than one country, they are often referred to as INGOs. It was as recent as 
the 1990s that many INGOs came into existence. Some of them cover more than 
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100 countries in the world. Before the 1990s there were mostly national NGOs, 
as many of them did not operate on an international level. The NGOs’ activities 
and their relations with the government may differ depending on the level of the 
organisation. Since INGOs often get more projects, they generally have more 
resources than local NGOs, including resources for security. They can also work 
directly with the governments from many countries. 
Abby Stoddard argues that ‘[t]here may in fact be no satisfactory way of 
categorizing NGOs according to their philosophy, and there are potentially 
unlimited ways of carving up the community according to which of the 
humanitarian principles and values are emphasised, and in what operational 
context’ (2003, p. 28). However, for the sake of this research, NGOs will be 
categorised by means of their main purpose. NGOs are divided into two 
categories by the World Bank: operational NGOs and advocacy NGOs. 
Operational NGOs design and implement development-related projects. For 
example, Save the Children, which is an operational NGO, is one of the largest 
and oldest NGOs with various development-related projects in more than 120 
countries. The motive of projects such as this one is to improve the socio-
economic conditions in developing countries. NGOs belonging to this category 
deliver services such as health care, educational programmes, and micro-credit 
for the communities (Lewis, 2009, p. 152).  
The defence or promotion of a specific cause or policy is the major objective of 
advocacy NGOs. Generally, NGOs which only focus on advocacy work do not 
engage in any direct field operations. Human rights for example are guaranteed 
under international law, but working to ensure that they are respected and taking 
up the cases of those whose rights have been violated can still be a dangerous 
activity. Human rights NGOs and their staff are often the only force standing 
between ordinary people and the unbridled power of the state. They are vital to 
the development of democratic processes and institutions, ending impunity and 
encouraging the promotion and protection of human rights. Amnesty 
International, which is also an NGO, belongs to this category. Over the past few 
decades, it has attempted to change the pattern of human rights in many 
countries. 
49 
2.8 NGOs’ Goals and Objectives 
Besides the different types of NGOs, their primary focuses may cover diverse 
areas including social development, financial development, reinforcement of 
existing assistance, and political advice or advocacy roles (Ahmed and Potter, 
2006, p. 78). The extraordinary performance of NGOs may also be explicitly 
seen in disaster situations. For instance in January 2010 when an earthquake 
severely damaged Haiti, NGOs were the very first international actors to assist 
the sufferers of this disaster. They delivered a great deal of food, clothing, along 
with other assistance for affected people. Another demonstration of the 
extraordinary performance of NGOs was identified when a tsunami hit mostly 
parts of Asia in December 2004. Aid workers were deployed to India, Indonesia 
and Sri Lanka to deliver food, first-aid, and shelter for victims. The performance 
of NGOs in emergency conditions is regarded by many as the most effective 
method to deliver humanitarian relief (Cerny and Durham, 2005, p. 12).  
NGOs not merely provide one-time relief, but will also take part in enduring 
humanitarian and development projects. Social and economic development 
projects of NGOs tend to be associated with the long-term projects in 
developing countries. To improve social and economic conditions in these 
developing countries, NGOs most often have several significant projects with 
regards to education, public health, social development, community 
development, and water sanitation (Ahmed and Potter, 2006, p. 39). One of the 
better examples of this category of NGOs is Catholic Relief Services. This is 
one of the better and largest US-based NGOs, which offers services including 
emergency response, public policy, education, agriculture, food security, water 
sanitation, health service, HIV and AIDS precautions, and peace-building. Their 
long-term projects may last for more than 20 years.  
Other NGOs are functioning to amend governments or any other political 
groups. Such NGOs are typically advocacy or influencing groups with the aim of 
creating adjustments in the policies of governments. Historically, such groups 
have been confronted with challenges from many countries because of improper 
articulation of the standards of human rights (Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler, 
50 
1998, p 4-7). Gradually, several countries have learned to work together with 
NGOs and respect their initiatives. The goals of human rights NGOs generally 
cover four main domains of human rights activities like advocacy, standard 
setting, monitoring accord with international norms, and enforcement (Smith, 
Pagnucco, and Lopez, 1998, p. 379-412).  
2.9 NGOs’ Organisational Structure and Budget 
NGOs have commonly relied on funding from donor agencies, multilateral 
lenders, charitable institutions, and government ministries for their own 
administration as well as for conducting programmes. Some INGOs have annual 
budgets of several hundred million US dollars, including World Vision ($1.1 
billion USD in 2012) and CARE US ($700 million USD in 2012). Much INGO 
funding originates from governments, and such funding allows NGOs to 
undertake important work in many areas, including health and welfare, 
environmental protection, culture, sport, and recreation. Consistent and 
transparent funding of NGOs helps to ensure services are delivered cost-
effectively through the most suitable providers. It can also help to develop the 
strength and capacity of a community.  
There are numerous of explanations why NGOs tend to be preferred providers of 
aid (Good Practice Funding, 2013): 
• Many NGO services are cost-effective. They frequently have less 
expensive structures and usage of a voluntary workforce.  
• Because NGOs are independent, they are generally better placed to reach 
individuals in marginalised communities. Therefore, they may have a greater 
relationship with a target group compared to a government agency.  
• NGOs are usually not bound by the same restrictions as the public service 
and therefore have the capacity to be a little more flexible and innovative.  
• NGOs might have specialist local knowledge or expertise which is not 
available to government agencies.  
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• NGOs help bring people together in constructive relationships. They work 
directly with communities to accomplish shared goals.  
• The non-profit nature of NGOs ensures funding is targeted to delivering 
effective services.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD) has 
estimated the total development aid for 2010 at over $500 billion (Zumkehr and 
Finucane, 2013, p. 4). While NGOs have no intention to generate income like 
for-profit organisations do, they do generally have the same pattern to that of 
for-profit organisation when it comes to their organisational infrastructure. The 
main distinction between for-profit organisation and NGOs would be the source 
of income. The principal sources of an NGO’s income are typically members, 
private organisations, governments, foundations, and foreign sources. To 
increase funds for NGO activities, NGO leaders often struggle to sustain their 
infrastructures for marketing, fund raising, strategy management, accounting, 
and evaluation systems. Also, while NGOs and for-profit organisations often 
have similar organisational structures, NGOs tend not to produce any tangible 
products, as for-profit organisations generally do. During the last few decades, 
the sheer numbers of NGOs has drastically increased which has subsequently 
increased the competition among NGOs for funding. In accordance with 
Lindenberg (2003, p. 250-253), donors now require higher financial 
accountability and more tangible evidence of programme impact. Furthermore, 
because it is sometimes challenging for smaller NGOs to sustain efficiency, 
larger NGOs have taken benefit from economies of scale in marketing, 
operations, and services.  
Donors naturally wish to see their assistance allocated to operations instead of 
administration. However, spending funds for maintenance and administration is 
unavoidable. Costs might include overhead for a workplace, marketing and 
advertising costs, and salaries for personnel. When an NGO grows, it might 
spend a more substantial proportion of their income on operations.  
Research by Jean S. Renouf (2011, p. 245-257) outlines the main INGOs and 
features a summary of international aid agencies with  key organisational 
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information, such as the year of foundation, whether each INGO has a wide or 
narrow mandate and provides information regarding aspects of operations, 
annual budget, sources of funding, and numbers of staff. The list also indicates 
whether each organisation is a signatory of the Code of Conduct with the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster 
Relief and provides the sources of the information collected. Table 2.1 indicates 
the ten countries in which donors offered the most aid in 2012. 
Table 2.1: Top ten countries for donor aid (2012)  
Country Economic aid ($ billions)  
United States 23.53 
United Kingdom 12.46 
Japan 11.19 
France 10.6 
Germany 10.44 
Netherlands 5.45 
United Arab Emirates 5.2 
Sweden  3.95 
Canada 3.9 
Spain 3.81 
 
Source: MapsofWorld,com 
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2.10 INGO Operating Environments 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees often operates alongside 
INGOs in specific environments. A security training module called 
Accountability and Due Diligence in UNHCR’s Operational Security 
Environment, designed to inform senior managers of the security risk 
management practices of the organisation, opens with the following statement: 
Working for UNHCR in high risk environments is a dangerous 
business. Security concerns are ubiquitous in today’s field 
operations, and investments in staff security can sometimes 
compete directly with the needs of refugees and IDPs for scarce 
available funds. In UNHCR’s world, the higher the security threat, 
the more likely it  is that the organisation will be required to 
operate important humanitarian programmes. The same forces that 
push refugees and IDPs from their homes are often the ones that 
pose threats (or provide cover for others) against humanitarian aid 
workers (UNHCR, 2013, p. 2). 
Trends in security incidents are now studied well enough that the overall 
situation can be perceived. While the reasons behind these trends are harder for 
experts to agree upon, the results are clear: the situation is worsening. 
It has been established that the past several years have seen a rise in the number 
of aid worker casualties. Additionally, civilian aid personnel are now more 
frequent victims of violence than uniformed peacekeeping troops (Stoddard et 
al., 2009). The tactics employed by the perpetrators are becoming more 
sophisticated and increasingly lethal, and it has been determined that the attacks 
are targeting a broader category of aid workers.   
This is perhaps not surprising considering the locations in which INGOs operate. 
In the 10 countries with the highest number of attacks against aid workers 
between 2002 and 2011 (see Figure 2.11), the 16 INGOs participating in this 
research had a 75 per cent overall presence in these countries. None of the ten 
countries had fewer than 8 of the 16 INGOs present. The presence could have 
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been higher, but some agencies had been forced to leave Darfur after the 
government of Sudan denied them permission to operate. 
  
Figure 2.11: Total incidents by country (2002-2011) 
Source: The Aid Worker Security Report for 2012 
Although it can be challenging to generalise different operations, most operating 
environments with high degrees of insecurity share the regular attributes of 
active conflict and large parts of the country beyond the effective control of a 
governmental authority or law enforcement   (Stoddard, et al., 2009, p. 4). 
Additionally, these countries are relatively high on the listing of failed states in 
the period under review. 
Humanitarian space is now more complicated following the end of the Cold 
War; the security environment of humanitarian space has also changed, 
particularly following the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September, 2001. 
This attack resulted in what has been referred to as the ‘War on Terror’. As the 
Humanitarian Policy Group stated in 2003, ‘the war on terrorism constitutes a 
framework within which national and international policy, including 
humanitarian aid policy, will be defined and implemented’ (Stoddard, 2003, p. 
1). The consequences of the 11 September attacks on aid agencies were 
numerous, including an additional politicisation of public funding aid allocation 
to an increasing assimilation of aid agencies in to the broader Western agenda. 
This in turn resulted in the multiplication of actors implementing relief 
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assistance, including private companies and military forces providing 
humanitarian assistance. As outlined by Donini, Fast, Hansen, Harris, Minear, 
Mowjee, and Wilder, 
To confirm that humanitarians need to be wary of politics, even as they do their 
work in highly politicized settings is nothing new. What is new in the post-Cold 
War and post-9/11 eras is that the stakes are much higher because the extent of 
need has proliferated, the awareness of need has become more instantaneous and 
more global, and humanitarian action has become a multi-billion dollar 
enterprise (2008, p. 3). 
Another common explanation of the rise in security incidents is the fact that aid 
agencies are targeted as they are viewed as collaborating with foreign armed 
forces or are considered as part of the UN’s integrated approaches. Stoddard, 
Harmer, and Haver elucidate: 
A theory often cited for the apparent rise - and one that is believed deeply by 
certain aid organisations who have suspended operations as a result - is the 
securitization of aid by western governments in the global counter-terror 
campaign, which has created a political association of aid organisations with this 
Western agenda. Another explanation has militants choosing aid institutions as 
soft targets, for the purpose of sparking conflict or general disorder. Others 
refute the importance of the targeting issue, insisting that the majority of violent 
incidents are crimes of opportunity having nothing whatever to do with politics 
of humanitarian action and everything to do with its material resources (2006, p. 
36). 
This is supported by Benedek, Daase, van Duyne, and Vojin (2010, p. 230), who 
explain that many INGOs are either associated with the UN by funding and 
programme delivery or are perceived as being linked to the UN, and that INGOs 
hence receive threats by proxy. Egeland, Harmer and Stoddard agree, positing 
that:   
Maintaining a credibly neutral image has become difficult due to the dual nature 
of the UN as both a political actor and a humanitarian actor, UN aid agencies 
have more difficulty projecting a neutral image than many other humanitarians. 
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The UN’s political role in many of the most-contested environments has placed 
it squarely in the Western camp, where it  is viewed as a legitimate and 
prominent target (2011, p. 16).  
This problem is unlikely to disappear soon. UNHCR states that ‘a major priority 
for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is to strengthen 
its partnerships with non-governmental organisations (NGO). The agency sees 
such partnerships as the best way to ensure that the basic needs of refugees and 
populations of concern are met’ (UNHCR, 2013).   
In 2008, some 25 per cent of UNHCR’s total expenditures were channelled 
through 636 NGOs, including 162 international agencies and 474 national ones 
(UNHCR, 2009). This means that INGOs are, like the UN, also increasingly 
working in environments of higher risks, and therefore have a higher frequency 
of incidents. As a result of increased attacks on aid workers, humanitarian 
agencies have been forced to take other measures to protect their security 
besides relying on only the principles of humanitarian action. It is now more 
widespread for humanitarian NGOs to consider precautions through the use of 
protection and deterrence tactics (Eckroth, 2010, p. 11-12). While for-profit 
companies may only go to risky areas only when it is necessary, NGOs are in the 
business of working in places where there are serious problems; aid workers are 
therefore operating necessarily in the kidnapping hot-spots around the globe. 
The next chapter will discuss the background and reasons for hostage taking and 
kidnapping of NGO staff globally in detail.  
Staff security in insecure working environments impacts many NGO operations 
(Sheik et al., 2000, p. 321). Studies have shown casualty levels from malicious 
acts among the NGO community to have risen within the last two decades (King, 
2002; Van Brabant, 2001). As stated previously, the change of security for the 
humanitarian community can be traced to the end of the Cold War, when violent 
conflicts increasingly started as civil wars or insurgencies within states instead 
of erupting between nation states as was common throughout the Cold War era 
(Kaldor, 2007, p. 20-29). Subsequently, NGO workers are finding themselves 
doing work in operating environments with diluted accountability and weakened 
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military structures; additionally, operating environments often lack demarcation 
or territorial lines. 
One study stated that around three hundred seventy-five aid workers died during 
active duty between 1985 and 1998; approximately seventy per cent of these 
were victims of intentional violence that involved guns along with other 
weapons, while seventeen per cent of casualties were results of automobile 
accidents (Sheik, 2000, p.321). Unintentional violence made up seven per cent, 
and eight per cent of deaths occurred from disease or natural causes (Dick, 2010, 
p. 4).From the largest study of humanitarian security thus far, data from the 
period 1997-2005 was collected from the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, ten UN aid organisations, domestic chapters of the Red Cross/ Red 
Crescent and forty-six NGOs. The research discovered that nearly one in three 
deaths of aid workers occurred within ninety days of the workers reaching their 
workplaces, and that approximately twenty per cent of all deaths occurred inside 
the first month (Stoddard et al., 2010). This can be a clear indication of the 
importance for humanitarian workers of acquiring a sufficient understanding of 
the operating environment before deploying into it. 
Attacks on humanitarian workers do not constitute a new phenomenon. The first 
killing of a United Nations staff member on duty happened as early as 1948, 
when Commandant René de Labarrière, a French Military Observer in the United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, was killed when the jeep he was 
driving hit a mine. According to a United Nations press release issued that day, 
Labarrière was investigating an alleged violation of the provisions of the Arab-
Israeli truce in the Afoula area of Palestine (United Nations, 1948). Though such 
incidents have always been an unfortunate part of humanitarian work, more 
recent times have witnessed several high-profile events with devastating 
outcomes.  
On 7 August 2010, it  was reported that medical team composed of about 10 aid 
members from a faith-based NGO were killed by Afghan militants. This is 
recorded as the single most serious incident following the 2006 incident when a 
team of 17 aid workers from the NGO Action Against Hunger (ACF) were killed 
at Muttur, Sri Lanka. Globally, around 260 aid workers were murdered, captured 
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or fatally wounded in 2008 alone (Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico, 2009, p. 
9). Figure 2.12 clearly illustrates the rise in numbers of victims: 
 
Figure 2.12: Total attacks and victims – Killing, injuries, and hostage taking 
(2002-2011) 
Source: The Aid Worker Security Report for 2012 
As can be discerned in Figure 2.12, Figure 2.13 illustrates that the attack-to-
victim ratio has remained relatively consistent. This is contrary to most 
perceptions of higher casualty ratios. 
 
Figure 2.13: Attack-to-victim ratio (2002-2011) 
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Source: The Aid Worker Security Report for 2012 
 
Violence against aid workers and workers’ deaths in traffic accidents are 
unfortunately commonplace and it is widely agreed upon that these particular 
incidents constitute a significant threat towards aid workers on a global level. 
Reports compiled from a study conducted from 2006 to 2009 reveal a substantial 
rise in violence against aid workers (Stoddard et al., 2006; 2009). Overall, the 
rate of targeted attacks upon aid workers of all sorts (i.e. NGOs, UN agencies 
and the ICRC) increased from 4 per 10,000 in 1997 to 9 per 10,000 in 2008 
(Childs, 2013, p. 66-69). 
There is little from the literature concerning the specific reason behind each 
method of attack, but Cooley and Ron (2002, p. 7-9) theorize that the growing 
number of international organisations (IOs) and INGOs within a given sector 
increases uncertainty over project or programme future, competition over donor 
funding, and the use of competitive tenders and renewable contracts generates 
incentives to take higher risks. Basically, when there are additional INGO staff 
in the same space, they usually are willing or asked to take a higher level of risk 
by operating in volatile and dangerous environments, to ensure future funding.  
By operating with a higher risk threshold, they typically tend to be more 
vulnerable as targets.  Once this is combined with the findings of Stoddard, 
Harmer, and Hughes in the 2012 Aid Worker Security Report (2012, p. 6-7), the 
some possible explanations emerge. Stoddard et al. found that all of the 
countries with the highest aid worker murder rates experienced active internal 
armed conflict during all or part of the period of time under analysis. There were 
also correlations between aid worker violence and low levels of political 
stability, high ‘state fragility’ scores, institutional weakness of the regime, and 
low degrees of ‘rule of law’. Conversely, there was no correlation between aid 
worker killings and the general homicide rates in host countries. This finding 
implies that violence against international aid operations is not suggestive of the 
general crime environment, but exists as a separate phenomenon that may be 
more connected to a failed or failing state apparatus as well as the dynamics of 
war. Consequently, aid workers might have to operate with little if any 
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extension of state authority to advise or protect them, especially in the more 
physically remote areas requiring humanitarian assistance. 
In the aforementioned Aid Worker Security Report for 2012, Stoddard et al. 
offer a statistical summary of incidents from 2000 to 2011. Even though the 
numbers go up and down from year to year, it is clear that over time there has 
been a consistent increase in both the number of incidents and in the number of 
victims. Table 2.2 is adapted from this report. 
Table 2.2: Major attacks on aid workers – Summary statistics (2000 – 2011) 
 
* Victims survived or not yet determined; those killed while kidnapped 
are counted under ‘killed’ totals. 
Source: The Aid Worker Security Report for 2012 
These reports have resulted in the acceptance that humanitarian work is 
becoming increasingly insecure. Research conducted by Sheik, Gutierrez, 
Bolton, Spiegel, Thieren and Burnham from 1985 to 1998 has established that 
planned and deliberate violence accounts for about 68 per cent of the deaths of 
aid staff whereas traffic accidents are only to blame for 17 per cent of the deaths 
(Sheik et al., 2000, p. 166-168). Consequently, the necessity of security for aid 
groups has gained increasing attention and sparked more debates; many 
organisations making the effort to devise more complete security principles and 
routines in an effort to establish a humanitarian space where aid workers {are 
capable of carrying out} their responsibilities with an acceptable degree of risk.    
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The protection of humanitarian workers has progressed significantly in the past 
decade, however, there is still room for improvement. This is likely to be a 
continuing issue, as hostage takers are consistently moving in parallel to ensure 
increasingly spectacular and devastating attacks against their adversaries 
(Taillon, 2002, p. 58). Attacks against aid workers have gone up significantly 
since 2006, with a particular rise in kidnapping. As security incidents increase in 
numbers, having access to and management of security information becomes all 
the more important. The significance of cooperation in sharing information, 
expertise, and planning, in addition to the necessity for training of staff is 
commonly agreed upon; the chances are greater for it  to occur when a 
community or group share a similar threat perception. As a result of the 
evolution and increasing sophistication of attacks against aid workers, 
humanitarian delegations are becoming better at sharing information. Indeed, 
Christian Aid, in a recent survey reviewing the extent of security collaboration 
involving the UN and NGOs in the field and the implementation of the Saving 
Lives Together (SLT) framework, identified information sharing among the 
highest priorities for coordination amongst all types of NGOs surveyed. From 
the 205 respondents from 72 organisations that participated, 88 per cent of those 
from international NGOs and 61 per cent of those from national NGOs reported 
that their organisations permitted information sharing. It seems that many have 
realised the advantages which closer collaboration provides to their mutual 
security. Significant barriers to information and resource sharing do however 
persist (Micheni, 2009, p. 10), with formal collaboration on security issues 
remaining rare. In instances where mechanisms are available, these are often ad 
hoc and dependent on personalities involved; consequently these are rarely 
sustained (Stoddard et al., 2009). 
Another challenge is that definitions of security incidents can differ between 
countries when it comes to languages and contexts. With the wide range of 
INGOs, there is also a number of reporting mechanisms. No uniform model or 
standard for reporting exists in the INGO community, so an event might or 
might not be regarded as an incident dependent upon where it takes place, its 
intensity, and its type, along with its victim(s) and those who write the 
subsequent security report. In Table 2.2, Stoddard, Harmer, and Hughes record 
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only individuals who survive the kidnap ordeal as ‘kidnapped’, whilst in 2009 
they stated that ‘kidnapping is counted here only if the victim was held for over 
24 hours, and incidents are only recorded if they lead to a death, abduction or 
serious injury’ (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 2). Defining security terms within the 
NGO community is to a degree lacking, and is considered an important area for 
improvement as it is important for a functioning security management approach 
(Sheik et al., 2000). With the assistance of NGO security reports which offer the 
prevailing definitions for security terms (Sheik et al., 2000) and which further 
afford the researcher means of examining and comparing terms and definitions, 
this chapter aims to look at those security terms. 
The next segment of this chapter will attempt to illustrate the parts of the world 
with the highest security risks, using United Nations security levels as of 16 
April 2013. While there are other potential sources for risk mapping, the 
researcher believes that the United Nations with its large humanitarian and 
development programmes, and as a funding and operating partner with many 
NGOs, represents the most accurate risk environment profiling for INGOs.  
2.11 The UN Security Level System  
The UN Security Level System (UNDSS, 2012) draws on a Structured Threat 
Assessment (STA) which offers a standard methodology for selecting and 
inputting numerical values into an automated system which in turn provides a 
Security Level. The aim of the Security Level System is to offer an objective 
account of the security environment of a particular area or location where the 
UN must operate.  It achieves this using a structured analysis of the prevailing 
threat in an area or location, and it is conducted in a way that promotes 
objectivity. This gives the UN, and therefore INGOs, with a consistent threat-
measuring tool which builds system-wide reliability on determining Security 
Levels. 
The Security Level System contains six levels and is designed as a security 
management tool for the global UN System, as it provides security decision 
makers with a snapshot of the existing security environment in a specific 
geographic area or location and could be employed to make comparisons and set 
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priorities (UNDSS). Further, the UN security level system is not a predictive 
tool, but one based upon current and historical information. It describes threats 
across a variety of categories as they appear in a particular geographic area or 
location at the present moment, and it achieves this by considering five families 
of threats, all five which are relevant to INGOs’ operating environments: 
 Armed conflict: Describes organized violence by groups fighting each 
other. The UN, like other non-involved parties, would most likely be 
indirectly affected by this threat. 
 Terrorism: Refers to violence by individuals or groups against civilians 
or other non-combatant targets. The United Nations could be either 
indirectly or directly affected by this threat. 
 Crime: Describes illegal activities undertaken for economic or personal 
gain. It does not have to involve violence. The United Nations could be 
either indirectly or directly affected by this threat. 
 Civil unrest: Refers to organised demonstrations or unauthorised 
disturbances to public order, e.g. rioting and looting. It may or may not 
involve violence. The UN could be directly or indirectly affected by this 
threat. 
 Hazards: Includes natural events, such as earthquakes and extreme 
weather or human-caused incidents such as large-scale industrial 
accidents, which can lead to destruction, injury or death (UNDSS).  
Each general threat category is also evaluated using three characteristics which 
are the key components of all threats: 
 Intent: The intention or disposition of a threat to cause harm. 
 Capacity: The ability of a threat to cause harm. 
 Inhibiting context: The qualities which exist in the environment which 
might act as incentives or deterrents to a threat. These are not mitigating 
measures developed by the UN. 
64 
 
2.12 Operations in High Risk Zones  
The researcher has highlighted in this section only those countries with levels 4, 
5, and 6 (Substantial, High, and Extreme) in the UN Travel Advisory as of 16 
April 2013 (UNDSS, 2013). 
The researcher has aimed to group the countries under review in a logical 
manner and according to similar security environment and threats. This means in 
some cases that countries are grouped without regard to their typical regional 
description. An example of this is Afghanistan, which often is described as West 
or Southwest Asia. From a security environment perspective, it would be unwise 
to separate Afghanistan from Pakistan, which is often described as belonging to 
South Asia.  
2.12.1 South America 
Colombia has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world, and 
political and social unrest continues to plague the country. This has led to a 
large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and in November 2011, the 
number of IDPs in the country stood at more than 3.8 million (UNHCR; 
Map 2.1: High risk environments in South America 
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Colombia, 2013). Assistance for the IDPs and poverty reduction programmes are 
the focus for many of the 18 INGOs working in Colombia (Friends of Colombia, 
2013). 
Small towns and rural areas of Colombia can still be extremely dangerous due to 
the presence of illegal armed groups and narcotics trafficking gangs (US State 
Department; Colombia, 2013). Hostage taking, while reduced, remains a threat 
in Colombia, and most abductions are criminally motivated rather than political. 
The ceasefire announced by the FARC in 2012 as part of the peace process has 
ended at the time of this writing. This may result in an increase in the terrorist 
threat (Australian Government; Colombia, 2013). 
2.12.2 North Caucasus 
Military operations in Georgia have ceased, but tensions remain high in some 
locations. The humanitarian community, including more than 40 INGOs (The 
World Bank; International NGOS, 2013), are assisting over 500,000 refugees 
from Georgia and internally displaced people inside Georgia (UNHCR; Georgia, 
2013). Most travel advisory sites advice against travel to the region, and the 
Australian Government ‘strongly advise[s] you not to travel to the North 
Caucasus’ (Australian Government; Georgia, 2013). 
Map 2.2: High risk environments in North Caucasus 
66 
Algeria is a country of transit for mixed-migration movements towards Europe, 
which has a large population of refugees from Mali and Syria. The majority are 
being hosted by families along the border and are being assisted by the 
Croissant-Rouge Algérien and 20 additional INGOs. Along with the recent 
influx of refugees, Algeria has hosted 165,000 refugees from Western Sahara for 
several years in four camps and one settlement in the south-western province of 
Tindouf (UNHCR; Algeria, 2013). 
Since 2008, over 25 Westerners have been taken hostage in the Sahel, including 
tourists, NGO workers and diplomats of several (primarily European) 
nationalities. The group which has claimed responsibility for these particular 
attacks, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), operates throughout the 
majority of Algeria including its southern area and has also abducted foreigners 
in neighbouring countries. The Australian Foreign Service specifies that 
‘credible information suggests that terrorists are intending to kidnap Westerners 
within these areas’ (Australian Government; Algeria, 2013). 
Mauritania’s security has experienced the conflict in Mali. Resulting from 
Western involvement in counterterrorism efforts, terrorist groups have declared 
their intention to attack Western targets in Mauritania as well as the region, and 
it is likely these groups will attempt retaliatory attacks against Western targets 
of opportunity, including INGOs. Al-Qaida, its affiliated organisations, as well 
as other terrorist organisations have formerly conducted kidnappings of 
Westerners for ransom and suicide bombing attempts in Mauritania (UK Foreign 
Office; Mauritania, 2013). Australia warns its citizens that ‘a stream of credible 
reporting suggests that terrorists may be planning to kidnap Western tourists, 
mine workers, oil workers and aid workers in Mauritania’ and that ‘possible 
targets include clubs, restaurants, embassies and high commissions, international 
schools, international hotels, and expatriate housing compounds’ (Australian 
Government; Mauritania, 2013). A minimum of 12 INGOs are operating in 
Mauritania (UNHCR; Mauritania, 2013).The present situation in Mali does not 
come as a surprise, due to the humanitarian and development challenges the 
country has faced. Mali was in the bottom five countries on the Human 
Development Index for 2009. Islamic groups, including Ansar al-Dine, the 
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Movement for Oneness and Jihad (MUJAO) and Al-Qaeda in the Lands of 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) remain involved in the region, and have declared their 
intention to attack Western targets through the entire Sahel. Hostage taking for 
ransom is Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s primary income source, and at the 
time of this writing around 20 Westerners being held hostage by Islamist 
terrorists in North and West Africa. Victims of kidnappings have included 
tourists, NGO workers and diplomats of a variety of nationalities, primarily 
European. These attacks have sometimes resulted in the murder of hostages. In 
addition to hostage taking, there have also been a number of recent bomb attacks 
in Gao, Kidal and In Khalil. Further attacks are likely in the region (UK Foreign 
Office).Despite the security environment, more than 20 international NGOs 
continue to operate in Mali (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, 2013). 
Having recently emerged from a historic revolution of the Arab Spring, Libya is 
going through a delicate post-conflict transitional period. Continued 
confrontations between armed milit ias, the growth of instability in the eastern 
part of the country, and the escalation of inter-ethnic and tribal conflicts pose 
significant challenges for both the new government and the approximately 15 
Map 2.3: High risk environments in North Africa and Sahel 
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INGOs currently operating in Libya. A series of attacks targeting the 
international community in Benghazi have led organisations to reduce their 
presence in eastern Libya, but the international community continues to assist 
700,000 people of concern (UNHCR; Libya, 2013).  
There is a risk of hostage taking in Libya and foreigners often present valuable 
targets. Such abductions are more likely in sparsely populated border areas. 
While AQIM uses northern Mali as a primary operating base, its members have 
proven themselves capable of travelling long distances to carry out abductions, 
including in neighbouring countries. Criminal gangs have also carried out 
kidnappings for terrorist groups in return for financial reward (UK Foreign 
Office; Libya, 2013). It is in this environment that the humanitarian community, 
including 15 INGOs (UNOCHA, 2013) are assisting over 100,000 refugees and 
IDPs (UNHCR; Libya, 2013). 
While the overall security situation in Egypt does not render it a high-risk 
environment, there are notable exceptions in Egypt’s Governorates of South 
Sinai, including Sharm el Sheikh, and North Sinai. These governorates have a 
heightened risk of hostage takings of foreigners and explosive attacks. 
Interestingly, the Australian Government advises their citizens to take up 
insurance against hostage taking if travelling to the area (Australian 
Government; Egypt, 2013).  
After years of civil war in Sudan, millions of Sudanese still struggle with food 
insecurity and poverty. Many of the more than 80 INGOs (UNOCHA, 2013) 
operating in Sudan are assisting refugees and IDPs, where the population of 
concern includes 2.3 million IDPs, some 140,000 refugees, 7,000 asylum-
seekers, and an estimated hundreds of thousands persons at risk of statelessness 
(UNHCR, Sudan, 2013). 
Aid workers from Western countries have been the targets of hostage taking in 
the Darfur region. Since 2009, there have been several kidnappings of NGO 
employees and peacekeepers in Darfur and the bordering areas of Chad and the 
Central African Republic (US State Department; Sudan, 2013). In addition, the 
UK Foreign Office reports of an increased risk for hostage taking in Khartoum, 
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and statements by terrorist groups have called for a ‘jihad’ in Sudan, specifically 
mentioning Western interests (UK Foreign Office, Sudan, 2013). 
After years of civil war, and after gaining its independence in July 2011, South 
Sudan confronts major political and socio-economic challenges. Millions of 
South Sudanese still struggle with food insecurity and poverty (World Vision; 
South Sudan, 2013). The mass arrival of returnees from Sudan and elsewhere in 
Africa has added to the pressure on the South Sudanese government, and the 
international community now assists over 500,000 IDPs and 100,000 refugees 
(UNHCR; South Sudan, 2013). Security challenges for the more than 50 INGOs 
(Star Tribune, 2013) in South Sudan are many. The border areas, however, pose 
the most serious risks, The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) being active in the 
western regions of South Sudan, especially in the states of Western Equatoria, 
Central Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal (Australian Government; South 
Sudan, 2013).  
2.12.3 Central and Southern Africa 
Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranked 173 out of 
177 nations by the UN Human Development Index. Since Guinea-Bissau gained 
independence from Portugal in 1974, the country has been beleaguered by coups, 
political assassinations, and a civil war. Approximately 15 INGOs operate in the 
country, and two have been active in successfully removing mines, which remain 
Map 2.4:  High risk environments in Central and Southern Africa 
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the highest threat to staff (US State Department; Guinea Bissau, 2013).  
Ivory Coast received USD 19 million in humanitarian aid in 2010 (Global 
Humanitarian Assistance; Ivory Coast, 2013), and although the situation is 
gradually returning to normalcy after the violence that followed the 2010 
presidential elections that divided the country politically, persistent security 
challenges still discourage all citizens who fled abroad from returning. There 
remain close to 50,000 internally displaced persons (UNHCR; Ivory Coast, 
2013) in Ivory Coast; the international community, including more than 30 
INGOs, is assisting them (UNOCHA, 2013). 
The regions of Dix-Huit Montagnes and Moyen-Cavally in western Côte d’Ivoire 
bordering Liberia that remain the highest risk situation for INGOs because of 
inter-communal tensions and the presence of armed militias in those regions. 
There have been cross border attacks in areas bordering Liberia and Ghana since 
June 2012 (Australian Government; Ivory Coast, 2013). 
Nigeria struggles with a high level of poverty, as one in four people do not have 
enough to eat (Oxfam; Nigeria, 2013). There are at least 13 INGOs working in 
Nigeria (Commonwealthofnations.org; International NGO, 2013). As the most 
populous country in West Africa, Nigeria plays a critical role in shaping the 
region’s geopolitical agenda. There is a general threat of crime, but the most 
serious threats are from terrorism and hostage taking. There is also a chance of 
retaliatory attacks following the French intervention in Mali. In 2011 an 
extremist group based in northeast Nigeria known as Boko Haram (The 
Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad) claimed 
responsibility for many attacks, including the bombing of the United Nations 
office in Abuja which killed 21 staff. Boko Haram members have admitted to 
killing and wounding thousands of people during the past three years.  Another 
group that has emerged over the past years is Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis 
Sudan (Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa), or ‘Ansaru’. It 
emerged in 2012 and is motivated by an anti-Nigerian government and anti-
Western agenda. The organisation is broadly aligned with al-Qaida. Groups such 
as Boko Haram and Ansaru are also behind many recent political hostage 
takings. Hostage taking in south-eastern Nigeria is typically financially 
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motivated, unlike the more politically motivated kidnappings in the northeast, 
with the victims being held for ransom (Australian Government; Nigeria, 2013). 
The Central African Republic received USD 56 million in humanitarian aid, and 
a total of $218 million in aid, in 2010. Additionally, the price of multilateral 
peacekeeping operations totalled $256 million (Global Humanitarian Assistance; 
Central African Republic, 2013). The country still bears the marks of many 
years of political and military crises. By mid-2012, approximately 65,500 
individuals were internally displaced and more than 150,000 Central Africans 
had found refuge in neighbouring Chad and Cameroon (UNHCR; Central 
African Republic, 2013).Furthermore, poor infrastructure poses logistical and 
administrative challenges to humanitarian operations, including that of a 
minimum of 13 INGOs (World Food Programme, 2013). Armed rebel groups, 
bandits, and poachers present real dangers, and the Central African government 
is not able to ensure the safety of visitors, including aid workers in the majority 
of the country.  
The security situation within the Central African Republic has also deteriorated 
since December 2012. On 24 March 2013, armed rebels reportedly captured the 
capital city Bangui after taking control of several towns in northern and central 
regions. Incidents of theft and robbery occur regularly and armed gangs are 
well-known to operate in the outlying parts of Bangui (UK Foreign Office; 
Central African Republic, 2013). CAR had the third highest murder rates of aid 
workers during the period 2006-2011 having a total of 85 murders (Stoddard et 
al., 2012, p. 4). The Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army’s (LRA) presence in 
eastern CAR also poses a specific safety and security threat. Foreigners, 
including aid workers, have been targeted by the LRA for kidnappings, violent 
crime, and killings. The security situation is particularly dangerous in border 
areas (Australian Government; Central African Republic, 2013). 
The Democratic Republic of Congo is struggling to recover from a civil war 
from 1996-2003 as well as recent rebel conflicts, that have reduced government 
revenues and national output. As of 2009, the DRC ranked 176 out of 182 
countries on the United Nations’ Human Development Index. To support, the 
international community has provided USD 2 billion in aid, of which $456 
72 
million was humanitarian aid in 2010. The peacekeeping operation in the DRC is 
the largest in the world with nearly 18,000 peacekeepers deployed in the 
country, costing $1.4 billion per year (Global Humanitarian Assistance; 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2013). 
In April 2012, fighting broke out in the province of North Kivu following the 
formation of the M23 rebel movement causing several local NGOs to suspended 
or reduce operations due to the unstable security situation (Australian 
Government; Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2013). However, more than 
100 INGOs continue to operate in the country (UNOCHA, 2013). The 
Democratic Republic of the Congo also had the world’s tenth highest murder 
rates of aid workers during the period 2006-2011, with 15 murders in 28 overall 
security incidents indicating a high level of violence (Stoddard et al., 2013, p. 
4). 
Burundi ranks 178 out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index. As 
outlined by a joint profiling report by the Burundi government, UN agencies and 
NGOs, some 78,900 IDPs in Burundi require sustainable solutions. Muggings at 
gun- and knife-point, bag snatching, pick-pocketing, burglary, car break-ins, and 
armed car hijackings have been reported. In Bujumbura, the UN has specifically 
designated the highway from the port to the southern end of the city as ‘not 
recommended’ due to banditry. There are also sporadic clashes between 
government forces and National Liberation Front (FNL) and other armed groups 
(The UK Foreign Office; Burundi, 2013). There are at least 45 INGOs operating 
in Burundi (UNOCHA, 2013). 
Kenya hosts the largest refugee camp in the world, Dadaab, with around 500,000 
refugees. Recently, the security situation within the Dadaab area is now high-
risk and dangerous with a number of incidents such as the abductions of aid 
workers and fatal attacks on refugee leaders and Kenyan security forces. These 
events have resulted in more restrictive security measures, curtailing 
humanitarian accessibility to the camps. Still, almost 100 INGOs are registered 
to operate in Kenya (Margiti.com; NGOs in Kenya, 2013). Mugging, 
kidnapping, carjacking and armed robbery occur particularly in Nairobi, 
Mombasa and other large cities (UK Foreign Office; Kenya, 2013). The threat of 
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hostage taking is high for aid workers. Armed groups from Somalia have taken 
aid workers hostage along the border with Somalia. On 29 June 2012, four 
foreign aid workers of Norwegian Refugee Council were kidnapped from the 
Dadaab refugee camp near the border with Somalia, and a Kenyan national was 
killed in the attack. The aid workers were later freed in a rescue operation. On 
13 October 2011, two Spanish aid workers were kidnapped from the Dadaab 
refugee camp. In July 2009, three aid workers in Kenya were kidnapped by 
Somali militias and taken into Somalia (Australian Government; Somolia, 2013). 
The motivations for these particular kidnappings are unclear, however the 
perpetrators took all the hostages into regions of Somalia controlled by al-
Shabaab, a terrorist organisation with links to al-Qaeda. 
On 1 October 2011, a French national was kidnapped from a private residence 
on Lamu Island, a popular tourist destination on Kenya’s north coast. She died 
while in captivity in Somalia. On 11 September 2011, a British national wife and 
husband were kidnapped, and the husband murdered, from a coastal resort close 
to the Kenyan-Somali border. On 16 October 2011, Kenya initiated military 
action against al-Shabaab, declaring self-defence. Kenyan troops crossed into 
Somalia using the stated purpose of pursuing al-Shabaab in south-eastern 
Somalia. Al-Shabaab responded to the Kenyan incursion into Somalia by 
threatening retaliation against civilian targets in Kenya, and succeeded on 
September 2013 with the coordinated Westgate Mall attack. 
In Ethiopia, recent droughts and declining natural resources are making poverty 
a common problem. With over 35 per cent of Ethiopians living beneath the 
poverty line, Ethiopia ranked 171 out of 182 countries on the Human 
Development Index in 2009. Additionally, the refugee population in Ethiopia 
has nearly doubled in the last two years, due mainly to the influx of over 
100,000 Somalis in to the Dollo Ado region and to a stream of Sudanese 
refugees entering the country in the region around Assosa. A steady and 
significant number of Eritreans have also entered Ethiopia’s Afar and Tigray 
regions. The total number of refugees hosted by Ethiopia has reached 370,000 
(UNHCR, Ethiopia, 2013). In total, 43 INGOs operate in the country (UNOCHA, 
2013). While Ethiopia is normally stable, domestic insurgent groups, extremists 
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from Somalia, as well as the heavy military presence alongside the border with 
Eritrea pose risks to security and safety. In May 2011, gunmen associated with 
the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) attacked a car from the United 
Nations World Food Programme (WFP), killing the vehicle’s driver, wounding 
one occupant, and kidnapping two other WFP employees. The kidnapped 
employees were later released (US State Department; Ethiopia, 2013). 
Somalia’s many years of civil war and chronic drought have left huge numbers 
of people fighting poverty and hunger. The past few years have been especially 
cruel to Somalia, as 2011 witnessed an unprecedented famine affecting countless 
Somalis, in addition to military interventions by the African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM) in support of governmental forces fighting insurgents, 
which resulted in a stronger support of al-Shabaab, and intensified fighting. The 
conflict between the government and armed groups in 2012 also created political 
and security vacuums which often negatively impacted civilian protection. The 
security environment in Somalia is very challenging, having an alarming degree 
of criminal activity by armed militia throughout Somalia. There have been 
murders, armed robbery and a number of incidents of kidnapping of aid workers. 
Terrorist attacks have occurred against international relief organisations 
including Westerners throughout Somalia, including Puntland and Somaliland. 
Between 2006 and 2011 there were 95 attacks on humanitarian staff, and there 
were 18 such attacks in 2011 alone (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 4).  In every year 
since 2008 we have seen violent kidnappings and assassinations of local and 
foreign staff working for international organisations, including the use of 
suicide bombing against targets.  
2.12.4 Middle East 
Turkey is in the rare situation of being both a donor as well as a recipient of aid, 
and over 20 INGOs are presently operating in Turkey, most of which are 
assisting refugees from Syria. There have been violent attacks throughout 
Turkey in recent times, and there is a continuing threat of terrorist actions and 
violence against Western staff and interests all over the country. Additionally 
there is a threat of kidnapping, with a British national kidnapped by the 
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Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Diyarbakir in June 2012. The same group 
had previously kidnapped road construction employees in May 2012, in the 
eastern province of Igdir (UK Foreign Office; Turkey, 2013). 
Recent years of sustained unrest in Syria has displaced countless people and has 
had a dramatic impact on one of the largest urban refugee populations in the 
world. As of January 2013, estimates of the number of Syrians who had fled 
their properties for safer regions of the country ranged from 2.5 to 3 million 
(UNHCR; Syria, 2013). Clashes between government forces and armed 
opposition groups are continuous, and they have dramatically impacted living 
conditions even in the main cities of Damascus and Aleppo. No part of Syria 
should be considered immune from violence (US State Department; Syria, 
2013). Places frequented by foreigners have been previous targets and 
techniques of attack include shootings and bombings; including suicide bombs 
and vehicle bombs. Due to the security situation, many organisations cannot 
operate, and only seven INGOs are fully operational (Al Jazeera, 2013). 
Kidnappings have occurred both for financial and political gain, and have been 
motivated by both criminality and terrorism. Some terrorist groups have claimed 
responsibility for kidnappings, such as a number of recent kidnappings with 
victims including Westerners (UK Foreign Office; Syria, 2013). 
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The overall situation in Iraq features a number of security, political and 
economic challenges. However, due to the very high degrees of security 
surrounding aid workers, casualty rates in Iraq are less than those in Chad and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo; they resemble levels in Haiti (Stoddard 
et al., 2012, p. 4). More than 80 INGOs can be found in Iraq 
(Commondreams.org, 2013), and the country received USD 2.2 billion in aid in 
2010, of which $185 million was humanitarian aid (Global Humanitarian 
Assistance; Iraq, 2013).Security in Iraq has improved somewhat over the last 
years but the threat is still extremely high. Foreign nationals living and working 
in Iraq continue to be at risk of being kidnapped. Most kidnapping activity is 
undertaken by criminal elements for ransom, but a substantial number of 
kidnapped foreigners are murdered (US State Department; Iraq, 2013). 
Yemen has a large presence of INGOs, with a total of 57 in operation 
(UNOCHA, 2013). The country received USD 664 million in aid in 2010, of 
which $111 million was for humanitarian assistance (Global Humanitarian 
Map 2.5:  High risk environments in Middle East 
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Assistance, Yemen, 2013). Violent crime against foreigners is rare in Yemen, 
but the threat level is extremely high due to the twin dangers of terrorism and 
political instability. This is reflected in research on NGO security, with 37 aid 
workers murdered between 2006 and 2011 (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 4). Terrorist 
organisations carry on being active in Yemen, especially in Yemen’s restive 
south, including Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which now 
controls significant territory, particularly in Abyan governorate. The threat of 
kidnapping in Yemen from terrorists, armed tribes and criminals is regarded as 
very high. There is a substantial possibility that anyone initially kidnapped by a 
tribe or criminal group could be subsequently sold to AQAP (US State 
Department; Yemen, 2013).  
2.12.5 South Asia 
In excess of 100 INGOs operate in Afghanistan (Afghanistan-analyst.org; 
NGOs, 2013) inside an extremely challenging security environment. Remnants 
of the former Taliban regime as well as the terrorist al-Qaeda network, along 
with narco-traffickers and various terrorist and insurgent groups that oppose the 
international community’s presence continue to function in different parts of 
Map 2.6: High risk environments in South Asia 
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Afghanistan. Methods of attack include bombs (roadside and other), suicide 
bombs (either on foot or by vehicle), indirect fire (rockets and mortars), direct 
fire (shootings and rocket propelled grenades), kidnappings and violent crime 
(UK Foreign Office; Afghanistan, 2013).This is reflected in research that 
showed Afghanistan to have the highest rate of attack against aid workers in the 
world, counting 160 attacks between 2006 and 2011 (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 
4).In excess of 50 INGOs are registered to operate in Pakistan (UNDOC, 2013), 
even though carjacking, armed robberies, house invasions, and other violent 
crimes take place in many major urban areas, deliberate attacks on aid workers 
remain the most serious concern.  
Pakistan ranked fourth highest when it comes to attacks against aid workers 
between 2006 and 2011 (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 4), examples of which include 
the attack on an international aid agency in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa on 10 March 
2010, the bombing of World Food Programme office in Islamabad on 5 October 
2009, and the killing of a US aid worker on 12 November 2008 in Peshawar. 
Five foreign humanitarian workers have been taken hostage in Pakistan since 
July 2011, and kidnappings may be motivated by desires for either financial or 
political gain (UK Foreign Office; Pakistan, 2013). 
India continues to experience terrorist and insurgent activities that might affect 
aid workers directly or indirectly. Past attacks have targeted public places, 
including some frequented by Westerners, such as luxury and other hotels, 
trains, train stations, markets, cinemas, mosques, and restaurants in large urban 
areas (US State Department; India, 2013). Although India has the highest 
number of national NGOs in the world, more than 30 INGOs also assist 
(UNDOC, 2013). 
More than 100 INGOs are working in Afghanistan (Afghanistan-analyst.org; 
NGOs, 2013) in an extremely challenging security environment. Remnants of the 
former Taliban regime and the terrorist al-Qaeda network, as well as narco-
traffickers and other terrorist and insurgent groups that oppose the international 
community’s presence continue to operate in various parts of Afghanistan. 
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Methods of attack include bombs (roadside and other), suicide bombs (either on 
foot or by vehicle), indirect fire (rockets and mortars), direct fire (shootings and 
rocket propelled grenades), kidnappings and violent crime (UK Foreign Office; 
Afghanistan, 2013).The above is reflected in research that showed Afghanistan 
to have the highest rate of attack against aid workers in the world, counting 160 
attacks between 2006 and 2011 (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 4). 
More than 50 INGOs are registered to work in Pakistan (UNDOC, 2013), and 
while carjacking, armed robberies, house invasions, and other violent crimes 
occur in many major urban areas, deliberate attacks on aid workers remain the 
most serious concern. Pakistan ranked fourth highest in terms of attacks against 
aid workers between 2006 and 2011 (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 4), examples of 
which include the attack on an international aid agency in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa 
on 10 March 2010, the bombing of World Food Programme office in Islamabad 
on 5 October 2009, and the killing of a US aid worker on 12 November 2008 in 
Peshawar. Five foreign humanitarian workers have been taken hostage in 
Pakistan since July 2011, and kidnappings may be motivated by desires for 
either financial or political gain (UK Foreign Office; Pakistan, 2013). 
India continues to experience terrorist and insurgent activities which may affect 
aid workers directly or indirectly. Past attacks have targeted public places, 
including some frequented by Westerners, such as luxury and other hotels, 
trains, train stations, markets, cinemas, mosques, and restaurants in large urban 
areas (US State Department; India, 2013). Although India has the highest 
percentage of national NGOs in the world, more than 30 INGOs also assist 
(UNDOC, 2013). 
2.12.6 Southeast Asia 
Thailand is a generally peaceful country, but tension and violence exist near 
borders in some areas and, on rare occasions, in large cities elsewhere. Bomb 
and grenade attacks have been taking place without any discernible pattern, 
including in places visited by expatriates and foreign travellers. There have been 
recent attacks in the main cities of Thailand, including in Chiang Mai in 2010 
and in Bangkok in February 2012 (UK Foreign Office; Thailand, 2013).For 
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several years, the far south of Thailand has been experiencing almost daily 
incidents of criminally and politically motivated violence including incidents 
attributed to armed local separatist groups. More than 50 INGOs operate in 
Thailand.  
The Philippines have few security concerns outside of the southern island of 
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Terrorist  groups such as the Abu Sayyaf 
Group, Jema’ah Islamiyah, and groups that have broken away from the more 
mainstream Moro Islamic Liberation Front or Moro National Liberation Front, 
have carried out bombings resulting in deaths, injuries, and property damage 
(US State Department; Thailand, 2013). Kidnap victims are sometimes held in 
captivity for long periods of time before being released, while others have been 
killed by their captors (Australian Government; Thailand, 2013). Thirty-seven 
INGOs are registered as operating in the country (UNOCHA, 2013). 
Map 2.7:  High risk environments in Southeast Asia 
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2.13 NGO Security Handbooks 
While there are hundreds, if not thousands, of active INGOs in the world today, 
the researcher has only been able to find four INGOs with their own 
comprehensive manual or handbook for security. These are World Vision, CARE 
International, Save the Children, and Mercy Corps, and each will be discussed 
individually below. 
World Vision has long had its own manual, and as of 01 June 2013 the manuals 
were available as a mobile phone app for general staff with a management 
version compiled for managers. Andries Dreyer, Director of Global Security 
Training, stated:  
Making the security manual mobile provides yet another way to 
ensure that staff can access the information they need when they 
need it. We need to make sure that they know exactly what to do 
when they encounter situations that could affect their safety. We 
need to have a culture of preparedness so that people keep in mind 
what they need to have and to know in order to be prepared. If you 
have a smartphone, downloading these apps right now is 
something that you can do to help ensure that you are prepared 
later (McAllister, 2013). 
In addition to World Vision, both CARE International and Save the Children 
have very comprehensive security manuals. Mercy Corps also provides a Field 
Safety manual that provides specific information relevant to staff security. 
Protection International has also issued a very comprehensive generic manual 
designed for human rights defenders.  
Some other international organisations, specifically the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of the Red Cross 
(IFRC), have security manuals that are used by many INGOs; Koenraad Van 
Brabant’s 2010 book, Operational Security Management in Violent 
Environments, is also in use by many INGOs. 
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2.14  INGO Responses to Insecurity 
Since 2002, Abby Stoddard and Adele Harmer’s extensive research has made an 
important contribution to widening and deepening the collective knowledge 
associated with humanitarian security management. Stoddard and Harmer’s 
publications tackle a variety of sub-topics associated with the field of 
humanitarian security and have been widely distributed inside the aid 
community, leading to increasing awareness around the issue and shaping 
discussions around it. 
The reaction to security concerns across the INGO community has been 
somewhat schizophrenic. On one side, some argue for much more ‘protective’ 
and ‘deterrent’ measures, while other people reason that ‘acceptance’ strategies 
offer valuable and efficient alternatives (Van Brabant, 2010, p. 55-57). Some 
agencies have developed sophisticated security analysis and reporting tools, 
policies, and procedures, while some continue, regardless of the risks, to 
function without standard or even established protocols or security management 
strategies. Most INGOs work tirelessly to discover the right balance between 
ensuring the security of their staff and achieving operational requirements, 
which is a considerably more urgent task today than it was in the past because of 
the repeated attacks on INGO staff and organisations (Murphy, 2004, p. 122).  
Reports and research specifically studying the topic of attacks against 
international aid staff concur that the situation has worsened. A report by the 
United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) notes that ‘between 
1992 and 2005, 229 United Nations civilian staff members have been killed as a 
result of malicious acts’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2005). Further, 
during the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005, UNDSS ‘received 
information detailing the deaths of 65 international and national staff of 
international, non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations as a result 
of malicious acts’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2006). Although there is 
no single definitive study that provides an authoritative quantity of humanitarian 
aid worker deaths, there exists general consensus that the absolute numbers of 
aid workers killed by violence are increasing (King, 2002; Van Brabant, 2001). 
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This poses critical troubles both for benevolent aid organisations as well as their 
donors as the ‘high amount of these kinds of security incidents weakens the 
efficiency of the operation and performance of the United Nations, reduces the 
personal safety and well-being of staff and compromises the security of field 
installations’ (UN, 2001). If the United Nations with its power and support 
apparatus suffers operationally, one can expect that the same is the case for 
INGOs. 
Providing and maintaining effective security measures in dangerous 
environments can be an expensive business. Regardless of the indication of a 
systematic improvement of security among the INGOs, it is not known just how 
much INGOs invest in security, since there is no set formula for deriving risk 
management costs for an overall programme budget. One approach that has been 
identified is the allocation of an arbitrary percentage of the overall programme 
budget to risk management costs, typically not exceeding 5 per cent. However, if 
we were to apply this formula to the total Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) for 2010, it would report that aid implementers could have had access to 
$25 billion for risk management expenditures in that year. This is a sum which 
would be neither realistic nor justifiable (Zumkehr and Finucane, 2013, p. 23). 
2.15   Interpreting Incident Data 
The requirement for humanitarian organisations to build better security 
management practices to cope with staff security needs inside an increasingly 
aggressive operating environment continues to be recognised by both academic 
and strategic studies (Bruderlein and Gassmann, 2006, p. 63-93). For the 
execution of improved security managing practices within these organisations, 
research has shown that enhanced security measures for humanitarian aid 
workers requires closer coordination between humanitarian aid organisations at 
both field and policy levels. Regarding recognition of the reasons for risk to 
humanitarian aid employees, academics and policy researchers have historically 
been at variance with security managers. Remarkably, academics and policy 
analysts posit that intended violent behaviour poses the highest danger to 
humanitarian aid workers, while humanitarian organisation security managers 
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specify crime and traffic accidents as being the greatest danger. These divergent 
answers have serious behavioural results for humanitarian aid organisations and 
contradict different methodological methods to the creation of strategies 
addressing staff security (Martin, 1999, p. 4-6). Recently, there appears to be 
more consensus, with intentional targeting largely thought to represent the most 
important threat to aid workers’ safety. 
However, NGO professionals have contended that findings from such research is 
inconsistent because they may extract information from the media. Such 
information rarely includes fatalities as a result of accidents, crime or illness, 
and it may present false quantities of deaths since the majority of attacks on aid 
workers occur only in a few countries like Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Sudan, 
making findings not applicable for the security of aid workers in general.  Figure 
2.14 comes from the 2012 Aid Worker Security Report (Stoddard et al., 2012, p. 
3) and shows the five countries with the highest recorded number of attacks 
against aid workers in 2011 based on data from the Aid Worker Security 
Database. 
 
Figure 2.14: The five countries with the highest recorded number of attacks 
against aid workers (2011)  
Source: Aid Worker Security Report, 2012 
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2.16   Methods of Attack  
In 2000, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and Johns Hopkins University 
gathered data on terrorist attacks on volunteers and NGOs from the Red Cross, 
UN programmes and NGO records. Once the data was analysed, it was 
determined that during the period of conflicts that took place Rwanda, Somalia, 
Burundi, and Afghanistan (between 1985 and 1998), the numbers of deaths of 
NGO volunteers increased significantly (Murphy, 2004, p. 22). While the next 
chapter will discuss the literature surrounding terrorism more closely, the data 
set offers an overview for the present chapter: 
• Being an aid worker can be a dangerous activity by itself, as aid workers 
are typically placed into volatile and unstable areas with a potential for injury or 
death to staff on duty. 
• NGO staff and organisations are increasingly attacked by terrorists and 
rebels for numerous reasons, as those previously mentioned in this chapter and 
further explored in the next chapter.  
The research also illustrated that ‘most deaths were due to intentional violence 
(guns or other weapons), with many connected with banditry’ (Murphy, 2004, p. 
22). In a separate study of data that is representative of death, hospitalisation or 
medical evacuation of staff from eight European and eleven North American 
NGOs between September 2002 and December 2005, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg 
School of Public Health Center for Refugee and Disaster Response gave the 
following findings (Gidley, 2006): 
• About sixty per cent of the reported deaths were because of planned and 
intentional violence.  
• Sixty-five per cent of intentional violence, including gunfire, attack, and 
rape, occurred while NGO workers were on the road to or from work, excluding 
while being in homes or offices. 
86 
• Most cases did not involve theft, which can be another indication of 
intentional violence being the goal. This represents a difference from the 
previous study that revealed that banditry was prevalent. 
• Sixty-five per cent of intentional violence were against national staff, and 
intentional violence was to blame for seventy-one per cent of deaths overall. 
• In fifty-six per cent of recorded incidents, small weapons were used. 
Hostage taking incidents where the victims were killed, (as well as the more 
usual outcome of victims being released alive), remained the quickest growing 
type of attack affecting aid workers. The Aid Worker Security Report, released 
late October 2013, states that ‘the number of kidnapping incidents has 
quadrupled since 2002, with an average increase of 44 per cent each year’.  The 
report also demonstrated that kidnapping is considered the most frequent form of 
major attack against aid workers, with kidnapping victims surpassing the number 
of victims of shootings, serious bodily assault, and all types of explosives. 
Kidnappings comprised nearly a quarter of all major attacks on aid operations in 
2012, and an even bigger percentage of aid worker victims (36 per cent) 
(Harmer et al., 2013, p. 5). This again emphasises the necessity of this research 
into management practices of INGO hostage cases.  
Armed groups are able to use the hostages for political leverage, as a 
propaganda tool, or to demonstrate control over a specific territory or in relation 
to the authorities. Aid workers are of course not the sole targets for hostage 
takers, however they are generally ‘a visible and soft one’ (Egeland et al., 2011, 
p. 26-31). The fifth chapter of this study will further discuss reasons that aid 
workers may become targets of terrorists. Other threats, such as armed break-ins 
and violent road banditry, dropped off during the period under scrutiny as 
organisations instituted tighter and more protective security measures and 
restricted movement in some areas. 
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2.17  Duty of Care 
There exists a legal grounding for ethical and moral imperatives in connection 
with staff security and safety among INGOs. Though ethical and moral questions 
have primary importance, INGOs in addition have a legal obligation to provide a 
duty of care that covers staff security and safety. Thus, security and safety are 
not merely personal, subjective matters of preference or conscience, but an 
obligation anchored with the organisation’s leadership, potentially shared by its 
top executive (Kemp and Merkelbach, 2011, p. 50-54). 
The concept of duty of care easily transfers to the topic of the present research, 
hostage management for INGOs. Most hostages are taken because the hostage 
takers are hoping to obtain concessions from the organisation that the victim 
works for, and not because the individuals themselves have done anything 
wrong. In all cases, however, the hostage takers want to extract something from 
the organisations or the outside world. They are unable to get what they need 
from the hostages, so it is not the hostages themselves who are the key factor; 
they simply permit the hostage taker to make a statement (Bolz et al., 2001, p. 
33).  The organisation, rather than the person, must therefore accept the vast 
majority of responsibility for engaging mechanisms to safeguard their staff.  
Humanitarian aid activities are performed by people for people. The 
effectiveness and success of humanitarian aid initiatives depend especially on 
the contribution of well-prepared staff able to operate in inhospitable and 
dangerous situations. Operating in emergencies places great pressure on staff. 
Therefore, NGOs cannot disregard the duty of care that they have towards their 
staff, national and international, and NGOs should recognise their responsibility 
in guaranteeing the physical and psycho-social well-being of each employee, 
before, during and after working with the NGO (Piziali, 2009, p. 8). 
The concept of duty of care can be taken from what the courts have called 
‘foreseeability’ in vicarious liability suits. An incident such as a hostage-taking 
could be considered a foreseeable occurrence under vicarious liability statutes 
and case law, particularly if the organisation are operating in a country or area 
which has a known potential for hostage taking.  Essentially, as an organisation 
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constitutes a potential target, it is under some obligation to safeguard its 
employees and property (Bolz et al., 2001, p. 33). When employees work 
abroad, duty of care should mean risk management measures beyond the normal 
safety and health requirements of an environment to which the employees are 
familiar. Assigning missions to travellers and expatriates introduces greater 
security risks, and employers have legal and moral responsibilit ies that extend 
duty of care as far as the dependents of international assignees (SOS 
International, 2011). Breaching duty of care can provide rise to legal action 
alleging negligence and could lead to damages or in the criminal prosecution of 
the employer.   
The legal responsibility may well be tested in a lawsuit filed in May 2011 in 
Manhattan Federal Court, United States of America. In the suit, a former staff 
member Flavia Wagner sued Samaritan’s Purse, the NGO she worked for when 
she was taken hostage, and Clayton Consultants, the private security company 
that negotiated her release. The claimant had been deployed to the Abu Ajura 
area in Darfur in May 2010 ‘despite the fact that other non-government 
organisations “had prohibited their employees from travelling in that area” 
because of the threat of kidnapping’, and she was subsequently abducted (Ax, 
2011). Wagner accused the organisation of ‘failing to train its security personnel 
adequately and of wilfully ignoring warning signs that abduction was a threat to 
foreigners’ (Shifrel, 2011). The lawsuit further claimed: 
While Samaritan's Purse possessed the resources to extricate 
plaintiff from her captivity quickly, it instead embarked on a plan 
designed to protect its own financial and political interests… in 
the end, Samaritan’s Purse, its insurer and Clayton got precisely 
what they wanted—a minimal ransom payment. Defendants 
achieved that objective only at the expense of plaintiff's health 
and well-being (Shifrel, 2011). 
2.18  Security Strategies   
Many INGOs base their core security model on the NGO ‘Security Triangle’ of 
risk reduction methodology. Essentially, the model proposes that there are three 
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primary means of reducing the risks faced by NGOs and their staff: 
‘acceptance’, ‘protection’ and ‘deterrence’ (Van Brabant, 2010, p. 55-57). Each 
element is discussed in detail in the following sections. 
2.18.1 Acceptance   
The humanitarian community has readily adopted the acceptance element of the 
security triangle. Acceptance is a strategy aimed at convincing people in the 
community of deployment, including adversaries, that an organisation is doing 
something good for the community and that it should not be targeted as an attack 
on the organisation would have a negative impact on the community at large. 
Acceptance is ‘founded on effective relationships and cultivating and 
maintaining consent from beneficiaries, local authorities, belligerents and other 
stakeholders’ (Fast et al., 2011, p. 1-19). The acceptance approach tries to 
reduce risks, as well as to allow local actors to manage the risks in support of 
the organisation, after receiving approval from official or de facto authorities to 
carry out the activities of the INGOs. This in turn is could become a method of 
reducing or removing potential threats to be able to access vulnerable 
populations and undertake programme activities. In low-risk environments one 
often finds a high level of effort directed towards the acceptance strategy. 
While this seems to be a natural approach that goes along with delivering 
assistance, it does have a number of weaknesses if an organisation becomes 
overly reliant upon it. For one, the strategy largely depends on the confidence 
level of the recipients in terms of the functions of INGOs and their perceived 
objectivity. Specifically, as discussed in the video The Price of Anything by the 
Security Management Network (2012), the acceptance strategy has slowly lost 
some of its effectiveness due to the increase in the number of humanitarian 
actors. With so many actors out there, the local population, armed groups, and 
parties to a conflict cannot differentiate between them all. What has been 
referred to as ‘humanitarian space’ has shrunk over the years, and the identities 
of parties operating in the same environment have become blurred in the eyes of 
local populations. It is increasingly common to see several distinct entities 
providing humanitarian assistance, including entities that have traditionally been 
one of the parties to a conflict. For instance, armed forces currently carry out 
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duties and responsibilit ies traditionally provided by NGOs in on-going 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (VENRO, 2013). This can severely limit the 
effect of acceptance as a security strategy in many operations.  
Acceptance alone may not be a sufficient security strategy, as seen in the 
increasing number of targeted attacks against humanitarian aid workers. By 
2008, the fatality rate for international aid workers had surpassed that of UN 
peacekeepers. The rate of non-fatal incidents among aid workers increased 
similarly, as there were 113 kidnap victims between 2000 and 2004 compared to 
429 between 2007 and 2011 (Childs, 2013, p. 64-72). 
While the acceptance approach has been a potential shield against the risk of 
political kidnapping, economically motivated kidnappings present a new 
challenge to INGOs. They now face greater risks from economic kidnapping, so 
it is therefore increasingly challenging for them to depend on the instruments 
that were effective against political kidnapping. Economic kidnapping questions 
the unique status of INGOs. Without political ideologies to impact the way they 
work, and without reputations to defend, criminal kidnappers are less inclined to 
grant INGOs immunity from kidnapping (Briggs, 2001, p. 4-5).   In addition to 
acceptance, then, most INGOs also make use of the protection and deterrence 
security approaches, each of which is described below. The context of the work, 
the values, and the capabilities of the organisation all play a part in determining 
the implementation of these approaches (Van Brabant, 2010, p. 55-57). 
2.18.2 Protection   
The protection side of the security triangle is the one most people associate with 
security; in other words, hardening measures. This can entail strengthening or 
fortifying the compound of the organisation, typically with high walls, razor 
wire, strong gates, bars on windows, and anti-ram devices, as well as hiring 
security guards (Gaul et al., 2006, p. 10). While community acceptance focuses 
on the minimization of threats, the protective approach does not influence the 
extant level of threat. Protective measures only reduce the risk of attack by 
making the organisation less vulnerable and they cannot soften the threat as the 
acceptance strategy does. Over-reliance on the protective strategy can be costly 
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and, in some cases, prohibitively expensive. It can also carry high cost in terms 
of staff welfare, as the ‘bunker mentality’ can lead to higher levels of stress 
among the employees by imposing restrictions on normal activity as well as 
freedom of movement (Dick, 2010, p. 17-20).  
2.18.3 Deterrence 
The efforts made to prevent individuals from performing violent activities 
against INGOs come under the category of deterrence. The deterrence strategy 
prevents a threat from being realised by ensuring that a serious consequence 
would result should an attack occur, and that a would-be attacker is aware of 
this. In essence, it is a counter-threat, such as supporting military actions, legal, 
economic or political sanctions, or withdrawing agency support and staff. Non-
government organisations usually possess very low capability of deterrents, 
outside of programme suspension (Bollettino, 2008, p. 265-267). To a point, 
armed escorts have been used more frequently by the humanitarian community 
as a deterrent against ambushes, and it is therefore of essence that each agency 
have a clear idea about the association of the humanitarian organisation with 
armed forces (Dick, 2010, p. 17-20). The employment of armed guards is not 
without controversy. In an editorial for a journal called Together, Charles 
Rogers, then Chief of Corporate Security for World Vision, presented several 
instances of ethical issues raised by the employment of armed securities by 
NGOs (Brabant, 2000, p.2).  
It is argued that if an NGO appoints armed security, it could ‘raise the bar’. It 
could increase the danger to unarmed agencies, as NGOs not using armed guards 
might then be perceived as easy targets. It is therefore understood that by 
adopting a specific security approach an NGO could influence the security of the 
other NGOs (Gaul et al., 2006). The organisations’ chances of being attacked 
may also increase as a result of appointing armed security, as it  could undermine 
the motto of the organisation that supports societal peace and hence affect the 
effectiveness of the acceptance strategy. 
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2.19  Threat, Vulnerability, and Risk Assessment in the Context of 
INGO Security   
The INGO community has gradually adopted well-structured procedures for 
information distribution and synchronized security approaches. Formerly, the 
United Nations frequently performed a lead role in synchronizing both service 
and protection during insecure scenarios (Muggah, 2003, p. 152); the INGOs 
themselves have now largely taken over this task. Though the independent 
nature of INGOs provides benefits to them in some settings, in an unsafe 
scenario it can become a liability. Threats made against one organisation could 
be a danger signal to every INGO. The opinion of the local population regarding 
other INGOs may be changed by the response of one organisation to any 
violence or attack against it. For example, if an INGO should choose to continue 
or suspend operations in a given operating environment in response to an 
incident, there could be a temporary change in the work of other INGOs, such as 
them having to cover for the activities previously carried out by the NGO that 
withdrew. As a result, there could be a change in the security situation such as 
an increased risk to those other INGOs (Gaul et al., 2006).  
2.19.1 Security, risk and risk management 
The concept of risk has over the past decades permeated security studies, as well 
as the international aid community, and is now increasingly used to improve 
security of INGO staff. The objective of this section is to briefly describe two 
major approaches to risk in relation to security and to explore the potential of 
risk management. Embracing a rationalist tradition, the concept of risk has 
evolved as a basis for decision-making under conditions of uncertainty 
(Bernstein, 1998; Daston, 1995; Hacking, 1990). Risk analysis works as an 
instrument in decision-making by evaluating future actions in terms of risk. As 
Luhmann (1993, p. 13) has argued, risk is conceptualized as ‘a controlled 
extension of rational action’. Risk analysis is an estimation of future threats, an 
estimation that builds on the premise that risks can be classified, quantified and 
to some extent predicted and that rational behaviour can help to manage or 
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perhaps even eliminate risk (Adams, 1995; Bernstein, 1998; Ewald, 1992; 
Power, 2004).  
The modern tradition of risk, however, is contested by Beck’s theory of risk 
society. According to Beck, late modernity is characterised by society’s inability 
to insure itself against risks that, on the one hand, exceed the calculable and, on 
the other, have catastrophic effects that cannot be compensated. According to 
Beck, the 9 September 2001 terrorist attacks escaped rational predictions and, as 
such, have displayed the limits of modern insurance technology (Beck, 2002; 
2003). Within the field of international relations, this has given birth to a 
research agenda on ‘reflexive security’ that focusses on the management of the 
new and constructed risks that transcend national borders (Rasmussen, 2002; 
2004). In risk society theories, hazards and insecurities are viewed as inevitable 
structural threats that can only be solved through cosmopolitanism, based on the 
negotiation of certain norms (Beck, 2005; Boyne, 2001).  
An alternative approach addresses risk as an instrument of governance rather 
than an organising principle of life. This method is based on the work of Michel 
Foucault, and risk is here considered a means for sorting reality, as ‘a way of 
representing events in a certain form so they might be made governable in 
particular ways, with particular technologies and for particular goals’ (Dean, 
1999, p. 177). This approach has inspired analyses of risk in a variety of 
disciplines such as international relations, criminology, insurance, and 
surveillance studies (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Garland, 2001; Lyon, 2003; 
Ericson, Doyle, and Barry, 2003). 
Two strategies have been described within the approach described by Dean. 
Baker and Simon (2002, p. 4) describe ‘risk spreading’ as the ‘wide variety of 
efforts to conceive and address social problems in terms of risk’, such as 
financial risk management, social security, police and national defence services, 
and environmental policies, among others. ‘Risk embracing’ on the other hand is 
described as the strategy that shifts the risk responsibility from the institutions 
to the individuals and corporations, aimed at constituting subjects that are made 
responsible through their management of risk (Baker, 2002, p. 33-51). Security 
can therefore be seen as a combination of these two strategies. 
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2.19.2 The INGO community and ISO 31000 Risk Management  
The INGO community is gradually changing to a risk management approach to 
security. In May 2011, the Security Management Initiative (SMI) published a 
landmark discussion paper entitled From Security Management to Risk 
Management. The authors argue convincingly that the international standard, 
ISO 31000: 2009 Risk Management - Principles and Guidelines, provides a 
‘better fit’ than contemporary models utilised within the aid community, and 
that adapting ISO 31000 standards to suit the INGO community’s specific needs 
would not only enhance the duty of care to staff on mission but also contribute 
to the growing professionalisation of humanitarian assistance (Merkelbach and 
Daudin, 2011, p. 54).  
Rich Parker, an expert on INGO risk management, believes that the INGO 
community has been slow to adjust to ISO 31000, and that those INGOs with an 
integrated security management system in place are either guided by the 
Humanitarian Practice Network, by one of the regional inter-agency forums, or 
have developed their own framework in isolation (Parker, 2012, p. 2). 
2.19.3 INGO security cooperation 
An important characteristic of hostage taking is that it could happen to 
employees at all job levels of the organisation; thus, organisations needs to have 
personnel protection plans which are not restricted to executive-level staff 
(Likar, 2011, p. 49). Cooperation between organisations is particularly crucial at 
this stage, since information and intelligence may be shared, permitting the best 
use of resources. The establishment of NGO security coordination offices in 
Afghanistan (Afghanistan NGO Security Office - ANSO), Iraq (NGO 
Coordination Committee in Iraq - NCCI), Gaza, Somalia, and Sudan in recent 
times has facilitated the collection and dissemination of security incident 
reporting and security warnings. These coordinating bodies release incident 
data, but do not necessarily analyse the data beyond simple summaries or basic 
trends and patterns; they do not have the time and even the mandate to take 
action (Fast, 2010, p. 3). 
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There are signs that INGOs are becoming better at sharing information. Indeed a 
recent survey conducted by Christian Aid to evaluate the extent of security 
collaboration between the UN and NGOs in the field and the implementation of 
the Saving Lives Together (SLT) framework, identified information sharing 
among the highest priorities for coordination amongst all groups of NGOs 
surveyed. Additionally, of the 205 respondents from 72 organisations that 
answered the survey, 88 per cent of these from international NGOs, and 61 
percent of national NGOs reported that their organisations permitted information 
sharing (Micheni, 2009, p. 10). 
The importance of cooperation in sharing information and expertise, planning, 
as well as the need for training of staff is commonly agreed, and is more likely 
to take place when a community or group share the same threat perception. This 
is likely to be a continuous issue, as hostage takers are evolving in methodology 
and consistently improving their methods to ensure increasingly spectacular and 
devastating attacks against their adversaries (Taillon, 2002, p. 58). A lack of 
proactive intelligence sharing and planning increases the attackers’ capabilities 
and gives their methods of attack a higher likelihood of success. Data from 
ITERATE, a database on international terrorism intended to determine the type 
and success rate of terrorist attacks, shows that terrorists were successful 76 per 
cent of the time with hostage-taking missions (Harvey, 1993, p. 76). 
2.19.4 Exposure and vulnerabilities  
The extent of exposure of a specific organisation to the threat is largely 
determined by the vulnerability of that organisation. The responsibilit ies and 
activities of the agency and the aid workers greatly affect vulnerability, so there 
is often a direct linkage between the vulnerability and the mandate of a 
particular organisation. It is also a common misperception that international 
staff face a higher risk than national staff; this may not always be the case. In 
fact, the opposite may be true in some circumstances as a result of the following 
(Gaul et al., 2006, p. 10): 
 Local criminals may consider national aid workers’ relationship with the 
international community as ‘traitorous’. 
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 They may think that these workers are rich as they are perceived as 
enjoying high salaries. 
 They may think that there will be lesser consequences for kidnapping 
national staff than for kidnapping international staff. 
There has also been a recent shift towards ‘remote management’ of operations in 
some of the most violent contexts, where deteriorating conditions have forced 
international agencies to manage their programmes remotely. Despite more 
activities for national staff, the same shift has not been seen in investment in 
security for national staff. A few of the larger and better funded INGOs have 
started to make this shift, but overall progress in security equitability for 
national staff has been slow and, for national NGO partners, progress has barely 
begun (Stoddard et al., 2011, p. 20-21). 
Ethnicity, religion, and gender may also determine a staff member’s level of 
vulnerability to violence. For instance, in Mindanao, female Muslim aid staff 
have been sent to specific areas of violence in order to control the level of threat 
and minimise the vulnerability to violence.   
The following factors may also influence the vulnerability to violence:  
 The satisfaction of employees with security measures. 
 Interpersonal abilities of employees. 
 Perspective of the local population regarding employees and salaries. This 
factor is related to community acceptance. 
2.19.5 INGO security training    
Security training can be a challenge for many INGOs. A recent study showed 
that more than 70 per cent of respondents stated that their organisation valued 
security training highly, but 44 per cent admitted that their organisation did not 
have sufficient resources for security training (European Interagency Security 
Forum, 2010). Most of the larger INGOs have their own internal security 
training section, or at least an individual in charge, but many operate in isolation 
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to a large extent. While some INGOs use professional training organisations 
such as the NGO RedR to deliver specific training, most of the INGOs utilise 
their own employees to various extents.  
Security training should differ according to the role and level of employees. To 
prepare for the possibility of hostage cases, two categories of staff require 
training, that of potential hostages and of potential hostage crisis managers. 
Many researchers (Muller et al., 1996; Regini 2002; Fagan, 2003; Van Hasselt 
and Romano, 2004; Van Hasselt et al., 2008) mentioned that in order to fill the 
gap that exists between learning and the real world, hands-on training should be 
given to aid workers. This is true for both categories identified above, and 
scenario-based training can be helpful to prepare and evaluate aid workers (Van 
Hasselt et al., 2005). The idea behind simulation and scenario-based training is 
that the skills and knowledge obtained during training can be drawn upon if 
necessary during real and critical events.  
Other groups whose situations can be compared to that of aid workers, such as 
journalists, have introduced training more systematically. Anthony Feinstein, a 
Canadian psychiatrist and author of Dangerous Lives: War and the Men and 
Women Who Report It, stresses the significance of mental preparedness and 
exactly how essential it truly is for journalists to comprehend the risks and the 
potential the signs of psychological distress before going to war. Feinstein 
conducted a seven-year-long study which highlighted that training and 
preparedness are key in tackling the possible emotional repercussions of being 
in life-threatening situations (Gornitzki, 2007). 
2.19.6 Being proactive 
Educating the potential crisis management team, and especially potential 
negotiators, is essential. Fagan (2003, p. 87) and Regini (2002, p. 14) mentioned 
that the organisation should teach the team about the context of their work with 
the help of available literature in the field. Regini, (2002, p. 13-14) mentioned 
that basic crisis management team training should include familiarisation with 
hostage taker personality type, suicide assessment, official problems, and 
psychology as well as the influence of mass media. Greenstone (1995, p. 281-
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282), Noesner (1999, p. 6-12) and Vecchi (2002, p. 1-6) all insisted that joint 
training is useful for tactical and negotiation teams. This should be done so that 
every team can understand others’ competence in responding to the critical 
situations. Excellent communication and success follow if the group members 
value the commitment and principles of the teams and the approaches adopted to 
solve the critical incidents. While the recommendation above was made for the 
law enforcement context, strong parallels can be drawn to crisis management 
between headquarters and the field. 
2.19.7 After-action analysis of critical incidents 
Regini (2002, p. 13-18) posited that those involved in hostage negotiations 
should analyse past critical situations in order to learn from the achievements 
and failures of others. They should analyse the various situations, responses and 
activities of the hostage takers as well as the approaches followed by the 
negotiators and law enforcement authorities to gain knowledge in this area. 
Information that represents the intensity of feelings and pressure to resolve 
critical incidents can be obtained from audio and video recordings, as well as 
written records.   
It is important that the training provided to aid workers be specific to their 
operational environment and context. Muggah (2003, p. 152) observed that the 
aid community often failed to take into consideration the difference in the level 
of danger to the international and regional aid workers. Similarly, we could find 
a difference in the level of danger to male and female aid workers affiliated with 
a single organisation. There is also an imbalance in training on offer for national 
and international staff. This is due to the belief that the local staff members will 
face a lower level of threat, given that they can manage with the regional 
languages, that they may be able to predict the local security threats well in 
advance, and that they know how to tackle those issues (Muggah, 2003, p. 154). 
As discussed above, such beliefs may misguide those responsible for staff 
security training; in fact these views may also be outright mistaken. Hence, the 
lack of a systematic and articulated training approach to improving the security 
of staff through skills enhancement is of concern (European Interagency 
Security Forum, 2010). 
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An organisation’s vulnerability to violence may also be influenced by the 
context of its job and the value of its possessions. It is therefore necessary for 
INGOs to review security regulations and processes as well as to link with 
domestic actors while assessing the organisation’s vulnerabilities (Gaul et al., 
2006, p. 10). 
2.20  Obstacles to Effective Security Management and Security 
Coordination  
In accordance with Barth, Eide, Kaspersen, Kent, and Von Hippel, (2005, p. 4-8) 
several reasons have been highlighted through the literature on humanitarian aid 
organisations as to the reasons they have not adopted adequately robust security 
management systems and why they are unsuccessful when it comes  security 
coordination. Donini (2004, p. 38-40) stated that one major hindrance to 
improved security management is an overly narrow focus on operational 
readiness for field operators. As a result, management loses focus on strategic-
level thinking about security and crisis management. Staff turnover can also 
produce a barrier between the experienced staff and newer staff of the 
organisation that have little if any previous institutional knowledge.  
Donini further argues that important variations in the capacities and mission of 
NGOs, lack of confidence or misunderstandings between NGOs and the UN 
concerning humanitarian principles, mutual fears about agency autonomy, 
competition over donor funds, and aid organisations’ wish to be in the spotlight 
are some of the additional obstacles to effective security coordination between 
humanitarian organisations.  
2.20.1 Impediments to security coordination  
Humanitarian principles and politics  
Based on the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence, assistance 
to beneficiaries has generally been delivered by humanitarian aid organisations 
in a traditional manner. The scope of such organisations’ work has expanded 
over the post-Cold War period since they became participants in post-conflict 
peace-building processes. The concept of impartiality has also been under 
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criticism ever since the Rwandan genocide of 1994 saw humanitarian aid 
organisations delivering help to people mixed up in the genocide yet still 
participated actively in violent conflict. As outlined by Donini (2004, p. 38-40), 
the strain between the support lent to humanitarian principles on the one hand 
and participation in the peace-building process on the other hand has resulted in 
an identity crisis. This issue still persists in Iraq. 
Humanitarian aid organisations at this time must make a decision between 
serving as subsidiaries of donor governments and playing a less important role 
within the international scene. NGO mandates have moved beyond assistance 
and protection to incorporate conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peace-
building, and good governance. A challenging situation prevails in Iraq as aid 
organisations must choose either to work with the occupying power or to risk 
being unable to fulfil their humanitarian mission. The capability of NGOs to 
keep their independence and neutrality is further complicated because of the 
‘War on Terror’. Hence, it can be hard for NGOs to substantiate their claims of 
neutrality and impartiality in this globalised world.  
Coordinating agencies  
To be able to coordinate the introduction of common standards and provide a 
common forum for the discussion of problems that impact the aid community, it 
utilises umbrella organisations. The Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is 
the main coordinating body when it comes to the UN. Several of its members are 
heads of UN agencies, representatives of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and NGO coordinating bodies like InterAction, and representatives of the 
International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). InterAction fills the 
function of coordinating body for the NGOs that operate in the United States. 
When NGOs act as implementing partners for the UN, with the assistance of 
bilateral arrangements or together with the United Nations, humanitarian aid 
organisations might also work closely together. These coordinating 
organisations not merely assist in clarifying the practices which can be accepted 
with regards to working together with military forces and private security forces, 
but in addition helps in identifying the minimum operating security standards 
(Inter Agency Standing Committee, 2013). 
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Though attempts were made at institutionalising coordination through these 
coordinating organisations, little evidence shows the outcomes of such efforts as 
having lent additional security coordination at the field level. Some of the 
obstacles to coordination at the field level are the disparate missions of 
agencies, competition for donor funds, conflicts between short-term objectives 
(humanitarian aid) and long-term objectives (development programmes), and the 
number of philosophies which come into play when working with the military 
and private security forces. In countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, these 
challenges to inter-agency security coordination are palpable. In each case, there 
is a choice for aid organisations. They can choose whether or not to act in 
collaboration with the UN or nurture their own personal relationships with their 
beneficiary communities (Bolletino, 2006, p. 8). 
Desire to maintain organisational autonomy  
Most NGOs are independent-minded organisations. This can be proven through 
the fate of the formal procedures introduced by the UN that were meant to fit 
NGOs into a coordinated security system. In 1996, NGOs worldwide refused to 
sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which was presented by the 
then United Nation’s Office for the Security of Coordinator (UNSECOORD). 
MOU signatories were expected to supply the UN with security authority in the 
field. NGOs were not comfortable with this.  
Today, the Saving Lives Together initiative serves to enhance coordination and 
cooperation between the UN and NGOs, however, there is still friction on the 
subject of autonomy where security is concerned. Likewise, to be able to 
maintain agency autonomy, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) refused to sign up 
to the Sphere project (Tong, 2004, p. 176-189), an inter-agency combined 
project that holds signatories accountable to standards in some areas including 
food security, water sanitation, health services and shelter. MSF’s refusal to sign 
stemmed from its unwillingness to lessen humanitarian aid to a collection of 
technical standards, and from a fear that Sphere would scale back MSF’s 
capability to remain flexible. Such flexibility, it was argued, is essential for 
NGOs to react effectively to humanitarian disasters.  
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Competition over scarce resources  
Competition over donor funds and a wish to be the centre of attention create an 
environment that is not ideal for cooperation (Bolletino, 2006, p. 9). 
Organisations that take the lead in order to deliver humanitarian aid to a 
beneficiary community always have strong incentives. Capturing the media 
spotlight for willingness to provide assistance in high-risk environments could 
make an organisation’s requests for donations more compelling. It may therefore 
be worth delivering help with a greater security risk to the organisation. 
The humanitarian action is threatened by the competitive aid environment, 
forcing organisations to pay attention to institutional imperatives. Since 
collaboration incurs costs, organisations are unlikely to take part in 
collaborative initiatives unless they can identify a body that is prepared to cover 
such costs. As a way to overcome this challenge, the job of coordination should 
be reconsidered to pay attention to the creation of organisational cultures that 
encourage improved inter-organisational trust and information-sharing. 
2.21 Conclusion 
This review has shown that it  is difficult to describe the INGO community as a 
uniform group, as there are too many diverse mandates, structures, policies, and 
practices. With no uniform definition of an NGO in existence, each INGO is 
typically defined according to which of the humanitarian principles and values 
are emphasised, and in what operational context.  
Despite reports of a total development aid for 2010 at over $500 billion, it is 
difficult to estimate how much of the funds INGOs spend on security.  What is 
clear, however, is that staff safety continues to be of great concern due to the 
repeated attacks on INGO staff and organisations. In fact, as the “humanitarian 
space” is shrinking, it is likely that INGOs will have an increased vulnerability 
to attacks. Security concerns are therefore omnipresent in today’s field 
operations, but while INGOs in the past were relying on the guiding principles 
as a mean of security, there has been a need to adapt security procedures 
suitable for today’s operating environment. 
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In the next chapter, the literature review will investigate a core topic of this 
research: hostage management. Although it is broadly accepted that INGOs need 
better security management and protocols, there is currently a lack of basic 
empirical knowledge about the existing security management protocols with 
reference to existing policies and knowledge. The current capabilities of INGOs 
to handle hostage incidents are also unknown. The chapter will attempt to 
identify why the number of aid worker abductions has risen drastically in recent 
years.  
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CHAPTER 3: HOSTAGE MANAGEMENT 
3.1 Introduction  
The first part of this chapter aims to foster an understanding of the hostage 
phenomenon. In order to do so, it will present the literature available on 
definitions of hostage taking and examine the difference between hostage taking 
and kidnapping. Particular attention will be paid to the definitions used by 
INGOs. This chapter will also explore the literature on international instruments 
and frameworks surrounding hostage taking, drawing conclusions about their 
relevance for INGOs. Finally, the review will examine the degree to which 
INGOs operate in the world’s ‘hostage hot-spots’.  
Whilst it is nearly impossible to cover all of the material relating to this subject, 
the researcher has reviewed leading writers’ and theorists’ discussions on the 
subject of hostage taking and kidnapping, with an emphasis on INGO 
application of policy and theory. Much of the research on hostage negotiation 
and the psychology of hostage survival derive from the United States, 
particularly from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation on negotiation and 
from the US military on survival. Hostage management as a field originated with 
the FBI’s Dr. Harvey Schlossberg, and much of the writing and thinking around 
the topic of hostage taking has continued to emerge from the above-mentioned 
institutions. Furthermore, many of today’s hostage management practitioners 
and academics have backgrounds as FBI or US police negotiators. 
3.2 Definitions 
The word ‘hostage’ is derived from the Latin word hospes, which means 
‘hospitality’. Hence, it is understood that there is a relationship between the 
hostage taking concept and the origin of this phrase. This term reflects the 
recurrent political and military utilisation of hostages in ancient times, when one 
or more hostages would be handed over by political authorities as an assurance 
of trust in the observance of obligation (Strentz, 2012, p. 3). 
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This concept has evolved immensely in both meaning and matter (Faure, 2003, 
p. 469) since the term originated. In current parlance, a hostage is someone who 
is captured or held as security for the accomplishment of a certain condition 
(Oxford Dictionary, 2013), and a hostage event is an incident in which one or 
more people are captured against their will by a group or by individuals, 
generally by force, after which the hostage takers make demands (Giebels et al., 
2005, p. 241-253). 
Hostage taking has also been described as ‘a way of setting up a bargaining 
position that cannot be as conveniently or well achieved by other means… [it] is 
a naked power play’ (Cooper, 1981, p. 1). Gary Noesner, the former Head of the 
FBI Hostage and Crisis Unit, gives another definition whereby ‘a hostage 
incident is carried out by a suspect involved in determined behaviour for the 
accomplishment of certain results that signifies substantive gain for the suspect. 
In this context, hostages serve as true bargaining chips that can be traded for 
something’ (Hammer, 2007, p. 39). Tom Hargrove, a former hostage held by 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia - FARC) in Columbia for 334 days, defined a hostage as ‘hostage. The 
deliberate creation and marketing of human grief, anguish, and despair’ (Lopez, 
2011, p. i).  
The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution 34/146 of 17 
December 1979, states that: 
Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or 
to continue to detain another person (hostage) in order to compel a 
third party, namely, a state, an international intergovernmental 
organisation, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, 
to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit 
condition for the release of the hostage commits the offense of 
taking hostages within the meaning of this Convention (United 
Nations, 1979).   
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There exists a scientific difference of meaning between the terms ‘hostage 
taking’ and ‘kidnapping’. Poland (1988, p. 137) differentiates kidnapping and 
hostage taking by defining the former as ‘[seizing and] restraining the victim to 
some secret location and making demands’, while hostage taking entails a direct 
argument with officials of a government or an organisation at a known location 
while the victims are kept secure in that location. These definitions do entail 
some problems and Poland acknowledges that the distinction is often not very 
clear.  
Attempts have been made within the NGO community to reach common 
definitions in the security field. The paper ‘Creating Common Security 
Terminology for NGOs’ (Dick, 2010, p. 17-20) examined security documents 
from a total of 32 organisations, and it contributes successfully towards 
providing such commonalities. Dick’s is the definitive work in defining security 
terminology among NGOs. As security documents are generally sensitive within 
an organisation, complete anonymity was maintained in the collection of data. It 
is therefore not possible to determine whether the INGOs participating in this 
research took part in Dick’s research. The definitions below are those that are 
identified in the paper as relevant to this study: 
3.2.1 Detention 
The term ‘detention’ has been defined by four INGOs in their security reports. 
The four definitions are quite similar and all focus on an individual or group of 
people holding the detained person involuntarily with no intention to harm, as 
well as with no clear condition to release the hostage (Dick, 2010, p. 17). Of the 
four organisations, one observed that detentions were found to be common at 
security check points, while another organisation observed that there may be 
many a reason for detention, including lack of satisfaction with a specific 
activity or agency (Sheik et al., 2000, p. 321).    
The basic definit ions for detention provided in the dictionary used for Dick’s 
study, the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, may not be suitable for the 
present research, as these establish ‘the detainer’ as a member of the security 
forces, while non-governmental organisations frequently function in domains in 
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which the government might not be the accountable authority. It is therefore 
necessary to apply an expanded definition which allows for a non-official person 
to be the detainer capturing or holding individuals (Dick, 2001, p. 17).  
3.2.2 Abduction 
A definition of abduction was provided by five organisations in Dick’s study. 
The term was described as the act of an individual or group of people taking 
someone unwillingly without providing any demands. Of the five, three 
categorised detention and kidnapping as abduction until a demand was made. 
Organisations did not provide any definition for detention with specific relation 
to the taking of hostages, but security guidelines discussed abduction as ‘the 
instant period after the holding of employees’. The definition of the word 
‘abduction’ in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary emphasises the physical 
taking of a person involuntarily; this sets it apart from detention, in which a 
person is held for a longer period of time. Therefore, the process of abduction 
precedes detention (Dick, 2010, p. 18).  
3.2.3 Kidnapping 
While most of the organisations surveyed by Dick discussed kidnapping and the 
measures to be taken if a staff member should be kidnapped, only four 
organisations defined the term ‘kidnapping’. Generally, kidnapping is used for 
monetary gain or other concessions, generally referred to as ransom (Dick 2010, 
p. 19). Out of the four organisations, one noted that it is difficult to determine 
whether an incident should qualify as a kidnapping, a detention or a hostage 
situation unless and until a demand has been made. The definition of kidnapping 
in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary does not mention the aspect of 
threatening harm; it  does, however, include the aspect of demanding money in 
exchange for freeing the kidnapped party.     
3.2.4 Hostage situation  
The term hostage or hostage situation was defined by five organisations 
participating in Dick’s research. All five defined a hostage condition as one in 
which a person is seized unwillingly by another person or by a group which 
proceeds to make demands, mainly from family, authorities, an organisation or 
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other related groups, to be met in exchange for the release of the hostage (Dick 
2010, p. 19). The conditions frequently specified by the captors for release of 
political hostages include:  
 Getting attention for a political cause: The hostages will not be 
released until the hostage takers have gained attention for a political 
view. This was often the primary demand made by the Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional (ELN) in Colombia, which, according to País Libre, 
a Colombian foundation for victims of abductions, abducted more than 
3,000 people between 2000 and 2007 (País Libre, 2013).   
 Hostage release in exchange for the release of political prisoners or 
other hostages, or guarantees for an individual being held by 
authorities to avoid prosecution: This has been seen as recently as 2012 
in Mali, where two Islamists were freed in Mauritania in exchange for 
three European hostages (BBC World). 
Dictionary definitions are similar to those of INGOs and reflect the concept that 
hostage release is conditional and based on the satisfaction of a particular 
demand.   
As seen above, there is a technical difference in the definition between hostage 
taking and kidnapping. In order to minimise confusion, this paper will refer to 
hostage taking and kidnapping interchangeably, as both terms are used in United 
Nations and INGO operations as well as in previous research in the field. 
3.3  Types of Hostage Incidents   
At the onset of a crisis, it is important to identify which type of a crisis event is 
occurring. A significant portion of the FBI’s training for commanders is based 
on this issue (Noesner, 1999, p. 8). It may appear a simple matter, but it can be 
more complex than it first appears, and the response and likelihood of success 
may be dependent on correct identification. 
Politically motivated hostage takers, especially terrorists, have been identified 
by some authors as the most difficult with whom to reach an agreement (Soskis 
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and Van Zandt, 1986, p. 423-435). Several authors distinguish ad hoc 
negotiations, (e.g. those directed at releasing hostages or ending a hijacking), 
from political negotiations (often conflated with concessions). The former are 
perceived as problematic but sometimes unavoidable, while the latter remain 
counterproductive and dangerous (Wardlaw, 1989, p. 164; Clutterbuck, 1985, p. 
232-248). There are a number of reasons for this, and they are predominately 
linked to the hostage takers’ firm objectives and ideology. In many cases 
hostage takers or terrorists motivated by politics or religion make demands that 
are expressive rather than instrumental. In these cases, the hostage taker may 
simply be giving vent to hate, anger or desire for vengeance rather than aiming 
to achieve clearly deﬁned tactical goals.  
As seen in the theoretical framework, INGO hostage cases are almost entirely 
well planned abductions, indicating an instrumental focus. In other words, it is a 
rational action with the aim of delivering substantive demands. In a crime-gone-
wrong, family dispute, or a siege, the hostage case is often dominated by 
expressive behaviour, which is often about venting emotional opinions, and with 
no clear goal. However, even instrumental cases will experience considerable 
emotionality, especially in the chaos of the incident onset (Romano, 2002). As a 
result both hostage-takers and victims vulnerable towards to slipping into a 
crisis, that can require intervention using a suitable crisis management 
technique. Alexander and Klein (2009, p. 17) agree, and state that motives can 
be separated into the ‘expressive’ (i.e. an attempt to voice and/or publicize a 
grievance or express a frustrated emotion) as well as the ‘instrumental’ (i.e. an 
attempt to get a particular result such as the payment of ransom). In reality, it  is 
almost always difficult to identify any single motive, especially when the event 
is terrorist-inspired. Material motives, such as ransom money, could be 
portrayed as political, moral, or religious, but then allowed to be “negotiated 
down” to ransom payments.  Ransoms could also be used to finance political and 
religious activities. Some insurgency groups also sell hostages to other groups 
for their own purposes. 
Where demands are political there is a framework to manage individual cases, 
and that framework is known by all concerned. Since the demands in political 
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cases tend to be for changes in legislation or prisoner releases, they have a 
tendency to be resolved inside the diplomatic arena and not by an INGO. 
Economic kidnapping, unlike political kidnapping, is motivated by a wish for 
profit and must be analysed in different terms. And although political 
kidnapping can be rational or objective when it comes to motives and goals, the 
potential risks political kidnappers are prepared to take for their causes tend to 
be more extreme and more unpredictable compared to those that economic 
kidnappers take in quest for money. It can thus be argued that the majority of 
INGO hostage cases, as economically motivated, are ‘rational’ when it comes to 
their motives and goals.   
Though there is overlap between the groups that execute economic and political 
kidnapping, the two crimes have different motivations and the dynamics that 
govern them are distinct. A complete familiarity with the differences is 
important in order to meet the new challenges posed by economic kidnapping 
(Briggs, 2001, p. 4-5). 
Hostage takers with ‘expressive’ motives are particularly unpredictable. If their 
hatred or desire for vengeance is strong enough there is nothing the authorities 
can do but try to reach the hostages before they are murdered (Wilkinson, 2006, 
p. 119). In addition, many terrorists see negotiation as a betrayal of their cause 
and their group belonging, and loyalties prevent them from making independent 
decisions. In addition, the usually careful and thorough planning behind such 
abductions, the high level of commitment, and the achievement of a position of 
real or perceived power make for an environment less conducive to resolution 
(Bahn, 1978, p. 3-7). The groups behind political hostage takings attempt to 
reach their ultimate political goals by first carrying out more immediate and 
focused activities, such as hostage taking, and thereby raising the human cost for 
an NGO to remain in their area of operations and deliver their programme 
activities (Libicki et al., 2007, p. xiv).  
In certain conditions, people abduct their own family members or friends. In the 
case of an INGO, they may abduct their colleagues. The hostage event can be 
described as a person or group of people detained by another person 
involuntarily in order to force a third party to comply with substantive demands 
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(Noesner, 1999, 6-12). Such substantive demands cannot be provided or 
achieved without the hostage, so the hostage is not the target, but a bargaining 
tool. An example of such a scenario could be a former employee taking a staff 
hostage, while demanding his job back, as was the case of the infamous Manilla 
bus hijack, where disgruntled former senior inspector Rolando Mendoza of the 
Manila Police District (MPD) hijacked a tourist bus carrying 25 people in an 
attempt to get his job back. His anger was not with the hostages, but towards the 
mayor and the police department. However, he felt he needed the hostages to 
ensure sufficient leverage to be reinstated.  
3.4  Legal Frameworks and International Conventions against 
Hostage Taking 
Hostage taking is covered by a number of conventions and declarations, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which guarantees inter alia 
the right to life, liberty and security of person, freedom from torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, freedom of movement, protection from 
arbitrary detention (United Nations, 1948).  Depending on circumstances, the 
situation of persons taken in captivity by terrorist hostage takers amounts to a 
violation of virtually every right listed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948). 
The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages is the only binding 
treaty addressing terrorist hostage taking (United Nations, 1979). Though the 
Convention has only 39 signatories, it has a further 170 parties that binds a State 
to implement the Convention. Since hostage-taking is sometimes considered a 
modus operandi of terrorists, other instruments on (specific aspects) combating 
terrorism adopted by international, regional or national bodies apply to terrorist 
hostage-taking situations. It states that:  
In so far as the Geneva conventions of 1949 for the protection of war 
victims or the Protocols Additional to those Conventions are 
applicable to a particular act of hostage taking, and in so far as States 
Parties to this Convention are bound under those conventions to 
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prosecute or hand over the hostage taker, the present condition shall 
not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed in the course of armed 
conflicts as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 
Protocols thereto, including armed conflicts mentioned in article 1, 
paragraph 4, of Additional Protocol 1 of 1977 (United Nations, 2005). 
Various global, regional or intergovernmental bodies have also adopted 
resolutions and decisions requesting the criminalisation of terrorist hostage-
taking. However, the various instruments neither unequivocally address the 
legality of payment of ransom to terrorist hostage-takers nor provide for the 
rights and entitlements of all categories of individual and collective victims of 
terrorist hostage takers (Heinz, 2012, p. 11). 
On 18 December 1985, the UN Security Council Resolution Against the Taking 
of Hostages was adopted by a 15 to 0 vote. UN conventions require that a nation 
use its own judicial system to implement and enforce the agreement; UN 
resolutions, on the other hand, are simply agreements on a particular set of 
principles or goals. Hence, conventions are more binding than resolutions, since 
resolutions do not imply a commitment to enforcement. Nevertheless, the United 
Nations has no direct power to force a nation to abide by any of its agreements 
(Enders and Sandler, 2006, p. 174). The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court states that ‘hostage-taking constitutes a war crime’ and the 
aforementioned Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional 
Protocols of 1977 consider hostage taking a breach of the protection of victims 
of war (United Nations, 2005). 
Following several decades during which hostage taking featured regularly on the 
list of examined issues, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted 
numerous resolutions including Resolution 2005/31, which condemned hostage 
taking and urged all thematic special procedures to continue to address, as 
appropriate, the consequences of hostage taking. Other resolutions on hostage 
taking include:  
Res. 2003/40 of 23 April 2003; Res. 2001/38 of 23 April 2001; 
Res. 2000/29 of 20 April 2000; Res. 1999/29 of 26 April 1999; 
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Res. 1998/73 of 22 April 1998; Res. 1997/28 of 11 April 1997; 
Res. 1996/62 of 23 April 1996; Res. 1992/23 of 28 February 1992; 
Res. 1991/40 of 5  March 1991; Res. 1990/36 of 6 March 1990; 
Res. 1989/26 of 6  March 1989; Res. 1988/38 of 8 March 1988; 
Res. 1987/28 of 10 March 1987; Res. 1986/49 of 12 March 1986; 
and, Res. 27 (XXXVII) of 11 March 1981 (Heinz, 2012, p. 3). 
3.5  History of Hostage Taking 
Hostage taking is not a new phenomenon. It has been used as a tactic for 
applying geopolitical power for over 2000 years (Hammer, 2007, p. 39), when it 
was a common and rightful policy of government diplomacy. Hostage taking was 
a tactic used by the Roman Empire to ensure the conquered populations did not 
rebel (Poland and McCrystle, 1999, p. xi). As McMains and Mullins (2010, p. 5) 
explained, the Israelites and their adversaries also had the tendency to imprison 
each other in order to reduce the man power of opponents and to force those 
opponents to surrender. One can consider historical hostage incidents such as 
the kidnapping of Helen of Troy and the abduction of Julius Caesar in 51 BC, 
resulting from the need for money, as additional examples. In order to obtain 
money or merchandise from others, pirates also took hostages in the post-
biblical period. 
Perhaps the earliest recorded hostage incident is described in Genesis 14 of the 
Old Testament of the Bible, in which Lot is taken hostage (Soskis and Van 
Zandt, 1986). The kidnap and successful release of Abraham’s nephew Lot, with 
the help of the armies of four kings, involved many elements of hostage 
management: the abduction, negotiations with other kings, and the eventual 
hostage rescue, which involved 318 soldiers helping Abraham to save his 
nephew. This is the earliest evidence of the use of force to save the life of a 
hostage. 
Later examples and milestones in the history of hostage taking show that King 
John II of France was captured and kept hostage by the English. He was not 
released until a ransom was paid. Later in the fourteenth century King Leopold 
of Austria took Richard the Lionheart hostage and held him for 14 months until 
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England paid his ransom. Despite having been a common tactic since the 
beginning of time, hostage taking has enhanced societal anger, frustration and 
feuds, often leading to loss of life rather than solving a problem (Greenstone, 
2005, p. xiii). 
The English phrase ‘to kidnap’ was first recorded in 1682 with reference to the 
practice of taking, or ‘napping’, children, or ‘kids’, for use as slaves (Lauvik, 
2008, p. 109). In more recent times, hostage taking has increasingly been used 
as a tactic to achieve political aims. Examples include the abductions at the 
Munich Olympics in 1972, the Iranian Embassy siege in London in 1980, and a 
number of abductions of foreigners in Lebanon in the late 1980s. These large 
events led directly to the development of more sophisticated management 
practices. In particular, the Munich Olympic massacre exposed a number of 
vulnerabilit ies from a structured management point of view. McMains and 
Mullins (2010, p. 2) highlighted the influential nature of that incident in 
pointing out that the fundamental concepts in building a contemporary police 
hostage/crisis negotiation were introduced by Dr. Harvey Schlossberg and 
Lieutenant Franz Bolz of the New York City Police Department following the 
tragedy in Munich. 
Hostage taking and abduction have been the choice of political terrorists since 
the middle of 1990s. Poland (2005, p. 137) noted that, as per statistical reports 
from law enforcement agencies, terrorists have taken two thousand individuals 
hostage over the past decade. Hostage taking as a tactic has been especially 
favoured by terrorist groups in Italy, Ireland, Central and South America, and 
the Middle East. In particular, second generation terrorist groups tend to make 
frequent use of abductions. Second generation groups are those that may trace 
their origins to political causes or ethnic or national freedom efforts but that 
have since lost their ideological orientation, (though not necessarily the 
associated rhetoric), and have become merely self-indulgent criminal terrorists 
(Bolz et al., 2001, p. 68). In the past decade, the tactic of hostage taking has 
continued at an amplified level, including events such as the Moscow Theatre 
siege in 2002 (Anderson, 2009, p. 102) and the Beslan School siege in 2004 
(Anderson, 2009, p. 74).  
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3.6  Hostage Taking in the 21st Century  
Today, hostage taking is regarded as a severe criminal offence and a human 
rights violation which is rebuked by a United Nations resolution and stated as a 
war offence under the Article 147 of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which 
prohibits the act of taking civilians as hostages (United Nations, 1949). 
Due to the nature of hostage taking as illegal and therefore usually secret in 
nature, the number of recorded incidents is estimated to be much lower than the 
actual numbers of incidents. What is clear, however, is that hostage taking is 
likely to continue as a menace. Poland (2005, p. 18-19) has found that the 
following factors may influence the growing trend of hostage taking and 
abductions: 
 As a result of advanced globalisation and the end of the Cold War, there 
has been a relaxation in national boundaries and border control. As a 
result, populations move more easily, and it is now more common for 
people to visit, work and live in foreign countries. Access to foreigners 
has therefore become relatively easy, and foreigners often represent 
attractive targets as hostages. A local community may be upset if one of 
their own is taken hostage, but less so with a foreigner. Further, taking 
foreigners hostage brings the interests of another country to bear on the 
hostage takers’ conflicts and issues. 
 Many populations around the world, especially those in developing or 
conflict countries, have been isolated and prevented from enjoying the 
benefits of globalisation. Many areas where INGOs operate are 
impoverished; foreigners there are often perceived as wealthy, and they 
also represent an outside element in the society. These facts have led to a 
larger pool of groups that hostage takers can influence. 
 A sequence of actions taken post 2001 by the US-led coalition forces and 
the United Kingdom, with the support of other NATO as well as non-
NATO countries, accelerated hostage taking and abduction in many parts 
of the world, particularly in Iraq. The so-called ‘war on terror’, the term 
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commonly applied to an international military campaign which started as 
a result of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, 
has led to a push-back that can also be credited for the growing trend of 
hostage taking and abduction all over the world. While each side can 
argue its actions as a response to the activities of the opposing side, it is 
clear that some terrorists opted for abductions as a tactic in their attempts 
to take revenge on their enemies. As these forces cannot win a traditional 
war, they have opted for hostage taking and kidnapping in order to fight 
against better organised armed forces (Bibes, 2001, p. 243-258).  
With the advancement of social media, it  is increasingly easy to reach a large 
public. As a result, hostage taking and abduction cases have become very 
effective in delivering messages important to their cause or to put pressure on 
families. Van Zandt (1993, p. 32-36) explained that the media’s influence has 
been effectively utilised by the terrorist groups. While the hostage taking may 
occur in an isolated area, the news of it  can reach the entire world through the 
media. The most prominent examples of media attention to a hostage situation 
may well be the Munich Olympic hostages (1972), the OPEC siege (1975), the 
US Embassy siege in Iran (1979-1981), the Iranian Embassy siege in London 
(1980), and the Japanese Embassy siege in Lima (1996-1997), all of which 
received high television viewer ratings.  
Depending on the source, there are between 15,000 and 25,000 kidnappings and 
hostage takings annually. Because there is no global watchdog group, and 
because many kidnappings go unreported, it is difficult to estimate the exact 
global rates. Ann Hagedorn Auerbach (1999), in her examination of 
international kidnappings that occurred over a two-year period from 1997 to 
1999, states that statistics concerning kidnappings are problematical. Auerbach 
found that many incidents were not reported and that the incidents that were 
reported may not have been accurately reported as a result of political reasons. 
She believes that only 30 per cent of kidnappings on a worldwide basis are 
reported and that ‘in some countries, the reporting rate is as low as 10 per cent’ 
(Auerbach, 1999, p. 435; Lopez, 2011, p. 86). What is clear is that there has 
been an increase in incidents, especially in the developing world (Epps, 2005, p. 
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128). Kidnapping is also widespread. In a check of US Department of State’s 
Travel Warning website on 29 December 2012, 55 countries were listed with 
warnings against kidnapping, abductions or hostage taking. 
In 1999, 20 aid workers were abducted, while in 2009 the number was 92 
(Stoddard et al., 2009, p. 9). The Aid Worker Security Report for 2012 
concludes that ‘after declining in 2010, total incidents of violence against aid 
workers rose again, particularly kidnappings’. The verified and analysed data 
(Table 3.1) from the Aid Worker Security Database show that, since 2009, 
kidnappings have become the most frequent means of violence against aid 
workers, showing the steepest and steadiest rise of all tactics over the past 
decade. According to the data, the majority of kidnappings of aid workers (at 
least 85 per cent) do not end in the death of the victim or victims; rather, they 
commonly end with a negotiated release, with a small number of rescues and 
escapes. It should be noted also that the data set likely does not capture all cases 
of kidnapping, as some organisations and victims’ families keep the crime and 
negotiations secret. It is reasonable to assume, then, that there are even greater 
numbers of (survived) kidnappings than shown, particularly of national staff 
who work for the INGOs/NGOs in their countries. 
Table 3.1: Major attacks on aid workers – Summary statistics of kidnapping (2000 
– 2011) 
 
Source: The Aid Worker Security Report for 2012 
The researcher’s own data supports the above. The researcher has compiled, 
merged, verified, and analysed data from a range of open sources as well as 
from a few restricted organisational sources. The researcher makes no claim to 
have identified all hostage cases, but believes the data in Table 3.2 represents 
the most comprehensive data set available.  
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The data on days in captivity of hostage cases from 2000-2012 (Table 3.2) again 
show a clear upwards trend: 
Table 3.2 Database of aid worker hostage cases – Days in captivity (2000 – 2012) 
 
Source: Kjell Lauvik, 2013 
A Control Risk analysis states that ‘most susceptible to increases in the crime 
have been those countries destabilised by conflict or where increases in foreign 
investment have not been supported by an enhanced security infrastructure’ 
(Control Risk, 2013, p. 83-84). Typically, these are the environments in which 
INGOs operate, a fact supported by the researcher’s own database.  
It is also clear that a large number of INGOs are affected by hostage taking. In 
the researcher’s own database, compiled predominantly from open sources, 144 
agencies are found to have had staff taken hostage since the year 2000. Not all 
of these agencies are INGOs, as the database compiles data of those carrying out 
what in the open sources is called aid work or humanitarian work. Based on the 
totality of the above data, it should be acknowledged that the prevalence of 
kidnapping incidents has increased (Epps, 2005, p. 128).  
Because holding a hostage with the hope of exchanging the person for 
concessions has proved so effective throughout time, it is easy to understand 
why it is in use by so many different kinds of groups. While abduction and 
hostage taking by terrorists are considered and accepted as a major threat to 
stability in many places, it must be emphasised that terrorists and rebels are not 
responsible for all of the abductions that take place worldwide. Organised 
criminals who attempt to obtain money through abductions are also very active, 
with the blurred lines of description regarding what constitutes rebels and which 
are terrorists, with both acting as organised crime groups involving illegal trade 
of drugs and abductions to fund their terror activities (Bibes, 2001, p. 245-248). 
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3.7  Motivations for Hostage Taking   
While taking an INGO staff member hostage typically falls under either 
‘economical’ or ‘political’ motivation categories, hostage situations in society in 
general can occur for a number of other reasons. Understanding these 
motivations leads to an understanding of what law enforcement personnel are 
trained for and used to dealing with when managing a hostage crisis. 
Globally, the majority of hostage situations are commonly and incorrectly 
believed to be the results of terrorist acts. They are in fact due to the efforts of 
mentally disturbed people to correct a perceived wrong, or to the desires of 
criminal gangs to seek financial gain (Lauvik, 2008, p. 118). The criminal 
kidnapping is often conducted by organised criminal gangs and can be concluded 
relatively quickly.  In this case, the victim is usually released as soon as an 
exchange of money has taken place. The chances of surviving such a kidnapping 
are very high. Political and terrorist kidnappings, however, can be far more 
complex, and in some cases they remain unresolved for years. 
3.7.1 FBI categories of hostage takers 
The FBI Special Operations and Research Unit (Gleason, 1981, p. 16-18) found 
that people worldwide take hostages in order to attempt to accomplish the 
following: 
 Escape from legal actions: These are often referred to as ‘acts of 
desperation’ and are more common in the Western world. Such a situation 
is typically a result of crime gone wrong or a family dispute. An example 
of this is the crime that led to the development of the modern model of 
hostage negotiation. In January 1973, the New York Police Department 
were called to a Williamsburg, Brooklyn business where four men that 
had vowed to fight to the death were holding twelve people hostage inside 
John and Al’s, a sporting goods store on a busy commercial block of 
Broadway, following a failed robbery. The crisis would last 47 hours and 
mark a milestone in the New York Police Department’s method of 
managing hostage situations. Rather than brute force, law enforcement for 
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the first time used psychology, firearm discipline, and patience to 
terminate the siege, techniques that would be codified inside the 
department’s hostage negotiating training programme that began later that 
year (McFadden, 1973, p. 63).  
 Furthering of a campaign of terror: In such a case, the hostages are 
taken not as a commodity to be used during negotiations, but as a tool to 
spread fear. This can be an effective tool, as many of these hostages are 
killed. The hostage takers try to gain as much media attention from these 
cases as possible to achieve the maximum effect of fear from each 
incident.  This type of hostage taking was used successfully in Iraq from 
2003-2008. Sometimes these situations are coupled with completely 
unrealistic demands, such as ‘all foreign troops must leave within 12 
hours or the hostages will be killed’ or ‘all prisoners must be freed by 
noon tomorrow’. These demands are simply attention grabbers as the real 
objective all along has been to kill the hostages. The killings are often 
documented and distributed, primarily on the internet, after they have 
occurred so that the hostage takers can continue to spread fear long after 
the incident has ended. 
 Political change: Hostages might be selected because of their nationality 
or the activities or support of the organisations they work for. The 
demands from the hostage takers often include withdrawal of the 
organisation’s support for the government, prisoner release, or withdrawal 
of the organisation from the country. In these cases the hostage situations 
are almost certainly public, as the hostage takers aim to gain as much 
attention for their cause as possible. They also seek to cause their 
political opponents as much discomfort as possible through the media. 
The outcome of hostage situations in these cases depends entirely on the 
motivation and goal of the abductors.  
 The kidnapping of the Israeli athletes by Palestinian Fedayeen (‘Self-
sacrificers’), members of Black September, at the 1972 Olympic Games 
in Munich, is one such example. Although hostages and terrorists died in 
a failed rescue attempt, the stated goal of Black September was to obtain 
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the release of 234 Palestinians and non-Arabs who were imprisoned in 
Israel. In addition, they wanted Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, the 
creators of the infamous terrorist group that bore their names, to be freed 
from jails in Germany. An indication that the attackers were not suicidal 
was that they asked for their safe passage to Egypt (Calahan, 1995, p. 3-
4). 
3.7.2 Fuselier and Gray categories of hostage takers 
Fuselier (1981, p. 10-15) and Gray (1981, p. 14-18) identified two further global 
categories of hostage takers in general: 
 Psychologically affected or mentally unstable people  
 Criminals who take hostages for monetary gain 
3.7.3 Mentally unstable hostage takers 
The mentally unstable may kidnap or kill for the thrill of it , from confusion, or 
due to psychosis. As the category ‘mentally unstable’ is a broad one, it is here 
divided into four sub-categories; the paranoid/schizophrenic, the 
psychopath/sociopath, the inadequate, and the depressed. The following 
descriptions are drawn from published work by the researcher (Lauvik, 2008, p. 
128-130). 
The paranoid / schizophrenic  
The paranoid or schizophrenic will sometimes see himself as a very important 
person, and will refer everything to him. Due to the nature of his mental 
condition, he will believe that everybody is out to ‘get’ him, and will be on 
extreme alert towards being fooled or harmed.  This makes it very difficult to 
obtain trust, or even build rapport, with him. In the most dangerous cases the 
hostage taker believes he is on a ‘mission’, often from God or any other supreme 
power, and is there to carry out the ‘big plan’. Because he might suffer from 
hallucinations, it will seem very real to him. Paranoid schizophrenics are often 
of above average intelligence, and will not respond favourably to attempts to 
fool or trick him. If dishonesty is suspected from their side, trust will be almost 
impossible to re-establish.   
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The psychopath / sociopath  
The second category of mentally ill hostage taker is that of psychopath or 
sociopath.  Such a person will manipulate his operating environment for his own 
gain. He will generally show very little sympathy or loyalty to others, and will 
rarely accept blame himself if anything goes wrong. It is always somebody 
else’s fault. Because this category of hostage taker does not have the moral 
values that are normal in society, so he will not feel guilt or remorse towards the 
hostages. This mental condition is never sudden, but often starts in the early 
teens. Some of the symptoms of a developing psychopath or sociopath are 
excessive alcohol or substance abuse, selfishness, and the desire for physical 
pleasure. It might be difficult to identify a person with this disorder, as he will 
appear very articulate and cool. Any demands will be perceived as realistic, in 
stark contrast to that of the schizophrenic. However, the demands will always 
centre on some sort of personal gain for him, usually monetary. This person 
represents some challenges during negotiation, as he is often quite impulsive 
and demands immediate results and satisfaction from his demands or desires. 
The inadequate  
This hostage taker is sometimes seen in crime-gone-wrong scenarios. This 
person sees himself as a loser. He has likely shown poor judgment and problems 
in adapting to new situations and environments throughout his life. The hostage 
situation can be his desperate attempt to obtain his ‘15 minutes of fame’, and 
irrationally prove to somebody that he can achieve something in life. Because 
this person suffers from extremely low self-esteem, he will thrive on the sudden 
attention from media, law enforcement, and onlookers.   
This category of hostage taker is in touch with reality and understands the 
logical consequences of his actions. It is important in these cases to find a way 
for him to save face, so it does not appear that he has failed again. This 
individual is often suicidal.   
The depressed  
The depressed hostage taker may also suffer from low self-esteem, and might 
have a decreased level of self-control due to sleep and appetite disturbance. The 
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depressed can sometimes take their own family members or other people known 
to him, such as friends or colleagues hostage.  His mood changes between very 
irritable or angry to sad and emotional. He feels guilty for acts in the past, and 
often feels unworthy to live. This category of hostage taker is suicidal most of 
the time. In some cases the mental condition makes the hostage taker feel 
responsible for the suffering of people outside of his immediate environment, 
and in extreme cases the entire world. He then sees this situation as punishment 
for causing this suffering to the world. His demands are often vague and can be 
difficult to interpret. In some cases no real demand for the release of hostages is 
provided, it can be ‘just leave me alone’. This person is very dangerous, and will 
often harm the hostages in the belief that he is ‘doing them a favour’.   
3.7.4 The criminal hostage taker motivated by money 
The following extract is drawn from published work by the researcher: 
Hostage taking has changed through history, and a marked shift in 
the profile of the victims has been seen over the past 20 years. The 
victims of kidnapping for ransom used to be predominately adult 
men with a potential for very high pay-out, such as company 
owners. The cases used to be relatively long (months and years), 
and would involve only a minimum level of violence. However, 
over the past few years the victims have increased in number but 
have a lower profile. This is probably because of the burden of 
holding a high profile victim hidden for a long period of time 
combined with increased security for potential high profile 
victims. Now women, children, and men of all ages are victims, 
and the rewards requested are at a lower level. These cases do not 
normally gain much media attention, and are low-profile, short-
term (usually less than a month) business transactions from the 
kidnapper’s perspective. It has also become more common to take 
multiple victims rather than a single one, and the level of violence 
has increased, especially with the use of body mutilation (cutting 
off an ear or finger to make a statement of intent). This particular 
type of mutilation is likely to continue, as kidnappers have found 
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that the ransom is on average paid faster if a piece of the victim’s 
body is delivered together with the demands (Lauvik, 2008, p. 
122-123). 
Kidnapping is big business, and like any other successful business, it has a 
hierarchy and an infrastructure; it also involves specialisation and sub-
contracting. Some groups specialize in surveillance or in performing the actual 
kidnapping, while others have the logistics and infrastructure in place to move 
the victim around or to keep guard over him or her in a fixed location. This is 
advantageous for the kidnappers, as they can compartmentalize information and 
tasks, making it less likely that the police can identify all involved even if some 
people are arrested. 
It is important to understand that most kidnapping for money is a business 
transaction from the kidnapper’s point of view. The kidnapper has a commodity 
to sell, i.e. the victim. These kidnappers are willing to negotiate, but they know 
how much they want and are willing to wait for it. It is a mistake to believe that 
they are unpredictable psychopaths; they are not. In fact, they take hostages for 
a living and are usually very good at what they do. They consider themselves 
businessmen and conduct risk and cost benefit analyses before taking action. 
The business plan is relatively simple, as the kidnappers promise not to harm the 
victim if the money is paid. This leaves the victim’s family or company with 
three options: 
 Pay a negotiated sum of money for the victim’s release. 
 Refuse to pay. 
 Hand the case over to law enforcement for a tactical solution.   
How the case is managed is an individual decision, and each choice has its pros 
and cons. If one pays, the case may be solved quickly, but may land the payer on 
the ‘secure payer’ list of organised crime. That means that the payers are likely 
to become victims of either extortion or kidnapping at a later stage.  If one 
refuses to pay, there is always the risk that the kidnap victim will be harmed, but 
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it  may also contribute towards reducing the business of kidnapping. In addition, 
refusing to pay initially does not mean that an agreement cannot be reached at a 
later stage; it simply allows more time for the victim’s relatives to gather their 
thoughts. The tactical solution can also be risky. The police must set up a trace 
on the ransom and either track the kidnappers to arrest them or attempt to storm 
the stronghold where the victim is being held, which may very well result in the 
injury or death of the hostage. 
3.8  Hostage Taking as Terrorism   
There are currently nineteen global or regional treaties pertaining to the subject 
of international terrorism (Van Leeuwen, 2003, p. 212), but despite this there 
were approximately 600 kidnappings attributed to terrorist organisations 
between 2000 and 2007, in a variety of countries (Likar, 2011, p. 53). However, 
the researcher will deliberately avoid debating what constitutes a hostage taking 
for terrorism purposes and what does not. This chapter will review some 
definitions of terrorism, but it is beyond the scope of the research to define 
terrorism: terrorism scholars have engaged in a decades-long attempt to define 
terrorism, and more than 100 definit ions have been catalogued (Jungman and 
Schmid, 1988, p. 5). These definit ions are often products of people’s needs, 
perceptions, and convenience and are therefore subject to cultural and 
circumstantial influences. For instance, whereas most Westerners regard the use 
of civilian hostages as human shields as an immoral act, it was largely 
considered a legitimate tactic, and a morally justified one, by many in the Arab 
world when used in Iraq in 1990 to prevent bombings. The researcher recognises 
that the type of hostage taking discussed in the research is in some cases 
terrorism, or at least used as a means to fund terrorism, while in other cases it is 
purely for profit. However, since religious and political influences are ever-
present in an INGOs work, hostage taking as terrorism is referred to in the 
discussion when appropriate.  
Hostage taking can be considered a terrorist act when it is used to put pressure 
on states organisations or individuals to generate a climate of fear. Hostage 
taking was a preferred tactic of political terrorists such as the left wing groups 
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the Red Brigade and Baader Meinhof in the mid-1970s and several other groups 
in the Middle East from the late 1980s. It has been referred to as a ‘Weapon of 
Mass Effect’ (O’Shea, 2007), as taking one employee of an organisation can 
leverage all the power of that organisation and force changes. There can even be 
an impact on government policies, as was the case with the Korean hostages 
taken in Afghanistan in 2007. Twenty-three hostages, all missionaries, were 
taken, and the policy of Korean deployments and foreign missions was changed 
when South Korea promised to withdraw its 200 troops from Afghanistan by the 
end of 2007 (Lauvik, 2008, p. 108). The same happened when a Philippine 
national was taken hostage in Iraq; the Philippines withdrew its troops from Iraq 
in July 2004 (CNN, 2004). 
3.9 Overview of Terrorism 
Edmund Burke coined the term ‘terrorism’ in the 18th century to describe 
Maximilien Robespierre’s Reign of Terror during the French Revolution 
(Robertson, 2007, p. v). The violence that happened under Robespierre entailed 
the guillotining of several thousands of people, including children. Senior 
individuals the Committee of Public Safety and the National Convention that 
enforced the policies of ‘The Terror’ were known as ‘Terrorists’. In stark 
contrast to the contemporary usage, the phrase ‘terrorism’ had a decidedly 
positive connotation in those days. Robespierre, the revolutionary leader, firmly 
thought that virtue was the mainspring of a popular government at peace but that 
during the revolution virtue has to be allied with terror to ensure that democracy 
triumph. He appealed famously to ‘virtue, without which terror is evil; terror, 
without which virtue is helpless’ and proclaimed ‘terror is nothing but justice, 
prompt, severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue’ (Robertson, 
2007, p. v).  
First, the régime de la terreur was neither random nor indiscriminate, but was 
very systematic and organised and was definitely deliberate in its approach. 
Further, the objective and justification was the same as can often be found 
today; the creation of a ‘new and better society’ (Hoffman, 2006, p. 2-4). The 
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French Revolution provided an example to future states in terms of the effective 
oppression of their populations, and we are still able to draw analogies today.  
However, terrorism by the means demonstrated during the French Revolution 
existed long before the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the 
implementation of nation states. Before 1648, terrorism was not constrained by 
borders and was widespread (Campbell, 2013, p. 2).  Despite its ancient roots, 
terrorism has only received formal academic attention for a few decades, and 
much of the research has focused almost exclusively on international terrorism 
(Robertson, 2007, p. v). This review will consider terrorism as it relates to 
humanitarian operations, and it will seek in particular to discover any linkage 
between humanitarian operations, terrorism, and hostage taking. 
3.10 Beginnings of Terrorism  
The use of terror as a political weapon is not new and can be found throughout 
history. More than 2000 years ago, the Romans experienced an organised 
terrorist group, Sicarii, also called Dagger-men. Sicarii targeted the occupying 
forces of the Roman Empire, but they also targeted those who collaborated with 
the Romans. They were driven by a belief that they could not follow their faith 
while living under the Romans.  
During the early Twentieth century nationalism intensified across the world. 
Although dissent and resistance were common in several colonial states, and 
quite often led to open warfare, nationalist identities became a center of 
attention for these actions. Many anti-colonial movements found the 
revolutionary extremism of communism attractive for several reasons. Leaders 
of these wars of national liberation saw the advantage of free weapons and 
training provided by the communist bloc, as well as increased international 
legitimacy. A number of these organisations and people utilised terrorism in 
support of their political and military objectives. The Soviet Union’s policies of 
supporting revolutionary struggles everywhere and of exporting revolution to 
non-communist countries provided extremists willing to employ violence and 
terror with methods to realise their ambitions (Donnelly, 1984, p. 67).  
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It was during this period that hostage taking emerged as an organized tactic of 
terror from the rise of urban guerrilla warfare and the revolutionary ideology of 
George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Since the 
Nineteenth century, guerrilla uprisings have been endemic in Latin America; 
formerly, however, the guerrillas operated exclusively in remote rural areas, and 
their strategies and tactics depended on their capability to retreat into and hide 
in the jungle. Not until the theories of Brazilian communist Carlos Marighella, 
set forth in his Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (1969), became popular did 
guerrillas start to operate in cities, which offered several tactical advantages, 
predominately easier infrastructure. The three main purposes of terrorism, 
according to Marighella (1969), are:  
• To disrupt the workings of government and civil authorities. 
• To produce a panic condition among the population. 
• To advertise the terrorist’s cause.  
Hostage taking, particularly when the victim is a key member of a government 
or business leader, accomplishes all these purposes. It provides a tactical 
advantage for the reason that as long as security forces are not able to locate the 
hostage, (which is often almost impossible even with modern tracking 
capabilities), the government is normally compelled to negotiate in some way 
with the terrorists and may acquiesce to some of their demands (Kushner, 2003, 
p. 194). 
3.11 Can Terrorism be Defined? 
Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, Lenin, is attributed to have said that ‘The purpose of 
terrorism is to terrorise’ (Giduck, 2005, p. 37). Defining the purpose of 
terrorism is relatively easy, but creating an overall definition is much harder. It 
has simply proven too difficult to conceive a definition to which all countries 
can agree. This should not come as a surprise; history provides numerous 
examples of great thinkers who debated that, under the right circumstances, 
unconventional tactics were not only a good way of achieving one’s objectives, 
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but also a moral or civic duty. Throughout history, religious leaders have 
philosophised about when ‘holy terror’ is justified and when unjust warfare is 
just. Likewise, many prominent military thinkers have advocated less-than-
honourable tactics as a means of achieving victory. This is the reasoning behind 
the famous phrase ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ 
(Campbell, 2013, p. 8). This expression is used frequently as justification for 
terrorism, and it was popularised by a combination of quotes from two people. 
The first is Carlos Marighella’s claim that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
liberator’. The phrase became more common, however, after Abdel-Rahman 
Abdel-Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa al-Husseini,  better known as Yasser Arafat, 
passionately argued before the United Nations Security Council that his people 
were ‘freedom fighters’ and not terrorists (Lauvik, 2008, p. 77). 
Because a definition of terrorism is politically charged, no universally accepted 
definition exists, and any definitions in use tend to rely heavily on who is doing 
the defining from their own standpoint. Some definitions focus on terrorist 
tactics to define the term, while others focus on the identities of the actors. Yet 
others look at the context and ask whether it is military, political, or criminal. 
In the 1960s the UN General Assembly initiated an attempt to reach a global 
definition of terrorism. Little progress was made, primarily because many states, 
predominately from states supporting an independent Palestine, were reluctant to 
outlaw terrorism unless at the same time the social factors that influence the 
‘causes of terrorism’ were addressed. This remains the most critical dilemma 
facing a world engaged in fighting terrorism, i.e. how to concede that some of 
the grievances that lead ordinary people to support terror organisations are 
indeed legitimate, without at the same time condoning the violent means used to 
reach their objectives.  
In the 1990s the UN General Assembly once again init iated discussions about 
generally defining and outlawing terrorism. The UN General Assembly’s Legal 
Committee issued a rough draft of a convention which reiterated that: 
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the 
general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political 
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purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the 
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, 
ethnic, religious or other nature that may be used to justify them 
(United Nations, 1996, p. 1). 
The convention was not adopted, and there are still disagreements between UN 
member states about this draft.   
Since it has been impossible to reach a definition, this research will use the 
word ‘terrorism’ based on some common denominators in most definitions. For 
this purpose, then, terrorism is considered to be:  
 Intended to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population. 
 Utilised for furthering political or social objectives. 
 Directed towards the civilian population, and not security forces. 
 A crime. 
 In the form of either a threat or force. 
Using this description of terrorism, we find that it is never accidental; all 
terrorists have a cause, motive, or reason for their acts, and all terrorist acts 
involve violence or the threat of violence.  It should be noted that this excludes 
any particular political belief or religion as a factor in the definition of a terrorist. 
3.12 Illegality of Methods   
In all cases, terrorist acts could also be considered a crime, such as murder, 
kidnapping, and arson. United Kingdom Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made 
a statement that resounded throughout the world after the attempt on her life and 
that of her cabinet in 1988; she responded to the assertion that the bombing in 
Brighton, England was a terrorist act when by declaring ‘we are not prepared to 
consider special category status for certain groups of people serving sentences 
for crime. Crime is crime is crime, it is not political’ (BBC World, 2006). She 
denied that violence for political ends could be defined by another name. There 
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are, however, some important distinctions to be made. While ordinary criminals 
may use what we could term terrorist tactics and may terrify their victims, this 
does not make them terrorists. Likewise, a single person pursuing his own cause 
may be a terrorist, but he may also be a lonely person with mental problems.  
Even individual terrorists who are clinically insane have their own reasons for 
committing acts of terrorism, regardless of how illogical, absurd, or invalid they 
may seem to the general population (Lauvik, 2008, p. 76). 
What remains clear though is that the terrorist is a criminal, whether he chooses 
to identify himself with military terminology or with civilian imagery. The 
violations of civil criminal laws are self-evident in activities such as murder, 
arson, and kidnapping regardless of the legitimacy of the government enforcing 
the laws. Victimising the innocent is criminal whether it  takes place under a 
dictatorship or a democracy. If the terrorist claims that he is justified in using 
such violence as a military combatant, he is a de facto war criminal under 
international law and the military justice systems of most nations (Campbell,  
2013, p. 14).   
This blur in distinguishing terrorism and crime makes it challenging to 
determine how many attacks against aid workers are acts of terrorism and how 
many results from crime. Different reporting procedures in various nations’ law 
enforcement agencies also bring the accuracy of the reports into question. To 
illustrate, Figure 2.1 is reprinted here; it is based on data from the aid worker 
security database and illustrates the countries in which the most attacks on aid 
workers were carried out over the ten-year period from 2002-2011.  
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Figure 3.1: Total security incidents by country (2002-2011)  
Source: AidWorkerSecurity.org 
It is notable that every country listed was experiencing a terrorist problem. How 
many of those attacks were actually political in nature (and therefore terrorist) is 
a matter of subjectivity and professional expertise. 
3.12.1 Terrorism in countries with attacks against aid workers 
Of the ten countries with the highest number of attacks against aid workers 
between 2002 and 2011(in order of number of attacks: Afghanistan, Sudan, 
Somalia, Iraq,  DR Congo, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Palestine and 
Chad), most have a high ranking in the Failed States Index and active terrorist 
organisations in the country. Below is a description of the terrorist activities 
toward the aid worker community in these countries. The data on terrorism 
below is extracted from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) database, and the Failed States Index ranking 
is from the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Failed States Index of 2013. 
Afghanistan is seventh on the Failed States Index of 2013. Although 
Afghanistan has sixteen terrorist organisations operative in the country 
according to the START database, the combined efforts of Al-Qaeda and the 
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Taliban is behind most of the attacks. An example of this is the 25 Sept 2003 
attack, when a vehicle for the Voluntary Association for the Rehabilitation of 
Afghanistan, or VARA, was ambushed in southern Afghanistan. One aid worker 
was killed and the driver of the vehicle was injured. Overall, the Taliban are 
behind more than fifty attacks, including nineteen cases of hostage taking. The 
one other organisation to target aid workers is Hizb-I-Islami, which was behind 
the largest attacks against NGOs in Afghanistan. On 6 August 2010 they shot 
and killed ten aid workers from the Nuristan Eye Camp Expedition, a medical 
team from the relief group the International Assistance Mission. 
Sudan, ranking third on the Failed States Index of 2013, does not have a large 
number of terrorist organisations active in the country, but rather appears to be a 
safe haven for groups to operate from. Although Al-Qaeda has a presence, it 
does not operate actively against the humanitarian community. Both the Eritrean 
Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) launch 
cross border operations, but are not targeting NGOs in Sudan. The last 
operational terrorist group in Sudan is the Ummah Liberation Army, which is the 
military wing of the Ummah Party, the main political opposition group in Sudan, 
does not target the aid community. 
The Al-Qaeda associated organisation Al-Shabaab is behind most of the attacks 
against aid workers in Somalia. Somalia clearly tops the Failed States Index of 
2013, but does not host a large range of active terrorist organisations; Al-
Shabaab is too dominant and is behind at least twelve attacks against aid 
workers, including at least 8 cases of hostage taking. The only other group that 
have attacked aid workers in Somalia is al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI). On 21 
March 2004, AIAI opened fire on a vehicle carrying three staff of the German 
Agency for Technical Assistance (GTZ), killing two and injuring one. The 
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), which seeks to establish an 
independent state for the Somali people in the Ogaden region of the Horn of 
Africa, use Somalia as a safe haven for cross-border attacks. 
Pakistan ranks thirteenth on the Failed States Index of 2013. While the country 
has moved in the right direction on the Failed States Index, from tenth in 2010, 
the attacks on, and hostage taking of, aid workers have not decreased. Despite 
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the twenty-nine registered terrorist organisations active in Pakistan, the Taliban 
is the only group with proven direct attacks on NGOs, with at least seven 
attacks. One of the worst in terms of casualties was on 10 March 2010, when 
fifteen Taliban gunmen assaulted an office of World Vision, killing five aid 
workers, injuring seven and damaging the building. 
South Sudan is for the first time listed in the Failed States Index, and enters at  
fourth place. The START database does not have any terrorist organisations 
registered as operational in South Sudan, so the relative high number of attacks 
on aid workers stems from criminal activity or from supporters of Sudan. 
Iraq ranks eleventh on the Failed States Index of 2013, and has over fifty 
terrorist organisations registered in the START database. There have been 
several deadly attacks against the humanitarian community in Iraq, including the 
bombings of the UN main office in Bagdad in August 2003 which killed twenty-
two people, and the bombing of the ICRC office where two staff were killed. In 
addition, there have been a range of hostage takings, such as when on 4 July 
2004, Fadi Fidel, a Canadian citizen working for the International Rescue 
Committee, was abducted by suspect Mahdi Army members. He was mistreated, 
beaten and tortured, but eventually released nine days later. 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) ranks second on the Failed States 
Index of 2013. Despite a large number of security incidents against aid workers, 
there are few terrorist attacks. Some groups, such as the Army for the Liberation 
of Rwanda (ALIR) and the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) 
have operative bases in DRC, but their activities are directed towards their 
target nations. The only registered terrorist attack against aid workers in DRC is 
when on 21 Feb 2001, Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) attacked a truck that was 
carrying food and supplies for the non-governmental organisation, Solidarités 
International. 
Sri Lanka is ranked twenty-eighth on the Failed States Index of 2013, and 
terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka has reduced significantly after the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) admitted defeat on May 17, 2009. The LTTE 
were behind all the registered terrorist attacks against aid workers in Sri Lanka, 
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with at least five attacks, including a claymore attack which killed two civilian 
aid workers. 
The West Bank and Gaza (Palestine) does not appear alone on the Failed States 
Index of 2013, but as part of Israel. Combined, they are the lowest ranked on the 
Failed States Index of the ten countries with the highest number of attacks 
against aid workers between 2002 and 2011, at sixty-seventh place. The West 
Bank and Gaza has over thirty registered terrorist organisations, and it is often 
difficult to determine exactly which group is behind an attack. There have been 
sporadic kidnappings of NGO workers in Palestinian areas over the past years, 
but the hostages have always been freed unharmed, often within hours. 
Chad, ranked fifth on the Failed States Index of 2013, does not have any active 
terrorist groups in the country, and none of the attacks on aid workers can be 
described as terrorism. 
Upon analysis, it becomes clear that of the attacks carried out on aid workers 
over the period 2002-2011, all of those illustrated in Figure 3.2 could be 
classified as both criminal and terrorist in nature. It is only by analysing each 
incident that a motive for an attack becomes clear and that the reason for the attack 
can be identified. 
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Figure 3.2: Trends in tactics (2002 - 2011)  
Source: AidWorkerSecurity.org 
3.13 Global Terrorism Database  
The data from the above tables is to a degree aligned with data on terrorism from 
2012. Data from arguably the most accurate database on terrorism, the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 
reveal that most of the countries with the largest number of terror attacks are 
also countries with a heavy presence of INGOs. Since 2001, START has 
maintained the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), an unclassified event 
database compiled from information in open-source reports of terrorist attacks. 
The GTD data set includes violent acts carried out by non-state actors that meet 
all of the GTD inclusion criteria (Global Terrorism Database, 2013): The violent 
act was conducted to obtain an economic, political, social or religious goal; 
included evidence of intention to deliver some message to society outside of the 
direct victims of the attack; and was in breach of International Humanitarian 
Law protecting non-combatants. 
  
Table 3.3: Ten countries with the most terrorist attacks (2012) 
 
Source:  http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
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Of the above Table 3.3, only India, and perhaps Thailand, do not have a large 
number of INGOs operating in country. A further analysis of data shows that 
although terrorist attacks occurred in eighty-five different countries in 2012, 
they were heavily concentrated geographically. More than half, 55 per cent, of 
all attacks and 65 percent of casualties took place in just three countries: 
Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These are also three of the countries that are 
most highly populated with INGOs.  
3.14 Why Are INGOs Targeted? 
Much of the general population’s perception regarding terrorist conduct and 
behaviour, including during hostage taking, is derived from the media and the 
entertainment industry. This has led the general population, and likely also the 
humanitarian as well as the law enforcement communities, to accept the terrorist 
stereotype as accurately depicting personality traits, dedication, sophistication, 
commitment, and modi operandi (Fuselier and Noesner, 1990, p. 6-11). It is 
therefore useful to include some of the contents of Issue No. 10 of Al-Qaeda’s 
Al-Battar training manuals in this literature review to understand the perspective 
of the hostage taker and the way that Al-Qaeda’s operations are organized and 
conducted. The topic of this issue is how to carry out kidnapping operations. It 
provides several reasons for kidnapping, such as to force the enemy to concede 
to demands, to cause embarrassment between the government and the passport 
nation of the detainees, to get information from the hostages, and to obtain 
ransom payment. Related to ransom payment, the document goes on by stating 
This happened at the beginning of the cases in Chechnya and 
Algeria, with the hijacking of the French plane, and the 
kidnapping operations performed by the brothers in Chechnya and 
the Philippines (SITE-Institute).   
All these objectives can be achieved with an increased likelihood of success 
through the abduction of INGO staff.  
An individual called Al-Mohager al-Islami (the Islamic Immigrant) that is 
prominent in posting messages on jihadi e-group forums produced and made 
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available a nearly 40-page pamphlet entitled The Art of Kidnapping—The Best 
and Quickest Way of Kidnapping Americans. The manual includes information 
for planning raids, the composition of support crews, general rules for these 
crews to follow, observation points, kidnapping suggestions, and methods of 
capturing Americans (Forest, 2007, p. 400).  
The instructions covered in the manuals discussed above reveal that organised 
terrorist groups learn from experience and collate knowledge in a way similar to 
those they may meet as adversaries in a hostage negotiation scenario. It is wise 
to assume, therefore, that the strategies and operational tactics employed in 
hostage negotiation are likely to be known to hostage takers affiliated with 
terrorist groups. 
Therefore, hostage taking will likely remain a tactic, technique, and procedure 
of terrorists to intimidate and extort people, in order to create anxiety, fear, and 
mayhem in support of their immediate, intermediate, or long-term terrorism 
objectives (United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2008, p. 3). In 
many ways, it has the same uses for terrorists as suicide bombing; a weapon for 
those whom perceive themselves to be the weakest party in a conflict to adjust 
this perceived or real asymmetric balance. On a strategic level, it can at least 
partially redress imbalances in capacities, and on a logical level, it  is effective, 
relatively inexpensive, and easily replicable with new targets. It is also effective 
on a tactical level, as it relies on human intelligence and the spread of fear 
radiating from the event (Chaliand and Blin, 2007, p. 29). 
It is paradoxical that the very human beings engaged in saving other lives 
increasingly risk their own. The assumption that humanitarian workers are 
protected by international humanitarian law as long as they act impartially is 
obviously overly optimistic (Eberwein, 2009, p. 3). There can be no doubt that 
INGOs have been targeted by terrorism, but understanding why is more 
complex. In the humanitarian world it  is generally believed that aid workers are 
targeted because they represent an easy mark. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, because of INGOs mandate of delivering assistance they often cannot 
sit in a ‘fortress’, but are forced to operate in areas with high vulnerability. The 
raison d’être of any aid organisation is to assist a given beneficiary population, 
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so in some form or another, access to beneficiary populations is essential. There 
can be no assistance without at least some direct contact and relation with 
beneficiary populations and individuals. An INGO delivering assistance to 
refugees cannot sit in an office removed from their beneficiaries; they are forced 
into often remote areas. This view is supported by Hoffman (2006, p. 2-4), who 
noted that NGOs are targeted for tactical reasons; speciﬁcally, that the nature 
and operations of NGOs make them easy targets. However, if terrorist groups 
are rational, they must consider much more than the relative ease of carrying out 
an attack on a given target.  
The following arguments regarding NGO staff as preferred targets are taken 
from a study by Craig Stapley (2009, p. 83-107) which considered information 
from various databases containing records of terrorist attacks on NGOs. The 
main source materials were the RAND/St. Andrews Terrorism Database and the 
RAND/MIPT (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) Terrorism 
Database, both of which have been compiled primarily from news publications 
worldwide. The database contains approximately 500 cases of terrorist attacks 
on NGOs from 1978 to 2000. It should be emphasised that the purpose of the 
study was not to create empirically testable statistics, but rather to conduct a 
preliminary study in the ﬁeld of target selection focussing particularly on NGOs. 
Stapley’s research identiﬁed ﬁve terrorist targeting imperatives relating 
specifically to NGOs (Stapley, 2009, p. 83-107). These imperatives are:  
 That terrorist groups perceive a real or imagined association 
between the NGO and a political entity (whether state or non-
state). 
 That the NGO, or its agents, engage in political activities that 
bring them into conﬂict with the terrorist group. 
 That the NGO, either actively or by virtue of being what it is, 
represents a threat to the social, cultural, or religious 
environment considered important to the terrorist organisation. 
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 That the NGO becomes a competitor for resources that the 
terrorists desire. 
 That the NGO is relatively soft in terms of ease of attack, and 
as such, are desirable targets. 
Below the researcher will explore each of the imperatives further. 
3.14.1 Association 
The association imperative might explain why terrorists target NGOs: terrorist 
organisations perceive NGOs as having an association with a political entity, 
whether this association exists or is merely perceived to exist. This association 
may be a matter of nationality, donor funding, or religion. Schaffert (1992, p. 
44) captured this targeting imperative when he noted that a terrorist victim is 
‘representative of a target group that is strategically involved in the terrorist’s 
political goals’. As long as an association can be established linking the 
immediate target with the larger audience, then the targeting selection is 
justiﬁed in the mind of the terrorist.  
An association does not have to be solely with a government or a government 
organisation. Indeed, if an NGO is associated with the United Nations, any 
assumptions made about the UN in general may be transferred to the NGO; the 
same is true of umbrella organisations other than the UN. Eighty-four per cent 
of all attacks on NGOs associated with the United Nations or the Red Cross 
occurred in the time period following the United States and coalition invasion of 
Iraq in the First Gulf War. Before that time, attacks on NGOs associated with 
the UN or Red Cross made up 3.8 per cent of all terrorist attacks (Stapley, 2009, 
p. 83-107).  
Stapley’s research determined that 59.7 per cent of terrorist attacks on NGOs 
have an associational component. After the First Gulf War, INGOs increasingly 
were associated with the main military forces involved in the war effort, and the 
perception of neutrality eroded. 
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3.14.2 Political activity 
Terrorism is a fundamentally political phenomenon; therefore, political motives 
must help guide a terrorist group in selecting targets. Hence, if an NGO is 
engaged in activities that conﬂict politically with the terrorist group, that NGO’s 
staff members might become targets. While many NGOs are apolitical in the 
way they organise and carry out their mandates, many are not. A group engaged 
in political struggle might be placed in terrorists’ ‘legitimate’ target category. It 
is not far-fetched to imagine that an NGO that, for example, supports training 
the Transitional Government of Somalia could be seen as a legitimate target for 
Al-Shabaab. This type of situation was cited by Randolph Martin in his 
description of the threats to NGOs. Adding to the threat level is ‘the erosion of 
the accepted neutrality of aid groups, who are seen by some belligerents as 
partisan, interventionist and generally an undesirable presence’ (Martin, 1999, p. 
5). Additionally, Stapley’s research found that about 7.6 per cent of all terrorist 
incidents on NGOs (thirty-four incidents) targeted groups engaged in overt 
political activities. 
Attacks on aid agencies or humanitarian groups have led well-known and 
well-respected groups such as the Red Cross, various UN humanitarian 
agencies, and Action Aid to completely suspend operations and withdraw 
personnel from the regions or countries in question. Aid organisations 
suspended operations due to terrorist attacks seven times in the ten-year 
period from 1985 to 1995 (Stapley, 2009, p. 101). 
It should be stressed that the effects of a political hostage taking are not always 
positive for the abductors. The Beslan hostage crisis on 1 September 2004 
greatly damaged the international public support that Chechen separatists had 
earned in previous years. The incident shocked moderate separatists that had 
previously allowed themselves to be conflated with the Islamists. Exiled 
Chechen separatist Akhmed Zakayev lamented that those willing to take children 
hostage gave all separatists a bad name, stating ‘a bigger blow could not have 
been dealt on us. . .  [n]ow people around the world will think that Chechens are 
beasts and monsters if they could attack children’ (Pape and Feldman, 2010, p. 
274). 
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3.14.3 Competition for resources 
Cooley and Ron (2002, p. 7-9) describe the conflict that has emerged among 
NGOs as they strive for resources in an increasingly scarce marketplace. They 
argue that due to the constraints forced on NGOs by the scarcity of resources, 
NGOs may act in ways that are in conflict with their stated missions. Drawing 
from Cooley and Ron, it can be theorised that terrorist organisations must also 
compete for resources in an increasingly competitive marketplace. In the post- 
11 September world, the major powers have combined to target and remove the 
ﬁnancing pipelines that terrorists counted on for support. Further, countries that 
in the past supported terrorism have later reduced or removed that support due to 
external pressure. It can thus be theorised that as scarcity increases, so will 
attacks for resources, as receiving ransom money directly can be a safer way of 
funding an operation than to rely on outside funding. 
Attacks for resources may be described as logistical targets. Drake (1998, p. 12) 
deﬁnes logistical targets as ‘those which are attacked in order to provide or 
safeguard the group’s resources’. Conducting a terrorist campaign can also be 
costly; while an attack solely for the purpose of garnering money is not a 
political act, and as such, not terrorism, combining an attack in a way that 
allows a terrorist organisation to further one or more of its political goals while 
still obtaining resources is simple multitasking.  
Such attacks are the primary reason behind the hostage taking in the Sahel. 
Recently there appears to have been a shift in international hostage cases, 
whereas more and more cases turned towards monetary ransom rather than 
political objectives. It now appears that terrorists get involved in kidnapping and 
hostage taking in order to fulfil their financial requirements. This shift began at 
the end of the Cold War, when left wing and Marxist groups could no longer 
obtain funds from their old paymaster, the former Soviet Union. Curtis, (2002), 
Jurith, (2003, p. 158), and Billingslea (2004, p. 49) pointed out that as the 
funding from the Soviet Union dried up, terrorists were forced to look for other 
resources. Some opted for trafficking of narcotics (Bibes, 2001; Curtis, 2002; 
Jurith, 2003), while others turned to kidnapping and hostage taking (Memmott 
and Brook, 2006, p. 8; Poland, 2005, p. 18). So, while a number of terrorist 
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groups consider hostage taking and kidnapping as part of their mission (Yun, 
2007, p. 23-26), others are involved only in order to gain financial support 
(Auerbach, 1999; Murphy, 2004). As stated by Maceda (2003), Murphy (2004), 
and Ramachandran (2005), terrorists have gained substantial financial support 
through hostage taking. 
However, financing for the execution of future operations is not the only 
resource needed by terrorist groups. For an organisation to be successful, groups 
need safe havens and access to recruits. Acts such as hostage taking help attain 
coercive objectives, and thus the organisational objective encompasses the 
enlargement and strengthening of a group (Likar, 2011, p. 49). Even a failed 
attempt to take hostages or to negotiate a concession receives a good deal of 
news coverage. By contrast, a bomb attack is over in seconds and receives 
coverage only in its immediate aftermath. And while hostage taking may provide 
substantive concessions that enhance the terrorists’ status, cause, recruitment, 
and funds. Other types of terrorist events seldom result in such concessions.  
3.14.4 Social, religious, or cultural conflict 
In many cases terrorist groups desire to set the agenda for what a population 
thinks and believes and how it lives. This desire may explain the actions of 
fundamentalist terrorist groups. Many of the fundamentalist groups are 
promoting a value system, and they wish to control the beliefs of a population; 
the value system then becomes associated with the structures of government to 
include interpretations of human rights as well as the judicial structure. If an 
NGO introduces a culture or viewpoint different from that of such groups, that 
NGO may be considered a negative inﬂuence.  
Often, NGOs are the vehicle by which Western culture is perceived to be 
transmitted. This is believed by adversaries to be the case both overtly, through 
organisational goals, and covertly, by means of covert messages sent by the 
personnel themselves. The most easily understood challenge to a belief system is 
perhaps religion. Terrorist groups may target religious NGOs if the terrorist 
groups feel that the NGOs are supplanting the religious values that the terrorist 
groups espouse. The SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) has attacked 
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Catholic missionaries and nuns, charging them with ‘spreading Christianity’. 
Attacks in 1992 in Afghanistan and in 1994 in Somalia also targeted Christian 
NGOs on the basis that they were inﬁdels, that were polluting holy land, or that 
they were promoting Christianity (Stapley, 2009, p. 83-107). The NGO database 
records seventy-three incidents, or 16.5 per cent of all attacks on NGOs, which 
can be attributed to attacks on the culture, religion, or society that the attacked 
NGOs represent. 
3.14.5 Soft targets 
The ﬁnal reason for which terrorists choose to target NGOs is perhaps the most 
widespread, and the reason that Hoffman noted when discussing this topic; it has 
to do with the relative ease of carrying out an attack and the security 
environment within which the NGOs and terrorists reside (2001, p. 7-8). Drake 
appears to agree, and theorises that ‘where there is a number of potential targets, 
attacking any of which would yield a roughly equivalent strategic beneﬁt, there 
is a likelihood that the terrorists will choose to attack the softest target, as 
carrying out such an attack represents the least risk to the terrorists’ (Drake, 
1998, p. 179).  
Given the mission of most NGOs, taking measures to reduce the exposure to 
terrorism may work against the achievement of their goals. Religious NGOs may 
feel it necessary to welcome all comers to organisations and facilities. 
Humanitarian groups may need to work outside of cities in order to reach the 
neediest poor and suffering. The end result is that many of these organisations 
ﬁnd typically prudent security measures hard to adopt. Martin (1999) notes that 
for many NGOs there is ‘a conspicuous lack of security among many NGO 
workers combined with a sceptical, if not averse attitude towards the need for 
security and other protective measures’ (Martin, 1999, p. 4-6). 
3.15 NGOs as Terror Support 
Another, darker side of NGOs and terrorism is the use of NGOs as a means for 
terrorists to operate. An NGO presents an almost perfect cover, and can be used 
as such by intelligence agencies, criminals, and terrorists. An NGO allows the 
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terrorist group to acquire the means necessary to survive and operate, to move 
assets and staff to where they are needed, or to store assets and retain staff for 
later purposes. An NGO resourcing process is both internally and externally 
controlled by the terrorist group, allowing for optimal flexibility (Vittori, 2011, 
p. 27). The use of NGOs as a cover is not only a means of acquiring resourcing 
through donations, but also a convenient way of moving and storing those 
resources. An NGO provides crucial capabilities such as a base of operations out 
of its branches, especially if the organisation has a worldwide reach. NGO 
branches also provide a shipping address, housing, employment, identity cards, 
and a recognised reason to be at a particular location.  They can also provide 
access to legitimate bank accounts from which to move money (Pargeter, 2006, 
p. 733-735). 
3.15.1 The four jihads 
At the present time, much of the terrorism directed at NGOs is initiated by 
Islamic fundamentalist organisations. It is important to emphasise that most 
Islamic NGOs are overwhelmingly occupied with humanitarian work. In fact, 
they most often practice the three forms of jihad not associated with the sword: 
the jihad of the heart, or moral reformation; the jihad of the tongue, or 
proclaiming God’s word abroad; and the jihad of the hands, or good works in 
accord with God’s will (Scheuer, 2006, p. 40-42). In addition, many 
organisations practice all four jihads, with a militant wing practicing jihad by 
the sword. Perhaps the best known example of such an organisation is 
Hezbollah. The organisation was originally established to deal with an influx of 
refugees from Southern Lebanon, a social cause, and Hezbollah augmented its 
social services to include charities, humanitarian efforts, and social work in 
general. The group’s extensive financial support has built hospitals, medical 
clinics, schools, orphanages, and centres for the physically handicapped (Post, 
2007, p. 165-167). The researcher observed this first-hand in August and 
September 2006, when he witnessed Hezbollah handing out assistance in the 
form of cash allowances to the populations before the humanitarian and 
development community had begun to conduct needs assessments, let alone 
provide assistance.  
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This is the positive side of Hezbollah, and this is the sole realistic alternative for 
social services in Southern Lebanon. The other side is represented by followers 
of Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the spiritual mentor of 
Hezbollah. Fadlallah had an exceptional interpretation of the where he justified 
hostage taking, assassination, and suicide. Fadlallah stated that death as a 
suicide bomber is no different than that of a soldiers entering battle knowing 
that they would die. He argued that there was no moral distinction between the 
two, and that the only difference was the time of death. To justify Hezbollah 
activities further, often observed in his sermons that ‘there is evil in everything 
good and something good in every evil’. Although he argued that the practices 
of suicide, assassination, and hostage taking were extremes and should only be 
carried out in exceptional times, he considered these to be exceptional times. 
This was the justification for the practice of kidnapping, although the Koran 
specifically necessitates hospitality towards strangers. With regards to the 
kidnapping of thirty-seven Western hostages in 1982, Fadlallah’s followers used 
the exceptional circumstances of the times to warrant violating the strict Koranic 
proscription of kidnapping, stating ‘just as freedom is demanded for a small 
amount of Europeans, it is additionally demanded for the millions of Muslims’ 
(Post, 2007, p. 165-167). 
3.15.2 NGOs established for terror 
It is now evident that several terror organisations actively use NGOs as a 
conduit for funding or operations. Sometimes, NGOs funnel legitimate donations 
from supporters to finance terrorist organisations and activities devoid of the 
explicit understanding of the donors. The Afghan Support Committee (ASC) is a 
nongovernmental organisation established by Osama bin Laden; it claims that 
donations to the organisation are made to widows and orphans, and then uses at 
least a portion of the donated money to finance Al-Qaeda operations (Nance, 
2008, p. 125). The fact is, the Al-Qaeda network has used several NGOs for 
their advantage. Osama bin Laden first gained fame as a humanitarian by 
running the International Islamic Relief Organisation and assisting the 6 million 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Nance, 2008, p. 316). 
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Another example of a multi-purpose NGO is the Benevolence International 
Foundation, an Illinois-based charity located in Bosnia-Herzegovina and run by 
a Syrian holding both US and Bosnian citizenship. This organisation is said to 
have been involved in a range of authentic activities, mixed with terrorist 
activities, such as running an orphanage in Azerbaijan and a tuberculosis 
hospital in Tajikistan, and to assisting in the attempted purchase of uranium and 
providing cash for the 1998 bombing of two American embassies in Africa 
(Vittori, 2011, p. 41). While Al-Qaeda has been the most famous group to utilise 
charities for malevolent ends, it is certainly not the only one. Hezbollah controls 
the Al-Aqsa International Foundation, the Martyr’s Organisation (Bonyad-e 
Shahid), and the Mabarrat Charity Organisation, along with a host of other 
charities located worldwide. HAMAS controls the Orphan Care Society and the 
Al-Islah Charitable Society, among others (Vittori, 2011, p. 60).  
The Tamil Tigers were also adept at using NGOs to advance their goals. The 
leading Tiger NGO was the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, which 
coordinated the activities of all other Tamil NGOs. The Tamil Rehabilitation 
Organisation was believed to be the lead conduit for funds from the US Tamil 
diaspora community to the headquarters and for the facilitation of Tamil Tiger 
procurement in the United States. Another NGO was the International Medical 
Health Organisation, which operated at least 15 Tiger medical centres as well as 
four mobile ones (Vittori, 2011, p. 80-81). 
3.15.3 NGO infiltration 
In addition to forming NGOs for purpose, infiltrating well-known NGOs is also 
effective for more operational reasons. A member of a terrorist organisation 
employed by a humanitarian NGO may be able to vouch for, and provide fake 
identification for, terrorist members; the individual might also be able to arrange 
shelter and transportation. NGOs often have freedoms and advantages that 
regular civilians do not have, such as access to ambulances to clandestinely 
transport weapons or other supplies, or access to refugee camps for recruitment 
(Vittori, 2011, p. 40). For instance, Al-Qaeda members testified that they 
received identification cards from the Nairobi-based Mercy International Relief 
Organisation as they planned the 1998 US Embassy bombings (English, 2004, p. 
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297-299). There have also been a number of circumstances of Palestinian 
terrorists acquiring employment with the United Nations Relief Works Agency 
(UNRWA), the United Nations agency established in 1948 to address the needs 
of Palestinian refugees. At least one of these employees, Nahed Rashid Ahmed 
Attalah, used a United Nations vehicle to transport arms, explosives, and armed 
activists (Schanzer, 2004, p. 102). A 1996 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
report claimed that approximately one third of fifty Islamic nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs) considered in the investigation had employed individuals 
with some sort of terrorist connections (Bergen, 2001, p. 47-48). 
3.16 Managing a Hostage Crisis 
This part of the chapter examines literature that has been published so far in the 
field of hostage incident management with particular reference to preparedness 
and management of obstacles related to INGOs. While it is not feasible to 
survey all of the material surrounding this subject, the researcher has reviewed 
the work of leading writers and theorists on the subject of hostage taking and 
kidnapping, with an emphasis on INGO application of policy and theory. The 
literature contains no extensive studies of hostage crisis management for 
humanitarian and development workers.  
Much has been written by scholars and practitioners on the field of hostage 
taking in general. However, the vast majority of literature is focused on 
identifying negotiation strategies or the various psychological orientations of 
those involved. For instance, Rogan, Hammer, and Van Zandt wrote in 1997 that 
‘hostage negotiation is rapidly emerging as a field of behavioural science 
application, poised to move beyond largely anecdotal accounts of effective and 
ineffective negotiation strategies towards increasing efforts at systematically 
incorporating alternative disciplinary perspectives and employing more rigorous 
methodological approaches for analysing the dynamics of crisis negotiation’ 
(Rogan, Hammer, and Van Zandt, 1997, p. 2). The topic of negotiation is of 
substantial but limited interest to this review, as it remains one of the options in 
a hostage scenario. Other options include payment without negotiation, ignoring 
the demands, and a ‘tactical option’; i.e. a rescue attempt. 
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Another significant portion of the literature on hostage incidents describes 
hostage-barricade situations, and not the more prolonged situations that are the 
target of this research. Such hostage-barricade scenarios are better described as 
sieges, which occur when the police surround a town or building and cut off 
essential supplies with the aim of compelling those inside to surrender (Oxford 
Dictionary, 2013). Sieges take place when the location of the incident is known 
and is surrounded by the authorities. This is not usually the case for hostage 
scenarios involving INGOs, but sieges will be reviewed as they share some 
similarities with at least the early stage dynamics of protracted crises. 
3.17 Policy on Hostage Management 
Most large international organisations, whether for-profit or non-profit, have 
policies in place for managing hostage cases. These are generally based on the 
existing norms of international law as reflected in the International Convention 
against the Taking of Hostages adopted by the General Assembly in its 
resolution 34/146 of 17 December 1979 which, inter alia, provides that ‘the 
taking of hostages is an offence of grave concern to the international 
community, that any person committing an offence of taking hostages shall 
either be prosecuted or extradited, and that States shall make such offences 
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of 
those offences’ (United Nations, 1979).  The United Nations also puts emphasis 
on Security Council Resolution 579 (1985), by which the Council  
unequivocally condemned hostage taking, called for the immediate 
release of all hostages wherever and by whomever they were being 
held, and affirmed the obligation of all States in whose territory 
hostages were held to urgently take all appropriate measures to 
secure their safe release and to prevent the commission of acts of 
hostage taking in the future (UNDSS, 2006). 
3.17.1 State policy on hostage management 
Many states have deemed it necessary to establish clear policies and procedures 
for hostage crisis management. The United Nations’ International Convention 
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against the Taking of Hostages, for example, was opened for signatures in 1973 
(and approved on 17 December 1979). The key provision of the convention is 
that:  
Each State Party is required to make this offence [hostage taking] 
punishable by appropriate penalties. Where hostages are held in 
the territory of a State Party, the State Party is obligated to take 
all measures it  considers appropriate to ease the situation of the 
hostages and secure their release. After the release of the hostages, 
States Parties are obligated to facilitate the departure of the 
hostages. Each State Party is obligated to take such actions as may 
be necessary to establish jurisdiction over the offence of taking of 
hostages (Enders and Sandler, 2006, p. 174).   
The Netherlands learned from their hostage crisis in the late 1970s when South 
Moluccans carried out a number of hostage sieges. In December 1975, seven 
South Moluccans took over a train with 50 passengers, eventually killing three 
of them during the course of a 12-day siege after which they surrendered. 
Simultaneously, a group of seven other South Moluccans broke in to the 
Indonesian Consulate in Amsterdam and took further hostages. In 1977, South 
Moluccan terrorists struck again, and again towards two targets simultaneously. 
This time it was attacks against a train and a primary school, demanding their 
own state and freedom for the terrorists that had been arrested after the 1975 
attack (Hughes, 2011, p. 46). 
Several gaps in the preparedness of dealing with a situation such as the South 
Moluccan attackers were identified, and the government put guidelines in place 
to set out the division of powers and to determine which organisations and 
persons need to be warned. The policies also deal with the principles of the 
actions to be taken by various government services, including a detailed 
checklist that sets out what must be done and when. The policy further set forth 
that three decision-making centres must be set up in the event of a hostage 
situation, those of a crisis centre at the national level, a policy centre at the local 
level, and a command post at the hostage site (van Leeuwen, 2003, p. 122).   
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The United States of America amended Chapter 55 of Title 18 of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1985, sections 2001 and 2002, to make 
any kidnapping with an international dimension a crime subject to federal 
jurisdiction. In essence, this amendment allowed the United States to claim the 
right to arrest anyone involved in taking any US citizen hostage, whether the 
crime took place within or outside the borders of the United States, and allowed 
US authorities to arrest suspects even outside of the borders of the United States 
(Anderson, 2009, p. 102). 
3.17.2 INGO policy on hostage management 
The policies of each INGOs vary, but the majority declare that should employees 
of an organisation or their immediate members of the family be taken hostage, 
the organisation shall likely make every effort to secure the speedy and safe 
release of the hostage(s). To accomplish this goal, most INGOs, in addition to 
states and corporations, is not going to enter into negotiations with hostage 
takers for ransom, but may establish contacts or begin a dialogue with them if it  
is determined that this might promote the speedy and safe release of the 
hostage(s). Such contacts or dialogues ought to be geared towards convincing 
the hostage takers of the inhumanity, illegality and futility of their actions as 
way of attaining their objectives. Many organisations have a policy that dictates 
that the organisation shall neither pay ransom nor make other substantial 
concessions to hostage takers to secure the release of hostages due to the fact 
that doing so would encourage potential hostage takers and thus increase the risk 
that other staff members might face in the future. 
The argument is always that negotiating with terrorists now risks more loss of 
innocent life later; it encourages terrorists to believe that future hostage taking 
will be profitable, thus leading to more incidents. Of course, the sincere 
defender of terrorism makes a parallel claim, which is that a risk to innocent life 
now will avoid the further loss of innocent life later (Held, 2011, p. 80).  
Gary Noesner, former Chief of the FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit, stated:  
Embracing a “no negotiation” policy may be politically correct, 
but if your family member or employee’s life is on the line, it’s 
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not so simple. In my judgment, governments should not attempt to 
thwart ransom payment undertaken by professionals; rather they 
should support the safe release of the victim first, and then follow 
up with a robust and relentless effort to identify, locate, 
apprehend, and prosecute the kidnappers. This follow up is absent 
in most countries where kidnappings abound. Only when faced 
with a higher prospect of punishment will the scourge of 
kidnapping be reduced or eliminated (Lowe, 2013, p. 4). 
The public stand on negotiation is somewhat contradictory to the statistics 
provided by kidnap and ransom insurance providers, who report an increase in 
number of insurance policies; indeed, some such providers collect USD 150 
million annually in premiums (Robertson, 2007, p. 79). All major K&R 
insurance providers have special insurance profiles for not-for-profit 
organisations and NGOs (Chubb, 2012).  
In addition to INGOs, there is a long list of states that have made claims about 
never negotiating with terrorists and then been forced to make exceptions; these 
include the Israeli government, well known for its no-negotiations policy during 
the 1970s, France during the 22 July 1968 El Al hijacking, and the United States 
and Israel during the 14 June 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 8474 (Enders and 
Sandler, 2006, p. 174). The researcher has also personally observed that some 
INGOs negotiate ransom in exchange for the safe return of staff.  
Data from the Aid Worker Security Database shows the ratio of kidnappings to 
killings of kidnapped aid workers for the years 2002-2011 (Figure 3.3): 
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Figure 3.3: Chart of kidnapped aid workers  
Source: https://AidWorkerSecurity.org/ 
The literature is limited in revealing the extent of policy and preparedness 
among INGOs. The generic security manual that European Community 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO) produced for humanitarian organisations mentions 
that: 
In 1996 a number of members of InterAction, the US NGO umbrella 
organisation, signed a Field Cooperation Protocol. The signatories 
agreed to instruct their representatives engaged in disaster 
response to consult with other NGO representatives similarly 
engaged to try to reach consensus in dealing with a wide range of 
issues including security arrangements, and in particular […] 
hostage policy (ECHO, 2004, p. 51). 
CARE’s Safety and Security Handbook (Macpherson and Pafford, 2004, p. 69) 
states that, in the case of a hostage taking:  
CARE does not pay ransom or provide goods under duress, but will 
use all other appropriate means to secure the release of the 
hostage. It will intervene in every reasonable way with 
governmental, non-governmental and international organisations to 
secure the rapid and safe release of CARE staff. The kidnapped 
person should have one goal…survival. It is vital to obey the 
captor’s instructions and not attempt escape. CARE and the staff 
member’s government will undertake securing a staff member’s 
release. CARE also will provide all possible support to the 
hostage’s family members). 
The handbook goes on to provide a guide for crisis management during a 
hostage crisis.  
World Vision states in its security manual that:  
In the event of a hostage taking/ kidnapping situation, the national 
director will have the full assistance of the Corporate Security 
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Officer and the Partnership Crisis Management Team to resolve 
the situation. WV will not pay ransom but will use all appropriate 
means to secure the release of the hostage (Rogers and Sytsma, 
2001, p. 126). 
Mercy Corps, in its Field Security Manual, states that  
Kidnapping is a very serious security infraction. Agencies should 
have an institutional policy regarding negotiation or payments to 
kidnappers and be prepared for specialized assistance in managing 
this type of crime. While Mercy Corps will do everything ethically 
possible to secure the release of detained or kidnapped staff,  
Mercy Corps will not pay ransoms for the release of kidnapped 
staff (Mercy Corps, 2006, p. 23).  
Save the Children has an extensive security manual called Safety First, which 
explains that ‘Save the Children will not pay any ransom to effect the release of 
a member of staff. However, Save the Children will use all appropriate means to 
secure their release’ (Bickley, 2010, p. 169). 
The above sampling appears to consistently reject the idea of payment of 
ransom. Despite this, the researcher has first-hand knowledge and observations 
to the effect that some INGOs do in fact pay ransom. Using the data above in 
Figure 3.3, the data can be interpreted in percentage of hostages killed per year. 
Figure 3.4 below shows this percentage: 
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of kidnapped aid workers killed 
Source: www.AidWorkerSecurity.org  
The data above shows an average of approximately 17 per cent of hostages killed 
over a ten-year period, which is significantly higher than the global norm of 9 
per cent of uninsured hostages and 2 per cent of those with kidnap and ransom 
insurance (Chubb, 2013). The topic of ransom will be further explored later in this 
chapter. 
3.18 Introduction to Crisis Management   
Crises occur and, depending on the case, they could be devastating for an 
organisation. However, crises can be managed. Ideally, a crisis may even 
improve an organisation’s operations. Ten Berge (1991, p. 32) observes that ‘a 
well-managed crisis develops the sense of togetherness among employees’, 
creating a positive climate that lasts long after the crisis has ended. 
3.18.1 Defining ‘crisis’ 
Recognizing and preventing crisis situations has been the subject of significant 
research over the past decades. However ‘it is a mistake to believe an 
organisation can avoid or prevent all possible crises’ (Coombs, 1999, p. 125).  
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The term ‘crisis’ means different things to different organisations and people. It 
can represent hazards, concern, nervousness, destruction, illness, danger, hurt, 
and property loss in addition to several other factors. It can also have an impact 
much broader than that on the organisation itself. Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer 
(2003, p. 86) illustrated that the regulations, quality, objectives and potential of 
the community can be affected by a crisis incident. They further explained that 
we cannot blame anyone for natural disasters, mistakes by individuals, and crisis 
scenarios created by nature. Man-made crises come under the category of 
organisational crisis scenarios, such as the Chernobyl nuclear crisis that took 
place due to human error. 
James and Gilliland (2012, p. 9) defined crises in terms of the following 
circumstances:  
 The individual who faces the crisis situation will always be 
in danger. 
 Though the crisis situation generally occurs in a limited 
time frame, there is a chance for the development of a 
sequence of chronic dangerous events from this situation. 
 It is difficult to solve the crisis situation. 
 The competence of the crisis interveners depends upon their 
lifetime experience in dealing with crisis situations. 
 Evolution and motivations will result from the crisis 
situations. 
 Crisis situations cannot be handled with rapid fixes or 
solutions. 
 Individuals face various kinds of challenges due to the 
crisis situation. 
 While facing crisis situations people will have emotional 
disturbances. 
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 There is a relationship between the ability of the crisis 
interveners and the resolution of the crisis. 
Pearson and Claire (1998, p. 60-63) offer perhaps the most relevant definition 
for INGOs, which is a synthesis of several business definitions of crisis: ‘an 
organisational crisis is a low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the 
viability of the organisation, is characterised by ambiguity of cause, effect and 
means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly’.  
All of the above considerations indicate that a crisis is sudden and 
overwhelming, therefore requiring pre-planning and organisation in order to be 
resolved successfully.  
3.18.2 Crisis management principles 
A crisis raises several challenges to an organisation; it can interfere with 
organisational performance, create uncertainty and stress, threaten the 
organisation’s reputation, and permanently alter an organisation (Carson, 2008, 
p. 64). To minimize the negative impact of a crisis, organisations will attempt to 
manage the crisis to the extent possible. A hostage crisis is a specific threat in 
the process of being realised, and it represents a crisis for almost any 
organisation. However, hostage crises conform in many ways to general crisis 
management principles. 
Williams and Olaniran (1998, p. 388) claimed that crisis management is ‘the use 
of public relations to minimize harm to the organisation in emergency situations 
that could cause the organisation irreparable damage’. Crisis management is 
more than an action taken within an organisation, also requiring ‘communication 
between the organisation and the public prior to, during, and after the negative 
occurrence’ (Kauffman, 1999, p. 422).   
Possibly the most valuable typologies for managers concentrate on the gestation 
period for crises. The ones that are extremely sudden and unexpected are 
inherently more difficult to deal with compared to those that develop during a 
period of time. The aims of crisis management, as outlined by Heath (1998, p. 
12-14), are to plan and provide for possible crisis events which could occur; the 
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pre-crisis stage; to lower or mitigate the impacts of a crisis by enhancing the 
response management; the crisis, and; to quickly and effectively assess the 
damage brought on by the crisis; the post-crisis stage. 
Fundamentally, crisis management can be viewed as a key strategic issue 
(Clarke and Varma, 2004, p. 419) which should be addressed by senior 
management of an organisation as a central concern. Therefore, it could be 
argued that crisis management ought to be a fundamental element of the 
strategic planning processes that an organisation performs rather than a measure 
that is added each time a crisis has occurred. For such strategic thinking to 
occur, a crisis management team has to be selected with a clear framework for 
communication. Furthermore, the whole organisation must be aware of the 
framework or strategy. Just how a firm prepares for a crisis may be determined 
by its culture, may dominate the management’s actions, and is reflected in the 
attitudes and norms of the organisation (Ray, 1999, p. 16-18).  
3.19  Managing a Hostage Incident  
It is essential to stress that if an international NGO employee is kidnapped, this 
crime, by international law, must be addressed between governments. All the 
others who are playing a part in the crisis is involved only through the request of 
the host nation and the passport nation of the victim. When it is a national staff, 
then the nation’s law enforcement officials has the mandate. Only in unusual 
circumstances does an NGO find itself in a situation where the organisation has 
no choice but to serve as the primary negotiator (Macpherson, et al., 2008, p. 
22-24). 
Dubrowski (2004, p. 1202) notes that from a management perspective ‘a crisis 
brings about a state of emergency, which due to its acuteness requires, prompts 
decision making and which must be as good as possible, since corrections are 
usually not possible’. Decision-making thus remains a crucial part of proper 
crisis management, and it is perhaps one of the more difficult elements of 
leading an organisation through a crisis. Boin, Lagadec, Michel-Kerjan, and 
Overdijk (2003, p. 135) stress that ‘crisis management thus falls within the 
leadership domain whether leaders like it or not’. 
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3.19.1 The aim of hostage management 
Schlossberg, generally referred to as the originator of modern hostage 
management, stated that ‘the primary consideration in such circumstances is to 
secure the lives and safety of threatened hostages, the police officers, innocent 
bystanders, and the criminals themselves’ (1979, p. 89-90). The American Bar 
Association (Jeffress, 1996, p. 138-139) reported that hostage negotiations fall 
within the public safety responsibilit ies of the police, as police duties includes  
resolving conflict, aiding people in need of assistance, and helping people in 
danger.  
Grubb (2010, p. 341-344) explained that in an effort to both manage the hostage 
taking scenario and save the lives of the hostages, law enforcement agencies in 
the United States started to adopt a ‘negotiate first’ strategy after realising the 
impact of such incidents. Fuselier (1981, p. 12) explained that this strategy 
resulted in the establishment of unique hostage negotiation groups with a 
selected negotiator, a tactical assault team (TAC), additional employees, and 
structured strategies. McMains and Mullins (2010, p. 10) explained that these 
hostage negotiation groups are operated with the motive of reducing and 
eradicating death among hostages. 
3.19.2 Challenges to managing a hostage crisis 
There are numerous challenges that could lead humanitarian aid organisations to 
inadequately manage hostage situations. For instance, a kidnapping can take 
place in one jurisdiction though the authority of law enforcement could be held, 
and ransom could possibly be paid, in another (Jenkins, 1990, p. 1-2). Drawing 
parallels to the piracy challenge helps to illustrate this challenge. The United 
States in 2012 captured a Somali pirate who had been active in the attack on an 
American ship in the Indian Ocean; the pirate was taken to New York for 
prosecution under American law. The pirate’s prosecution and eventual 
detention, should he be convicted, will cost the US millions of dollars, a sum 
much higher than a single ransom payment demanded by the Somali pirates. 
Thus, while prosecuting pirates domestically in the courts of the capturing 
nation could make sense when it comes to deterrence, such prosecution is 
actually a costlier (and logistically more challenging) option (Sterio, 2009, p. 3-
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8). An obvious parallel is seen with hostage situations, particularly in 
transnational cases. An additional complicating factor is the multitude and a 
number of actors that may be associated with potential ransom payments. 
According to research and case studies, these may include members of the 
family, NGOs, multi-national businesses, insurance providers, government 
entities and third party intermediaries. On many occasions, individuals, families 
and private businesses might want to deal directly with the hostage takers from 
fear that harm will come to the hostage(s) in the event the authorities are 
notified (The Financial Action Task Force, 2011, p. 26). However, the fact that a 
hostage scenario is a changing process that could last from a couple of hours to 
many years underlines the significance of mobilising a qualified team to control 
this type of situation (Eguren and Caraj, 2009, p. 175). 
A particular challenge in managing a hostage case in which negotiation or 
contact is involved is that there is little in common between hostage-takers, who 
have abducted staff whom they do not know, and the team managing the 
situation, whose colleagues have been taken but whose actions should be carried 
out according to the law. The moral gap separating the two entities makes the 
process more difficult, as traditional ‘empathy techniques’ are not particularly 
effective.  
A further complicating matter is that in many cases there is little actual contact 
between the hostage takers and the team managing the case. Firstly, the question 
of negotiating with terrorists is a dual decision that begins as a simple matrix; 
i.e. the hostage taker’s decision as to whether to negotiate and the crisis 
management team’s decision as to whether to negotiate. Further, the hostage 
takers will normally try to reduce exposure to the extent possible. Even though 
they may have a temporary stronghold, they are still subject to some level of 
host government’s authority which may influence the group’s behaviour and 
ability to operate (Faure, 2008, p. 179-200).  
A third difficult factor is that any group, organisation or movement is likely to 
contain many types of individuals, and not all group members may be hostage 
takers; the categories are hermeneutic and not hermetic (Reuveny and 
Thompson, 2010, p. 248). Cooper (1981, p. 1) posits that ‘there are no natural 
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categories of hostage takers [...] they tend to reflect the discipline and training 
of those who construct them’. Likewise, hostage takers with criminal 
accomplices often work in separate cell structures, with each cell responsible for 
a different part of the abduction. For example, one cell snatches the subject, 
another cell guards and takes care of the subject, and a third cell handles the 
ransom negotiation and turnover of the victim (Likar, 2011, p. 49).  
To further complicate the scenarios, crisis conditions, coupled with a conflict 
dynamic of perceived incompatibilit ies and interference between hostage takers 
and those who have received demands, often create a situation that challenges a 
hostage taker’s ability to cope with the dangerous demands of the event. Without 
the correct management of the crisis, an escalation rather than a reduction of the 
conflict may occur due to increased relational mistrust, sensitivity to saving face 
or self-image concerns, and information processing errors (Hammer, 2007, p. 
39). 
3.19.3 The benefits of preparedness 
As is true in any crisis, the better prepared an organisation is for a hostage 
event, the more likely it  is to be able to manage it optimally. The crisis that is 
commonly considered to have fuelled the development of modern hostage 
management, the massacre at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, was an 
unfortunate example of a hostage crisis mishandled at nearly every turn. First, 
the German authorities were so focussed on image that they had minimum 
security in place, and many of the guards were civilians with very little training. 
Second, there was no preparedness or policy in place to guard against the 
eventuality of a hostage event, despite the fact that Europe was at the height of 
the tension that resulted from terrorism associated with a left-wing agenda. 
Third, once the hostages were taken, chaos ensued. The media were allowed to 
film almost unhindered, and East German television broadcasted live as police 
snipers approached the stronghold (Kerr and Clarke, 2011, loc. 390-392). Then, 
when it came time to negotiate, the German authorities first delayed, and then 
offered to exchange the hostages for an unlimited amount of money. This offer 
was rejected (One Day in September, 1999).  
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And last, when the German authorities decided to attack, they also showed a 
remarkable lack of preparation and coordination. Members of the attack force 
were selected according to whether they had handled weapons before. Not a 
single member of the assault force had advanced weapon training. After about 
two hours of gunfire exchange, a terrorist threw a hand grenade into the 
helicopter with the hostages and killed all on board. Eight years later, by 
comparison, the hostage rescue at the Iranian Embassy in London took 17 
minutes from beginning to end. 
Parallels can be drawn to the INGO world. Many INGOs, like the German 
government at the time of the Munich disaster, are also very image conscious, as 
image forms a fundamental part of their security strategy; to be seen as 
humanitarian and neutral. Hence, their security posture may be low. In addition, 
funds for security may have to compete with those intended for the operation, 
and security may at times lack priority. 
An example of how poor preparedness affected an INGO is when Sharon 
Cummins, from Ireland, and Hilda Kawuki, from Uganda were abducted from 
their residence in Kutum, Darfur on 03 July 2009 while working for GOAL, an 
Irish INGO. After their release on 18 October 2009, Cummins was critical of 
GOAL’s management of the case. In a documentary aired on RTE on 21 
December 2010 Cummins explained that, six weeks before the abduction, GAOL 
had received a threat that foreigners would be abducted in the area of operation 
where GOAL worked.  
In the end, after 107 days in captivity, Sudanese and Irish negotiators managed 
to work with local tribes to release the hostages unharmed. After a medical 
check-up, they were walked straight into intense media spotlights. Cummins 
explained: ‘It was tough, having cameras stuck in your face after all the trauma, 
with skin infections, not having washed your hair for 107 days, with the extreme 
stress, still hungry. I could have done without that’. She was distressed for 
months afterwards. GOAL offered counselling ten days later, but their own 
policy states that counselling should be provided immediately upon release. 
Cummins concluded:  
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Ultimately, it was GOAL’s responsibility to look after our security; I 
expected them to make the right decision. GOAL let us down 
badly. I believe they had adequate information to make decision 
and respond appropriately to pull us out. They need to have 
accountability in security management.  I would hate for someone 
else to go through what I went through because of the negligence 
of another aid agency.  I feel betrayed by GOAL. I realize I was a 
cog in the wheel, I was working in one of the most dangerous 
places in the world, and there was very little regards to my 
personal safety (RTE, 2010). 
There was a significant amount of negative focus on GOAL after the airing of the 
documentary; in both hostage management and security communities, this event 
is seen as a perfect example of how not to manage a crisis. In both case studies above, 
preparedness could have mitigated the negative outcomes of the hostage crisis, both on 
individual and organisational levels. 
3.19.4 INGO planning for hostage incident management  
As established above, the main objective of managing a hostage incident is to 
discover the ideal solution for everyone involved, including hostage takers. For 
this to be a success, planning and preparation have primary importance.  
A crisis management plan is created to prepare and implement a timely, prudent, 
and efficient reaction to a kidnapping, for an extortion attempt, or to the threat 
of kidnapping or extortion directed against the organisation’s employees, 
families, or their guests, facilities, operations, assets or reputation. The crisis 
management plan is the cornerstone for the NGO’s response and functions as the 
institutional guideline when emotions and stress are greatest (Macpherson et al., 
2008, p. 22-24).It can be hard to ascertain and measure crisis preparedness in an 
NGO. In the paper Creating Common Security Terminology for NGOs, Anna 
Dick examined security documents from a total of 32 organisations and 
discovered that ‘although only two organisations described a crisis in this 
context, and only four organisations defined crisis at all, most organisations 
understood a crisis situation to be related to an ongoing, direct threat to the life 
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of a staff member’ (2010, p. 11). Hence, one can assume that most organisations 
have undergone some level of crisis preparation.  
Of the INGO security manuals that the researcher has reviewed (CARE 
International, World Vision, Human Rights Defenders, Mercy Corps, Save the 
Children, and the generic ECHO security guide for humanitarian workers), all of 
them contain relatively detailed crisis guidelines which are especially 
comprehensive in relation to kidnapping. This further indicates that INGOs have 
a level of crisis management plans in place. 
3.19.5 The three stages of hostage management planning 
As outlined in the theoretical framework of this study, hostage management 
planning, like any crisis planning, can be divided into three components; those 
of pre-incident, incident, and post-incident.  
Pre-incident  
The pre-incident stage involves all the planning, anticipation, and ‘what if’ 
modelling and intelligence-gathering that can be done in advance. Plans are in 
themselves important documents, provided they are relevant and up to date. 
However, emphasis must also be placed on conducting on-the-ground 
assessments that provide the information in the plans, assessments that hence 
form a key component of the preventive strategy. Threat assessments, in which 
groups and individual adversaries are identified, are also essential, as is a proper 
vulnerability assessment. A vulnerability assessment identifies specific 
locations, routines, procedures or people that may become targets due to gaps in 
the security mitigation for the organisation or staff (Erickson, 1999, p. 347). 
Much can be done with pattern analysis. One study shows that, seasonally, the 
concentration of kidnappings was during the winter and spring months. Even 
days of the week can be analysed. Thursday and Monday stood out in the same 
study with the most total kidnapping-based attacks, followed closely by Friday 
and Tuesday (McGovern, 2010, p. 84). Each threat environment has different 
patterns which it is important to identify and analyse. 
In addition, at the pre-incident stage, management must obtain information 
about each staff that includes emergency contact numbers, relevant medical 
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history, and special instructions in case of emergency. Having this information 
readily available not only enhances the personal safety of the employee but also 
makes it  easier to support the family of an employee who is abducted (Katz and 
Caspi, 2003, p. 199).  
Incident 
Media management will likely be at the forefront during an incident. Most 
mainstream news organisations impose standards that rule out graphic images 
from hostage takings, but the perpetrators of incidents might disseminate those 
images through the Internet and other new media sources to audiences that are 
smaller but are considered high-value, including potential recruits. The hostage 
takers also know that videos on YouTube or other online venues can reach 
substantial audiences regardless of the amount of attention paid to these items 
by traditional media outlets. Videos showing the executions of kidnap victims 
have sometimes been viewed online millions of times. The video of the 
beheading of Nicholas Berg, an American businessman taken hostage in Iraq, 
was posted on the Web on 11 May 2004; within 24 hours it  had been copied onto 
other sites and downloaded more than 500,000 times (Seib and Janbek, 2010, p. 
35). However, if media is properly managed, such incidents can assist greatly in 
reducing the likelihood and impact of future incidents.   
Post-incident  
Post-incident planning is concerned with handling events in the aftermath of a 
hostage-taking; it deals with physical and psychological injuries, and the need to 
get operations back to normal as quickly and safely as possible (Bolz, Dudonis, 
Schulz, and Riemann, 2001, p. 34). Further, a post-incident analysis must take 
place. It is quite common to treat a hostage incident as a one-off occurrence for 
the organisation, and the challenge is to design the organisation in such a way 
that it constantly learns from past incidents. If a group is successful in abducting 
one target, then it is likely that the tactic will be repeated against new targets. 
Hence organisations need to develop processes by which they learn rapidly from 
past incidents inside and outside their operating environment, thus ensuring they 
are prepared for any eventuality (Suder, 2006, p. 201). 
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3.20 Mitigating the Risk of Hostage Taking 
One of the major obstacles for INGOs is a narrow focus on operational readiness 
for field operators rather than thinking about crisis and security management on 
a strategic level. Other obstacles include lack of training, inadequate attention 
paid to developing risk assessment, high rates of staff turnover resulting in a 
disconnect between levels of staff expertise, and finally, a lack of the tools 
needed to understand and prepare for threats in the operating environment 
(Bolletino, 2006, p. 14). All these can have a significant negative effect on the 
organisation, according to theories of the social trust approach. This approach 
maintains that a staff’s trust in the organisation is built on an understanding of 
that organisation’s goals, motives and actions in relation to the staff’s values. If 
it  appears that the organisation takes hostage threats seriously, the staff will 
trust the organisation to appropriately manage the risk. However, it is easier to 
destroy trust than to gain it, or as Wittgenstein said ‘Der Zweifel kommt nach 
dem Glauben’ (doubt comes after belief). When the individual staff cannot 
control the level of risk is, trust becomes the most important factor. When 
people perceive themselves to be at risk, they follow only the advice of those 
they trust (Covello et al., 2001). 
As Bodie and Merton (1999, p. 257) argue, risk is ‘uncertainty that matters’, and 
for uncertainty to matter it needs to be taken into account. One way of achieving 
this is by performing a risk assessment exercise. A risk assessment is designed 
to identify the several types of vulnerabilities of a company, institution or 
individual, and it is instrumental for the formulation of a risk management 
strategy. The outcomes of such assessments are generally plotted with regards to 
the likelihood of an event in comparison to the impact this kind of event might 
have on the company or the person. This plotting will then be utilized to identify 
levels of risk, based upon which decision makers must either decide on a risk 
aversion strategy or embrace the potential risks by having a risk management 
plan. 
Being protected from abduction is really a question of degree, and INGO 
employees can sometimes be unrealistically optimistic in their appreciation of 
167 
risk levels. Unknown information affects the risk estimate, as does the 
effectiveness of existing risk mitigation measures. This makes it an 
exceptionally dynamic process, one in which knowledge and data are critical.  
Once the risk assessment suggests that there exists a high likelihood of 
kidnapping for a person or corporation, protective measures are necessary to 
tackle the risk.   
Denial of the real risk levels can be a psychological defence mechanism 
deployed to keep unpleasant truths at bay (De Becker, 2002, p. 23). The 
consequence is that low probability risks, such as hostage taking, are often 
treated as practically zero risks. While it is true from an individual’s perspective 
that the likelihood, but not necessarily the risk, of being taken hostage remains 
low, from an organisational perspective the likelihood of an undesirable event 
among a large group of staff is much higher (Sunstein, 2005, p. 160).  
There are generally two possibilit ies open for the risk manager: averting the risk 
or embracing it. Averting a kidnap would entail suspending operations and 
evacuating personnel; embracing kidnap risk may include preventive steps like 
maintaining the anonymity of company agents in risky regions, making sure that 
their movements are unpredictable, providing them with physical protection, 
such as armour and armed escorts, a definite strategy for protecting and filtering 
information, and restrictions on non-essential travel. However, groups 
specialising in hostage taking operate mainly in politically unstable countries 
where the central authority is commonly weak, private and public corruption is 
endemic, and the social fabric of the nation has unravelled to a considerable 
degree. We might refer to them as ‘anomic terrorists’, as they make an effort to 
operate inside an environment of anomie or lawlessness and thrive in failed 
states or in nations with weakened central control (Bjørgo, 2005, p. 23). This is 
the same environment where many international NGOs operate. One way of 
mit igating the consequences of a hostage incident would be to have clearly 
prepared plans and procedures for handling the crisis, such as development of a 
strategy in case a hostage situation occurs. Reactive measures when it comes to 
a medium to very high risk of kidnap would probably include some type of 
insurance, either self-insurance through savings and investments to cover a 
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ransom and hostage recovery service in addition to financial loss, or kidnap and 
ransom (K&R) insurance coverage, along with crisis communications plans.  
Kidnapping prospects are therefore those individuals who, constituted as a 
population in the process of identifying and managing kidnap in terms of risk, 
require the employment of very specific strategies aimed at ensuring their 
protection, one of these being investment in K&R insurance. 
3.21 Hostage Negotiation  
It is important to stress that while some level of negotiation is involved in most 
hostage cases, it remains but one of the options in a hostage scenario. Other 
options include payment without negotiation, ignoring the demands, and a 
‘tactical option’: a rescue attempt. As mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter, the vast majority of the literature in this area is focused on identifying 
negotiation strategies or the various psychological orientations of those 
involved. 
While international consensus condemns the act of hostage taking, opinion is 
sharply divided over the legality of forceful rescue missions by the hostages’ 
national state. The ‘right to rescue’ or ‘defence of nationals’ justification for the 
use of force engenders strong support from some and strong condemnation from 
others, but it receives only brief commentary in academic literature. Eichensehr 
(2007, p. 452) argues that Article 51 of the UN Charter carefully limits right to 
use force to rescue their nationals held and in danger abroad as part of the 
states’ inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. As a 
type of self-defence, forceful actions to rescue hostages are subject to the 
magnitude, necessity, immediacy, and proportionality requirements for all 
forceful self-defence actions and must satisfy these requirements in order to be 
legal. Eichensehr expands upon this assertion by outlining two major arguments 
in support of the lawfulness of a right to rescue. First, the humanitarian premise 
of a right to rescue is consonant with the goals of the international legal system. 
Thus, rescue actions must adhere to a strict proportionality standard, avoiding 
civilian deaths, and must also follow the principles of international humanitarian 
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law, including never deliberately targeting civilians or in the course of 
attempted rescues.  
The trend of hostage crime moving from individual offences to large-scale 
events such as the hostage rescues at the Munich Olympics, the Iranian Embassy 
in London, the Beslan School, and the Moscow Theatre means that more police 
resources, greater expertise, and better coordination of resources and efforts are 
now required (Forst et al., 2011, p. 194). Hostage rescue is today a highly 
specialised skill practiced only by elite forces in most countries. This is because 
the risk of casualties is so high from all three sides: those of the hostage takers, 
the hostages, and the rescue team. The massacre at the Munich Olympics in 1972 
had a profound impact on the world and future police operations against 
terrorists (Simonsen and Spindlove, 2009, p. 184-185; Purpura, 2006, p. 60).  
The German government’s response to its disastrous failure to defuse the 
hostage situation at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games was to create the 
specialised anti-terrorism commando unit GSG 9, which established a 
formidable reputation after the successful recapture of the hijacked Lufthansa 
airliner in Mogadishu in 1977 (Van Leeuwen, 2003, p. 120). The French police 
equipped itself in 1972 with a Brigade de Recherche et d’Intervention (BRI) 
(replaced in 1985 by the RAID), and in 1976 the French Ministries of Defence 
and the Interior set up the first service designed to respond directly to the shock 
caused by violent actions: the Groupement d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie 
Nationale (GIGN) (van Leeuwen, 2003). Several nations, including France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Israel, the United States, and, more recently, Peru, have 
demonstrated their hostage rescue capacities through successes achieved in the 
public eye. That said, the great majority of special hostage rescue operations 
have ended in partial or complete failure (Forest, 2007, p. 400).  
3.22 Psychological Effects of Captivity   
Although the history of kidnapping and hostage taking is a long one, it is only 
relatively recently that there has been a systematic attempt to understand the 
effects, both long-term and short-term, on individuals and their families. 
Fortunately, hostage takings and forcible confinements are still relatively rare 
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phenomena within the INGO world. When they do occur however, they can 
cause enormous psychological harm to the victims. 
3.22.1 Short-term psychological effects on hostages 
In the majority of hostage incidents, the lives of the hostages are at risk. This is 
an essential point; it  is not the property, status, or belongings of people that are 
at risk, but their very lives. Some psychological effects of detention will emerge 
immediately upon capture, and the first feeling is usually fear for one’s life. 
Most hostages think the that the intention of the captor is to kill them (Broder 
and Tucker, 2011, p. 265-266), and the hostage takers will likely actively 
promote this thought, as it can improve the chances of concessions being made. 
The hostage taker likely also feels the need to behave in an aggressive, 
emotional, frightening and angry manner in order to make it appear that the 
situation is under his or her control and to force the hostage to respect his or her 
orders. This leads the hostage to believe that the captor will kill them (Phillips, 
2011, p 849). 
The predicament of the kidnapper is often that he or she must convince the 
people from whom concessions are sought that he or she is capable of killing the 
victim (Best, 1982, p. 107-128; Crenshaw, 1998, p. 7-24). Given this, the 
hostage taker needs the hostage to believe that he or she is going to die unless 
demands are met. Violence in captivity serves this purpose. However, 
kidnappers also employ violence to control the victim. Van Brabant (2000, p. 
55-57) suggested that victims were beaten to weaken their will and deter 
resistance or escape. Manipulating the victim with violence might facilitate a 
form of learned helplessness (Alexander and Klein, 2009, p. 17). The above 
suggest that violence is calculated for effect. In a recent study in which 181 
kidnapping cases in 32 countries were examined, cruelty was found to be 
systematic and varied in the degree of intensity and focus. Kidnappers directed 
their attacks on the body or the psyche of the victim and did so in a strategically 
calculated manner. This suggested that violence toward a victim is not random 
but that it rather represents a highly systemised form of torture (Phillips, 2011, 
p. 845-869). Yang, Wu, and Huang (2007, p. 324-339) found that upon securing 
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the victim, an offender’s primary concern becomes controlling the victim, with 
emphasis placed on manipulating the victim’s psychological state. 
Psychological effects of captivity were identified by Oots and Wiegele (1985, p. 
1-32). They pointed to the feelings of hostages such as anxiety, fright, 
tentativeness, and fear. Furthermore, Hillman (1983, p. 157-165) identified that 
hostages could feel existential fear, sensory input burden, and an overwhelming 
sense of helplessness. If held in a group, some of the hostages may be injured or 
killed by the captors, which makes the others fearful of not surviving. The 
hostages also adjust to the extreme environment, and feel disconnected with the 
real world. Instead, they exist in a condition in which their emotions, thoughts 
and actions are, at least by design, controlled by another person. Normally 
people are able to plan their day to day activities in an orderly world. When they 
are taken hostage, people lose control over their actions and feel that they are in 
an insecure place. They may feel that the world has turned into an erratic and 
volatile one. The hostage feels concern for his or her life, the duration of the 
hostage situation, and also worries about loved ones (Fletcher, 1996, p. 232-
240). 
Many hostages also identify real or perceived risk of bodily harm. Hostages 
believe that they are going to be sexually violated, or that they will suffer 
forever with loss of face, amputations, or other physical injuries. This fear has 
found some grounding in research. In a study that examined 33 hostage 
takings/forcible confinements that occurred over an eleven-year period 
(December 1989 – December 2000) it was found that 36.6 per cent of women 
were sexually assaulted. Sexual assaults occurred only against women and 22.5 
per cent of offenders sexually assaulted their hostages. It was also found that a 
hostage taking is more likely to become sexual if the hostage taker is known to 
have used sexual violence in the past. Thus, if the hostage taker involved in a 
particular operation has a history of sexual violence towards hostages, the 
assumption should be made that a sexual assault is imminent. In this case the 
normal procedure for resolving a hostage taking (stall and negotiate) could 
inadvertently provide a greater opportunity for the hostage taker to sexually 
assault the hostage. Policy should therefore encourage acting more rapidly when 
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there are reasonable grounds to assume that the hostage will be sexually 
assaulted (Mailloux and Serin, 2002, p. 2-9). 
For some surveyed the fear of bodily harm was equal to or higher than that of 
death. An immediate, and in some case long-term, loss of the feeling of security 
was also common among respondents. People generally consider that the world 
is a safe and secure place and that they possess some control over their 
circumstances and actions (Broder and Tucker, 2011, p. 265-266). This stance is 
often altered, even remaining so after release.  
Another common psychosomatic effect is the feeling of guilt. The hostage may 
feel guilty towards his or her family or, as an INGO staff member, towards the 
beneficiaries who may not get the assistance they need as a result of the 
situation. Gilmartin and Gibson (1985, p. 46-48) pointed out that the stress 
encountered by hostages can create a physical reaction as well. Some hostages 
were highly affected with high blood pressure and elevated heart rate, as well as 
deficit in muscular control. Nudell and Antokol (1990, p. 56-66) pointed out that 
during a hostage situation the hostages may lose bladder control, vomit, feel 
dizzy, and experience abnormal breathing rate or asthmatic reactions. Some 
hostages may also experience heart failure or stroke.   
Lanza (1986, p. 95-107) pointed that some hostages may experience 
hallucinations. One study (Siegel, 1984, p. 264-269) found that more than 
twenty-five per cent of hostages may have hallucinations and confusion, 
obsession with body imagery, trouble with eyesight, sensitivity to light, tunnel 
vision, geometric patterns, tactile-kinaesthetic hallucination, dissociation and 
audio hallucination.  
Apart from the main existential psychological reactions, some additional 
feelings common among hostages include total sense of susceptibility; extreme 
feelings of danger; profound feelings of helplessness and hopelessness; deep 
feelings of defencelessness and powerlessness to fight and escape; sensory 
overload; and lost sense of self-worth and respect for others. 
As the hostage situation goes on, the earlier stress is reduced, and the hostage 
can start to manage the situation (Broder and Tucker, 2011, p. 256).  
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3.22.2 Long-term psychological effects on hostages 
At the stage of release, one might think that much of the stress the hostage is 
feeling turns to anticipation. However, the resolution stage creates greatly 
enhanced stress for the hostage. In the resolution stage, the hostage may have 
settled into a routine and have adjusted to the situation, which again will be 
dramatically changed. The increased stress affects both captors and hostages, 
and it is not uncommon for levels of violence to rise just prior to release.  
Even after the release, the hostage may feel treated like a criminal by law 
enforcement, especially if an armed intervention was used to secure freedom as 
these are often chaotic, and it is standard procedure to secure all people, 
hostages and hostage taker, until it  is clear who is who (Broder and Tucker, 
2011, p. 265-266). The normal immediate reaction to release is elation and 
optimism, but this may be accompanied by emotional labiality, with periods of 
excitement and loquacity alternating with withdrawal, exhaustion, and 
bewilderment. New anxiety-related symptoms are very common in those 
released from a brief ordeal; these were reported in 94 per cent of 168 Dutch 
hostages within the first four weeks of release, falling to two-thirds thereafter 
(Fletcher, 1996. p. 237-240). 
Van der Ploeg and Kleijn (1989, p. 153-169) followed 138 former hostages and 
their families for six to nine years, at which point 12 per cent of former hostages 
and 11 per cent of family members were regarded as still requiring professional 
help. Although negative effects decreased over time, anxiety, tension and 
sleeping problems were still common, and psychosomatic complaints increased 
in both former hostages and family members. 
For long-term hostages the demands of re-entry into society are heavy and 
prolonged and, in some respects, similar to those of individuals released from 
any long-term imprisonment. The ‘settling down’ stage is associated with a 
range of psychological, emotional and somatic problems, and suicide has been 
reported during this phase especially in those who endured prolonged torture. 
Over the first year following release, optimism tends to wane, and feelings of 
perplexity, lack of involvement, and loneliness increase.  
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The psychiatric treatment of released hostages and their relatives does not differ 
substantially from the psychiatric treatment of other victims of trauma, although 
management is inevitably affected by intense media, public and political interest 
(Fletcher, 1996, p. 237-240). 
3.22.3 Stress on stakeholders 
Hostage taking forces a strong burden, especially psychologically, on all the 
people involved in both the crime and the management of the incident, including 
hostages, hostage takers, security forces, colleagues, and managers. Victims of 
hostage situations therefore include more than just those who are taken. The 
families of those involved are victimised, as are the hostage incident managers 
who assist during the crisis. Even the public at large can be considered victims 
because there is more for them to fear and because new regulations or 
procedures may be instituted, making everyday living more difficult. Hence, not 
every victim of a hostage incident is always immediately recognisable (Bolz et 
al., 2001, p. 34). Figure 3.5 shows the lines and flow of relationships which 
develop in the aftermath of an incident. 
 
Figure 3.5: Flow of relationships during a hostage crisis 
Source: Dudonis, Schulz, and Riemann (2001). 
175 
If there is a loss of life it will naturally create a major stress for representatives 
of the organisation, but even observing the absence of a colleague and feeling 
helpless to assist can cause severe stress on colleagues of a person taken 
hostage. There is a plethora of current research that provides evidence regarding 
stress to emergency workers (Somodevilla, 1986, p. 395-398; McMains, 1986, p. 
365-368; Nielsen, 1986, p. 369-374), police officers involved in critical 
shootings (Reese, Horn, and Dunning, 1991; Solomon and Horn, 1986, p. 383-
393), and military personnel involved in warfare (Mullins, 2008, p 63-81). 
It is typical for relatives and friends to experience marked anxiety and anger 
immediately after a kidnapping. Prolonged hostage situations may precipitate 
serious financial difficulties, depression and substance misuse. Some relatives 
and friends shun campaigning, believing that enough is being done to secure 
release and feeling concern that raising a hostage’s profile might increase his or 
her value as a captive. Others put considerable time and energy into campaigns, 
publicising the hostage’s plight in order to raise awareness and keep the 
situation on the political agenda. Either stance may contribute to post-release 
readjustment difficulties, as some blame themselves for not having done enough, 
and others are loath to give up new-found prominence (Fletcher, 1996, p. 232-
240). 
3.22.4 Stockholm syndrome   
The Stockholm syndrome will only be peripherally reviewed, as it is a rare 
occurrence and is not fully relevant to the management of INGO hostage cases.  
The Stockholm syndrome takes its name from the aftermath of a 1973 robbery-
gone-wrong in Stockholm, Sweden. It essentially refers to an emotional response 
from hostages that increase their chances of survival, at least in its earlier stage. 
On 23 August 1973, Jan-Erik Olsson, a 32-year-old career criminal, entered the 
Sveriges Kreditbank. Armed with a submachine gun and with rock music blaring 
from a boom box radio that he was carrying, he fired a burst of bullets into the 
ceiling and announced in English, ‘the party has just begun’. Four bank 
employees (one man and three women) were trapped and held captive in the 
bank’s vault as customers fled.  The hostages were held in the vault of the bank 
for more than five days (Simon and Blum, 1987, p. 194-200). The police quickly 
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acceded to Olsson’s demand that his confederate, Clark Olofsson, who was in 
prison, be brought to the bank. The two held the police at bay with their 
hostages imprisoned in the 11-foot-by-14-foot vault for 131 hours in conditions 
that have been described as ‘horrible’ (Slatkin, 2012, p. 1-4). 
The hostages were reportedly abused repeatedly and threatened with death 
during the siege. They were displayed at the vault door with guns held under 
their chins and wire nooses around their necks as surety against a police assault, 
but none of the hostages was actually assaulted while in captivity. After their 
release, the police were shocked to find that all four hostages showed marked 
empathy towards the two captors as well as enmity towards the police (Olin and 
Born, 1983, p. 18-24). A clandestine police microphone in the vault revealed the 
nature and extent of the interactions between the hostage takers and their 
hostages. It is clear that there was consensual sexual touching between Olsson 
and one of the female hostages (Slatkin, 2012, p. 6). Furthermore, the former 
hostages refused to provide information about the captors and spoke publicly on 
their behalf, even going so far as to collecting money for their defence case. One 
former hostage went on to be engaged for marriage to Olsson (Simon and Blum, 
1987, p. 198-200).  
The Swedish incident does not appear to be an aberration. Other examples of 
similar behaviour were reported in the same time period, the Patty Hearst and 
Gerald Vaders cases being the most frequently cited. As the hostage situation 
evolves, a deeper than normal bond may start to develop between hostage and 
hostage taker. The hostage may possibly develop sympathy towards the hostage 
taker or his or her cause, and may want to learn more about the hostage taker on 
a personal level. Strentz (1980, p. 137-150) defines the condition simply as a 
‘nonvoluntary and unconscious positive bond between captive and captor that 
develops in response to the trauma of victimization. In a true manifestation of 
the phenomenon, hostages do not perceive the incongruity or irrationality of 
their feelings toward the hostage-takers in a self-critical or insightful way’. 
Olin and Born (1983, p. 18-24) listed the following tell-tale symptoms of 
Stockholm syndrome: 
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 The victim has positive feelings for the captor. 
 The victim shows fear, distrust, and anger towards the authorities. 
 The captor displays positive feelings towards the victim. 
Another important factor is the time taken by both hostage and captor for 
interaction. More time will increase the chance of rapport, and this can gradually 
develop to the Stockholm syndrome. For the post-release treatment, it is 
important to understand that the hostages have only a specific mental bond with 
their captors (Simon and Blum, 1987, p. 194-200). 
However, in the years since the Stockholm syndrome was first reported, 
questions have arisen about its frequency and the centrality or importance of its 
occurrence in hostage situations. 
Slatkin (2012, p. 7) revealed frequencies of occurrence indicating approximately 
10 per cent for positive feelings by hostages toward their captors and 28 per cent 
for hostage-takers’ positive feelings toward their captives. Both figures were 
well below earlier reports of frequencies above 50 per cent. Hence, it appears 
that the Stockholm syndrome may have received much greater attention by 
academics, trainers, negotiators, and the tabloid public than it might have 
warranted.  
3.23 Kidnap and Ransom Insurance 
Kidnap and ransom (K&R) insurance is a sensitive subject in the humanitarian 
world, and no literature deals directly with this theme. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that crisis management and kidnap and ransom insurance vary 
considerably regarding their application to national staff of INGOs, although the 
issue is generally not openly discussed (Egeland et al., 2011, p. 26-31).  
When an organisation takes out K&R insurance, a condition of the policy is that 
its existence not be revealed. If the organisation does reveal the existence of 
coverage, the insurance can be cancelled. A dramatic example of what can 
happen when information on K&R insurance holders is disclosed is the series of 
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kidnappings between 1984 and 1989 of 40 members of the Colombian Jewish 
community that held K&R insurance policies. These kidnappings occurred after 
factions of Colombia’s guerrillas managed to infiltrate the insurance files by 
means of an agent among the file-keepers (Lobo-Guerrero, 2007, p. 315). 
3.23.1 What does kidnap and ransom insurance entail? 
Insurance is not a new phenomenon, but rather an old form of privatisation of 
security that has been documented as going back to the early modern period, 
when slaves and merchants were insured in their persons and in their capacity to 
generate revenue (Lobo-Guerrero, 2007, p. 315). Private entities, including 
individuals, corporations, and INGOs pay millions of dollars in ransom money 
every year, and scores of insurance companies sell K&R insurance policies to 
reimburse those entities for ransom payments (Chubb Group of Insurance 
Companies, 2012). K&R insurance is a form of security practice that illustrates 
the attenuation of the inside/outside and public/private distinctions featured in 
the literature on the privatisation of security (Bigo, 2003). It is, however, also 
an example of the privatisation of security itself: it  cannot be analysed within 
the traditional scope of the nation-state, though it does interact with the latter. 
K&R insurance belongs to the category of special risks insurance and is 
therefore subjected to special forms of underwriting. It deals with a very 
specific type of population that requires particular forms of ‘future’ protection. 
Lloyd’s of London was the first to offer K&R policies, but today they are just 
one among many who offer this specialty insurance. A standard K&R policy has 
five main components, four of which encompass reimbursement of money lost as 
the result of a kidnapping. These four components are reimbursement of any 
ransom paid; reimbursement for expenses related to securing the release of a 
kidnap victim or resolution of extortion threat; reimbursement of expenses 
relating to securing the release of a detained or hijacked victim; and 
reimbursement of money lost when being delivered as ransom. 
The fifth, non-reimbursement component of a K&R policy provides access to 
security consultants for preventative measures as well as access to individuals 
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experienced in hostage negotiation, risk management and crisis response in the 
event of an abduction (Kenney, 2008, p. 551-588). 
Although the ransom component of the insurance tends to draw the most 
attention, it must be pointed out that the insurance also provides for the 
immediate deployment of skilled negotiators who can become the backbone of 
the organisation’s ﬁeld response. These can represent the INGO with 
governmental or institutional counterparts. If there are no governments involved 
and the organisation is forced to become the primary agent to win a staff 
member’s freedom, these representatives can take the lead. 
Such experts become essential advisors to INGOs that do not have their own 
specialist staff, but they also support the family of the victim if the family 
should decide to pay ransom. While many INGOs have a policy of non-payment, 
the same rarely if ever applies to family or other external entities. Without 
professional crisis management services, victimised families often make tactical 
errors in their responses to demands. When the first ransom demand is made, the 
counteroffer of the family is very important to guarantee the safety of the 
victim. If the counteroffer is too low the kidnappers might, in rare instances, 
threaten to inflict bodily harm to show the family that they are serious. On the 
other hand, if the family pays the amount demanded without making a 
counteroffer, it is possible that when the ransom is paid the criminals will either 
demand much more instead of releasing the victim or release the victim but 
consider the entire family as future targets, knowing there is more money to be 
made (Menezes, 2012). 
3.23.2 The emergence of kidnap and ransom insurance 
As kidnapping for political or criminal gain has become more prevalent, 
multinational companies and NGOs increasingly purchase K&R policies (Wong, 
2004).  According to Mark Hall of Air Security International, a supplier of 
protection services, ‘there is probably anywhere between 8,000 and 10,000 
kidnap and ransom situations globally on an annual basis’ (Hall; in Easen, 
2004). Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, more than 430 foreigners have 
180 
been abducted in that country (Slevin, 2006) and at least 40 have subsequently 
been killed (Poole, 2006). 
The wave of high profile kidnappings in Iraq has led to significant media 
coverage and attention. An online advertisement brochure from one established 
insurer reads ‘most kidnaps are carried out in order to obtain a ransom, and in 
most cases a ransom is paid. Rescues are rare, largely because the authorities in 
most countries recognize that the safety of the victim is paramount’ (Chubb, 
2013). Aimed at senior executives at Fortune 500 companies the brochure 
continues by highlighting the added value of the insurer’s product, direct access 
to a world-leading security management consultancy, stating: 
The average percentage of deaths following a kidnap is 9% [7% 
are rescued, 15% are released without payment, 2% escape, and in 
67% of cases a ransom is paid]. In cases involving Control Risks 
[a London-based market leader in crisis response], less than 2% of 
people are killed (Chubb, 2013). 
Many companies are managing the risk of kidnapping by purchasing insurance. 
The London-based Foreign Policy Centre estimated in 2001 that ‘economic 
kidnapping is one of the fastest growing criminal industries’ and ‘that 
kidnappers globally take home well over $500 million each year—and rising’ 
(Briggs, 2001, p. 1). According to Chubb Insurance (2013), ‘sales of K&R 
insurance policies have jumped sharply since Sept. 11, 2001. Applications for 
K&R insurance are up 20 per cent from two years ago [2002] due to an increase 
in terrorism awareness. […] Corporate policies range between $1,500 and 
$5,000 a year for $1 million of coverage’. Coverage of up to $5 million can be 
arranged under certain circumstances. 
3.23.3 Pros and cons of kidnap and ransom insurance 
The issue of K&R insurance is argued quite strongly from both pro and con 
stances. In their simplest distillations the positions are the pro-ransom stance, 
which advocates use of all means available to limit immediate threats of 
violence and death, versus the anti-ransom stance, which advocates use of all 
means available to limit acts of hostage taking over a longer term. 
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The most relevant literature to examine these stances comes from the field of 
piracy, specifically the recent trends in piracy off the coast of Somalia. Maritime 
industry practitioners assert that paying ransom is the only tool available once a 
ship has been hijacked. Paying ransoms, they claim, minimises risks of escalated 
violence, revenue liability, and environmental disaster. Those individuals and 
states opposed to paying ransoms believe that each ransom payment fuels and 
perpetuates the menace of piracy and that the eventual outcome of this 
escalation would likely be military intervention. 
Despite the staff trauma, logistical difficulties, and resulting expenses, the UK 
High Court has noted the positive aspect of ransom payment, in that it is not 
aware of a case in the past with Somali hijackings where the ship and crew and 
cargo have not been released. To date, Somali pirates have not made a practice 
of torturing or killing crews of hijacked vessels. This would seem to be a 
logically necessary component of the kidnap and ransom model. Because Somali 
pirates are in the business for money alone, it is in their interest to make sure 
hostages survive.   
From a moral perspective, the researcher has been told by INGO staff involved 
in managing hostage situations that it is easier for organisations to pay ransom 
in cases with pure monetary motivation, but more complex when it is a political 
case. Distinguishing between the two can, at times, be difficult. The abductors 
may use a social cause as justification though their main objective is simply a 
criminal act for profit; additionally, in some cases the abductors have dual 
objectives: they want to highlight a social injustice, but the abduction is also a 
means to gain financial benefits. This was likely the case with the abductions 
that led to the War Measures Act in Canada in 1970. Then Prime Minister Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau’s televised statement explaining the War Measures Act perfectly 
illustrated this problematic dynamic: 
[I]t has been demonstrated now to us by a few misguided persons 
just how fragile a democratic society can be if democracy is not 
prepared to defend itself, and just how vulnerable to blackmail are 
tolerant, compassionate people. […] The governments of Canada 
and Quebec have been told by groups of self-styled revolutionaries 
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that they intend to murder in cold blood two innocent men unless 
their demands are met. The kidnappers claim they act as they do in 
order to draw attention to instances of social injustice. But I ask 
them whose attention are they seeking to attract. The Government 
of Canada? The Government of Quebec? [...] What are the 
kidnappers demanding in return for the lives of these men? 
Several things. For one, they want their grievances aired by force 
in public on the assumption no doubt that all right-thinking 
persons would be persuaded that the problems of the world can be 
solved by shouting slogans and insults. They want more. They 
want the police to offer up as a sacrificial lamb a person whom 
they assume assisted in the lawful arrest and proper conviction of 
certain of their criminal friends. They also want money. Ransom 
money (Montefiore, 2008, p. 158-159). 
The opponents of K&R insurance argue that an entire criminal industry 
surrounds the extortion of multinational corporations through kidnap for ransom; 
a criminal  industry that insurance companies are financing by paying ransoms 
to hostage  takers.  One respected journalist wrote in an article: ‘in an 
unintentional conspiracy, the terrorist, the victim, and the insurance companies 
have found a level at which they are all prepared to work. The kidnappers get 
their cash, the victims have insurance, and the insurance companies get their 
premiums’ (Auerbach, 1999, p. 435).  
The reality is that as long as it is legal, each organisation will have to identify 
their needs based on their risk profile. If the organisation does not have a strong 
financial or donor base, and no trained hostage incident managers, they are more 
likely to need insurance as a mitigating measure. However, a large organisation 
that can afford to deploy trained hostage managers for months at a time may not 
have the same requirements. 
3.23.4 Monetary and political gains: Kidnapping for ransom 
The objective of a hostage taking for monetary ransom is simple: profit. Ransom 
demands can be overwhelming with more than 14 countries recording cases of 
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USD 25 million or more (Clements Worldwide). Kidnappers usually settle at 
between 10 and 20 per cent of the original demand, except in the case of the 
former Soviet Union, where the mafia is extremely reluctant to negotiate and 
uses excessive violence to achieve its aims (Petersen International Underwriters, 
2012). According to Qaiser (2012, p. 1-5), during the period 1990-2002, of the 
ransom payments paid and known to Lloyd’s of London Syndicate in respect of 
foreign nationals kidnapped, 40 per cent were between $100,000 and $500,000, 
and 12 per cent between $2 million and $5 million.  
However, when ransom becomes political rather than financially motivated it 
increases the complexity of the situation, especially if terrorism is involved. 
Extremists certainly understand how to gain interest in their agenda. This is 
achieved through different tactics and methods, but common denominators 
include the degree of violence used, the symbolic value of the target, and the 
level of sensationalism of the attack. Terrorists frequently target individuals 
because of the symbolic value they represent (Terrorism-Research.com, 2011). 
INGOs can often represent this symbolic or real value through nationality, 
perceived wealth, or religion. The fact is that hostage taking and kidnapping 
have been shown to be very successful means of extracting concessions from 
targets. One study found that hostage taking offered a 79 per cent chance that all 
members of the terrorist team would escape punishment or death and that in 40 
per cent of cases terrorists obtained concessions from the target (Clarke, 2006, p. 
55). 
3.23.5 Ransom to fund terrorism  
Hostage taking for monetary ransom as a means of financing terrorism has been 
identified by law enforcement agencies worldwide as a significant source of 
revenue for violent extremist groups. Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) is estimated to have collected at least USD 65 million in 
ransom payments since 2005. It has been reported that the average ransom 
payment for the release of a hostage taken by AQIM between 2008 and 2009 was 
USD 6.5 million (The Financial Action Task Force, 2011, p. 26).  
Dan O’Shea, the former coordinator of the Hostage Working Group at the US 
Embassy in Iraq, stated:  
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A decade removed from the Al Qaeda initiated hostage-beheading 
terrorism campaign in Iraq in 2004, has evolved into the 
kidnapping for ransom model fuelling the jihadist resurgence the 
world is seeing on display in Africa today…Western nations have 
secretly paid millions in kidnapping ransoms to AQIM and 
affiliates to release some of the 50 expatriates. These ransom 
payments estimates range from $40 to $65 million. (Lowe, 2013b, 
p. 5). 
For an organisation to function effectively, it needs manpower and money. And 
to obtain manpower and money, the public must be made aware of the 
organisation; media attention is required. This concept is referred to as ‘the 
Magic Triangle’, and was first noticed in response to the activities of the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, sometimes referred to by its 
French acronym, PLFP. It argues that a successful terrorist group, as with any 
business, organisation, or government, relies on dynamic interaction between 
three essential elements: manpower, money, and communications media. In each 
case of abduction, the media exposure leads directly to either more money or 
more recruits, usually both (Bolz, Dudonis, Schulz, and Riemann, 2001, p. 34). 
Evidence of this can be found in the Philippines, where over the years, the 
different rebel and terrorist groups used historical grievances of the Muslim 
communities in Mindanao to garner support from the Moro population. Heinz 
claimed that ‘Abu Sayyaf’s membership skyrocketed from a few hundred to over 
a thousand after its first major kidnapping payoff as the prospect of 
moneymaking enticed new recruits’ (Heinz, 2012, p. 11). 
According to the magic triangle model, the usual distinction between terrorist 
and criminal organisations is really a continuum, with purely ﬁnancial motives 
at one extreme and purely ideological or political objective at the other. Most 
terrorist groups have had to move toward the middle of the continuum, 
embracing both criminal activities and attendant violence to sustain their 
ultimate objectives (Treverton, Matthies, Cunningham, Gouka, and Ridgeway, 
2008, p. 24).        
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 A Taliban spokesperson stated that ransom payments were used to fund 
operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan and to train and recruit 
operatives for attacks overseas:  
“[I]t was a God-sent opportunity”, said Mullah Hezbollah, 30. “It has 
helped us to multiply our stockpile of weapons and explosives to wage 
battle for at least a year or so. We were really concerned when we 
received orders to launch Operation Nusrat, because we had hardly 
any funds to buy weapons to carry out such a major offence. Thanks to 
the ransom payments, however, the operation proceeded with “full 
vigour” (Ansari, 2007).  
Further, even if ransom is not received in high amounts, acts such as hostage 
taking help to attain coercive objectives, and the organisational objective 
encompasses the enlargement and strengthening of a group. Generally, groups 
take action against soft targets to ensure their success and to build confidence 
among the group’s membership, thereby helping them bond. Forcing members to 
participate in violent actions also lowers defections from the group and 
reinforces their cohesiveness (Likar, 2011, p. 57). Even a failed attempt to take 
hostages or to negotiate a concession will receive a good deal of news coverage. 
By contrast, a massive bombing is over in seconds and receives coverage only in 
its aftermath. Hostage taking may yield concessions that augment the terrorists’ 
prestige, cause, recruitment, and resources. Other kinds of terrorist events 
seldom result in a concession Hostages can also provide the hostage takers with 
prestige and turn them into political actors. In addition, more than three-quarters 
of political hostage situations globally end in some level of success for the 
hostage takers (75.7 per cent, or 1,350 of 1,784 of all hostage missions ended in 
the terrorists securing one or more hostages) (Enders and Sandler, 2006). 
Therefore, as long as we place a high premium on human life, hostage takers 
will continue to take hostages (Jenkins, 1975, p. 1).  
To counter this, the African Union (AU) in 2009 leaned on existing international 
instruments proscribing the financing of terrorist in adopting an unequivocal 
Decision to Combat the Payment of Ransom to Terrorist Groups. The Decision 
strongly condemned ‘the payment of ransom to terrorist groups for hostages to 
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be freed’ and asked the international community ‘to consider the payment of 
ransom to terrorist groups a crime’ (Heinz, 2012, p. 12). 
3.23.6 Legality of ransom payments 
Since the events of 11 September, politicians and policymakers have become 
increasingly aware of the important role insurance plays in reducing 
vulnerability and promoting preparedness and prevention in the current war on 
terror. Policymakers have come to appreciate the role that insurance plays in 
securing vital economic interests, while at the same time the insurance industry 
has begun to recognise its reliance upon government security policies. 
There have been repeated attempts throughout history to prohibit the payment of 
ransom. Colombia probably took this the furthest by enacting the Anti-
Abduction Act of 1993, which criminalised the negotiation or payment of 
ransom. The Act went so far as to declare:  
Any person who, “knowing that money is going to be destined to 
pay a ransom for the release of an abducted individual,  
participates in the transaction thereof”, is considered to have aided 
and abetted the kidnapper, and faces up to five years in prison’ 
(Meadow, 2008, 760). 
The Act also criminalised the procurement of K & R insurance:  
“[W]hoever participates in an insurance contract the purpose of 
which is to guarantee payment of a ransom in possible abduction 
cases, or who participates in the negotiation or intermediation of 
the ransom demanded thereof” faces up to two years in prison 
(Meadow, 2008, p. 760).  
Although the Colombian legislation declared ‘insurance contracts intended to 
cover the risk of payment of ransom to be null and void’, the legislative 
treatment was unsuccessful because portions of the Colombian legislation 
prohibiting ransom payments were declared unconstitutional. 
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United States President Obama issued Executive Order 13536 on 13 April 2010. 
The Order appears to make criminally punishable any act of providing financial 
aid directly or indirectly to any person or entity classified as a ‘Specially 
Designated National’ (SDN) by the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), or 
to any person or entity that is determined by the Treasury and State Departments 
to have engaged in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or 
stability of Somalia. It is important to stress that it covers Somalia alone. The 
Order does not mention the word ‘ransom’ in the text, and some read it as 
having very little effect on ransom payments to pirates other than to the two 
listed in the SDN group enumerated in the annex of the Order.  
The storm of controversy surrounding United States Executive Order 13536 is 
interesting because it is not the first such prohibition internationally, though it 
may be the first such proclamation issued by any nation.  
The UN Security Council Resolution 1844 (2008) is one of the most important 
of the resolutions regarding financial support, including ransoms, provided to 
individuals or entities that would seek to disrupt stability in Somalia. It 
reemphasises UNSCR 733 and also introduces additional restrictive measures. 
Acknowledging the effects of piracy on the region, UNSCR 1844 expresses 
concern at all acts intended to prevent or block a peaceful political process. It 
also notes the role piracy may play in financing embargo violations by armed 
groups. Based on these issues, the Resolution forbids payment of funds, 
financial assets, or economic resources to certain individuals or entities. UNSCR 
1844 therefore is a very early indicator that the UN’s position is anti-ransom. 
Resolution 1844 was followed a few months later by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1846. UNSCR 1846 acknowledged and expressed concern over 
escalating ransom payments fuelling the growth of Somali piracy. This concern 
was again reiterated in Resolution 1897. 
On 26 April 2010, the European Union Council passed Regulation 356/2010, 
which essentially implements the principles of UNSCR 1844; it  is also similar to 
US Executive Order 13536. The regulation imposes specific restrictive measures 
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directed against certain natural or legal persons, entities, or bodies in view of 
the situation in Somalia (Marts, 2010, p. 1-36).  
On 18 February 2010, the English High Court held in Masefield AG v. Amlin 
Corporate Member Ltd. that the payment of ransoms to Somali pirates is not 
contrary to public policy. Such a clear assertion that ransoms are permissible is 
unique when compared to other international laws, but an examination of how 
this fits with other UK positions shows that the policy may be just as restrictive 
in some situations. The British Foreign Office states: 
Although there is no UK law against third parties paying ransoms, 
we counsel against them doing so because we believe that making 
concessions only encourages future kidnaps. This is why the 
government does not make or facilitate substantive concessions to 
hostage takers (House of Commons, 2013). 
Even the US, perhaps with the exception of payments in Somalia, concedes that 
the prohibition of ransom is valid only for government entities. While the US 
government ‘strongly urges American companies and private citizens not to 
accede to hostage-taker demands,’ it  does not prohibit payment of ransoms by 
private entities. The US State Department warns:  
U.S. private organisations […] must understand that if they wish 
to follow a hostage resolution path different from that of U.S. 
government policy, they do so without U.S. government approval. 
In the event a hostage-taking incident is resolved through 
concessions, U.S. policy remains steadfastly to pursue 
investigation leading to the apprehension and prosecution of 
hostage takers who victimize U.S. citizens (US Department of 
State, 2013). 
The statement above reflects the State Department’s recognition that no law 
currently requires private organisations to comply with US ‘no concessions’ 
policy. Hence, unless paying ransom violates the law in the country of 
abduction, those payments do not violate US federal law. 
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While many support prohibiting ransom, there are also numerous arguments 
against doing so. A prohibition on the payment of ransoms could be seen as an 
obstacle to hiring staff for high-risk zones. If staff are not assured they will be 
reasonably looked after in the event of a hostage case, they may be deterred 
from deploying to a high risk environment. 
Some think that prohibiting ransoms will not deter piracy. Despite a potential 
prohibition, INGO management may simply decide that paying a ransom for 
staff release and incurring any prosecutorial liability is a better option than 
allowing employees to be harmed. Similarly, perhaps because the Philippine 
government is aware of the limited effectiveness of these defensive strategies, it 
remains permissive of ransom payments to release hostages. According to a 
report in Xinhuanet (2010), as a policy, the Philippine government neither 
negotiates nor pays ransom to kidnappers, but it  gives ship owners a free hand in 
negotiating for the release of abducted Filipino sailors (Meadow, 2008, p. 742-
776). 
3.24 Conclusion  
This review has shown that while individuals and groups have engaged in 
hostage taking for a very long time, the motivations and methods of operation 
have changed over time. In fact, there are so many different modi operandi 
around the world that it  is difficult to find a general pattern. Planning and 
execution, kidnappings vary from the extremely detailed and professional to that 
of crimes of opportunity. It is also clear that whatever the initial reason for 
taking the hostages, the motivation of the captors may change over time.  
This chapter has also shown why NGOs may be targets for terrorist operations, 
and how NGOs can be misused by terror organisations. The chapter further 
examined the various models of negotiation that have influenced hostage 
negotiation as well as the general components of a negotiation strategy. 
Literature relevant to the psychological effects of captivity, both on the hostage 
and on the stakeholders, was reviewed, including the Stockholm syndrome. 
Lastly, the chapter examined literature related to the use of kidnap and ransom 
insurance and discussed what such coverage provides.  
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The aim of this review was to examine published and non-published materials on 
existing conceptual frameworks, theories, techniques, processes, styles and 
instruments of other researchers related to the topic under research. This allowed 
the researcher to identify the noteworthy literature and which had made 
important theoretical contributions to the field being studied. It also allowed the 
researcher to identify gaps in the literature, the most significant being the lack 
of ample literature on long-term hostage management. The research 
methodology is the topic of the next chapter, which will describe the 
methodology, plan and data collection technique employed. It will thus provide 
what Payne and Payne (2004, p. 150-151) described as a ‘grander scheme of 
ideas orientating researchers’ work’.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and explain the research methods 
utilised in the study. These research methods consist of the approach, 
methodology, plan, and data collection technique employed. The research 
methodology will aim to bring together into a coherent whole the procedures to 
be followed in the research project. 
The collection of information in this study is qualitative and makes use of semi-
structured interviews. The procedural foundation of the study, as well as the 
motives for deciding upon the chosen methodology, will be discussed in the 
present chapter. The chapter also reflects on the justifications for the use of the 
selected techniques and their strengths and limitations; it discusses ways of 
ensuring data quality and the authenticity of the research findings, as well as 
examining ethical issues. Lastly, it briefly discusses the modes of data 
interpretation and analysis. 
4.2 Research Design 
Qualitative readings find meaning in human conduct through understanding 
experience and can therefore not be entirely founded upon, or sufficiently 
analysed using factual data. Explanations derived from data analysis are, in the 
case of this research, worth only a fraction of the interpretation and re-
interpretation of significant human experiences (Kvale, 1992; McLeod, 1997). In 
other words, a qualitative study attempts to understand human behaviour through 
association; it does not begin from a completely new source or some 
indisputable ‘findings’, but proceeds from the  standpoint of everyday 
perceptions of humans and happenings (Kvale, 1992; 1996, p. 17-18). The 
conduct of people is therefore inextricably connected to their awareness and 
actions (Romanyshyn, 1971). Whereas quantitative research focuses primarily 
on methods and tools for gathering information in theoretical assessment, a 
qualitative investigation is important to this study because it is more dependent 
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on the skill, language and character of the interviewers and interviewees (Berg, 
1995; Welman and Kruger, 2001). This is reflected in the researcher’s 
perceptions regarding the nature of reality and what there is to know about it 
(ontology), the researcher’s perceptions of where he stands in relation to reality 
(epistemology); and the researcher’s perception of how he can explore reality 
(methodology).   
An interpretive paradigm was suitable for this research for a number of reasons. 
An interpretative paradigm supports the belief that reality is constructed by 
subjective perception and that predictions cannot be made. Such a paradigm is 
therefore suitable for small scale research, as is the case here, especially given 
that the researcher’s main interest was in the social construction of meaning. In 
hostage management, people’s actions are very much based on their 
interpretations, in which the relevant objects and actions in the situation are 
taken into account and defined. Further, in a crisis situation such as a hostage 
case, people make decisions and act in accordance with their subjective 
understandings of the situations in which they find themselves. This represents a 
core of the interpretative paradigm (Littlejohn and Foss, 2008, p. 159).  
Ontology is the science or theory of being. It concerns the question of how the 
world is built; i.e. ‘is there a “real” world “out there” that is independent of our 
knowledge of it?’ (Marsh and Furlong, 2002, p. 18). Two basic distinctions can 
be made here: firstly, there is the view that a real world that is independent from 
our knowledge and that life is built  upon its foundations, hence the expression 
foundationalism. The alternative view is, naturally, an anti-foundationalist view 
which entails the belief that no real world exists but that the world is, rather, 
socially constructed and human perspective is dependent on a particular time or 
culture (Marsh and Furlong, 2002, p. 18). The researcher identifies himself as a 
relativist, or interpretist, and therefore as an anti-foundationalist. The researcher 
believes that he does not exist independently of his interpretation of the data, 
and he therefore finds it impossible to remain fully objective. The researcher 
approached the present research with some prior insight about the topic, but felt 
it to be insufficient for the development of a fixed research design due to the 
complex, multiple and unpredictable nature of what is perceived as reality. The 
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goal of research into hostage management is to understand and interpret human 
behaviour rather than to generalise and predict causes and effects. Hence, it is 
important to understand motives, meanings, reasons and other subjective 
experiences which are bound by time and context (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988, p. 
508-521). 
Epistemology ‘is a theory of how human beings come to have knowledge of the 
world around them’, or ‘a philosophical grounding for establishing what kinds 
of knowledge are possible—what can be known—and criteria for deciding how 
knowledge can be judged as being both adequate and legitimate’ (Blaikie, 2007, 
p. 13-18). Epistemology, then, is the theory of knowledge, and the researcher’s 
epistemological position reflects his ‘view of what we can know about the world 
and how we can know it’ (Marsh and Furlong, 2002, p. 18). As is clear from the 
brief discussion of ontology above, the researcher is anti-foundationalist, and 
the epistemology reflects this. The present research topic focuses on the specific 
and concrete, and the researcher is seeking to understand the specific context of 
the problem. Knowledge and understanding in research can only be obtained by 
having the same frame of reference as the participants; consequently, any such 
knowledge sought in a research project is subject to the participants’ reality 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 1-37). 
The methodology for this research was derived from the above understandings of 
ontology and epistemology. Qualitative research explores questions such as 
what, why, and how, rather than how many or how much; it is primarily 
concerned with meaning rather than measuring, with exploring to understand 
why individuals and groups think and behave as they do (Keegan, 2009, p. 12). 
This was key in the researcher’s choice of methodology. The field of hostage 
management is so loaded with biases, emotions, and external pressure that 
quantitative data would not have sufficed to achieve the desired depth of 
understanding of the views of the sample group. Because an individual’s history, 
background, culture and tradition cannot be fully comprehended by means of 
explanation and mathematical data analysis alone (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000; 
Henning et al., 2004), it was important to use a qualitative method that could 
incorporate the researcher’s long experience of working alongside INGOs in 
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highly complex security settings; it was also essential to have the ability to 
interpret some of these organisations’ cultures of security, especially with 
regard to issues of autonomy within the security structures. This was of 
particular importance when interpreting answers to questions regarding issues of 
cooperation with other agencies and host governments.  
As the researcher himself is a hostage incident manager and has actively 
participated in several cases, his insight into the topic allowed some level of 
interpretation that, in his opinion, would best be aligned with qualitative 
methods. Further, the researcher is trained in the same methodology of 
negotiation as are several of the participants, allowing interpretation of nuances 
that could best be achieved using the selected methodology. This is crucial as 
human behaviour is of prime importance in the interpretation of experience, 
taking into account an individual’s social tradition as well as position in, and 
connection to, the larger world (Henning et al., 2004; Kvale, 1973; 
Romanyshyn, 1971). The researcher benefitted from inside knowledge as to how 
many INGOs think of hostage management, especially on the topic of payment 
of ransom. This understanding was valuable to the present research, as there are 
some sub-fields of hostage incident management that are challenging to research 
using official data and survey methods in a quantitative way, such as kidnap and 
ransom insurance (for which admitting to having a policy may render the 
insurance null and void) and duty of care in actual cases. The use of qualitative 
techniques instead offered the opportunity to make a distinct contribution to the 
literature by elucidating the contexts (Noaks and Wincup, 2004, p. 12). 
Elliot, Fischer, and Rennie (1999, p. 215-229) promote researchers’ rights of 
hypothetical standpoints and individual expectation. On initiating this study, the 
researcher expected to find significant contrasts between the perceptions and 
views of INGO security chiefs and workforce and those of specialists. In 
offering thorough analysis and interpretation of the data collected, the 
researcher has attempted to explain the lived experience of the interviewees. By 
means of careful interpretation of respondents’ reports, the investigator has also 
made an effort to demonstrate the significance of their experiences. Hence, the 
choice of a qualitative approach was the appropriate one for the present study.  
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4.3 Study Population and Sampling Selection Procedure 
4.3.1 Type of sampling 
Mouton (2001, p. 110) asserts that one of the main reasons for sampling is to 
obtain a sample that represents the possible target population. The researcher 
believed the most suitable type of sampling for this research to be non-random 
sampling (also known as nonprobability sampling) and, specifically, purposive 
sampling. Through this method, Yin (2010, p. 37-41) states that the researcher 
gathers information from ‘those that will yield the most relevant and plentiful 
data for the research’. The researcher’s main aim in choosing a purposive 
sampling strategy was to gather information from enough people to ensure the 
sufficiency of the data and, more importantly, to begin to interpret, explore and 
understand the research topic. The researcher agrees with Holloway’s (1997, p. 
142) suggestion that ‘generalisability is less important than the collection of rich 
data and an understanding of the ideas of the people chosen for the sample’. 
Since the researcher discussed sensitive topics in the gathering of the 
information for this research, it was not possible to select participants using 
systematic sampling procedures. Information about hostage cases is typically 
kept within a very small segment within each organisation, and very seldom 
shared outside the organisation. The likelihood of getting a relevant sample 
group using another method, such as systematic sampling, was therefore 
assessed by the researcher as very low.  Furthermore, the researcher aimed to 
identify subjects that demonstrated the most typical characteristics or attributes 
of the population under study (Vos, 2002, p. 201-202), and those that are 
informative (Neuman, 2003, p. 213). In other words, the goal or purpose for 
selecting the specific samples was to yield the most relevant and plentiful data 
for the research (Yin, 2010, p. 88). The researcher therefore, in accordance with 
Kumar (2010, p. 179), approached only those people who, in the researcher’s 
opinion, were likely to have the required information and likely to be willing to 
share it. The researcher was therefore looking for attributes such as role in the 
organisation, years of experience, whether the INGO hold any prominence in the 
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community, and their willingness to discuss the sometimes sensitive topic of the 
study. 
4.3.2 Study population  
The World Bank defines a non-governmental organisation as a private 
organisation that pursues activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of 
the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake 
community development. An international non-governmental organisation has 
the same mission as a non-governmental organisation, but it is international in 
scope and has outposts around the world to deal with specific issues in many 
countries (World Bank and NGOs, 2007). 
According to the reports of Union of International Associations, there are 26,789 
active INGOs in operation (Union of International Associations, 2013). This 
number is staggering and is clearly beyond the realm of this study. To establish 
a realistic target population, the researcher used Skjelsbaek’s (1971, p. 420-442) 
parameters stating that ‘the conventional requirements are that an INGO must 
have members and financial support from at least three different countries and 
the intention to cover operations in as many’. In this study, furthermore, the 
researcher included only INGOs with operations in ten or more countries. This 
permitted the research to focus specifically on those INGOs with global systems 
in place to address hostage management should it  become necessary.  
The number of INGOs present varies greatly with different operations. Using the 
‘Who does What Where’ (3W) database of the United Nations’ Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) to sample some of today’s 
most prominent humanitarian and development operations (UN OCHA, 2012), 
the researcher found between 40 and 160 INGOs present in various countries. 
The researcher found that many of the INGOs identified were small as regards 
staff numbers and were narrowly focused on a specific objective of the total 
operation. An example is provided by INGOs offering assistance and aid in 
Afghanistan, such as Afghan Aid, Care of Afghan Families, Danish Assistance 
to Afghan Rehabilitation, and the like. Even though these organisations are 
registered as international, they have a very narrow scope. The total number of 
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large international NGOs falling within the definition and parameters set for this 
research is likely in the range of 25-50.  
4.3.3 Sample size  
Through purposive sampling, the researcher selected 16 INGOs, covering the 
entire spectrum within the parameters set for the research in terms of size, 
location, and mandate as discussed above. From each of these 16 INGOs, the 
researcher identified staff in strategic positions who were willing to discuss 
hostage crisis prevention, preparedness, and response. These then became, 
according to Weiss (1995, p. 17), a ‘panel’ rather than a ‘sample’ as they were 
uniquely able to be informative due to their expertise in the area. 
The researcher believes that the sample group identified was large enough to 
ensure the discovery of most or all potentially important perceptions around the 
issue being researched; at the same time, the group was not so large that data 
became repetitive or superfluous. Because the participants were selected through 
judgemental sampling, and were experts in the chosen topic, the number of 
participants needed was smaller than the number that would have been required 
had the researcher used random sampling (Jette, Grover, and Keck, 2003, p. 224-
236). The researcher did not find expanding the sample group to be either 
required or desirable, as the collection of additional data would be unlikely to 
shed further light on the issue being researched (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 
67).  
The participants held key roles in their organisations. Fourteen were among the 
top three in their organisation’s security structure, while two were their 
organisations’ top executive. The INGOs they worked for had operations in a 
wide range of countries and activities. The smallest participating INGO operated 
in ten countries, the minimum requirement for this study, and the largest in more 
than a hundred countries. Activities spanned across the range, including poverty 
reduction, development, human rights advocacy, medical and health, refugees 
and IDPs, education, disaster assistance, food and water, and livelihood 
activities. 
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In addition, the researcher identified ten leading industry experts, including 
insurance providers, hostage negotiators, former hostages, a psychologist, 
trainers, and NGO security experts able to provide information and data beyond 
what INGO staff in general could reasonably be expected to know with regard to 
hostage management. Not all of the experts had knowledge relevant to each of 
the questions in the interview; they only provided advice in the fields of their 
expertise. Those experts were based in seven countries: Malaysia, Norway, 
Somalia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yemen.  
4.4 Data Collection  
The researcher identifies with the interpretivist research paradigm. His 
fundamental assumptions are that reality is constructed by those participating in 
the study and that knowledge comes from human experience. His approach to 
obtaining knowledge is therefore to become part of the situation by 
understanding the views of participants (Hathaway, 1995 p. 554). 
As described by Maykut and Morehouse (1994, p. 123), ‘the qualitative 
researcher’s perspective is perhaps a paradoxical one: it is to be acutely tuned-in 
to the experiences and meaning systems of others—to indwell—and at the same 
time to be aware of how one’s own biases and preconceptions may be 
influencing what one is trying to understand’. 
The researcher, while sharing the characteristic, role, or experience under study 
with the participants, takes note of Rose’s (1985, p. 77) warning that ‘there is no 
neutrality. There is only greater or lesser awareness of one’s biases’.   
4.4.1 Data collection instruments 
One of the primary data collection tools in qualitative interpretivist research is 
the researcher him- or herself. Much of the data is generated through interviews 
and then interpreted, considered, reviewed, and concluded. That said, 
information-gathering tools are crucial in all studies as they determine a number 
of decisive factors: the way in which the required information is to be retrieved, 
the dependability and validity of the information to be gathered, and the very 
results of the research. As Wiersma (2000, p. 3) rightly emphasised, ‘the 
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procedure of information gathering needs suitable administration and 
management as the information will allow suitable conclusion to be arrived at 
regarding the investigative difficulties encountered’. 
For the collection of data for the present study, interview schedules as well as 
secondary data collection were used. According to Saunders et al. (2007, p. 
150), ‘documentary secondary data are often used in research projects that also 
use primary data collection methods’. These data were used to triangulate 
findings based on other data such as written documents and primary data. 
Triangulation involves the practice of viewing things from more than one 
perspective, and the principle behind this is that the researcher can get a better 
understanding of the topic that is being investigated if he/she views it from 
different positions (Denscombe, 2010, p. 348-349). 
According to Mathison (1988, p. 14), ‘triangulation has provided an important 
methodological issue in naturalistic and qualitative approaches to evaluation [in 
order to] control bias and establishing valid propositions because traditional 
scientific techniques are incompatible with this alternate epistemology’.  
This research specifically used data triangulation, or the use of contrasting 
sources of information. The researcher made every effort to corroborate the 
interview data with other sources of information to verify the validity of 
findings on the topic through information triangulation (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2005, p. 5). Specifically, documents and observations provided some back-up 
for the content of the interview, and assisted in determining the accuracy of the 
interview data. In addition, interview content was checked against other 
interviews to observe the level of consistency. Researcher collected secondary 
data from academic publications, journals, newspapers, government 
publications, policies, annual reports, videos, and company websites.  A list of 
documents reviewed is found in Appendix 2. 
The decision to utilise these two data collection tools was based on their ability 
to supplement one another; in other words, each tool provided access to distinct 
viewpoints, offering details and responses that could not have been gained from 
the other.  
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4.4.2 Interviews 
One means of information collection practiced in this study was the discussion 
tool. In the context of research methods, an interview or discussion is described 
as ‘a chat between the person who conducts the interview and the participants 
with the intention of drawing out particular data from the participants’ (Moser 
and Kalton, 1971, p. 271). It is a relationship in which the person conducting the 
interview asks participants questions intended to elicit responses relevant to the 
study (Kvale, 1996; Naoum, 2006). The interview pertains to the participants’ 
experiences, outlooks and visions concerning the organisation or circumstances 
being researched. As such, it  comprises ‘perfect speech circumstances featured 
by a procedure not restricted by dominance where the gathering concerned in 
building of implication exchange dialogue without compulsion’ (Stringer, 1999, 
p. 36). 
An adaptable tool of the semi-structured discussion was utilised for the 
interviews performed as part of the present research. Compliance with the 
partially planned discussion manual, or the interview schedule, allows 
researchers the freedom to devise additional questions based on the information 
obtained from the replies of the participants in the interview. Among other 
advantages, qualitative discussions provide researchers with the opportunity to 
acquire information from the participants’ outlooks, beliefs, interests, anxieties, 
gestures, and tones of voice (Babbie and Mouton, 2006; Bogdan and Biklen, 
1998; Bryman, 2001; Gay and Airasian, 2003; Krathwohl, 1998; Kvale, 1996; 
Naoum, 2006; Rubin and Rubin, 1995). Partially planned discussions also give 
researchers the opportunity to control the extent of probing and the pace of the 
interview; furthermore, as active participants in the interview process, 
researchers are able to ascertain that the interviewees are suitable for the 
purposes of the study. 
Nevertheless, the interview process does contain problems and drawbacks; for 
instance, the way in which questions are asked may impact the participants’ 
responses. Babbie and Mouton (2006, p. 289) stated that ‘very frequently, the 
manner in which the questions are put forward slightly influences the replies one 
receives’. In other words, ‘the researcher’s suppositions and standards influence 
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the inquest and turn out to be a part of the discussion […] there cannot be an 
unbiased investigation […] the researcher happens to be a respondent in the 
discussion and one who enquires into that same proceedings’ (Stringer, 1999, p. 
15).  
Additional problems may hamper the interview process itself. Discussions 
taking place at the local and international levels and involving, for instance, 
measures to be taken in hostage negotiations may be too sensitive to be shared 
with the researcher. In this study, the researcher found it necessary to assist 
some of the participants to achieve an appropriate balance between focusing on 
the questions posed and expressing their views on related matters.   
Each interview in this study was scheduled for one hour to allow time for any 
unanticipated situations, whether technical or related to the discussion, which 
could arise during a partially planned interview. All interviews were conducted 
remotely through Skype™. Skype™ is a Voice over IP (VoIP) service that 
allows free video and voice calls to anyone else who has the program, as well as 
inexpensive calls to mobile phones and landlines worldwide. In 2011 Skype™ 
boasted over 600 million users; it is a suitable tool for reaching participants in a 
cost-effective way (BBC). For the research, Skype™ in essence acted as a 
telephone, and was used for practical reasons. It was not feasible for the 
researcher to make special trips to each of the many countries in which 
participants lived in order to conduct face-to-face interviews within a reasonable 
period of time for a short-term investigation; Skype™ offered flexibility of 
location for each interview and was suitable due to the cross-sectional technique 
selected for this research. While a longitudinal study gathers data over an 
extended period of time (it may extend over years), a short-term investigation 
may only take weeks or months. Unlike a cohort study, in which successive 
measures are taken at different points in time from the same respondents, a 
‘cross-sectional’ study is one in which different respondents are interviewed at 
different points in time over a shorter period (Cohen et al., 2007, p. 211).  
With the consent of the participants, the discussions were recorded digitally 
using the Replay Telerecorder for Skype™ software; they were subsequently 
transcribed by the researcher for suitable information coding, classification and 
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examination. The transcriptions were made without the subjects’ names to 
ensure confidentiality (Bryman, 2001; Patton, 1990; Schurick, 1998; Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1998).  
The researcher gained valuable information from both participants’ verbal 
replies and other communicative elements, together with the researcher’s own 
interpretations of the subtle cues present in participants’ voices and tones of 
voice at the time of the discussions. From these inferences, the researcher 
subsequently rebuilt the conversations and the details of certain events, 
assumptions, notions, views and challenges that arose during the discussions 
(Babbie and Mouton, 2006; Bryman, 2001; Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Patton, 
2002). 
4.4.3 Interview question development 
The semi-structured interview used in this study contained questions in six 
sections and targeted ten experts as well as staff from 16 INGOs who were in 
strategic positions to discuss hostage situation prevention, preparedness, and 
management. Hence, the interviewer was able to communicate with people who 
possess in-depth knowledge in a specific field, up-to-date information in that 
field, and the ability to link their experiences with the themes of the interview. 
De Vos, Strydom, Fouche, and Delport (2005, p. 296) explained that semi-
structured interviews are especially suitable as an information collection method 
where an issue is controversial or personal, as was the case with this research.  
Below follows a description of these sections:  
 Section 1: General characteristics – This section aimed to explore 
general views on trends in hostage taking, such as increases or decreases 
in numbers of cases, level of brutality, casualty rates, and any possible 
shift between political and economic hostage taking. 
 Section 2: External assistance – This section considered kidnap and 
ransom insurance. As discussed in Chapter 3, payment of ransom is only 
one element of K&R insurance policies; another element is that of expert 
assistance in case of an incident. The researcher hoped to gain insight 
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into both the extent of use of K&R insurance and into perceptions 
surrounding its use.  
 Section 3: Preparedness and policy – In this section the researcher 
aimed at exploring the extent of the participants’ organisational policies 
on hostage management and discovering whether participants were 
prepared to manage cases from both a procedural and a resource point of 
view. Another important element was determining participants’ stands on 
punishing the hostage takers, which is argued by opponents of ransom 
payment to be the only effective solution.  
 Section 4: Managing the crisis – This is the section with the most 
questions in the interview, and it aimed to explore how INGOs manage a 
case, and their views on some specific topics relevant to case 
management.  
 Section 5: Individual staff preparedness – In this section the researcher 
aimed to obtain insight into INGO staff levels of individual preparedness 
in the event of hostage threats. This is relevant both in their training and 
in the sense of how much they are told about the risks in their operating 
environments.  
 Section 6: Miscellaneous – This last segment of the interviews was a 
very important one. The researcher aimed to explore whether a minimum 
standard could be defined when it came to the duty of care for staff in 
managing a hostage crisis. This section further gave participants a chance 
to address any topic not covered in the interview.  
The full interview schedule has been included in Appendix 1.  
4.5  Validity of research instruments 
To ensure reliability in qualitative research, assurance of trustworthiness of the 
data is crucial. Seale (1999, p. 465-478) states that, while establishing quality 
studies through reliability and validity in qualitative research, the 
‘trustworthiness of a research report lies at the heart of issues conventionally 
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discussed as validity and reliability’. When testing qualitative work, Strauss and 
Corbin (1990, p. 250) suggest that the ‘usual canons of “good science” [...] 
require redefinition in order to fit the realities of qualitative research.’ 
Reliability can be assessed by posing the following three questions (Saunders, 
Lewis, and Thornhill, 2009, p. 29): 
1. Will the measures yield the same findings on other occasions? The researcher 
believe this is the case. The researcher has continued as a practitioner for the 
duration of this study, and have made observations indicating that the study 
is repeatable with similar findings. 
2. Will similar observations be reached by other observers? Research that have 
been conducted in parallel with this study have brought forward similar 
findings. In particular, this is the case with The Aid Worker Security Report, 
released late October 2013, which support many of the findings through 
independent research.  
3. Is there transparency in how sense was made from the raw data? The 
researcher used the common methodology of themes, and the themes were 
derived from the interviews using the Dedoose software.   
4.6  Pilot study and interview modifications  
At the end of the exploratory phase of the present research, a pilot study was 
conducted. According to Everitt (2003, p. 163), a pilot study refers to 
‘...investigation designed to test the feasibility of methods and procedures for 
later use on a large scale or to search for possible effects and associations that 
may be worth following up in a subsequent larger study’. Saunders et al. (2007, 
p. 29) recommended conducting a pilot study for an interview before subjecting 
it  to the target population. The main purpose for conducting a pilot study is to 
ensure that respondents will face no obstacles or problems with respect to the 
interview process. The feedback obtained from the pilot study is used to modify 
and improve the interview schedule before beginning with actual data collection. 
According to Saunders et al. (2007, p. 29), a pilot study enables the researcher 
to ensure the validity of the interview schedule.     
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The pilot study for the present study interview schedule was conducted on 02 
and 03 May 2012. Fink (2003, p. 46) argues that a minimum of ten respondents 
are to be interviewed for the pilot study of the interview schedule, but the 
researcher found a pool of six respondents, 4 INGO and 2 experts, to be 
sufficient due to the relatively small total sample size. The respondents, after 
completing an interview as scheduled, were in addition questioned with respect 
to the following issues: 
 Question clarity (Fink, 2003, p.46). The questions were clear in general, 
but question 4: “What are your thought around pros and cons of utilizing 
a commercial entity in managing a hostage crisis for NGOs” could be 
misunderstood to mean taking over and control the process, so subsequent 
questions were stated as “assist in managing”. 
 Question relevance (Fink, 2003, p.46). All questions were deemed 
relevant for INGOs, but some experts found INGO questions difficult to 
answer. This was anticipated, and not changed for later interviews. 
 Overall layout of entire schedule (Bell, 2005, p. 148). Participants 
expressed that the interviewed followed an easy and logical path, so no 
changes were made on this point. 
 Time taken for completing the schedule (Bell, 2005, p. 149). This issue 
required the greatest modifications. The researcher had scheduled 30 
minutes per interview, but the norm was over 50 minutes. This required 
rescheduling of a few interviews, and a warning to future participants that 
the time required would be longer than first anticipated.  
Hence, the researcher made some minor modifications and improved the 
scheduling of the interviews in accordance with the feedback obtained at the end 
of the pilot study.  
4.7 Data analysis 
Qualitative research methods are extremely varied, multi-faceted and nuanced 
(Holloway and Todres, 2003, p. 347-350), and thematic examination can be 
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considered as an initial means for qualitative research. Such thematic analysis is 
a relatively common approach, and can be applied to most topics. It is 
particularly effective when small samples are used and themes are rigorously 
explored, as was the case with this study. As Dawson (2005, p. 120) explained, 
thematic analysis is highly inductive as themes ‘emerge from the data and are 
not imposed upon it by the researcher’.  In using this approach, the researcher 
looked to combine data collection and analysis. The researcher specifically 
followed Aronson’s (1994) pragmatic definition of thematic analysis by 
following these five processes: 
1. Collecting data from interviews. 
2. Transcribing the conversations. 
3. Identifying themes from patterns within the transcriptions. The researcher 
identified these themes by ‘bringing together each of the research participants’ 
components’ 
4. ‘Piec[ing] [themes] together to form a comprehensive picture of the 
collective experience’. Thereafter, themes were bound together and reduced so 
as to reflect any findings in brief summaries such as statements or paragraphs. 
5. Building a valid argument for developing the themes through reading 
relevant literature and formulating thematic statements that link to any 
excavated findings.  
Holloway and Todres (2003, p. 347) recognised ‘thematising meanings’ as a 
specific and basic skill required for carrying out all qualitative studies. Boyatzis 
(1998, p. 86) defines thematic examination for this purpose not as a precise 
means but as an instrument to utilise for various methodologies. Likewise, Ryan 
and Bernard (2000, p. 769-802) consider thematic symbols to be part of a 
procedure carried out in ‘main’ research conduct, like grounded theory, rather 
than a precise method in itself.  
One of the advantages of thematic examination is its adaptability. Qualitative 
research means can be classified into two groups. In the first group, one can find 
those themes attached to, or branching from, a certain hypothetical situation. 
207 
These include, for instance, dialogue examination (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 2008, 
p. 58) and interpretative phenomenological examination (Smith and Osborn, 
2003, p. 113). There is relative consistency in the practice of this methodology, 
and in general one formula directs examination. For other methods, such as 
grounded hypothesis (Strauss and Corbin, 1990), dialogue examination (Burman 
and Parker [eds.], 1993; Willig, 2003), and account examination (Murray, 2003, 
p. 111-131), there are several expressions of the methodology from within the 
main hypothetical structure. Secondly, there are methodologies that are 
fundamentally free of presumption and can be used across a wide range of 
hypothetical and epistemological methods (the latter referring to studies of the 
nature of knowledge, its presuppositions and foundations, and its extent and 
validity). Although it is frequently termed a pragmatist and experimental 
methodology (Aronson, 1994; Roulston, 2001), thematic investigation is in fact 
placed squarely in the second group, and is well-matched with both the 
essentialist and constructionist theories in crisis management research to be 
taken on subsequently. A thematic study, when adopted, is an adaptable and 
helpful research instrument that offers a strong and thorough yet multi-faceted 
explanation of information.  
Thematic systems regulate the drawing out of: (a) lowest-order principles 
obvious in the manuscript (Basic Themes); (b) groups of fundamental ideas 
clustered jointly to sum up more conceptual values (Organising  Themes); and 
(c) super-ordinate ideas summarising the main descriptions in the manuscript as 
an entity (Global Themes). 
The researcher carried out a narrative analysis using the qualitative analytical 
tool Dedoose. After each interview had been separately analysed, the data was 
cross-analysed to base theoretical developments and conclusions. This cross-
analysis again used Dedoose to condense meanings through word clustering 
(Khan and VanWynsberghe, 2008) and allowed the creation of the themes. The 
researcher used  Dedoose  as it offers  a  powerful  range  of  tools  specifically  
designed  for  qualitative data analysis. As with most computer-assisted 
qualitative analysis software (CAQDAS) packages, the approach is code-based.  
The fact that no software needed to be installed and that the program was fully 
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web-based was an advantage for the researcher due to his extensive travel 
schedule. 
Once the themes had been identified, the thematic systems were symbolised as 
web-like plans showing the outstanding topics at each of the three stages and 
demonstrating the correlation amongst them (see figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1: Themes - adapted from Attride-Stirling, 2001 
 
The use of thematic grouping is a process used extensively in qualitative 
research and similarities are effortlessly established, for instance, in grounded 
assumption (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, p. 111). The process of thematic systems 
does not attempt to identify the origin of opinions or the conclusion of 
rationalisations; it merely offers a way for breaking up text, thus reducing 
ambiguity and striving to find meaning in the text. The three classifications of 
themes can be explained as shown below (Attride-Stirling, 2001, p. 385-405):  
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• Basic Theme: This is the main or lowest-order thesis that is obtained from the 
written information. It is like assistance, like a declaration of conviction secured 
about an essential concept and adds to the meaning of a super-ordinate thesis. In 
order for a Basic Theme to make common sense further than its direct 
connotation it requires to be interpreted in the background of certain other Basic 
Themes.  Jointly, they stand for an Organising Theme (Attride-Stirling, 2001).  
• Organising Theme: This is a middle-order premise that systematises the Basic 
Themes into groups of comparable matters. Organising Themes are groups of 
meaning that sum up the main suppositions of a cluster of Basic Themes, so they 
are extra conceptual and additionally informative of what is happening in the 
manuscript. Nevertheless, their function is in addition to improve the denotation 
and importance of a wider topic that connects numerous Organising Themes. 
Like Toulmin’s guarantees, they are the values on which a super-ordinate claim 
is founded. Therefore, Organising Themes concurrently combine the key notions 
projected by numerous Basic Themes and scrutinise the chief suppositions 
inspiring a wider premise that is particularly noteworthy in the texts in its 
entirety. In this manner, a cluster of Organising Themes comprises a Global 
Theme (Attride-Stirling, 2001). 
• Global Theme: Global Themes are super-ordinate premises that include the 
chief images in the information in its entirety. A Global Theme is similar to an 
assertion that is a closing ideology. As such, Global Themes are clusters of 
Organising Themes that jointly offer a disagreement, an arrangement or a 
declaration concerning a certain matter or truth. They are large-scale themes that 
sum up and make sense of groups of lower-order themes distanced from and 
sustained by the information. Therefore, Global Themes inform us as to the 
general meaning of the texts in the context of a particular study. They are, 
together, a summing up of the chief themes and an informative presentation of 
the texts. Significantly, a cluster of texts might well give more than one Global 
Theme, based on the intricacy of the information and the investigative 
objectives; nevertheless, they are lesser numerically than the Organising and 
Basic Themes. Every Global Theme is the centre of a thematic system; 
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consequently, an investigation might end in several thematic systems (Attride-
Stirling, 2001). 
4.8 Ethical considerations 
Blumberg et al. (2005, in Saunders et al., 2007) define ethics as the moral 
principles, norms or standards of behaviour that guide moral choices about our 
behaviour and our relationships with others. Research ethics, then, refer to 
questions of formulating and clarifying research topics, designing research and 
gaining access, collecting, processing, storing and analysing data, and writing 
up research findings in a moral and responsible way.   
Thus, in any study it is necessary to follow ethical guidelines to ensure 
compliance with the researcher’s responsibilities to fellow researchers, 
respondents, the public and the academic community. Although the present 
research is concerned with extending the sum total of knowledge in society, 
respondents were reminded that they were free to withdraw from the study at 
any time, and assurance was provided to respondents with regard to data 
confidentiality. Furthermore, respondents were given the full right to decline to 
answer a question or a set of questions. In addition, assurance was provided that 
identification information would not be included in the printed dissertation or 
typed manuscript.   
A central feature of social science research ethics is the principle that 
participants should be fully informed about a research project before they agree 
to take part (Oliver, 2010, p.28). This principle is known as informed consent, 
and such was obtained and recorded for each of the participants, INGO staff and 
experts, through a signed consent note returned via email or fax. The 
participants observed in the study were provided with the information related to 
the research purpose and the objectives of the research. The practice of 
providing information related to the research to the participants in prior also 
served the purpose of enabling the researcher to improve the validity of the 
research instrument.  
The researcher took the following ethical precautions: 
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 The researcher sought, and was granted, clearance for the study by the 
ethics committee at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. 
 All participants were briefed and returned a signed consent form as a 
condition for participating. 
 Before commencing the interview, participants were reminded that the 
interview would be recorded, that the responses would be kept 
confidential to the degree possible, and that they did not have to talk 
about anything they did not want to, and that they may end the interview 
at any time. This was of particular importance to the expert participants 
that were former hostages. Lastly, the participants were again asked 
whether they were willing to participate. 
 Personal information such as name, phone number, address and email was 
requested from each respondent, but the researcher ensured that the study 
was conducted in such a manner that respondents could be confident with 
respect to their anonymity and privacy. 
4.9 Dissemination 
Fuller and Petch (1995, p. 88) provide four reasons for dissemination that the 
researcher supports: to inform others, to ensure that research is used, to meet 
obligations to participants, and to clarify recommendations and interpretations. 
The researcher also fundamentally agrees with D’Cruz and Jones (2004, p. 169) 
in that dissemination is ‘not something we should hope to achieve simply by 
writing up our findings’. In fact, the researcher believes that dissemination may 
begin before a dissertation has been completed: as the researcher continues to 
actively work within the humanitarian environment, and specifically as a trainer 
within security, he has informally discussed aspects of the research within the 
context of workshops, seminars, and presentations throughout the research.  
Upon accepted completion of the research, the findings will be distributed to 
relevant NGO security bodies, as well as to the hostage management community, 
with the hope that the research findings can directly influence work practice in 
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the field and contribute towards keeping humanitarian and aid workers safer 
through increased knowledge and understanding.  
The researcher will continue to work within the field of study itself, and 
therefore use the findings in a practical manner in his day-to-day work, hoping 
that the work can continue to have an impact many years after the study has 
ended. The researcher has also identified further gaps in knowledge that may be 
explored in the future. 
4.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the research methodology of the study, explained the 
sample selection, described the procedure used in designing the research 
instrument and collecting the data, and provided an explanation of the method of 
data extraction. In addition, this chapter has outlined the ethical aspects 
considered in the study; the manner in which data was validated during the 
analysis and presentation of the findings; and, briefly, the method of data 
analysis and presentation. 
The chosen research strategy was appropriate for accomplishing the original 
goals of the study but proved to be extremely challenging. Laying the 
methodological and conceptual groundwork for a holistic understanding of the 
complex social process of managing a hostage crisis is, clearly, not a trivial 
task. While the study did succeed in answering the research questions posed at 
the outset, the researcher believes that an equally important contribution of the 
study is the foundation provided for subsequent research on INGO crisis 
management procedures in general and on hostage management in particular. 
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Chapter 5: Presentation of findings  
 
5.1 Introduction 
The study was aimed at understanding how international non-governmental 
organisations prepare for and deals with hostage incidents, as recent years have 
seen a significant increase in number of hostage incidents and is becoming a 
matter of utmost concern for many INGOs. ‘What makes up international non-
governmental organisations’ preparedness and response mechanisms to hostage 
situations?’ was the overarching question that guided this study. The researcher 
hoped to gain a better understanding of these elements in order for the research 
to aid in the development of successful strategies for INGOs to improve their 
management of hostage situations. To achieve this, the researcher adopted a 
qualitative approach to the research and the data was collected through the use 
of semi-structured interviews, later transcribed, and subsequently themes were 
identified from patterns. Where relevant, the researcher has included verbatim 
responses to support the discussion of the findings.  
The coding process was designed from a thematic examination of patterns within 
the transcriptions of the interviews. The researcher carried out a narrative 
analysis using the qualitative analytical tool Dedoose, cross-analysing the data 
after each interview to search for theoretical developments and conclusions. 
This cross-analysis again used Dedoose to condense meanings through word 
clustering, thereby allowing the identification of the themes.  As Dawson (2005, 
p. 120) explained, this type of analysis is highly inductive as themes ‘emerge 
from the data and are not imposed upon it by the researcher’. Thereafter, themes 
were bound together and reduced so as to reflect any findings in brief summaries 
such as statements or paragraphs. Hence, thematic systems regulated the 
drawing out of: (a) lowest-order principles obvious in the manuscript (basic 
themes); (b) groups of fundamental ideas clustered jointly to sum up more 
conceptual values (organising themes); and (c) superordinate ideas summarising 
the main descriptions in the manuscript as an entity (global themes). The 
researcher has presented these themes into tables, diagrams, and graphs for ease 
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of reference, acknowledging that the sample group is smaller than desired to 
fully reflect quantitative data. The findings presented are the result of the 
researcher’s interpretation of the analysis, so while the researcher has used tools 
such analytical software, the interpretations are still fully owned by the 
researcher. 
The aim of the coding was to organise the data for analysis and thus to 
determine participants’ views of hostage management, their specific response 
mechanisms to such crises, and whether INGOs have sufficient policies, 
resources and knowledge in place to address a hostage crisis. Finally, the 
researcher introduced the thematic analysis that categorised participants’ 
responses based on their unique experiences into conceptual schemes based on 
the research questions. Hence, this chapter analyses the data collected in the 
study and discusses how the data speaks to the four key organising interview 
questions discussed in the methodology chapter.  
Qualitative analysis is guided not by hypotheses but by questions, issues, and a 
search for patterns. The researcher has, when possible, made comparisons 
between the findings outlined in the literature review and the findings from the 
present research study. In doing so, the researcher used both the participants’ 
general responses and verbatim quotes with the aim to explain the findings in 
order to confirm them and assist in placing them in context. Similarities and 
differences are identified between basic, organising, and global themes, and that 
of the existing literature.  
A significant overlap in the themes and opinions emerged among the INGO 
participants and the expert participants. Where differences emerged, they were 
mostly a matter of the emphasis and salience of certain themes. For this reason, 
the themes are presented together and are compared and explained where 
necessary.   
5.2 Participant profiles 
In this section, the researcher provides background information on the 
demographics and professional characteristics of the research participants 
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described. The demographics present the viewpoint of the general characteristics 
of the respondents and, with regard to the experts, their professional 
perspectives.  
In total, 26 interviews were conducted. Through purposive sampling, the 
researcher selected 16 INGOs, covering the entire spectrum within the 
parameters set for the research in terms of size, location, and mandate as 
discussed above. From each of these 16 INGOs, the researcher identified staff in 
strategic positions who were willing to discuss hostage crisis prevention, 
preparedness, and response (Table 5.1 below).  
Table 5.1: Distribution of the sample of experts by role 
Role Frequency (f) Percentage (%) 
Director of security 6 38 
Security Manager 5 32 
Chief of Security 1 6 
Director General 1 6 
Global Security Advisor 1 6 
Security Focal Point 1 6 
Secretary General 1 6 
   
Total 16 100 
 
The number of staff employed globally by the 16 INGOs totals approximately 
105,000 staff, and they operate in a number of fields and mandates (table 5.2). 
Several INGOs list more than one core activity, so the frequency surpasses the 
number of INGOs surveyed.  
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Table. 5.2: Distribution of the sample by primary activities of the INGO 
Role Frequency (f) Percentage (%) 
Poverty reduction 1 4 
Development 4 15 
Advocacy 2 8 
Medical 2 8 
Refugee & IDP 4 15 
Education 3 12 
Disaster assistance 6 23 
Food & Water 1 4 
Livelihood 3 12 
   
Total 26 100 
 
The sixteen INGOs also varied in size and structure. The smallest participant 
organisation operated in 10 countries, while the largest in more than 100 
countries (Table 5.3) 
Table 5.3: Operational countries of the INGO 
Countries of 
operation 
Frequency (f) Percentage (%) 
100+ 1 6 
91-100 1 6 
81-90 2 13 
51-80 3 19 
31-50 2 13 
16-30 2 13 
11-15 2 13 
0-10 3 19 
   
Total 16 100 
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In addition, the researcher identified ten leading insurance providers, trainers, 
and NGO security experts able to provide information and data beyond what 
INGO staff in general could reasonably be expected to know with regard to 
hostage management. Not all of the experts had knowledge relevant to each of 
the questions in the interview; they only provided advice in the fields of their 
expertise. Those experts were based in seven countries: Malaysia, Norway, 
Somalia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yemen. The 
expert participant profiles are listed below in table 5.4. Some participants have 
multiple areas of expertise, so the tally supersedes the 10 experts in the study. 
Table 5.4: Distribution of the sample of experts by areas of expertise 
Role Frequency (f) Percentage (%) 
Case management 5 17 
Negotiation 4 14 
Insurance 2 7 
Family liaison 3 10 
Post-release assistance 3 10 
Security policy 7 24 
Security training 2 7 
Hostage survival 3 10 
     
Total 29 100 
 
The four key questions discussed in the methodology chapter, with their basic, 
organising, and global themes, will now be individually discussed with reference 
to the relevant literature and quotes from the participants in order to support the 
findings. Participants’ words are presented in italics.  
5.3 Trends in hostage taking 
It was important for this research to confirm whether the participants’ responses 
regarding trends were aligned with those discussed in the literature. This was 
necessary in order to interpret the data on preparedness and policy with greater 
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insight. The researcher found it likely that if an agency had consciously 
registered an increase in number of abductions, the likelihood would be higher 
than that organisation would have policies and preparedness measures in place. 
Likewise, the trend, if any, of political and financially motivated abductions 
could influence the management approach to a hostage situation. 
As stated in Chapter three of the literature review (Introduction to the Hostage 
Phenomenon), there may be as many as 15,000 to 25,000 kidnappings and 
hostage takings annually. Because there is no global watchdog group, and 
because many kidnappings go unreported, it is difficult to estimate the exact 
global rates. Ann Hagedorn Auerbach, in her examination of international 
kidnappings that occurred over a two-year period from 1997 to 1999, stated that 
statistics concerning kidnappings are problematical. She found that many 
incidents were not reported and that the incidents that were reported may not 
have been accurately reported for political reasons. Auerbach believes that only 
30 per cent of kidnappings on a worldwide basis are reported and that ‘in some 
countries, the reporting rate is as low as 10 per cent.’ (Auerbach, 1999, p. 435). 
What is clear is that there has been an increase in incidents, especially in the 
developing world (Epps, 2005, p. 128). It also is clear that many countries are 
considered risk countries when it comes to abductions. In a check of the U.S. 
Department of State’s Travel Warning website on 29 December 2012, 55 
countries were listed with warnings against kidnapping, abductions or hostage 
taking. 
The increase in the number abductions appears clear also in the reports of the 
INGO world. In 1999, 20 aid workers were abducted, while in 2009 the number 
was 94 (Stoddard, Harmer, and DiDomenico, 2009, p. 9). The Aid Worker 
Security Report for 2012 concluded that ‘After declining in 2010, total incidents 
of violence against aid workers rose again, particularly kidnappings. 
The researcher’s own database of aid workers taken hostage supports the above. 
The researcher has compiled, merged, verified, and analysed data from a range 
of open sources as well as a few restricted organisational sources, showing a 
clear upwards trend, increasing from 709 days in 2000, to 6010 days in 2012. 
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5.3.1 Incidences of hostage taking  
With regards to the first interview question in the study, related to trends in 
abduction, most participants responded that there was an increasing trend. They 
reported that 150-200 kidnaps take place each year and that the incidence of 
abductions of NGO workers increases by 10-20% every year. Nineteen of the 26 
participants responded on this topic, and the vast majority, 17 participants, or 89 
per cent of respondents to the question, felt there was a numerical increase of 
INGO abductions globally. Only two, both INGO participants, felt there was a 
reduction or an unchanged trend. There were some strong views expressed on 
this increasing trend:   
One INGO participant stated: “The trends are increasing dramatically. The trends are 
certainly increasing and getting to a point where the rate of kidnapping is becoming quite 
alarming.”  
Another concurred: “I think we all agree that the trend is rising and we are still the lowest 
hanging fruit”.  
A third INGO participant was more analytical, and explained that “there certainly is an 
increase but I am not too sure, if you have to put it into perspective and look at the 
increase in the number of staff that we have in the fields, whether that ratio is equal”.  
Participants expressed a firm belief that there is an increase in number of 
abductions, and that ‘the problem is increasing’ in scope. The researcher 
interpret this to mean that the participants are conscious of an increasing 
problem, and that hostage cases are discussed, at least to a degree, between 
agencies.   
The view of an increase is supported by statistics from both research into aid 
worker security, and the researcher’s own database of events. The fact that 
humanitarian workers were held in captivity for more than 6000 days in total in 
2012 substantiate the scope of the problem, and again underscore how topical 
this research is and why further research should be conducted. The Aid Worker 
Security Report, released late October 2013, supports this finding and states that 
‘The number of kidnapping incidents has quadrupled since 2002, with an 
average increase of 44 per cent each year.  Kidnapping has become the most 
common type of major attack against aid workers, with kidnapping victims 
surpassing the number of victims of shootings, serious bodily assault, and all 
types of explosives. Kidnappings comprised nearly a quarter of all major attacks 
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on aid operations in 2012, and an even greater percentage of aid worker victims 
(36%) (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, 2013, p. 5). Also the United Nations has 
experienced an increase. In the September 2013 report of the Secretary-General 
on Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United 
Nations personnel, the systematic increase in abductions is described: ‘The 
marked increase in abductions of United Nations personnel since 2010 is a 
serious concern. In 2012, 31 United Nations personnel were abducted, compared 
to 21 in 2011, 12 in 2010 and 22 in 2009’ (United Nations, 2013, p. 4).    
Stoddard et al. (2006, 2009) demonstrated an increasing trend in humanitarian 
workers’ abduction rates and Rowley et al. (2008, p. 39-45) that NGO workers 
who operate in war areas are subjected to increased intentional violence. Taillon 
(2002, p. 58) also showed that hostage taking is a continuous issue and that 
devastating attacks are on the rise. Data collected by the National 
Counterterrorism Center (2006), Perin (2005), and the Willis Group (2004) also 
show increases in kidnapping rates.  
5.3.2 Motivations for hostage taking   
Participants also shared observations on trends related to motivations for 
hostage taking. Of the 13 participants that offered observations on trends related 
to political and financially motivated abductions, 11 (85%) believed that the 
trend was towards financially motivated abductions.  Only two participants saw 
the trend as shifting towards politically motivated hostage taking.  
 
Figure 5.1: Participants’ views trends in abductions 
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While the vast majority of the participants indicated a trend towards political 
hostage taking, it must be acknowledged that there is a ‘grey zone’ in defining 
motivations behind hostage taking for terrorism, as often the hostages are taken 
for ransom, but the money received is used for activities related to terrorism. 
While in these cases the ultimate motivation for the hostage taker may be 
political, the situation may be solved by paying ransom money. 
One of the experts explains: “Over the recent years, there has been a shift away from 
killing for political expedience or political advantage and more to a kidnapping for 
ransom.” An INGO participant concurred: “Now it's becoming more like a business. So 
our aid workers are being taken and sold for money.”   
Another participant further explained the change in trends by stating: “you would start to 
see big increases probably around from 2003, right, during Iraq when kidnappings were 
sensational as were the abductions of Margaret Hassan1 and contract workers and other 
NGOs which were done obviously for very ideological and political reasons. I think the 
shift is certainly to criminality.” 
The abductors in the Sahel, predominately Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM), may in some cases use a social cause as justification for hostage 
taking, but their main objective is simple profit. It can be extremely difficult to 
differentiate between the two, and in some cases the abductors have dual 
objectives; they want to highlight a social injustice, but the abduction is also a 
means to gain financial benefits.  
One participant explains: “They always put a front forward that it might be political but if 
you scratch the surface even a little bit, then you will see there is always a monetary 
motive behind it. So I would say, for us right now, it’s almost 99 per cent monetary 
driven.”  
An expert agrees: “They are out there to get their own source of funding to feed their 
political agenda so there is lot of cross fraternization between the criminal groups and 
groups which have a more political agenda, militant groups, so one resort to the other, or 
there is merging of those groups.” 
                                                             
1 Margaret Hassan, who worked for CARE International, was taken hostage while on her way to 
work in Baghdad on 19 October 2004. On 16 November 2004, CARE International issued a 
statement indicating that the organization was aware of a videotape showing Hassan's murder. 
On the same date, Mrs Hassan's family stated that it believed her to be dead after being sent a 
video apparently showing her murder. Al-Jazeera reported that it had received a tape showing 
Hassan's murder but was unable to confirm its authenticity. The video showed Hassan being shot 
with a handgun by a masked man. Her remains have never been recovered.  
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The fact that participants clearly identified a trend towards financially motivated 
hostage taking can partially explain why INGOs increasingly use ransom 
payment as a tool in managing a hostage situation, as will be discussed later in 
this chapter. Hostage taking of INGOs, as well as the United Nations staff, was 
predominately politically motivated in the past, and an offer to pay ransom 
would not necessarily have strongly affected the outcome of the case. Where 
hostages in the past predominately were used to put direct pressure on a state or 
organisation, hostages today are increasingly used as a funding mechanism for 
other activities. In the post-September 11 2001 world, the major powers have 
combined to target and remove the ﬁnancing pipelines that terrorists counted on 
for support. Further, countries that supported terrorism in the past have frozen 
that support due to outside pressure. It can thus be theorised that as scarcity 
increases, so will attacks for resources, as receiving ransom money directly can 
be a safer way of funding an operation than to rely on outside funding. The 
ransom money keeps the organisations active, fund training, planning, feeding, 
weapons, and accommodation. 
It is the researcher’s opinion that the data supports this view, and this has a 
direct implication for how a case is managed. In politically motivated hostage 
cases, where demands can be exchange of political prisoners, troop withdrawal, 
or autonomy issues, the INGO does not have any authority or significant 
influence over a sovereign state, and therefore in reality does not have the 
resources to deliver such demands. However, if the abduction is purely of 
economic, the demands may be within the scope of the INGO to deliver. 
The findings of this study differ at first glance from that of the Aid Worker 
Security Report for 2013, which states that ‘…it can be difficult to determine the 
motives. However, reports in the aid worker security database, AWSD, reveal 
that, of the incidents where motives are known or can be reasonably inferred, aid 
worker kidnappings skew towards motives that encompass political intentions, 
as opposed to purely economic incentives’ (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, p. 8). 
The researcher believes this does not contradict the findings in this study. In this 
study, financially motivated means that payment of money as ransom can 
resolve the matter, whether this is for ultimately political use, such as arming 
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fighters, or for personal or criminal gain. For it to be described as ‘political’, the 
demands must be political in nature, such as prisoner release or independence 
issues. 
The literature reviewed for this study acknowledges this trend. Billingslea (2004, 
p. 49), Curtis (2002), and Jurith, (2003, p. 158) all pointed out that as the 
funding from the Soviet Union dried up in the 1990s, terrorists were forced to 
look for other resources. Some opted for trafficking of narcotics (Bibes, 2001; 
Curtis, 2002; Jurith, 2003), while others turned to kidnapping and hostage taking 
(Memmott and Brook, 2006, p. 8; Poland, 2005, p. 18). Furthermore, while a 
number of terrorist groups consider hostage taking and kidnapping as part of 
their mission (Yun, 2007, p. 23-26), others are involved only for gaining 
financial support (Auerbach, 1999; Murphy, 2004). As stated by Maceda (2003), 
Murphy (2004), and Ramachandran (2005), terrorists have since at least 2005 
gained substantial financial support through hostage taking/kidnapping. 
Abductions where money is the main motive are the primary reason behind the 
hostage taking in the Sahel (which covers parts of—moving from west to east—
The Gambia, Senegal, southern Mauritania, central Mali, Burkina Faso, southern 
Algeria and Niger, northern Nigeria and Cameroon, central Chad, southern Sudan, 
northern South Sudan, and Eritrea).  
It is also notable that what starts out as political hostage taking may become one 
of financial motivation should that be the direction in which the management 
wants to take it. This is, in essence, the method used in the crisis bargaining 
model introduced by Donohue, Kaufmann, Smith, and Ramesh (1991, p. 133-
154). The model works on the basis that the initial stages of negotiation tend to 
focus on relational issues, such as power, role, trust and status between hostage 
managers and hostage takers. Once these issues become resolved, more attention 
or weight is placed on substantive issues in order to resolve the problem. In 
essence, crisis bargaining is about relationships, while normative bargaining is 
more focused on resolving material issues. For organisations with insurance 
against ransom payment, the crisis bargaining model described above seems a 
logical one to follow in order to ensure the release of staff. 
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Political hostage taking can be an effective tool for a group. Lapan and Sandler 
(1988) demonstrated this in their study, explaining that terrorists believe that if 
they capture a sufficiently valuable hostage, the government will renege on its 
no-concession pledge.  
5.4 Policies for hostage incident management      
Policy emerged as the first Global Theme, with four Organizing Themes beneath 
it; kidnap and ransom insurance, whether to pursue justice, post-release 
assistance, and management of family of staff taken hostage. 
The literature review was limited in revealing the extent of policy and 
preparedness among INGOs. The generic security manual produced by the 
European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO, 2004) for humanitarian 
organisations mentions that ‘in 1996 a number of members of InterAction, the 
US NGO umbrella organisation, signed a Field Cooperation Protocol. The 
signatories agreed to instruct their representatives engaged in disaster response 
to consult with other NGO representatives similarly engaged to try to reach 
consensus in dealing with a wide range of issues including security 
arrangements, and in particular […] hostage policy’ (ECHO, 2004, p. 51). 
Hence, a number of interview questions were developed to explore this topic. 
5.4.1 The importance of policy 
To manage hostage crises appropriately, adequate plans and procedures should 
be established. Usually, situations of hostage taking are unexpected; INGOs 
therefore need to be prepared for such situations at any time. Having clear 
policies helps INGOs face such circumstances in a systematic way which again 
may increase the chances of securing a safe release of the hostage. Participants 
contended that preparedness is the primary step for planning followed by 
policies developed for guiding people in times of crisis. Policies must be 
applicable during the time of crisis and should be flexible enough to be 
implemented according to the abduction scenario. Such plans and policies 
accelerate decision making and provide a clear approach and method.  
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The potential consequences of not having policies and procedures in place are 
perhaps best exemplified by the mismanagement of the hostage crisis at the 1972 
Munich Olympic Games (Calahan, 1995, p. 3-4; The True Story: Olympic 
Massacre, 2007; One Day in September, 1999; Strentz, 2012, p. 3) 
Chapter Two established that while we can talk about the ‘INGO community’, 
that community does represent a group of individual or loosely connected 
INGOs, with the vast majority holding their own security policies and practices. 
Despite this, the participants showed uniformity when it came to the importance 
of having policies in place for managing a hostage crisis. All 26 participants 
stated that having clear plans and policies in place was important to successfully 
resolve a hostage case, and only one INGO participant felt that his or her 
organisation did not have adequate policies or plans in place at the time of the 
interview. Thirteen INGO participants confirmed that they were confident in 
their overall organisational preparedness.  
This is in line with the NGO security manuals examined for this study; they all 
placed emphasis on policy and procedures. Mercy Corps, in its Field Security 
Manual, states that ‘Kidnapping is a very serious security infraction. Agencies 
should have an institutional policy regarding negotiation or payments to 
kidnappers and be prepared for specialized assistance in managing this type of 
crime.’ 
The expert category of participants also supported the necessity of clear policy and 
procedures. According to one expert participant: “Absolutely vital.  It doesn't matter the 
size of the operation, where they are located, it is a must do.  Contingency planning and of 
course the more complex the higher risk areas locations where they are trying to operate 
their programs, more important it becomes.” 
Another expert also saw policies and plans as essential: “I think that it’s too numerous to 
mention, you know huge advantage, so first of all, I would mention the policy, it sets the 
tone for the culture of the company; that everyone understands that there is a risk 
awareness culture, you know, everyone understands that there has to be a balance 
between safety and risk awareness and also doing the job they need to be doing, delivering 
in the way that they need to deliver. But if there is a kidnap incident, then everybody 
knows exactly what the plan is, they have been drilled in; how to react, how to set up the 
structure for dealing with the crisis management team and incident management team.”  
The policy and procedures are not only important for the management, but also 
for the hostages. A participant that was a former hostage explained how his 
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knowledge about how his organisation’s work towards the safe release of 
hostages allowed him to keep his spirits and morale up during his captivity:   
“I do remember when [person] said something like, ‘most kidnappings last two months’, 
and then I also remember you saying that no matter what happens, [organisation] won’t 
give up on you. So I knew that there is probably something out there, you know, some team 
working on my behalf, and although I don't have information about the externals about, 
you know, what was done on my behalf, I could feel that there was something going on for 
me.” 
One INGO participant admitted there were some gaps in the policy: “We do have a policy 
for abduction and the crisis management plan; who is doing what, what to do and not to 
do for hostage crisis in general, but the policy may be something we would have to work 
more on.” 
The 2013 Aid Worker Security Report states that ‘every agency working in 
unstable environments can reasonably expect to experience a kidnapping at some 
point, and it is part of their due diligence to grapple with what this will mean in 
practice. Are they truly prepared to accept this as a high-likelihood risk?  Do 
they have policies and procedures in place for dealing with it when it occurs?’ 
(Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, p. 10). The participants in this study unanimously 
supported having clear policies and plans in place regarding hostage taking, and 
the researcher believes this is a field that has greatly improved over the past 
decade.  Such plans and policies accelerate decision making, and provides a 
clear approach method, so they form an essential component of both preparation 
and response.  Through the interviews it became clear that the participants had 
established such documents, and that they were actively rehearsed in some 
cases. Only one INGO participant felt they did not have adequate policies or 
plans in place at the time of the interview, but they were about to implement the 
policy soon thereafter. Based on the above, it appears that the INGO community 
has gradually adopted well-structured procedures for information distribution 
and synchronised security approaches. While the United Nations frequently 
performed a lead role in synchronising both service and protection during 
insecure scenarios in the past (Muggah, 2003, p.152), this has gradually changed 
and the role has been undertaken by the INGOs themselves, and having such 
clear policies helps the INGOs face such circumstances in a systematic way 
which again increases the chances of securing a safe release of the hostage. 
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Whether to negotiate 
Whether or not to negotiate becomes a cornerstone in any organisational policy 
regarding hostage situations. All 16 INGO participants mentioned negotiation 
during the interviews. In some instances, the participants were direct and open 
about the fact that negotiations take place.  
An INGO participant made this clear: “In the instance of Afghanistan, we negotiated the 
release without making any payment.”  
Another supported negotiations as an option: “Besides that, I think we need to have a 
proper crisis management team; we need to have a negotiation team because negotiators, 
I feel, are the expert, and it is not everybody’s job to negotiate with the hostage takers or 
the kidnappers.”  
Some participants indicated in-house capacity: “I believe we cover our own cost and as 
far as negotiation stuff, in fact I do the negotiations.” 
A review of INGO security policies and manuals found that the policy of each 
INGO naturally varies; in general, though, most INGOs state that should staff 
members of an organisation or their immediate family members be taken 
hostage, the organisation shall likely make every effort to secure the speedy and 
safe release of the hostage(s). To achieve this goal, most INGOs, as well as 
states and corporations, will not enter into negotiations with hostage takers for 
ransom, but they may establish contact or start a dialogue with them if it  is 
concluded that this would promote the speedy and safe release of the hostage(s). 
Such contact or dialogue should be aimed at convincing the hostage takers of the 
inhumanity, illegality and futility of their actions as means of attaining their 
objectives.  
CARE’s Safety and Security Handbook (Macpherson and Pafford, 2004, p. 2) 
state that “CARE does not pay ransom or provide goods under duress, but will 
use all other appropriate means to secure the release of the hostage. It will 
intervene in every reasonable way with governmental, non-governmental and 
international organizations to secure the rapid and safe release of CARE staff. 
The kidnapped person should have one goal…survival. It is vital to obey the 
captor’s instructions and not attempt escape. CARE and the staff member’s 
government will undertake securing a staff member’s release. CARE also will 
provide all possible support to the hostage’s family members”. The handbook 
also goes on to provide a guide for crisis management during a hostage crisis 
(2004, p. 69). 
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World Vision states in their security manual that “In the event of a hostage 
taking/ kidnapping situation, the national director will have the full assistance of 
the Corporate Security Officer and the Partnership Crisis Management Team to 
resolve the situation.  World Vision will not pay ransom but will use all 
appropriate means to secure the release of the hostage” (Rogers and Sytsma, 
2001, p. 126). 
Mercy Corps, in their Field Security Manual, states that “[kidnapping] is a very 
serious security infraction. Agencies should have an institutional policy 
regarding negotiation or payments to kidnappers and be prepared for specialized 
assistance in managing this type of crime. While Mercy Corps will do 
everything ethically possible to secure the release of detained or kidnapped 
staff, Mercy Corps will not pay ransoms for the release of kidnapped staff” 
(Mercy Corps, 2006, p. 23).  
Save the Children has an extensive security manual “Safety First”, and explains 
that “Save the Children will not pay any ransom to effect the release of a 
member of staff. However, Save the Children will use all appropriate means to 
secure their release” (Bickley, 2010, p. 169).  
The interviews confirmed the presence of policies. On participant stated: “It is clearly 
written in our security policy, so we have a clear statement that says that we don’t pay 
ransom, that we focus on negotiation, that we have a crisis management team that kicks in 
and all that.” 
Based on the above, there appears to be consistency among INGOs both in 
allowing for some level of dialogue or negotiation and in rejecting the idea of 
payment of ransom. The issue of whether to allow for payment of ransom, 
therefore, shows itself to be another cornerstone of an organisation’s policy. 
Ransom as a resource will be specifically discussed later in this chapter. 
While only one participant admitted to not having adequate policies or 
procedures in place to effectively manage a hostage case, there were indications 
in the data from the interviews that the policies on managing hostage incidents 
in the INGO community do not go into sufficient detail. Examples of policies 
seen as lacking include the issue of how to manage national staff hostages as 
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well as the duration of assistance post-release. These topics are discussed in 
detail later in the chapter. 
Pursuing justice 
Pursuing justice emerged as an organising theme for this study. A topic in the hostage 
management community, and to a degree in international politics, is how to stop 
the current practice of paying ransom for hostages by making sure that hostage 
takers are apprehended and brought to justice. The theory is that by doing so, 
there would be a strong deterrence to commit further abductions; the risk would 
be higher. 
The chart below (Fig. 5.2) shows that the vast majority (76%) of participants 
that responded to this question do not feel that pursuing justice after the release 
of a hostage is likely.  
 
Figure 5.2: Participants’ views on pursuing justice 
The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages adopted by the 
General Assembly in Resolution 34/146 of 17 December 1979 provides that ‘the 
taking of hostages is an offence of grave concern to the international 
community, that any person committing an offence of taking hostages shall 
either be prosecuted or extradited, and that States shall make such offences 
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of 
those offences’. While it  is clear, then, that international legal instruments exist 
to punish hostage taking, the reality differs.  
An expert participant offered insight as to why this may be the case: “That is an area often 
forgotten. People are normally so relieved in most of these incidents that they somehow 
come to a successful resolution that people come out”. 
Only five participants thought that pursuit of justice for the hostages after their 
release was likely to be initiated and actively pursued by the organisation, while 
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thirteen admitted it was not likely that they would pursue justice. When asked to 
explain why, seven of the thirteen (54%) listed security concerns for the 
remaining staff in the operation as the primary concern.  
“That can be a bit tricky because our heavy reliance in terms of security mitigation 
measures is acceptable, we try to promote that. We try to get more accepted in the 
communities we work in because that’s our main protection layer. So if we stop doing that 
we might be aggravating more people and that would put our programs at the risk, so I 
don't think we should do that.”  
This viewpoint was echoed by another participant: “I do not think we should pursue that, 
that is of course related to whether we are to continue operate in the area or not. If we 
are, that can pose additional risk towards us and increase the threat level.”  
While the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages stipulates 
that “any person committing an offence of taking hostages shall either be 
prosecuted or extradited, and that States shall make such offences punishable by 
appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those 
offences”, research has shown that nearly 80% of hostage takers escape 
punishment or death (Clarke 2006, p. 55).  
Pursuing justice is a situation that offers special constraints for INGO, 
especially humanitarian agencies. The researcher imagine all former hostages 
and INGOs with victims would want those responsible punished. However, this 
research has shown why in reality it is much more complex and complicated. 
Many INGOs work in failed states or conflict zones, with often sub-standard law 
enforcement, without resources to conduct a long investigation. And even with 
good law enforcement, INGOs may have to continue operations in the same 
environment after the release of the hostage. While a corporation may be able to 
relocate if the security level increases, that is not necessarily the case for an 
INGO. A refugee agency cannot be away from the refugees, and a water and 
sanitation (WATSAN) agency cannot be away from the population it  is there to 
assist. Most INGOs are in place to assist in life saving or to preserve basic 
human right issues, and will only suspend operations as an absolute last resort. 
However, if they actively pursue justice after the release of the hostage, they 
may in fact increase the risk towards the other staff working in the operation. It 
is at this stage more important to preserve the safety of the existing staff in the 
future than to follow up on a case that has ended with the safe release of a 
hostage. This combined with the sense of relief and celebration that usually 
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follows the freedom of a former hostage, the reality is that very few actively 
pursue justice of the hostage takers.  
Despite this, many believe that punitive action is key in stopping the hostage 
taking. The views of Gary Noesner, former Chief of the FBI Crisis Negotiation 
Unit, are expressed that governments should ‘support the safe release of the 
victim first, and then follow up with a robust and relentless effort to identify,  
locate, apprehend, and prosecute the kidnappers. This follow up is absent in 
most countries where kidnappings abound. Only when faced with a higher 
prospect of punishment will the scourge of kidnapping be reduced or eliminated’ 
(Lowe, 2013, p. 4). 
An expert participant supported this view: “These things often spiral upwards in a number 
of incidents.  Demands are being made, whether it’s financial or political or status. And 
they will escalate and numbers of cases escalate till there is something that will break the 
spiralling upwards and the best method of doing that is to arrest and bring justice to the 
hostage takers. Of course, reality is that in most cases it doesn’t happen.”  
 
An example of a state that have implemented measures to reduce kidnapping is 
Edo state in Nigeria, which has made kidnapping a capital offence to act as 
deterrence. Edo state had in the last few months before changing the law 
recorded kidnapping of prominent Nigerians, such as the wife and daughter of a 
Supreme Court judge, a prominent lawyer, teachers, medical doctors, and even 
politicians. Governor Adams Oshiomhole stated on 18 October 2013 that  
“I have just signed into law a bill amending the Kidnapping Provision 
Law 2009 as amended by the state House of Assembly which now 
prescribes death penalty for anyone who is involved in any form of 
kidnapping.  Having signed into law the death penalty, let me assure 
the good people of Edo State that as reluctant as one wants to be in 
matters of life and death. I am convinced that the overriding public 
interest dictates that we invoke the maximum penalty available in our 
law on those involved in the act of kidnapping. Anyone sentenced and 
convicted, I would sign the death warrant.” (Ibileke, 2013) 
In addition, Gary Noesner, former Chief of the FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit, 
stated:  
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In my judgment, governments should not attempt to thwart ransom 
payment undertaken by professionals; rather they should support the 
safe release of the victim first, and then follow up with a robust and 
relentless effort to identify, locate, apprehend, and prosecute the 
kidnappers. This follow up is absent in most countries where 
kidnappings abound. Only when faced with a higher prospect of 
punishment will the scourge of kidnapping be reduced or eliminated 
(Lowe, 2013, p. 4). 
INGO policy coverage for abducted family members 
Another organising theme under the global theme of Policy is the degree an 
INGO should assist family member that have been abducted. When the INGO 
participants asked whether their policy on hostage taking included insurance 
coverage and assistance for family members of abducted employees, eleven 
INGO participants (69%) stated that their organisations had a relevant policy in 
place while one stated that this topic was not included in current policy.  
However, of the eleven that had a policy coverage for family members, ten 
covered only family of international staff deployed abroad.  
One INGO participant explained: “I think there's a big difference here between national 
staff and the expat staff for most NGOs, whether they will openly admit it or not.”  
The majority of the participants indicated that the family of an international staff 
member, in a family duty station, would be covered as stated because the 
organisation had placed them in the location of the threat.  
Another participant was quite clear on this topic: “If a dependent of an international staff 
member is kidnapped, you have full responsibility because you placed them in that 
situation, so from duty of care perspective, you are one hundred per cent responsible for 
that person.”  
The participant continued: “For the local staff, I think it’s a totally different ballgame 
because they are there before, they live in that environment.”  
The majority of the participants likewise agreed that the decision as to whether 
or not to assist abducted national staff was not as obvious. The general opinion 
was that it was then a matter for local law enforcement to manage, with one 
notable exception: if the staff was taken as a direct consequence of being employed 
by the INGO.  
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One INGO participant explained: “When it comes to national staff, it will be important to 
try to bring to the surface and assess whether this has something to do with the national 
staff’s employment with our organization and whether that is the motive or part of the 
motive of family or dependents being kidnapped and there, I would say that we would be 
obliged to offer our support to resolve that case...”  
The language used during by participants in answering this question was rather 
hesitant, and this indicated that policies may not be as strong as they could be in 
identifying the exact parameters and inclusions of the assistance offered to 
abducted staff members and their dependents. While several participants 
indicated they had practices in place, typically assisting if it was the family of 
international staff that had followed to the duty station, this appeared to not be 
rooted in policy. Such incidents do take place with some regularity. As an 
example, on 5 November 2013, the spouse of the operational manager of a major 
INGO was kidnapped in Maputo, Mosambique (Lowe, 2013).  
Post-release assistance 
A key organising theme under the global theme of Policy is the degree an INGO 
should provide assistance after a former hostage has been released. The period 
immediately following the release of a hostage is important. Discussion of the 
topic of the post-release period may aid in determining whether INGOs have a 
policy in place for assisting hostages post release, and for how long such 
assistance last.  
Thirteen (81%) of the 16 INGOs with staff represented in the present study were 
reported to have a policy in place for post-release assistance. It was clear that all 
participants understood and supported the need for post-release treatment and 
assistance, but the length of assistance varied significantly.  
The psychologist among the expert participants spoke to the importance of 
assistance: 
“These are sort of long-term; you can imagine longer term work on this. However, 
immediate assistance is actually helping them with this transition. The post hostage 
assistance that they need to get afterwards is also the assistance to transit from being in 
captivity to kind of life in freedom again. Reconnecting with their social network; their 
family members, their friends, their work environment and things like this. So helping 
them in kind of like return their lives back to normal, the longer the hostage situation 
lasted the harder it may get.”  
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Many former hostages have described the difficulties they face in returning to 
their former life. In the documentary ‘Beirut Hostages’ (2009), Brian Keenan 
related the fact that, for the first six months after his release, he would walk into 
a person’s home and sit down on the floor—because for more than five years, he 
had not sat in a chair. He went on to explain that he did not seek any new 
friends, but rather wanted isolation to contemplate his identity and his life.  
One of participants in this study that is a former hostages also agreed with the need for 
post-release support: “I went through about five months of therapy in [location withheld] 
and it's not something that I first wanted to do but then I did it because I was advised that, 
you know, I should or I may want to seriously consider it and I started having some 
dreams that weren't very good, so I did it and I’m a full believer in it for people who have 
been through experiences such as mine. I am a full believer in such a therapy.”  
The one participant from the INGO that did not have a post-release policy in place stated 
that “we do not really have procedures for that in place, we have some considerations. But 
no, it is not really well defined yet.” 
Perhaps the largest identified gap in the policies by the participants regarded the 
duration of post-release treatment. When the participants were asked for how 
long the assistance in their organisations are in effect, the answers varied 
significantly from one to twenty years; participants also indicated that there may 
well be a policy gap among the INGOs on this topic.  
One INGO participant described the challenge: “When to stop this all and when they 
should return to their work? Actually, honestly I do not have a clue.”  
For comparison, most kidnap and ransom insurances provide two years of post-
release assistance. The researcher believes this is an area that can be improved, 
for the better of both hostages and agencies. Hostages would benefit from 
knowing they and their families will be looked after sufficiently, and the 
agencies will have clear legal limitations in their support post-release. 
Former hostages are under immense emotional stress and may require 
psychological and medical intervention after release. Fletcher (1996. p. 237-
240) demonstrated that even after the point of release, where one would think 
that much of the stress the hostages are feeling is regenerated to feelings of 
optimism and anticipation, there is still a period of much enhanced stress for 
them. The normal immediate reaction to release is elation and optimism, but this 
may be accompanied by emotional stress, with periods of excitement and 
loquacity alternating with withdrawal, exhaustion, and bewilderment. New 
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anxiety-related symptoms are very common in those released from a brief 
ordeal. A 1980 study by Stöfsel found that 94% of 168 released hostages 
displayed new anxiety-related symptoms within the first four weeks, falling to 
two-thirds after four weeks.  
Van der Ploeg and Kleijn followed up 138 hostages and their families for six to 
nine years, at which point 12% of hostages and 11% of family members were 
regarded as still requiring professional help. This reveals that for long-term 
hostages the demands of re-entry into society are heavy and prolonged.  The 
'settling down' stage is associated with a range of psychological, emotional and 
somatic problems, and suicide has been reported during this phase. Hence, 
assistance may be long-term. 
5.5 Procedures in place for hostage incident management      
While policy is important in determining how an organisation responds to an 
incident, procedures are essential in determining how teams or individuals 
respond. Hence, procedures emerged as a global theme in this study. The theme 
has four organising themes; how to manage first contact with hostage takers, the 
development of a hostage reception plan, the level of information sharing with 
the family of abducted staff, and INGO crisis management preparedness. 
Even with policies and procedures in place, it  is found that an actual hostage 
crisis event presents unanticipated challenges.  
As expressed by one participant, “The thing is we found that no one is ever as prepared as 
they think they are. So even with all our preparations and everything, every time we have 
an incident, we always find a few holes in it.”  
5.5.1 First contact 
The first organising theme under the global theme of Procedures is how to 
manage the first contact with hostage takers. At the onset of a crisis, the 
situation may be unclear for the organisation and at times chaotic. If this first 
stage can be managed effectively, it  may indicate that the organisation has 
proper procedures in place for the entire event. Decision making is a crucial 
aspect of crisis management, and one of the first chances in a hostage crisis to 
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make an operational decision with potential impact on the safety of the hostage 
is during the first contact with the hostage takers. Some INGO staff interviewed 
for this study indicated that their organisations had established procedures for 
staff in general to deal with the first contact; the procedures reflect an effort to 
obtain as much essential information as possible without jeopardising the safety 
of the hostage, as well as to establish a non-hostile response. 
Most participants (88%) in the study considered the management of first contact 
with the hostage takers to be crucial, and a few contended that training should 
be provided to staff in the field. The first contact from hostage takers is 
normally made to the office from which the hostage works, so the contact would 
be at a local level. It should be clarified that contacts may not necessarily be 
through telephone; they may also take place through media or through 
intermediaries, to mention two methods of contact. A few participants 
considered first contact less important, with one respondent feeling that the 
second contact was more important than the first due to the expected chaotic 
engagement during first contact.  
 
Figure 5.3: Participants’ views on importance of first contact 
When asked how important it is for staff to manage the first contact from the 
hostage takers correctly, no one, among either the INGO participants or the 
experts, believed it to be unimportant. Fifteen INGO participants, 94%, 
answered that it was important to get the first contact right, and eight experts 
agreed.  
One participant described the importance of first contact in this way: “It is crucial. The 
life of the colleague is in the hands of the hostage takers, so the way out of this crisis is by 
talking to them. You have only one chance to make your first impression. So the golden 
hour as they call it and rapport-building is of the essence; so therefore, we have made 
23
0
0
5
10
15
20
25
First contact is important First contact is NOT important
First contact is important
First contact is NOT important
237 
quite elaborated guidelines because we do not know when the first call is going to come 
in.”  
One expert participant put it simply: “As they always say, you never get a second chance 
to make a first impression.” 
If managed properly, the first contact also contributes towards the long-term 
strategy for securing the safe release of the hostage. If little is known about the 
hostage takers, this contact becomes the first opportunity to gain any valuable 
information that can be built into the management strategy.  
One INGO participant sees the first contact as a tactical opportunity: “Establishing first 
contact with the hostage takers is naturally very important because unless we know who 
are they and what are they wanting, what are their demands, we cannot negotiate with 
them.”  
Despite the general consensus that the first contact is important, the INGO 
participants described varying levels of preparedness to face this first challenge.  
One INGO participant considered his or her organisation to be prepared: “It’s critical, and 
we do have some protocols in place. When you get the call, we have an emergency action 
plan, there is a list of questions to ask, information to obtain, what to say and what not to 
say.” Another, however, admits that his or her organisation may not be as prepared as it 
should be: “Not everybody is prepared to deal with that first contact in the organisation.” 
This procedure shows a gap between what participants know, that first contact is 
important, and what has been implemented. For an INGO operating in 
sometimes more than 100 countries, it is unreasonable to expect all staff to be 
trained in managing a cold-call, or unexpected call, from a hostage taker, but 
checklists can be made available for staff in key positions that are the most 
likely to receive such a call.  
Studies related to criticality of managing the first call have not been conducted 
but there are indications that an able communicator should be appointed to 
handle the first call from the hostage taker and that effective communications 
and negotiations have been proved fruitful in rescue operations (Auerbach, 
1999; Strentz, 2006).   
5.5.2 Hostage reception plan 
As important as it is to have proper plans and policies to confront the 
unexpected, there must also be proper plans laid out to receive the hostages 
when they are released. The hostage reception plan is a plan that is put in place 
to deal with the immediate aftermath of the release of a hostage, and became the 
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second organising theme under the global theme of Procedures. Such a plan 
typically includes potential release scenarios and locations, safe havens for the 
former hostage, communication issues such as calls to family and dependents, 
logistical issues such as repatriation or evacuation, media management, medical 
checks, and more immediate practical issues such as food, clothing and hygiene. 
This plan needs to be based on several factors, such as the likely mental and 
physical state of the former hostage, the security situation at the location of the 
release, the quality of medical facilit ies, the distance to family members, and the 
availability of transport.  
All 26 participants agreed that a hostage reception plan is important, and 14 of 
the INGOs (88%) stated that they had such plans in place during a hostage 
crisis. The participants who were likely best positioned to judge the importance 
of such plans—the former hostages and the psychologist—are quoted below on 
this issue.  
A participant that is a former hostage, stated: “It is important to plan because some of 
these things can go wrong, so it’s not just the basic food, clothes, medicines, medical 
check; it’s going to be also cash, passport, visa and psychological support.”  
Another former hostage agreed and said: “I wanted to get out of that situation as quick as 
possible, so I was very happy that there was a plan in place for me to do that.”  
This is in line with what a psychologist participant stated: “I’m talking here about the 
smoothness of the steps that somehow the former hostage feels things are well planned, 
organized and taken care of somehow and there are no kind of instances which would 
cause any additional anxiety to the person. So that is important.” 
Another participant described the importance of the reception plan on several levels: “And 
interestingly enough, after the initial surge of activity, there is often not a lot to do; there 
is a lot of waiting.  And good reception planning can keep our staff occupied in a positive 
way. In the planning, it is good for the mind to be focusing on when he, she or they come 
out. Fundamentally, do they work according to plan? No, they don’t. They never do. But, 
they are absolutely vital about how you respond.”   
 
As experience in managing hostage crises increase in the INGO community, 
INGOs have increased their preparedness. The findings from this questions 
shows that this element of the preparedness is in place, and is considered 
important. 
This view was echoed in the 2013 Aid worker security report: ‘While most risk-
mit igation procedures have not changed significantly over the past decade, what 
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has changed is the management of the agency’s response to a kidnapping. 
Placing a priority on this indicates acknowledgement of the growing threat, as 
well as the documented high costs, and critical impact it can have on a relatively 
well-prepared organisation, let alone an ill-prepared one.’ (Harmer, Stoddard, 
and Toth, p. 10)  Buth (2011) supported these assertions, when he contended 
that as a part of incident management there must be a hostage release plan which 
should include a gatekeeper to protect the former hostage from immediate 
exposure to media, arrangements for the victim to contact and meet his or her 
family, provisions for clean clothing, medical intervention, and arranging for 
appropriate meetings with the government agencies and press.  
Macpherson, Persaud, and Sheehan (2008, p. 22-24) confirms the participants’ 
positions. The focus of managing a hostage incident is finding the optimal 
solution for all involved. For this to be successful, planning and preparation is 
of importance. Unanimously, literature points to the advantage of having clear 
guidelines to follow during a crisis. The crisis management plan is designed to 
prepare and implement a timely, prudent and effective response to kidnapping, 
an extortion attempt or the  threat of kidnapping or extortion directed against the 
organisation’s employees, families, and/or its guests, facilities, operations, 
assets or reputation. It is the foundation for the NGO’s response and serves as 
the institutional guideline when emotions and stress are greatest.  
Specifically, Bolz, Dudonis, Schulz, and Riemann (2001, p. 34) states that post-
incident planning is concerned with handling events in the aftermath of the 
hostage-taking; it deals with emergencies, physical and psychological  injuries, 
and the need to get operations back to normal as quickly and safely as possible.  
5.5.3 Informing the family 
It can be complicated deciding the degree of information sharing with the family that is 
appropriate and tactically sound, so this emerged as the third organising theme under the 
global theme of Procedures.  
All 26 participants agreed that the family needed to be informed, and for some 
participants this appeared to be important also from a negotiation and 
management perspective.  
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One participant explained: “I think unless the victim is kept informed intimately 
throughout, they can undermine the effort by negotiators by unhelpful comments in the 
press, I think I have seen this on occasions particularly in the UK, where next of kin was 
critical about what the government is doing. I think if the family is promptly briefed 
without delay as to what procedures are in place, that would be helpful.”  
This was echoed: “It’s absolutely key that we get families on our side straightaway 
because they can be a lot of damage to the process if you don’t get them on board.”  
A third participant concurred: “We think that, trust between us and family is very 
important, and if the family members are to move on their own interface, so in the case of 
media it is crucial and make sure that professional advice and guidance is available.”  
However, when asked whether the family should be consulted on tactical and 
strategic decisions on managing the case, the participants were divided. This is 
illustrated in Figure 5.4:  
 
Figure 5.4: Participants’ views on the level of interaction with family of hostage 
 
Those in favour of both sharing information and consulting mostly argued that it 
would make the management of the case easier.  
N04 explained: “The school says you cannot lose the confidence from the family. If you 
lose that once you will not gain it back so I think that it's really important that you keep 
them updated at all times and that you have them as part of your CMT [crisis management 
team], you make daily talking points to the families.”  
N02 further expanded on his or her NGO’s practice in such cases: “The family should 
know all the time what we know. We should build a relation with the family so that they 
feel sure that we are not hiding anything, that they are updated and also consulted in the 
sense that we are doing this and this and we usually do inform.” 
The participants that favoured an approach of generally sharing information, but 
not consulting on tactical aspects (46%), interestingly argued from the 
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perspective of improving the management of the case. Most participants averse 
to consulting on tactical issues argued that the family would not be in a position to 
provide optimal decisions or advice.  
One participant explains: “That is a sensitive question. Well they need to be kept informed. 
But they don't have a need to know everything that's going on and it depends on the family 
and who the family representatives are at some level but it’s our policy not to share the 
strategic planning with the family in detail because if it leaks, it could undermine the 
successful outcome and, you know, families are like organisations. We’re all dysfunctional 
at some level and amidst of a crisis, dysfunction rises to the surface and we cannot allow 
that dysfunction to undermine a successful outcome.”  
Likewise, an INGO participant stated that: “The part of consulting the hostage’s family 
about some certain routes to go or avenues to explore during the negotiation, I don’t think 
it's a good idea because these people are not trained to do that, and also they are not a not 
a neutral party, they are affected by what’s happening to their family member and that 
might impair their judgments.”  
One participant, to the point, summarised: “No, we don’t. We utilise the personal 
knowledge of the hostage itself, but tactical, no way.” 
The comments of the experts averse to seeking tactical advice from the family 
mirrored those of the INGO participants.  
An expert participant warned against informing and consulting too much, as it is 
impossible to guarantee that information provided to the family is not leaked, 
which can inadvertently end up harming either the negotiation process or the 
well-being of the hostage:  
“You cannot guarantee that by passing that information, it won’t harm or injure other 
person still concerned, and that maybe other person’s concern not in direct conflict with 
the situation, so it might be another hostage on the road from another hostage situation 
whereby you start informing people that you know your hostage is being killed. […] 
Another hostage in another situation could be killed because you made that decision.”  
Other participants likewise emphasised the emotional state of the family and the 
resultant perceived lack of objectivity in decision-making:  
“I think the family are going to be in pretty emotional state, so ask advice and listen to it, 
but listen to it very objectively because what you hear is probably, it might not be what 
you can apply. They are all going to be terribly emotional, they can talk a lot about the 
personality of the captive and that could be useful to you, but as to advice as to what to do, 
no I don’t think so.”  
An expert participant agreed: “No, I would not do that. Tactical and strategic advice in 
such situations from the families would be stressed by emotions mainly.” 
 
Given the above, a potentially difficult part of any hostage crisis is to determine 
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how much information to provide to the family, and that managing the family of 
an abducted staff member is a key component in the overall hostage 
management. Providing family liaison and support is vital in the resolution of a 
crisis, ensuring that the INGO can lead a coordinated response, information is 
effectively managed, and the agency’s duty of care obligations to the staff 
member and their family are fulfilled. It is clear from both the literature and the 
interviews performed as part of this study that the family is victimised as well.  
Each INGO will have to establish procedures that stipulates to which degree the 
contact with the family should be. For example, the NGO CARE has documented 
the need for support to the family in its security manual, which states that CARE 
will ‘provide all possible support to the hostage’s family members’ (2004, p. 
69). However, this study reveals clearly the importance of having a dedicated 
member of the crisis response as the family liaison, offering a single route for 
information exchange between the crisis team and the family. This study also 
establishes that the knowledge of the family being taken care of can greatly 
assist the hostage during captivity, as this is one of the primary concerns of a 
hostage while in captivity. 
It is clear from the literature review that hostage events place enormous stress 
on the family, and that there is need for assistance. Diego Asencio (2011, p.205) 
described his family’s suffering throughout his captivity in Colombia in 1980. 
He wrote:  
‘There was another curious condition manifesting itself during my 
captivity that I believe cries out for greater research by 
psychologists. Certainly, every crisis manager should be aware of 
it . For want of a better term, I would call it the Victim and 
Victim’s Family Syndrome’.  
This is in line with terminology used by the United Nations, the FBI, and New 
Scotland Yard; the family is referred to as the ‘victims’, while the person 
abducted is referred to as the ‘hostage’. Asencio continued by explaining why 
the family may experience such high level of emotions:  
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Although not subjected to the same physical danger as the victims 
themselves, these families are psychological and emotional 
casualties of terrorist acts. The family has no way of directing its 
anger at the terrorists who are simply inaccessible as the focal 
point of such feelings. There is also no socially acceptable means 
of expressing grief—no funeral, no ceremony, or other rite—since 
the victim is simply missing and the state of his well-being 
unknown.  
Thomas Hargrove, who was held hostage  for eleven months in 1994-95 by 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia - FARC) in an interview with BBC, agreed. He said: ‘In this complex 
scenario, I had the simplest role. All I have to do is survive, and survival is the 
most simple instinct. I knew I was alive, they never knew for sure.’ 
Kristen Mulvihill, the wife of hostage David Rohde, described her exhaustion, 
writing:  
I often feel I have no room for anyone else’s emotion. I am 
constantly barraged with well-meaning but often tearful inquiries 
about David. Calls from friends and family once a comfort now 
feel like an added responsibility. I do not know what to tell them. I 
have hit full saturation. It’s all I can do to keep myself composed, 
let alone comfort someone else (Rohde and Mulvihil, 2010, p. 
132). 
Bolz, Dudonis, Schulz, and Riemann (2001, p. 34) found that when a hostage 
incident takes place, it affects not only the workers directly involved, but also 
their families and friends. Increasingly, INGOs are recognising that their 
obligations to their field staff also extend to families who, though directly 
affected by events, have sometimes been overlooked in the midst of crisis 
responses. Providing family liaison and support can be vital in the resolution of 
a crisis, ensuring that the agency can lead a coordinated response, information is 
effectively managed, and the agency’s duty of care obligations to the staff 
member and his or her family are fulfilled. 
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Previous findings identified that concern for the well-being of the family is 
prominent in the mind of a hostage, and knowing that they are taken care of 
contributes to a more positive attitude. In a 2012 study of the human cost of 
piracy (Hurlburt and Seyle), ‘My family being distressed by worry about my 
well-being’ was rated as the number one concern, while ‘Being killed’ was the 
sixth greatest concern. ‘My relationships with my loved ones getting difficult’ 
and ‘My family experiencing financial hardship because my salary is stopped’ 
were also high on the list of concerns, so being able to take care of the family 
has an obvious impact on the mental state of the hostage. 
5.5.4 Crisis management preparedness 
A substantive organising theme under Procedures is the crisis management 
procedures for the organisation, and identifying INGOs’ levels of preparedness 
to manage a hostage crisis was a key objective of this research. Four basic 
themes emerged under crisis management preparedness, identifying the role of 
four key actors in managing the crisis; the role of the organisation’s security 
personnel, the role of the organisation’s executive officer in the operation of the 
crisis, the role of the host government, and the role of the passport nation.  
Some INGOs have better crisis management structures in place for managing 
hostage crises than others. One INGO participant said:  
“We trained our own pool of hostage incident managers working in our organisation; we 
have identified good crisis managers. We have the list on standby so we can pull about 30 
people that are trained by Scotland Yard. Exactly what they have in the UN. So we have 
got it internally and we have invested in that.” 
One expert participant describes the perceived INGO preparedness levels: “I think most 
NGOs now have some sort of crisis management structure in place to deal with whatever 
it might be; flooding, or fire, or it could be whatever, not necessarily a kidnap instance, 
but they have some sort of crisis management structure to deal with unforeseen incidents 
and some of them are quite elaborate and non-power intensive I would say, some of them 
have adapted to the police structure of Gold, Silver, Bronze, you know, and have very big 
manuals to go by. Our experience is that when a kidnap incident comes in, these structures 
are far too large, and especially if you don’t take four weeks here, if you take an average 
kidnap, it is going to run six months, you can’t have that much staff tied up 24/7 for six 
months…” 
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All INGO participants referred to their crisis plans, or similar phrases, and this 
indicated to the researcher that a structure was in place. Some participants had a 
clearly defined structure for managing a hostage case, but from most 
participants it appeared to be a generic crisis management structure. As 
established in the research, a crisis is sudden and overwhelming, and therefore 
needs pre-planning and organization to be resolved successfully. It is the 
researcher’s belief that mot INGOs now have a level of preparedness in place to 
manage a generic crisis. Most participants also specifically mentioned a hostage 
incident plan, indicating a specific contingency in place for such a crisis.  
The theoretical framework of this study outlined Coombs (1999, p. 125) theories 
which stated that ‘it  is a mistake to believe an organization can avoid or prevent 
all possible crises’. The literature offers plentiful definitions of what constitutes 
a crisis, but Pearson and Claire’s (1998, p. 60-63) is perhaps  the most relevant 
in this case: ‘a low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of 
the organisation, is characterised by ambiguity of cause, effect and means of 
resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly’.  
The role of the security officer during a hostage crisis 
The participants identified three potential roles of a security officer during a 
hostage crisis: to investigate or liaise; to manage the security of the operation 
rather than being fully engaged in the management of the crisis; or to serve as a 
key member of the crisis management team. Here the INGO and expert 
participants differed. The majority of the INGO participants, 11 of the 15 who 
provided an answer, or 73 per cent, named the security officer as a key member 
of the crisis team. As seen in Figure 5.5 below, only one of the six experts, or 17 
per cent, would place a security officer in the same role. Rather, the experts 
preferred the security officers to manage the security of the operation rather than 
engaging directly with the running of the crisis. The latter is the model used by 
the United Nations. 
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Figure 5.5: Participants’ views on the role of security officers during hostage 
crisis. 
The difference in opinion is likely due to the structures used. While law 
enforcement and professional hostage managers deploy a negotiation team 
specifically to manage the situation, most INGOs would rely on internal 
structures. Hence, the security officer would be a key member of their team. 
The role of the executive officer during a hostage crisis 
The executive officer of any INGO operation naturally plays an important role 
in managing a crisis, and while the roles and responsibilit ies of the executive 
officer may vary among INGOs, that person as a rule plays a key role in 
decision making and in driving the plans. As is illustrated in Figure 5.6 the 
participants in this research were divided as to the best use of the executive 
officer during a hostage crisis.  
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Figure 5.6: Participants’ views on the role of executive officers during hostage 
crisis. 
The main argument in favour of excluding the executive from the crisis team was 
that he or she is responsible for continuing managing the operation in general, 
with the added challenges a hostage case brings along. In addition, it was 
posited that the executive would be too emotionally invested in the case to offer 
objective advice or make objective decisions.  
On participant stated: “If I think about his daily work and job and responsibilities, he 
shouldn’t be involved anytime in the physical process of the hostage incident 
management.”  
Another expressed a similar view: “Somebody have to keep operations moving, somebody 
has to keep watching for the fallout and other security issues and operational issues and 
everything else for normal operations if we continue normal operations.”   
An INGO participant expanded on the emotional connection to the case: “He or she 
should not be acting as the negotiator himself or herself because as I said there are a lot 
of other things, even the head may have a lot of emotional attachment and emotionally 
they maybe overcharged, and secondly the negotiation is again, I feel, is sort of a 
specialised job, there are specially trained people to negotiate with the hostage takers so 
he should not be involved in negotiating with the hostage takers.” 
Two participants were clear on their organisations’ policies as far as the executive officer 
on the ground. The first stated: “We try to make sure that the [executive] does not lead the 
crisis because the [executive] has got responsibilities for the rest of the country, another 
1000 staff members on the ground.”  
The second said: “So our policy is that the [executive] does not run the crisis; he hands it 
over to the crisis manager who heads the crisis management team and then [executive’s] 
role is to keep the organisation as a whole on track and set the overall tone of the 
response, the policy and so on.” 
One of the experts explained this from an outside perspective: “You don’t usually get the 
very senior person on the crisis management team simply because that person is too 
important to be locked into the room for thirty days 24/7, you know it’s not practical for 
that senior person to be involved hands on in the incident; normally the most senior 
person is not involved, so he can concentrate on keeping the rest of the organization 
running.” 
The participants arguing in favour of an active role for the executive presented the 
following elucidations:  
“This person will be the head of the IMT, Incident Management Team and therefore the 
head of all tactical decisions.”  
“That would be to coordinate all in-house and external resources that are brought on 
board before managing the crisis, being a visible leader for the organisation in country.”  
One expert participant supported the views of the INGO participants favouring an active 
role: “Head of office in the country should be the head of crisis response and crisis 
management team.” 
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The role of the host government during a hostage crisis 
The government of the country where the worker is captured and held hostage is 
known as the host country, and the International Convention against the Taking 
of Hostages, adopted by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 34/146 of 17 
December 1979 is quite clear on the host government’s responsibility: 
 “the taking of hostages is an offence of grave concern to the 
international community, that any person committing an offence of 
taking hostages shall either be prosecuted or extradited, and that 
States shall make such offences punishable by appropriate 
penalties which take into account the grave nature of those 
offences”.   
Further, on 18 December 1985, the UN Security Council Resolution against 
Taking Hostages was adopted by a 15 to 0 vote. UN conventions require that a 
nation use its own judicial system to implement and enforce the agreement. UN 
resolutions, on the other hand, are simply agreements on a particular set of 
principles or goals. Hence, conventions are more binding than resolutions, since 
resolutions do not imply a commitment to enforcement. Nevertheless, the United 
Nations has no direct power to force a nation to abide by any of its agreements 
(Enders and Sandler, 2006, p. 174). So while it is clear that international legal 
instruments exist to punish hostage taking, it is unclear as to whether the host 
government is obliged to manage all or most aspects of a hostage case.  
Overall, participants’ responses indicated that the host country should take 
responsibility and help the INGOs in every way possible to secure the safe 
release of hostages. In the interviews, the participants identified two potential 
roles of the host government: to either assist in the crisis management by 
providing information, pressure on the environment surrounding the hostage 
takers, resources, or to take the lead in the process of working toward release of 
the hostages. However, some countries may show resistance to do so, and others 
may not have adequate facilities or capabilit ies to assist.  
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Analysis of the data shows that the participants felt strongly that the level of 
cooperation with the host government depended on perceived reliability or 
existing working relationships. As shown in Figure 5.7, eighteen of the 26 
respondents, or 69 per cent, said the level of cooperation depended on the 
government. 
 
Figure 5.7: Participants’ views on the role of the host government during hostage 
crisis. 
One participant explained the intricacies of such cooperation: “It is a very good question; 
it depends very much on the situation. In the end it is our crisis, it is the crisis for the 
family, it is the crisis for the host government but it is our crisis as well. So we must build 
a good relation with this host government but they are instrumental to our strategy from 
our perspective. So if we can use them, then we will and if we see them as a risk because 
they perhaps might consider armed intervention or whatever, still we must have a good 
contact but only to mitigate this risk factor. So depends very much.”  
Other participants were more negative in their view of the governments’ capacities to 
assist:  
One claimed that “Technically it was their job to keep this from happening in the first 
place right…it all depends on location, and you know it's a very tricky game.”  
Another counselled: “Be cooperative, not get in the way. That is really what's going to 
happen if they get involved, they tend to get in the way and create problems, whether it's 
trying to release the hostages with force or collect ten per cent from the ransom payment.”  
“But we certainly believe that the host government has the ultimate responsibility for the 
staff on the ground. But some countries that do not have a government, like Somalia etc., 
we can expect little from them.” 
The participants that were in favour of the government leading the process 
explained this as a responsibility of the host government.  
One posited: “The host government, as according to the international law, has the duty of 
providing humanitarian actors with protection, and we are one of those who they have an 
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obligation towards, if we are there in an area with elected government or whatever 
government of the day, then they have an obligation to solve the crisis.”  
An expert participant warned against failing to co-operate with the host government: “If 
you ignore them and push them to one side, they will be often become upset. There may be 
spoilers. We must interact with them. And from our side, we need to be completely 
transparent and visible…We need to make sure that they understand the primary 
responsibility there is and we are holding them to book, they are accountable for bringing 
about the release of people. It is a pressure tactic and of course, it is the balance of how, 
who and when you put the pressure on and then take the pressure off.  That is the art of 
good management across the slate. But ignore them at your peril.”  
The above data regarding the general reluctance to fully involve the host 
government to assist during the crisis took the researcher by surprise. As 
established in the research, the International Convention against the Taking of 
Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its 
Resolution 34/146 of 17 December 1979, clearly states that ‘States Parties to 
this Convention are bound under those conventions to prosecute or hand over the 
hostage taker’. It is therefore clear that the host government has the primary 
responsibility in managing a case. This applies to the way the United Nations 
manage a hostage crisis as well. Paragraph 13 of the United Nations policy on 
hostage incident management states:  
‘Notwithstanding the provisions of the present procedures, the 
Government of the  State in which the hostage-taking has 
occurred, or, if applicable, the Government of the State where the 
hostages are held by the offenders, has the primary responsibility 
under international law to take all measures it considers 
appropriate to ease the situation of the hostages, in particular to 
secure their release and, after their release, to facilitate, when 
relevant, their departure. Any request for United Nations 
assistance in mediating an agreement to secure the release of 
hostages, made either by a member State or an organization 
involved in the hostage incident, must be forwarded to the Under-
Secretary-General for Safety and Security for approval.’   
The researcher finds the lack of host government involvement concerning, as 
most INGOs, including those participating in this study, are not hesitant to hold 
host government accountable for their security if a security incident has 
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occurred. In other words, participants were quick to point out the role of the host 
government in providing a safe operating environment, but hesitant in allowing 
the same government to manage a situation. This can be seen as contradictory, 
as good security management should include prevention, mitigation, and 
planning elements. It may be understandable that cooperation with government 
in some cases can be sensitive, but the INGO has no legal right to exclude a host 
government from managing the crisis. 
Macpherson, Persaud, and Sheehan (2008, p. 22-24) makes it clear that if an 
international NGO employee is kidnapped, this crime, according to international 
law, should be addressed between governments. Everyone else who is party to 
the event is involved only through the request of the host nation and the national 
government of the victim. If it is a national staff, then the nation’s law 
enforcement has the mandate. Only in very rare circumstances will an  NGO ﬁnd  
itself  in a  situation where the  organization has  no choice other than to serve 
as the  primary negotiator. 
Further, in Stoddard, Harmer, and Hughes (2012, p. 6-7) it is stated that:  
[…] in the case of international organisations and their officials, the 
host government has a special responsibility under the UN Charter 
and the government’s agreements (called Host Country 
Agreements) with the individual organisations. These agreements 
apply to all types of environments where international assistance is 
deployed, not just conflict contexts, and cover a wide range of 
issues including communications, travel and transport, privileges 
and immunities, as well as safety and security. There are also a 
number of conventions and frameworks, primarily developed 
within UN bodies, which describe state responsibilit ies for aid 
workers.  
Bruderlein and Gassmann (n.d.) concur and state that host country should take 
responsibility for international aid workers’ security. There are however no clear 
terms and conditions stated as to what kind and to what extent of security should 
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be provided. The level of taking responsibility and cooperation depends on the 
policies of the individual country and its legal processes.  
The role of the passport nation during a hostage crisis 
The nationality of the hostage plays a role in the way that the ‘home nation’ of 
the hostage responds to a hostage crisis. If the hostage has dual citizenship, the 
passport used for entry to the country where the hostage was taken will 
determine which nation responds to the crisis. The literature review provides 
little information regarding a passport nation’s role during a hostage situation, 
except for the in extremis option of a hostage rescue. Even here the literature is 
divided. While international consensus condemns the act of hostage-taking, 
opinion is sharply divided over the legality of forceful rescue missions by the 
hostages’ national state.  
The participants in this research predominantly saw the role of the passport 
nation as taking a support function. Fourteen of the respondents (67%) that 
provided an answer were in favour of such a support role, including providing 
intelligence and technical assistance. Thirty three per cent indicated that the 
passport nation should pressure the host government to assist in resolving the 
crisis.  
Figure 5.8 below shows the participants opinions on the role of the home nation 
during a hostage crisis. 
 
Figure 5.8: Participants’ views on the role of the home nation during a hostage 
crisis. 
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One participant cautioned that the passport nation’s activities often are beyond the 
influence of an INGO: “Their key role is the feeding information on it, depends on the 
countries, some other examples we saw that some countries, they have a mandate that 
obliges them to go and be actively involved in negotiations, so we cannot really control 
the country of origin for our staff members.”  
Another participant focused very much on the capabilities of support: “The home nation 
basically can provide such kind of information and evidence that helps to prove the life of 
the hostage or identify the hostage or prove the identity of the hostage not only the life. 
The other thing that the home nation, or any organ of the home nation, should provide 
support for the citizen in this case, and how it is provided and what is provided are 
defined international laws and the national constitutions which each country defines on a 
different way, but most of them consider, ‘If my citizen is taken in to hostage, I must do 
everything to get him or her released.’”  
 
The answers indicate to the researcher that this element is not always clearly 
laid out in the policy and procedures of the INGO. Much can be gained by the 
support from the passport nation in terms of intelligence and technical capacity, 
and even in establishing adequate family liaison, so the INGO could benefit 
from a more systematic inclusion of the passport nation as an actor. 
5.6 Capacity of INGOs to manage and contain a hostage situation   
The previous segment of this chapter explored the level of INGOs policies and 
procedures in place as a foundation of managing a hostage crisis. This part of 
the chapter examines INGO capacity to manage and contain hostage situations in 
terms of financial and human resources. 
5.6.1 Financial resources 
The third global theme in this study is Financial Resources. From this theme, 
three organizing themes emerged; cost of managing a hostage crisis, whether the 
INGO should be liable for cost, and whether insurance for ransom was an 
option. 
Resources required for managing a four-week hostage crisis 
An attempt was made during the interviews to identify the resources typically 
required to manage a hostage crisis for more than four weeks, with the 
hypothetical example for comparison reasons provided of two international staff 
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having been abducted in Darfur, Sudan. This is the first organising theme under 
the global theme of Financial Resources 
Hostage cases can be extremely labour intensive, and this is one of the reasons 
that the United Nations has a dedicated Hostage Incident Management team; it  is 
simply not possible to absorb the crisis into the organisation’s normal 
management and operational structure.  
An expert participant used personal experience to quantify a previous case: “In cases we 
started to plot and count man-hours spent on such a response. And it is huge. I remember 
a case in Darfur again.  Two persons taken, internationals, and they were held for close to 
100 days and when we counted up in man hours or person hours of how long they were 
taken, it was between two and three years’ worth of work. Put a cost on that and you're 
talking about the hours people have to divert from their normal work, cost is coming into 
six figures, for an expanded operation.” 
An INGO participant also mentioned a specific example to illustrate the labour-intensive 
nature of managing a hostage situation: “In Somalia, I don't think that would differ much 
in terms of resources. We had twenty-five people working around the clock and that goes 
from the CMT in [Capital of organisation’s home country] to the CMT on the ground.” 
A second INGO participant gave a specific figure in dollars: “I think four weeks would be 
at least hundred thousand dollars to bring together the team full-time doing this job. Yes, 
an expensive exercise I would say.” 
Most respondents’ organisations seemed to have a crisis management structure 
set up similar to that established by the United Kingdom emergency services; it 
is referred to as Gold, Silver, Bronze. The Gold-Silver-Bronze command 
structure is used to establish a hierarchical framework for the command and 
control of major incidents and disasters. In such a structure, Gold Command is 
in overall control of the organisation’s resources to manage the incident. Gold is 
not on site, but in a distant control room, typically at the organisation’s 
headquarters, where he or she formulates the strategy for dealing with the 
incident. The Silver Commander is the senior member of the organisation in the 
country of the hostage taking, in charge of all the local resources required to 
manage the case. Silver decides upon the best use of these resources to achieve 
the strategic aims of the Gold Commander; he or she determines the tactics used. 
The Bronze Commander is in charge of the crisis or negotiation cell in the 
country. 
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Several participants listed their crisis management structure and explained how 
they would deploy to manage the case. One provided a thorough explanation 
built on experience from several cases:  
“You know, the planning procedure stipulates that there will be a crisis management team 
involved that can consist between four to six people, but in reality it spirals up out of 
control.  It becomes a crisis management team at headquarters level, crisis management 
team at country level, hostage incident management team at flash point, you get family 
support, you get communication strategies. I would say hands down, it’s up to 40 people if 
it is an intense life-threatening hostage situation.” 
The experts agreed, and one emphasised the need for rotation after some time: “So I would 
also say, as we do, we need to rotate that structure every thirty days because it gets so 
physically tiring you know, physically and mentally exhausting that you’ll feel that you 
would be making bad decisions after thirty days, so we rotate every thirty days and we 
ensure that the structure is maintained.” 
The interviews provided information that supports the notion of a hostage crisis 
being labour intensive. The data from the participants indicated that at least ten 
people would be involved one way or another to form a solid response to a 
hostage situation. This element is also substantially backed by the findings from 
the 2013 Aid worker security report where it states that ‘For many NGOs, 
however, particularly medium-sized and smaller ones, a kidnapping can have a 
crippling effect. Staff assigned to the crisis management team must be able to 
put aside other duties, and would ideally be rotated every few weeks. Long-
duration kidnappings (e.g. several months) can place a significant resource 
burden on the organisation’. 
Liability for cost 
The literature review of INGO security manuals and policies (CARE, World 
Vision, Mercy Corps, ECHO, Save the Children) shows that most INGOs have 
an official policy of not paying ransom, but as seen above, a hostage case still 
carries significant cost even without such payment. With ten or more staff 
engaged in full time management of the crisis, including travel abroad for some, 
a case of one month can easily cost over USD 100,000. Zumkehr and Finucane 
(2013, p. 4) showed that NGOs have commonly depended on funding from donor 
agencies, multilateral lenders, charitable institutions, and government ministries 
for their own administration and for conducting programs. They do not, in 
general, generate their own money. Hence, as part of the interviews for the 
present study, and as the second organising theme under the global theme of 
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Financial Resources, a question was asked as to who should cover the cost of a 
hostage case involving staff from an INGO. 
The cost incurred when managing an abduction situation is usually large. It is 
generally agreed that the NGO should cover the cost of managing hostage 
situation either from its own resources or through K&R if the organisation is 
insured. The participants in the present study explained that most INGOs cover 
this cost from their own resources and do not expect financial aid from external 
sources. Previous studies also support this view. The researcher (Lauvik, 2008) 
described it in his previous work as an issue of duty of care as hostage taking 
can be considered a foreseeable event for INGOs. Bolz et al. (2001, p. 34) 
projected the same view: that when an aid worker is taken hostage, the INGO 
itself is targeted, and hence it is the responsibility of the organisation to protect 
its workers. All 16 INGO participants agreed that the INGO itself should cover 
the cost of managing the hostage incident.  
One INGO participant explained it in simple terms: “We, certainly as the implementing 
agency and the people are with us; we certainly take the responsibility to do that.”  
Others shared similar views: “…it’s purely on us, these are our employees; they are our 
responsibility.”  
“It is us, it is the NGO itself.”  
“We should take responsibility and cover the cost ourselves, that’s how we work really.”  
Two participants mentioned insurance as the payer, but since the INGO pays for 
the insurance, these responses are also considered to have concurred with the 
view that the INGO should take financial responsibility for managing hostage crises.  
One INGO openly stated that this was the exact reason the INGO carried insurance 
coverage: to cover expenditures in the case of a hostage situation. “K&R, that’s why you 
have it!”  
Another expanded: “So [INGO] would include those costs and then we would try and get 
recover those from the insurance company. And I do not know whether or not we would be 
successful with all of them but that is what we would try.” 
One of the experts estimated the total cost of a case: “I think it’s very important. First of 
all, we are going to see the cost aspect which can be significant, like if you are talking 
about the last six-month kidnaps, depending on the average ransom payment might be half 
a million or three quarters of a million, and then you add on fees like our advice fees, 
hotels, travels or whatever logistical coordination, it would probably go towards two 
million. You know, the whole incident’s going to cost.” 
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Although two of the INGO participants (12.5%) also contended that the host 
nation and the home nation should cover some of the cost of managing the event, 
the vast majority made it clear that the liability in terms of cost to manage a 
hostage crisis lays entirely with them. It is considered that the NGOs therefore 
should cover the cost of managing a hostage situation either from its own 
resources or through kidnap and ransom insurance should they have such 
coverage. Whether to gain support through an insurance policy is a risk 
management question each INGO will have to make on their own. In terms of 
covering expenses, outside of ransom, such policy cannot be seen as 
contradictory to the public stand of not paying ransom, as it simply is risk 
transference in terms of travel expenses, overtime, and other cost occurring 
during the crisis. 
Insurance for ransom 
The third organising theme under the global theme Financial Resources is 
whether insurance against ransom payment is a viable option for INGOs. The 
predominately public stand by INGO of not paying ransom is somewhat 
contradictory to statistics of kidnap & ransom insurance providers. Overall, 
twelve INGOs and five experts were positive to K&R insurance, also regarding 
the several components apart from ransom that are covered by such policies. 
Only one expert and one INGO were completely against the use of K&R 
insurance. The overall response, as shown in Figure 5.9, indicated quite a 
significant deviation from the public stance and that of the policies of INGOs, 
with 17 responding participants (89%) positive to some use of K&R insurance, 
and only two against it altogether. 
 
17
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Positive to K&R Negative to K&R
Positive to K&R
Negative to K&R
258 
Figure 5.9: Chart showing participants’ views on use of kidnap and ransom 
insurance 
Several participants were positive to the overall use of K&R insurance, 
including ransom insurance. K&R insurance is a complex issue that is rooted in 
the culture and laws of the countries in which an INGO operates. One quote 
explained the philosophy from the INGO participant’s perspective:  
“Well I mean, an NGO, whether you have insurance or not, you still have liabilities, so 
every organisation has to look at its own exposure whether it either has to self-insure 
which is you pay out of your existing budgets or you take a policy to cover those 
eventualities. I mean, if you are to be in the game then you have got to be willing to pay 
the price and if you have got to be working in these high-risk environments then you need 
to take appropriate measures, and either be prepared pay for it through self-insured 
policy which is being out of your budget or you have to get some insurance to have some 
underwriter cover the cost.” 
A second participant is also showed pragmatism about the use of insurance: “And this is 
only a tool to help the organisations or just take over that responsibilities or actions. This 
is a transfer of risk, in other words, from the side of the organisation.”  
A third gave a similar opinion: “I think that such insurances would insure life and death, 
possibly financial burden that one needs to have for the hostage bearer and additionally, it 
starts professional conduct and services, it will keep you to supporting the crisis traits and 
ensuring safe release of the abducted and these are the advantages I think.”  
Other participants were more direct in their support of K&R insurance: “My personal 
opinion is for a typical NGO, if they don't have it they have no business in this line of 
work.”  
“In the NGO community, I think it's absolutely imperative to have it.”  
“All organisations should have, ideally, a kidnap and ransom insurance.”  
“The main advantage you have, [K&R] gives you the capacity to pay the ransom if should 
one arise, that’s the biggest advantage.”  
“As far as we can see, the advantage is it can allow the organisation to survive financially 
because these things can be extremely expensive.”  
One participant went even further, and confirmed that they held insurance for ransom: “At 
this time K&R insurance is vital, if you do not have it, you will have to open your own 
piggybank to take out the amount of money. We roughly know what they ask for 
internationals and what they ask from the nationals. And that kind of money does not just 
lie around, so K&R insurance is crucial in my opinion, we certainly have it.”  
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One participant explained what his or her INGO had witnessed from others: “So an 
example of this is that in [country] recently, I have been following the beheading of [name] 
it was an [INGO] staff member, several NGOs have actually paid ransom right up front, 
right, which has changed the dynamics for the rest of us quite a bit, and also changed our 
risk level in the country. I do not know that it would work for NGOs because there is such 
a variation on policy whether or not ransom is paid and I think all NGOs ideally would 
like to say, ‘No’, they wouldn’t pay, but seeing a body without a head, I think, can change 
things quite a bit.” 
An INGO participant explained: “We say publically that we do not pay ransom, and the 
last two abductions we were involved with, there wasn’t any ransom demand made, they 
never came to that.”  
Perhaps the biggest indicator of a difference between public stance on paying ransom and  
actual INGO practice is the following statement from a participating K&R insurance 
expert and provider: “And what we found is that the more training we do with people; 
some that started out by saying our policy is not to pay ransom, when you go to the table 
top exercise and they understand that the risks of their people and a possible torture, bad 
treatment of their people that what is the actual moral question which is greater, actually 
safeguarding their people or the path of not paying a ransom which may obviously limit 
the amount of torture abuse that their staff might endure. They may also come around and 
say actually we will continue to publicly state that we don’t pay ransoms but actually we 
think that’s the best solution to save lives of our people.” 
However, even among those positive to the insurance, some negative factors 
were acknowledged. Three INGO participants expressed concerns that 
systematic payment of ransom could increase the frequency of abductions or lead to 
higher ransoms.  
One said: “Our concern is that it may encourage more kidnaps.”  
This was supported by a second who posited: “Well insurance makes people worth more 
money, I think that would encourage people unless it has to be done in a way that is 
discreet and not known, but how can you guarantee that.” 
A third believed that increase in abductions linked to payments could be seen in the field: 
“Our assessment of most of these security professionals working in [country] were that the 
incidents are going to rise and that is exactly what we saw that after that we noticed a 
sudden increase in the kidnapping cases or the hostage taking cases of the NGO 
community of both national as well as international.” 
 
The most contentious aspect of this research is likely that of whether INGOs 
should pay ransom to ensure an early and safe release of the hostage. Kidnap 
and ransom (K&R) insurance is a sensitive subject in the humanitarian world, 
and no literature directly related to this theme has been found. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that crisis management and kidnap and ransom insurance 
varies considerably regarding their application to national staff, although the 
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issue is generally not openly discussed (Egeland, Harmer, and Stoddard, 2011, 
p. 26-31). The researcher has not found a single INGO that will publically state 
that ransom is paid as a matter of policy. This is likely due to two factors: 
Firstly, insurance companies stipulate that revealing the fact that an INGO is a 
policy holder may render the insurance nil and void. Hence, INGOs cannot 
reveal the extent of their insurance coverage. Second, INGOs fear that if it  
becomes known that they pay ransom, more of their staff will be taken. This will 
lead to a higher risk organisationally, and increase the likelihood of death or 
severe injuries. When the frequency of abductions increases significantly, so 
does the likelihood of casualties. 
An INGO will have to carry the cost of a hostage crisis, whether that be through 
self-insuring, where all costs are covered by the organisation, or through the use 
of an external policy; kidnap and ransom insurance.  In a survey conducted by 
David Klimas in October 2013, where he explored whether a project in a 
complex environment has ever faced a crisis, 55% had kidnap and ransom 
insurance (Klimas, 2013, p 4). INGOs appear to be following this global trend of 
increasingly using kidnap and ransom insurance, and this was clearly revealed 
through this study. Not all agencies that hold such policy actually do pay 
ransom, but there is an increasing use of such policies. The Aid worker security 
report of 2013 states that  
‘Understandably,  ransom payments are seldom mentioned in 
public reports of  kidnapping events, but the dataset has four 
reported cases where Western governments made ransom 
payments to secure the release of their nationals (anecdotally, 
there are several more). It is not reported, but generally 
understood, that in many cases private ransom payments have been 
made, from families and organisations of the kidnapped aid 
workers, as well as from their home governments.’  
The report continues:  
‘In reality, money is often paid – by families, private companies, 
governments, and aid agencies. Usually this is done through 
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indirect means, using a range of intermediaries (even bank 
accounts), so as to preserve the ‘official’ claims that no money 
exchanged hands between agency and perpetrators’. 
Having a policy for hostage crisis may for some agencies ease financial 
planning, as the policy cost is known. Especially for smaller agencies without 
their own hostage management and negotiation capabilities, such insurance 
policies could be a very strong risk mitigation measure, as the expert advice that 
comes with the policy, both in preparatory terms and during the crisis itself, will 
strongly improve the likelihood of a successful outcome of the crisis. Smaller 
agencies without psychologists and stress counsellors as part of their resources 
may also benefit from the post-release assistance a kidnap and ransom policy 
offers as part of their duty of care for their staff. The participants negative to 
kidnap and ransom insurance feared a pull-factor should it be known that they 
carry insurance. However, holding the policy does not equate to paying ransom, 
that decision remains with the agency and its policy on managing a hostage 
crisis, and evidence suggest that a public policy of not paying ransom has not 
proven a significant deterrent’. (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, 2013, p. 12)   
Interpretation of the interviews indicate to the researcher that at least 7 of the 16 
INGOs have either paid ransom, or were at least willing to consider doing so 
should the situation dictate it. This is a position far away from the public stance 
of no ransom payments. The researcher believes this change has taken place for 
several reasons. Firstly, the trend in abductions have changed from political to 
that of financially motivation. While a decade ago in the majority of the cases 
the INGO did not have any actual influence over political demands, such as 
prisoner release, troop removals, or independence issues, today they can largely 
influence the outcome. The pressure on an organisation when one or more of its 
own staff are taken hostage, especially as most INGOs are involved in 
humanitarian issues and passionate about saving lives, is tremendous. And 
paying ransom, especially when done through a third party, can appear to be an 
easy solution. A second factor the researcher believes has contributed to an 
increase in ransom payment is the exponential growth of the kidnap and ransom 
insurance industry since 2001. And for many INGOs, having a kidnap and 
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ransom insurance is a good solution. A standard K&R policy has three main 
components, two of which encompass reimbursement of money lost as the result 
of a kidnapping. These two components are as follows: Reimbursement of any 
ransom paid or reimbursement of money lost when being delivered as ransom; 
and reimbursement for expenses related to securing the release of a kidnap 
victim. The third, non-reimbursement component of a K&R policy provides 
access to security consultants for preventative measures as well as access to 
individuals experienced in hostage negotiation, risk management and crisis 
response in the event of an abduction.  
If we examine each of these components by themselves, they will often 
contribute towards a safe release of the hostage. The reimbursement of ransom 
paid is just that; reimbursement. It does not mean that the INGO have to pay 
ransom, the decision is entirely with the crisis team of that organisation. If their 
policy is to not pay ransom, this component can be removed from the insurance 
coverage, and significantly reduce the premium of the coverage. 
The second component of a typical insurance is reimbursement for expenses 
related to securing the release of a kidnap victim. Managing a hostage case can 
be extremely expensive, even without ransom payment. Participants in the 
research acknowledged so, and estimation of managing a four-week case ranged 
around USD 100.000. The researcher has been involved in some cases where the 
negotiation team alone worked a combined 4500 hours over a 9-10 week period. 
Add to it flights, food and accommodation allowance, and other expenses, it 
becomes costly. Since an abundance of spare funds is not something the average 
INGO can count on, reimbursement of cost may be a suitable mitigating measure 
against the organisational risk of a hostage case. 
The third component is perhaps the most interesting for many INGOs. Although 
the ransom component of the insurance tends to draw the most attention, the 
insurance also provides for the immediate deployment of skilled negotiators who 
can become the backbone of the organisation’s crisis response. These can 
represent the INGO with governmental or institutional counterparts, or act as an 
advisor to the crisis team if the organisation is forced to become the primary 
agent to win a staff member’s freedom. Only a very few INGOs has an in-house 
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capacity to provide skilled negotiators to manage a case, so having access to 
professionals can mean the difference between a positive or negative outcome. 
The researcher agrees wholeheartedly with one of the research participants who 
stated: “So I think, if you're a company and you want legal advice; you get a 
lawyer, or if you want accounting advice; you get an accountant, so it’s 
important to have some sort of specialized advice.” Negotiating for someone’s 
life is a specialist skillset, and not the time to gamble or test new approaches.  
The topic of stopping ransom payment has recently been on the highest global 
political agendas; a discussion of several hours took place at the June 2013 G8 
meeting in Northern Ireland. The G8 (Great Britain, the United States, Japan, 
France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Russia) agreed at that meeting to ‘stamp out 
the payment of ransoms for hostages kidnapped by terrorists’. For the first time, 
it  was publically stated that five of the G8 nations had been ‘shifting’ on the 
issue while three refused to pay ransoms as a matter of principle.  
 
 
Figure 5.10: Participants’ views on viability of private kidnap and ransom 
insurance 
 
K&R insurance could also be relevant to cover family or dependants of staff, 
either through the organisation or privately. Participants were evenly divided on 
whether it  is a viable option for family and dependents of staff, as seen in Figure 
5.10 above.  
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Ten of the responding participants (48%) thought it to be viable, while eleven 
did not (52%). The experts were also divided, with three speaking for and four 
speaking against K&R insurance as a viable option for families and dependents 
of INGO staff. The evenly split responses render it difficult to arrive at a 
conclusive answer as to whether private K&R insurance is a viable option. 
Among the INGO participants who thought that private insurance may be a 
viable option, none gave an absolute opinion.  
One said: “I think it is worth thinking about it.”  
Another was more specific: “If I do give thought to it, and if the organisation would not 
look after my family, I’ll certainly consider it.”  
A third approached this issue from a management perspective: “Difficult to say, I think 
that will have to be subject to that individual to undertake, I think it is very difficult for an 
organisation to deny anybody to take that.” 
An expert participant was more positive: “I think it is worth having for anybody who can 
buy it, it is just like paying fire insurance or casualty insurance for your house or your 
cars, in some areas you almost have to have it. I think the prices are quite reasonable.”  
In contrast to the above view, seven INGO participants listed inhibit ing cost as 
the main reason private K&R was not viable:  
“I do not see that as very realistic because it is very expensive.”  
“I’m not sure that it is actually something our staff could afford.”  
“I think, also it's a bit too expensive for individual staff to undertake such an insurance.”  
The experts agreed that cost was the most common prohibitive factor.  
On expert participant said: “Bluntly speaking, no. In most cases, salary is just not high 
enough, particularly national staff salaries, I don’t know any examples, and I haven’t 
talked to any colleagues who have pursued that line privately.”  
Even an insurance expert among the participants thought it would not be a realistic option: 
“It certainly can be considered. I think it is often restricted because of price.” 
5.6.2 Human resources 
As confirmed by the interviews excerpted in the preceding segments of this 
chapter, managing a hostage crisis can be very labor intensive. Hence, the fourth 
global theme in this study is Human Resources. An INGO not only needs a large 
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number of people; it may also need to lean on several categories of staff such as 
crisis management experts, negotiators, psychologists, and media managers. . From 
this theme, four organizing themes emerged; the use of outside expertise in 
managing a hostage crisis, a common hostage management response, the use of 
psychologists, and the use of media managers. 
One participant said “It’s almost organisation grinding to a halt when this kind of 
operation is going on.”  
5.6.3 The use of external assistance 
The interviews aimed to explore whether the human resources described above 
were either in place or available at short notice for the INGOs. Further, the 
researcher set out to determine whether the resources were in-house or external. 
Whether the INGO could use outside expertise became the first organising theme 
under the global theme of Human resources.  
 
Figure 5.11: Participants’ views on the use of external assistance to assist in a 
hostage crisis. 
One aspect of acquiring K&R insurance is that an insured INGO can obtain 
external expert support to assist its own crisis team during a hostage case. Of the 
22 participants offering an opinion on this topic, only one INGO staff 
participant (5%) was negative to external assistance (Figure 5.11):  
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“I think it could create a problem if they don’t adhere to the humanitarian principles and 
if they don't have enough experience.”  
An expert participant and K&R insurance provider, said: “Understand that we deal with 
various NGOs, some of which have absolutely we-will-not-pay-ransom policy, some of 
them want to take out our advice, so you can get what they call a response stage covered 
only.” 
 
Kenny (2008) presented in his study that private groups have better control over 
larger population and territories; it is therefore advantageous to have external 
private groups to intervene during humanitarian workers’ crisis situations. 
Kenney (2008, p. 551-588) and Menezes (2012) discusses the component of 
K&R insurance that is relevant to a discussion of human resources: the expert 
advisor. Although the ransom component of K&R insurance tends to draw the 
most attention, policies also provide for the immediate deployment of skilled 
negotiators who can become the backbone of the organisation’s ﬁeld response. 
These can represent the INGO with governmental or institutional counterparts. If 
there are no governments involved and the organisation is forced to become the 
primary agent to win a staff member’s freedom, these representatives can take 
the lead. 
Literature featuring families of hostages further emphasise the benefits of 
external assistance. David Rohde and Kristen Mulvihill (2011, p. 100) originally 
liaised only with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), but then decided to 
engage an external expert. They wrote:  
On the basis of this recommendation, we set aside our fears and 
decide to hire AISC. They will send a negotiator to Kabul to 
represent our family and to work alongside a kidnap expert from 
Clayton. Both teams advise us to keep ‘the bureau’, or the FBI, out 
of it. They are useful for some things, but cannot deliver funds, 
release prisoners, or provide direct negotiations when discussions 
involve ransom. They are strictly an information-gathering agency.   
Kristen Mulvihill (Rohde and Mulvihill, 2011, p. 84) also described the effect 
that the pressure had on her.  
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At the same time, I feel completely enraged at my husband’s captors 
and utterly confused. If they want to make a deal so quickly, why 
won’t they list their demands? This is all part of a sick psychology on 
the captors’ part: make the family feel totally responsible and utterly 
without control. Demand they meet demands, but fail to name them 
[…] I am completely exhausted, on edge, and angry at the FBI agents 
in Kabul for scuttling our communications with David’s kidnappers. I 
pace back and forth in our small galley kitchen, then collapse on the 
living room sofa.  
The assistance of an expert in cases such as Rohde’s can make a difference. 
It should be emphasised that an external assistance team does not take over the 
management of the crisis; it  simply provides advice and assistance to the crisis 
management team.  
One participant elucidated: “It depends I guess, how we look at the management, so I think 
that the resources that a policy like this bring, as well as some of the personalities and 
experience, are excellent but I would never describe them as an outside group that were 
coming into manage the situation because at least, in all the crisis management plans and 
protocols that I’ve been a part of and dealt, we, as an organisation, would never 
surrender that to anybody whether it’s the government or a policy that we pay for or 
anybody else.”   
Another offered an expansion: “I think the key thing is the assisting. I think, certainly from 
my perspective, we would never have another organisation manage the situation and that 
is actually not what they do; they come in and they sit alongside you—having done it twice 
now, and they lead you through processes, they coach you in the right direction, they 
bring a wealth of experience from a specific country but also generically from how kidnap 
nowadays is a kind of a business in most places and have a set way of working, if you 
like.”  
The above comments from the participants are of significant import; the external 
expertise is described as being there not to take over the crisis, but rather to 
offer expert advice. Kenney (2008, p. 551-588) indicates that the experts can 
represent the INGO with governmental or institutional counterparts. One 
participant felt external service benefitted the organisation:  
“I feel great benefit in it. One, they offer more than just looking at the strategy and they 
often have a good bit of experience far beyond what a single NGO could have. So they are 
aware of the statistics in the country, the trends that are in the country a lot more 
intimately because it is their prime business than what we could be in the countries where 
there is a risk.”  
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Another provided further information on the advisory capacity: “No professional services 
are ever going to deliver ransom, receive a hostage, anything like that, and I do not know 
that the smaller NGOs really understand that or that they prepare themselves and they 
manage the structures for having to allow for those processes, if that’s what their policy 
says.” 
Several participants felt it  was unrealistic to have an in-house trained capacity 
for the eventuality of such a low-frequency event, pointing out that insurance 
provided the same expertise on a retainer basis.  
One INGO participant said: “Well, we put one thing upfront and that is: in order to ensure 
a safe release of the hostages and the well-being of our employees, we need external 
advice because we have not done this ever and we want someone who has done this before 
because it is a very tricky situation. So we need external advice and we need the best 
external advice, it needs to come from experience; and therefore, we say that if this is the 
case then we must look out for our support.”  
A second spoke to the proficiencies of external experts: “I think that it's very clear that 
you bring in a professional for whatever you’re doing. You would be foolish not to, you 
don't go to a general practitioner to have heart surgery kind of thing you know, you 
always want to have the best of the best on board for something that critical.”  
The expert participants in this research emphasised the special skills an external 
advisor could bring to the table.  
According to an expert participant, “So I think, if you’re a company and you want legal 
advice, you get a lawyer, or if you want accounting advice, you get an accountant, so it’s 
important to have some sort of specialised advice. You know we might go through the 
whole history without having a single kidnap or only have a couple or whatever, but you 
can’t expect companies to have that sort of knowledge or experience from within.” 
Despite the majority of participants favouring external assistance as an option, 
six INGO participants and three experts expressed concerns with the external 
assistance providers’ profiles and their level of understanding of the INGO 
world.  
One participant explained his or her concern: “This external company, this external entity 
must have an appropriate profile. So there are some commercial entities that have some 
specialists on board to have previous NGO experience and are very well familiar with the 
ways of working of NGOs.”  
Another participant’s statement supported this: “they need to understand the dynamic of 
the NGO, they need to understand the NGO approach to security, which to a great extent 
is acceptance, and you are familiar with that. Yes, a commercial company does not 
necessarily do that.” 
 
The overall view of the participants was that it was acceptable and even 
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encouraged to seek outside expert assistance, but that the external entity should 
have a deep understanding in NGO operations and culture. This to best shape the 
advice to the crisis management team of the NGO 
5.6.4 Common hostage management response   
The United Nations has, since the late 1990s, operated a pool of trained Hostage 
Incident Managers to deploy and assist in securing the safe release of hostages 
throughout the world. More than 100 staff are trained, but not all of these are 
deployable at any given time for operational reasons. 
Given the essential nature of human resources in such critical situations, it  is 
clear that for hostage incident managers to be directly involved with an 
abduction scenario, they must have adequate training; furthermore, training must 
be periodically refreshed.  
Having a pool of trained hostage incident managers, a roster, available has 
allowed the UN to remain fully self-sufficient with respect to managing a 
hostage crisis. The system avoids using insurance for ransom payment, allowing 
the UN to stay true to its policy of not paying ransom for the recovery of 
abducted staff. The researcher aimed to explore whether a similar arrangement 
would be possible within the INGO community, and asked the participants if 
they could see a way for the NGO community to establish a roster of trained 
Hostage Incident Managers to be deployed on a cost-share basis in a crisis. This 
became the second organising theme under the global theme of Human 
Resources. 
Twenty-one participants answered this question, and seventeen of these (81%) 
believed it could be possible (Figure 5.12). 
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Figure 5.12: Participants’ views on possibility of a roster of hostage managers 
 
Studying the data from interviews performed in the present research reveals that 
even the participants who were positive to such a roster harboured some 
concerns.  
One participant pointed to the challenge in information sharing, and stated: “I haven’t 
thought of that before but I guess it’s a possibility and there are some different forums 
where NGOs meet on security issues and share information and so on, but that would be 
going an another step in to climb up operational and sharing the thoughts with, I feel that 
would be quite tricky to manage.” 
A second identified another potential challenge: specifically, that of financing such a 
roster. “Yes, it is possible that the NGO community agrees to establish such a service to be 
activated in case of extreme danger but biggest concern here is cost, so for me it can be, 
but actually the problem is more financial for small NGOs like us, it may be discussed in 
the near future.”  
Those participants with a negative view toward the possibility of establishing a 
roster echoed the concerns of the participants with a positive view.  
An INGO participant echoed Fast (2010, p. 365-389) in describing a community of very 
different agencies: “The NGO community isn’t one community, we all know that. Anytime 
we try to get something together, organising the collective, right now there are just 
multiple barriers that we put in our own way.”   
Another simply stated: “Honestly, I don’t [think it is possible]. I think it’s all about trust 
and we have different policies.”  
The literature review offers no specific response to this question, outside of the 
fact that INGOs, as well as the range of their mandates, roles, and structures, are 
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so many in number and so diverse that few studies have captured data 
representative for all INGOs. With the multitudes of mandates, the competition 
for donor funding, and the range on insurance options available for INGOs, the 
researcher believes it  can be difficult to invite other members of an INGO in to 
manage or assist in what would likely be perceived as an internal matter. 
While the participants were mixed in their opinions about the idea of 
establishing an INGO roster, many had identified a potential alternative 
solution: the already existing United Nations roster which they believed could 
become available to INGOs through the Saving Lives Together (SLT) 
agreement. The Saving Lives Together initiative serves to improve coordination 
and cooperation between the UN and NGOs, but there is still friction on the 
topic of autonomy for security. The framework reads:  
SLT is a series of recommendations aimed at enhancing UN and 
NGO security collaboration in the field. Under the SLT 
framework, the humanitarian community contributes to the 
collection, analysis and dissemination of critical security and 
safety information. Information and analysis is made available to 
humanitarian security managers in the interest of our mutual 
safety and all decisions made, on the basis of, or with 
consideration to, such information remains the responsibility of 
their respective organisations (United Nations, 2013).  
Objective 1 of the framework is: ‘Convening broad-based forums for field 
security collaboration and information sharing, including NGO/IO engagement 
with the UN Security Management Team’. 
Altogether, nine INGO participants (56%) mentioned Saving Lives Together as 
an alternative, or answered positively when prompted to offer an opinion on the 
option. Figure 5.13 illustrates this. 
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Figure 5.13: Participants’ views on using Saving Lives Together for hostage 
management 
One participant explained: “I was kind of asking why should the NGO having a separate 
setup, because if you look at the Saving Lives Together framework, the initial thinking in 
2004 when this was presented by the UN coordinator, the security support to NGOs was 
one of the main issue and that we could draw from the resources of the UN.”   
Several others responded similarly:  
“My first thought was, I don’t know why the NGO community couldn’t do it if the UN 
already does it, but why don’t we just put it under the Saving Lives Together framework 
and use it as one of the resources that we go back and forth with.”  
“However, I would say that under the concept of this Saving Lives Together, UN probably 
is better trained, better organised and better placed to deal the situations like that and the 
NGOs also can benefit from their resources and their facilities on cost share basis and I 
think this is going to be more cost effective as well.”  
Two participants expressed reservations about the SLT initiative. “I would not do it 
through Saving Lives Together…”   
“I am not sure it is an ideal situation. I do not support it; I think the NGOs in the field 
need to become self-sufficient to some extent at least around things that are important...”  
 
It can be costly for a large INGO to hold kidnap and ransom insurance coverage, 
and the researcher believes this could be a contributing factor to the large group 
of participants in this study that mentioned the framework for security 
cooperation between NGOs and United Nations, the ‘Saving Lives Together’ 
framework, as a potential avenue for assistance in a hostage crisis. United 
Nations train at least 20 new hostage incident managers annually, and have more 
than 100 active trained managers. Having such a pool of trained managers 
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available has allowed the UN to maintain fully self-sufficient, and stay true to 
the policy of not paying ransom for the recovery of abducted staff. The majority 
of participants, 9 of 12 that commented on the framework, were positive to a 
strengthened cooperation. This would act as the deployment of an expert from 
the insurance provider; one or two members from the pool of trained hostage 
incident managers would deploy as advisors to the NGO crisis team. The 2013 
Aid worker security report cautions against relying extensively on outside 
assistance: ‘Outside expertise in crisis management and negotiations can 
undoubtedly be helpful, but it is likewise important for agency staff to be well 
trained and prepared for such events’ (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, p. 9).  
If such cooperation between the INGOs and UN were to take place, the UN 
would not act as negotiators, and would not take decisions, but simply provide 
advice. There are naturally both legal and financial concerns surrounding such a 
cooperation, but it  could reduce the cost of managing a hostage crisis from the 
NGOs perspective, and United Nations would gain even further experience and 
expertise in managing these often protracted hostage cases. 
 
5.6.5 The use of specialist functions in managing a hostage crisis 
The researcher aimed to determine whether the INGOs sampled had in place two 
specialist functions that assist in managing hostage cases: a psychologist and a 
media manager. Broder and Tucker (2011, p. 265-266); Phillips (2011, p 849); 
Best (1982, p. 107-128; Crenshaw (1998, p. 7-24); Yang, Wu, and Huang (2007, 
p. 324-339); Oots and Wiegele (1985, p. 1-32); Hillman (1983, p. 157-165) all 
indicate clearly that the psychological impact of being taken hostage is 
significant. Hostage taking places a heavy burden, especially psychologically,  
on all the people involved in both the crime and the management of the 
incident—including hostages, hostage takers, security forces, colleagues, 
managers, and families. Victims of hostage situations therefore include more 
than just those who are taken.  
One way to describe relationships in conflict is to use a method called conflict 
mapping. This is a technique used to describe a conflict graphically, placing the 
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conflicting parties in relation to each other as well as to the problem (Fisher et 
al., 2007, p. 22).  
The role of psychologists 
The third organising theme under the global theme of Human Resources is the 
use of a psychologist during a hostage crisis. In the event of an abduction, a 
psychologist can have multiple and important roles to play: helping the hostage 
crisis management team to deal with the stress, assessing the psychology of the 
hostage taker, and providing appropriate counselling for the hostage post rescue. 
Most organisations have access to psychologists who are specially trained to 
handle hostage cases. Most of the respondents in this study agreed that the need 
for a psychologist in the hostage management is fundamental.  
All 16 INGO participants agreed that a psychologist or mental health worker 
was required as part of the overall case management of a hostage situation, and 
all ten experts agreed. The participants varied in their opinions as to how best to 
use such a resource, and the responses included: 
 Assisting the family as liaison or with psychological support. 
 Profiling the hostage takers. In this case the psychologist or stress 
counsellor would listen in on the negotiation and assist the hostage 
incident management team with tactical and strategic advice based on 
observations about the hostage takers. 
 Assessing the hostage. Through observation, the psychologist would 
focus on the well-being of the hostage. 
 Assisting the hostage incident management team in managing their stress 
levels and in the design of reception plans. 
 Assisting other staff involved in the operation to manage stress and other 
emotions resulting from the abduction. 
The data from the interviews conducted for this study showed (Figure 5.14) the 
most important roles of a psychologist to be assisting family and the hostage 
incident management team: 
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Figure 5.14: Participants’ views on role of psychologist during hostage crisis 
 
While the point on assisting family was expected, the role in assisting the 
hostage management team in managing the crisis registered surprise with the 
researcher. The stress and pressure on the team working to secure a safe rescue 
of a hostage is often overlooked, but the participants seemed very much aware. 
In the interviews, the statements in favour of using an internal or external 
psychologist or stress counsellor were strong.  
One INGO participant stated: “Psychologist or a stress counselor is a must in my 
understanding.”  
According to another: “Well, I think we cannot over-emphasise the need of having a stress 
counselor or psychologist to be part of the hostage incident management team.”   
 
A third was unequivocal: “That as well is extremely important one. One of the big lessons 
learned from the kidnapping we had was that we need to put it in early, we need to have it 
almost from day one.”  
 
The expert participants were in accordance with the need for the assistance of a 
psychologist, but one pointed out it had to be the right person for the job:  
“... and this comes from experience, it is important for me that the right sort of 
psychological help is there and it is important that whichever psychologist is chosen, if not 
an experienced or trained negotiator but one that fully understands the field negotiators 
are working.”  
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If a psychologist is used, his or her work during the hostage case is 
predominantly to assist the family of the hostage and to monitor the hostage 
incident management team. The psychologist is perhaps the ideal family liaison, 
as they are professionally skilled in managing extreme emotions, as can be the 
case with family of a hostage. It is important that the crisis team has a close 
contact with the psychologist, but each crisis structure and resource capacity 
will dictate where this person is best placed during the crisis. There may be 
some advantages in having a psychologist sitting with the negotiation cell, as 
this person could then be used for other purposes, such as managing the stress of 
the crisis team itself.  
In line with the majority of responses obtained in this research, Regini (2002, p 
13-18) confirmed that a crisis management team should be able to assess the 
psychology of hostage takers. The literature is quite explicit as to the impact a 
hostage event can have on the hostage’s family, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter. There is also an emerging recognition on the stress that is put on the 
hostage incident management team, with evidence in the literature reflecting 
disturbing stress to emergency workers (McMains, 1986, p. 365-368; Nielsen, 
1986, p. 369-374; Somodevilla, 1986, p. 395-398), to police officers involved in 
shooting (Reese, Horn, and Dunning, 1991; Solomon and Horn, 1986, p. 383-
393), and to military personnel involved in warfare (Mullins, 2008, p 63-81). 
One expert participant expressed the importance of a psychologist to aid staff as well as 
the crisis team: “And also to look after the existing staff because there are enormous 
stresses and strains. Stressors as they like to call them don’t they? That team who are 
responding, specially the one who is having to do the talking as the number one 
responder, I don’t think it’s a luxury item, I think, it should be seen as one of the core 
components of the professional spot.”  
A psychologist in the expert group, as could be expected, supported the role on several 
levels: “I think it is actually a profile and that can probably contribute at different levels. 
One is certainly depending of course on the openness of the person and kind of readiness 
of this professional also to be open to different signs to different developments that are 
going on. 
I think that the training background that we have, we have the capacity of observation 
already, interpersonal level, intercommunication level, process levels so from our 
perspective, when I was a part of the crisis cell for example, I would be very much part of 
the discussions that were going on.   
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So that is from that perspective, I also think for the purpose of maintaining the link with 
the family, knowing what is happening within the crisis cell simply helps giving the 
grounds to reassure the family that the  maximum is being done.” 
 
The Role of a media manager 
The fourth organising theme under the global theme of Human Resources is the 
use of a media manager during a hostage crisis. The presence of a media 
manager may be useful for the hostage incident management team on several 
levels. The United Nations takes this role very seriously, as lack of media 
management may result in harm to hostages. The guidelines read:  
Due to the fact that premature or erroneous disclosure of 
information related to a hostage incident can place the lives of 
hostage(s) in jeopardy, cause severe emotional distress to the 
families of the hostages and negatively affect the activities of the 
Organization, information concerning the hostage-taking shall only 
be disclosed by a duly authorized official of the Organization 
(United Nations, 2012, p. 2).  
Furthermore, the guidelines continue, ‘The purpose […] is to ensure that all 
media resources are coordinated in accordance with the media strategy.’ 
As with the question of including a psychologist on the crisis team, 24 
participants supported the involvement of a media manager, while only one 
believed it to not be necessary. The participants that was not positive to a media 
manager stated:  
“Don’t feel strongly about it. I think the HIM has to provide the substance in terms of 
media communication. They have to agree on what can be released, what can be said.” 
In contrast, the other experts were in strong support of including a media manager. One 
explained why: “For different reasons, again very valuable, and I’d imagine it would be 
foremost in the minds of the senior management of the organisation particularly sort of 
wider risk management and decision on to how to handle the organisation’s reputation, 
credibility, but also to ensure that the message is put out in the public domain consistent 
and do not adversely affect the sort of negotiations or the actions towards release that 
happen in the operational field level.”  
An INGO participant supported the use of media management experts: “Again I think it's 
imperative and in our new revised guidelines, since we don't have communication people 
at all our programs, that’s someone that we will definitely send to the CMT locally to deal 
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the local press as well as having here in the communication department to work with the 
media strategy.”  
A second provided a concise statement on the subject: “Absolutely essential, day 
one.”  
The participants clearly expressed the importance of media management during 
a crisis, and most indicated that they had such resources in place. As with the 
psychologist, where in the crisis structure the media manager is placed will 
depend on plans and resources, but the media manager should contribute to plans 
and strategies. 
Van Zandt (1993, p. 32-36) and Jenkins (1976) supports arguments for using 
someone to manage the media. With the advancement of social media, it is 
increasingly easy to reach a large public. As a result, hostage taking and 
abduction cases have become very effective in delivering a message. Van Zandt 
(1993) explained that the influence media on these activities has been utilized by 
the terrorist groups effectively. While the hostage taking may occur in an 
isolated area, the news of it could reach the entire world through media. Jenkins 
(1976) claimed that ‘Initial research tentatively suggests that heavy media 
coverage of hijackings, kidnappings and other hostile seizures carried out by 
terrorists increases the likelihood that similar incidents will occur in the period 
immediately following.’   
5.7 Individual preparedness and knowledge 
The researcher also aimed to explore in this study the answer to the question 
“What training and knowledge of hostage incidents and survival do INGO staff 
have access to?” From this, the fifth global theme in this study is Individual 
Preparedness. From this theme, two organizing themes emerged; training and the 
use of personal profile forms. 
5.7.1 Personal training and preparation 
The first organising theme under the global theme of Individual Preparedness is 
that of training. Romano and Rugala, in their 2011 study ‘Workplace Violence: 
Survival Mind-Set’ reveals that personal training and preparedness for the 
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possibility of a hostage situation are important to improve survival chances as 
well as recovery time post-release. However, security training can be a 
challenge for many INGOs. A recent study showed that more than 70% of 
respondents stated that their organisation valued security training highly, but 
44% admitted that their organisation did not have sufficient resources for 
security training (European Interagency Security Forum, 2010). Most larger 
INGOs have an internal security training section, or at least an individual in 
charge of security training, but many operate in relative isolation. While some 
INGOs use professional training organisations such as RedR to deliver specific 
training, most utilise their employees to various extents.  
From the respondents’ perspectives, pre-deployment security training is 
important. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.15 below: 
 
Figure 5.15: Participants’ views on the importance of training 
As seen above, 24 of the 26 participants, or 92%, deemed training important as 
individual preparation. 
One participant expressed a clear opinion on the lack of preparedness with which some 
organisations deploy staff: “Well I think, according to my experience that there are far too 
many organisations placing their staff in situations that are completely unprepared. I 
mean, there's a lot of missionary, faith-based organisations out there, I am not questioning 
their faith in God, but you know that at the end of the day, you just still got to be prepared. 
You just can’t leave it all to God.”  
24
1 1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Training important Training not important Answer not provided
Training important
Training not important
Answer not provided
280 
 
Fourteen of the fifteen responding INGO participants (93%) thought such 
training was important, and all ten experts agreed. Nine INGO participants 
stated that training should include a practical element of simulated hostage 
taking. 
One participant described the value of such training: “If I had my way, that hostile 
environments type training, some of them are little weird but the good ones, I would send 
every person through it every year if I could because I haven’t found a better way to reach 
out to every type of person, who experiences things differently, because it all leaves an 
impression and they all make it to that higher level of awareness after these courses.”   
Another referred to a solid organisational commitment: “Every single staff member is 
trained for a three-day course and hostage survival is a significant part of their training 
and people cannot travel without it, and it is being refreshed so I can tell you it is closing 
in to one hundred per cent coverage.”  
 
There is at times strong competition between agencies for funding within the 
INGO world, and it is always better to prove that funding has been spent 
towards operations rather than overhead. Individual staff security training may 
have suffered from this. All participants acknowledged that individual staff 
training to prepare them for a high-risk environment, including being taken as a 
hostage, was important. However, the level of actual training delivery varied 
significantly. It appeared that the larger the INGO is, the more training it 
provides to its staff. The largest INGOs all had more or less systematic 
requirements for security training before staff were deployed to more risky 
environments. Former hostages are clear on the value of training; it  is extremely 
important. 
Not all INGOs have the capacity to have an in-house security staff, let alone a 
training team. And cost can be prohibitive for an NGO to systematically send 
staff to join training delivered by specialised NGOs or private entities in hostage 
survival training. There appear to be no easy solution to this problem. While it  is 
clear that having training, for staff as well as crisis management teams, increase 
the likelihood of a successful outcome of a crisis, it is also clear that many 
organisations either do not have the resources available, or do not prioritise 
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security training sufficiently to offer this to all staff that could be exposed to a 
higher risk level.  
Other groups that NGOs could compare themselves with in terms of risk 
exposure, such as journalists, seafarers in piracy-prone waters, and United 
Nations staff, all have far more systematic training requirements in place but for 
a few of the largest and best funded NGOs. Anthony Feinstein, Canadian 
psychiatrist and author of “Dangerous Lives: War and the Men and Women who 
Report It”, stresses the importance of mental preparedness and how essential it 
is to understand the dangers before journalists go to war and the potential 
symptoms of psychological distress. Feinstein conducted a seven-year long 
study, which highlighted that training and preparedness is key to tackle potential 
emotional repercussions (Gornitzki, 2007). 
The above is in line with developments in parallel industries. The Human Cost 
of Piracy (Hurlburt and Seyle, 2012) imparted guidelines considered essential to 
ensure seafarer welfare in high risk areas. The programs and considerations 
mentioned include: 
 Providing pre-departure education and training 
 Ensuring contracts support continuation of employment status and 
entitlements 
 Providing updated information on safety and the rights to avoid the risk 
 Establishing family liaisons and humanitarian support of seafarers’ 
families 
 Providing drills and exercises 
 Understanding of who has responsibility for repatriation when a hostage 
is released from captivity 
 Providing compensation and post-release care 
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In addition to the points above, it can be argued that there is a need for personal 
preparation of family of staff as well.  
According to one participant: “Because one thing that I don’t want to have, and 
I think that is very common, that a lot of people working don’t tell the families 
enough about what they are doing good in attempt to protecting them before 
going to hostile environments.” 
 
There can be no doubt that training forms an important part of preparation, and 
the voices of former hostages are uninform in emphasising the importance of 
individual preparation.  
A former hostage among the participants described the impact of his training and 
preparedness: “I said it on my release and I still believe that any person who is going into 
a situation, working in a high-security situation, must have security training including 
hostage training, at least to know what to expect because it really allowed me to get 
through my experience.”  
The participant continued: “You know, being taken hostage is a dehumanising experience, 
but a lot of it involves psychology… you have to realise that even though you’re basically 
dehumanised to the point of being an animal, you still have your wits about you and you 
have to maintain your ability to say no, you know, if you're asked to do certain things it’s 
a slippery slope as I describe it, if you start going along with your captors on some 
things… So, if you can tell people that before sending them to the field, as I said half the 
battle, more than half the battle is psychological preparation and the ability to just keep 
on holding on in captivity… And part of that is advising people that, you know, your 
organisation will not give up on you…and that’s a pretty important thing, especially when 
you are hostage.” 
Psychological preparation is only one aspect of hostage survival, but knowing 
how to respond to violence is another. When forced rescue is used, it is typically 
extremely aggressive and violent, and by design as confusing as possible to 
provide the hostage rescue team with optimal advantages. There are several 
examples through history of hostages having been killed during rescue, some of 
whom lost their lives because they made the wrong move. Muki Betser, second 
in command of Operation Thunderbolt—the Israeli operation to free the hostages 
on Air France Flight 139 in July 1976—explained: ‘From the elbow to the 
finger, you are ready to shoot. And you know your first shot has to hit him 
before he can hit you.’ Although 100 hostages were rescued, three hostages were 
killed, six terrorists, as well as 45 Ugandan soldiers protecting the terrorists. 
One of the hostages killed was Jean-Jacques Maimoni, who jumped in happiness 
upon the arrival of the army, shouting ‘Thank God we are free’, and was shot by 
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two in the assault team. His movement was in strong contrast to that of the other 
hostages, who all took cover.  
One expert participant also believed training can make the difference between 
life and death in forced rescues: 
“Often I wonder how much training Linda Norgrove had, and whether she would be alive 
today if she had known how to react during a forced release, if she had been trained on 
what to do during the hostage management training early in her career.” 2 
 
5.7.2 The use of personal profile forms 
Too often, plans for responding to a kidnap start at the moment of confirmation 
that an incident has occurred. However, individual preparation may begin much 
earlier. Some organisations use a form that is filled and placed in a sealed 
envelope to be accessed only in the case of abduction, a so-called ‘Red form’. 
This form includes personal details that can be used to obtain ‘proof of life’ in 
the form of answers to questions to which only the hostage could respond within 
a reasonable amount of time, and the use of such form became the second 
organising theme under the global theme Individual Preparedness.  
As shown in Figure 5.16, eighty-five percent of the participants who provided an 
answer to this question were in favour of using personal profile forms. 
                                                             
2 Linda Norgrove died from injuries sustained in an attempted rescue on 8 October 2010. A grenade thrown 
by the rescue team landed near her after she had tried to escape in the confusion. 
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Figure 5.16: Participants’ views on the use of personal profile forms 
 
Two INGO staff participants were not in favour of using such forms.  
One stated that his or her reservations were logistical in nature: “In [INGO], the 
disadvantages of trying to do that corporately are just massive, it is too big an 
organisation to manage that kind of level of information, keep it up to date and so on 
which would not be possible, and to keep it confidential and all of these things that would 
come around it.”  
Another did not see the need to go to such an extent: “We don’t go that far, we go for the 
proof of life form and passport information, and that’s for all staff and dependents.”  
The only expert participant to speak against the use of personal profile forms stated: “I 
will be slightly controversial. I don’t think it helps save anybody’s life. And depending on 
the size of the organization, whether it is doable.”  
The management of the data seemed to be the greatest concern, even for those in 
favour of the system. One INGO participant mirrored some of the concerns of 
those who were negative to the use of the forms:  
“We have got a policy in place for that. It’s very difficult to maintain and very difficult to 
manage because the question is where you hold that documentation. Do you hold it at 
national office, do you hold it at regional office, do you hold it at headquarters, how do 
you collect the data, how do you send it in, how do you update it, staff rotate. So it is an 
ideal policy to have but it’s very difficult to uphold.”  
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Most expert participants felt  personal profile forms to be useful; their reasons, 
however, differed substantially. One believed it would form a part of an 
individual’s preparation and, to a degree, provide informed consent:  
“I think if that happens, obviously for the hostage incident manager it would just be 
invaluable help. Because you don’t need to think of proof of life questions there might be 
or whatsoever. On the other hand, given that this is such a rare event, I don’t know that it 
is practical to get this from all staff. Perhaps, in the hostile environments, I think it might 
be actually useful. I think in addition, when you do something like that, it’s also kind of 
part of preparation for the person.”  
Another gave a practical reason: that having a personal profile form on file would speed 
up identification and repatriation in case of a hostage’s death in captivity. “A huge 
advantage is in hostage identification if dead bodies are returned because that speeds that 
process up.” 
A third mentioned the core reason many organisations have such a system in 
place: to provide early proof of life. In addition to proof of life, proof of 
authority is important. Proof of authority means that the caller is in fact the one 
you should talk to, and not an opportunist hoax: 
”I think the confidence is invaluable and that’s what’s important and proof of 
life forms that we talked about, not only practical in the sense that it’s good to 
have, for the organisation, the proof of life questions should that be needed, you 
get a very early call before you can get hold of a family member for proof of life 
question.” 
 
The study clearly showed that having a system in place that stores personal 
information about staff in high-risk environments is of benefit. This information 
would include contact details for next of kin in more detail than normally 
collected, about where children go to school, blood group, and some sample 
proof-of-life questions. Proof of life questions are essentially questions only the 
hostage will be able to answer in a reasonable time, and hostage negotiators can 
use these both tactically and strategically. Such questions are extremely 
important during the first stages of contact to provide early proof of life. In 
essence, a question is asked, and the hostage, either directly or through the 
hostage takers, provides the answer. If the answer is correct, the assumption is 
that the hostage was alive at the time of the question, and negotiation can 
proceed. Of equal importance is to establish proof of authority. In high profile 
cases it is not uncommon for several groups or individuals to claim to hold the 
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hostage. Through the same mechanism the negotiation team obtains proof of 
authority, meaning that the caller is in fact the one you should talk to, and not an 
opportunist hoax. Where there are some challenges, such as continuous updating 
the profiles and ensuring that the information remains confidential until needed, 
the benefits appear to outweigh the negative aspects.  
Katz and Caspi (2003, p. 199) states that at the pre-incident stage, management 
must obtain information about each staff that includes emergency contact 
numbers, relevant medical history, and special instructions in case of 
emergency. Having this information readily available not only enhances the 
personal safety of the employee but also makes it easier to support the family of 
an employee who is abducted.  
 
5.8 Identifying a minimum standard 
The last of the research objectives was to define a minimum standard, or what 
can be considered duty of care for an INGO with regard to managing hostage 
cases. Identifying a minimum standard also became the sixth and last global 
theme. The NGO security umbrella organisations, such as InterAction and ESIF 
have furthered the field of security policy, practice and guidelines significantly 
over the past years. Despite this, there appear to be no clear minimum standard 
when it comes to crisis management, including preparing for and managing a 
hostage crisis. For INGO managers there are two closely related concepts that 
are useful in understanding what managers are responsible for in carrying out 
their duties in relation to staff security: due diligence and duty of care. These 
two concepts are legalistic in nature and carry specific but variable meanings 
depending on the specific professional field employing the terms. For 
applications to management of security issues within the INGOs the legal 
meanings are not precise or well established, but the principles involved are 
important.  
The participants in the current research identified four major issues, or 
organising themes, that should be considered in ensuring that an organisation 
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fulfils its duty of care towards staff with regard to hostage management. The 
four are, in order of counts for each: 
a. Training 
b. Policy 
c. Plans 
d. Informed consent 
Figure 5.17 below shows how the participants view issues around duty of care 
for the organisation towards their staff. 
 
Figure 5.17: Participants’ views on duty of care 
It is of great interest to the researcher that these four issues overlap closely with 
the specific research questions that emerged as the research progressed: 
 What capacity do INGOs have in terms of human and financial resources 
to manage and contain a hostage situation?   
 What training and knowledge of hostage incidents and survival do INGO 
staff in environments where hostage situations occur have access to? 
17
15
13
9
4
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Training Policy Plans in place Informed consent Other issues
288 
 What do INGOs have in place in terms of policies and procedures for 
Hostage Incident Management?      
The fourth question was on Duty of Care itself. The overlap again indicates to 
the researcher that the topics were of high relevance, and that the study has 
contributed to the knowledge in the field. It has become relatively clear through 
the study that INGOs to a large degree have policies and plans in place, but 
equally clear that, for some agencies, these plans and polices are too superficial, 
and do not specify issues in particular surrounding post-release assistance and 
abduction of family members. 
Kemp and Merkelbach (2011, p. 50-54) quite specifically asserts that INGOs do 
have a duty of care toward their staff. These are not only of ethical and moral 
concern; INGOs have a legal obligation to provide a duty of care that covers 
safety and security. Thus, safety and security are not mere personal, subjective 
matters of choice or conscience, but represent a responsibility grounded with the 
organisation’s governance, potentially shared by its top executive.  
One participant’s comment resonated with the weight of the legal aspect of duty of care: 
“When you stand in front of a jury of twelve, you can show then that you have done 
everything that is reasonable to keep your staff safe in line with what other organisations 
are doing. And that is not a cop-out. That’s the reality.” 
The concept of duty of care easily transfers to the topic of the present research. 
Most hostages are taken because the hostage takers are hoping to obtain 
concessions from the organisation the victim works for, and not because the 
individuals have done anything wrong. In all cases, however, the hostage-takers 
want to extract something from the organizations or the outside world. They 
cannot get what they want from the hostages, so it is not the hostages themselves 
who are the important factor; they merely allow the hostage-taker to make an 
announcement (Bolz, Dudonis, and Schulz, 2001, p. 33).  The organisation, and 
not the individual, therefore has the majority of the responsibility to put in place 
mechanisms to protect their employees.  
Humanitarian aid activities are performed by people for people. The 
effectiveness and success of humanitarian aid initiatives especially depend on 
the contribution of well-prepared staff capable of operating in inhospitable and 
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dangerous situations. The work of an organisation operating in emergencies 
places great pressure on its staff. Therefore NGOs cannot ignore the duty of care 
that they have towards their staff, national and international, and should 
recognise their responsibility in guaranteeing the physical and psycho-social 
well-being of each employee, before, during and after working with the NGO 
(Piziali, 2009, p. 8). 
Duty of care is what the courts have called ‘foreseeability’ in vicarious liability 
suits. Thus, an incident such as a hostage taking could be considered a 
foreseeable occurrence under vicarious liability statutes and case law, 
particularly if the organisation operates in a country or area with a known risk of 
hostage taking. In effect, such an organisation is a potential target and is under 
some obligation to protect its employees and property (Bolz et al., 2001, p. 33). 
When employees work across borders, duty of care involves risk management 
beyond the usual health and safety requirements of a familiar environment. 
Having travellers and expatriates introduces greater security risks, and 
employers have legal and moral responsibilit ies that extend duty of care as far as 
the dependents of international assignees (SOS-International, 2011). Breaching 
duty of care may give rise to legal action alleging negligence and may result in 
damages or in the criminal prosecution of the employer.  
The legal responsibility may well be tested, as a lawsuit was filed in May 2011 
in Manhattan Federal Court, United States of America, where former staff Flavia 
Wagner is sued Samaritan’s Purse, the NGO she worked for, and Clayton 
Consultants, the private security company that negotiated her release. Ms. 
Wagner alleges that the organisation that deployed her when she was abducted 
in the Abu Ajura area in Darfur in May 2010 “failed to train its security 
personnel adequately and of wilfully ignoring warning signs that abduction was 
a threat to foreigners”.  The claimant was deployed “despite the fact that other 
non-government organizations had prohibited their employees from travelling in 
that area because of the threat of kidnapping” (Ax, 2011). The lawsuit further 
claimed that "While Samaritan's Purse possessed the resources to extricate 
plaintiff from her captivity quickly, it instead embarked on a plan designed to 
protect its own financial and political interest," and goes on to say "In the end, 
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Samaritan's Purse, its insurer and Clayton got precisely what they wanted - a 
minimal ransom payment." Defendants achieved that objective only at the 
expense of plaintiff's health and well-being." (Shifrel, 2011) 
5.8.1 Training 
The first organising theme under the global theme of Identifying a Minimum 
Standard is training. Ten INGO staff participants listed training as a minimum 
requirement, and seven experts concurred, a total of 65% of the respondents. 
One expert participant held that INGOs are increasingly bound by the legal 
ramifications of the concept of duty of care:  
“So much of our role is given by litigation, so I guess what I have seen is: the trend to get 
them to a certain level of preparedness or the training given first of all by public 
companies, the shareholders demanded that there was proper duty of care and level of 
preparedness and so many companies took a start and then other companies then followed 
to that suit… I think some sort of pre-departure training should be mandatory so that the 
people understand the dangers, and filling out of pre-deployment form should be standard 
and an understanding of what not to do, should you get kidnapped, and from there you can 
go on to full package, to having complete five-day course and table top exercises.”  
Another participant prioritised training as a minimum requirement: “I think it’s training 
not just of individuals but also for the managers themselves because the HEAT [Hostage 
Environment Awareness Training] actually just gives you certain things; it gives you an 
ability to understand avoidance and you get some awareness and then of course conduct 
during capture, but I think that you don’t want them to be kidnapped, I think that you 
should work quite high on the on the mitigation. That should be the minimum standards.”  
Another gave a similar opinion: “We would expect that any NGOs sending out people here 
have given the people some training in personal security.” 
5.8.2 Policy 
The second organising theme under the global theme of Identifying a Minimum 
Standard is Policy. Ten INGO participants and five experts (58% combined) 
listed policy as a minimum requirement for an INGO to be considered as 
meeting its duty of care. One participant simply stated “to have a security 
policy” while another specified: “clear policy and guidelines”. Three of the ten 
INGO participants speaking about policy mentioned K&R insurance as a part of 
the policy.  
The experts also referred to policy: “So having clear policy and procedures within the 
organisation is number one.” 
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The researcher believes that a clearly stipulated policy on key matters such as 
ransom payments, negotiation, limitation of personnel to be covered, and post 
release assistance is fundamental to good hostage incident management. The 
policy forms the basis for planning a response, and allows staff to know how the 
organisation will assist in a crisis.  
5.8.3 Plans 
The third organising theme under this global theme is the development of plans. 
Seven INGO participants and six experts (50% combined) listed plans as a 
minimum requirement.  
One mentioned “a crisis management manual, a specified management plan, where it is 
very clearly said that in the country office that who is doing what, in case of an 
abduction.”  
A second simply said: “I would expect them to have a crisis management plan.”  
An expert participant posited that the first question to ask when evaluating preparedness 
for a hostage case should be: “Do they have a crisis management plan and who 
implements it.” 
 
As with policy, without at least a generic crisis management plan in place, the 
researcher believes the organisation is failing in providing duty of care towards 
its staff. These plans must be flexible enough to allow for the certain unexpected 
element, but rigid enough to allow a predictable response. 
5.8.4 Informed consent 
The fourth and last organising theme under this global theme is the development 
of plans. Informed consent was cited by three INGO participants and six experts, 
35% combined, as a fundamental element of duty of care.  
One participant described informed consent as “being realistic about what the potential 
risk is. That is number one and for staff to understand that they have a responsibility also 
and that they are held accountable for fulfilling that responsibility.”  
A second offered a succinct comment: “They should be aware of imminent risk.”  
An expert participant simply said: “I think they should be aware of the situation that they 
are going into.”  
Another stated: “Let’s start off with have we prepared the staff member, employee, do they 
know the risk they are taking and this is not about just hostage taking, it’s about the 
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fundamental rights of an individual and the legal affairs department of anybody should be 
able to comment on this.”   
Informed consent, like in academic settings means that the staff of the INGOs to 
the degree possible understand the risks of their jobs. Even further, they 
understand what their employer will and will not undertake or assist with in case 
they or a member of their family is taken hostage. The 2013 Aid worker security 
report explore this topic as well: ‘Perhaps the final aspect of an  organisation’s 
responsibilit ies in risk  management and ensuring that the risks of  kidnapping 
are reduced to tolerable levels, is the duty to inform staff of  the risks they face: 
and that in turn, the staff accept a degree of  risk  after having been made fully 
aware of  the extent. This   is establishing ‘informed consent’.  The challenge in 
the case of kidnapping, as one aid agency security adviser pointed out, is that 
people are not good at calculating low-probability, high-impact scenarios. It is 
almost impossible to conceive of the consequences fully – made harder by the 
fact that, understandably, victims of kidnappings generally tend not to share 
their often highly traumatic experiences in the public realm. Taking the decision 
to work in a high-risk environment is therefore often done with an incomplete 
picture of what a kidnapping incident might entail and how the individual would 
cope if it  happened” (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, p. 11) 
In the largest study of humanitarian security to date, data from the period 1997-
2005 was collected from the from the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
ten UN aid organisations, domestic chapters of the Red Cross/ Red Crescent and 
forty-six NGOs (Stoddard et al., 2010). The study found that nearly one in three 
deaths of aid workers occurred within ninety days of the workers reaching their 
particular workplaces, and that approximately twenty per cent of all deaths 
occurred within the first month. This is a clear indication of the importance for 
humanitarian workers of acquiring an adequate understanding of the operating 
environment before deploying into it (Stoddard et al., 2010); they need to have 
informed consent. 
5.9 Conclusion  
This chapter has combined information from the literature with data drawn from 
interviews concerned with the preparedness and responses of international non-
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governmental organisations to hostage situations. Using qualitative analysis of 
the participants’ responses, the researcher identified findings from the data and 
made use of a narrative format to interpret the findings of the study. The next 
chapter will provide a summary of the main findings as well as 
recommendations and a discussion of the study’s shortcomings and significance.  
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Chapter 6: Summary of Study, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As an aide to the reader, the final chapter of this thesis provides a brief overview 
of the study. The importance of the research is explained, and the researcher 
discusses ways in which the findings may have implications on policy and 
practices. The researcher also makes recommendations for future research 
studies in the field of hostage management. 
6.2 Summary of the Study  
The INGO community generally accept that here is a need for better security 
management and protocols, and the interest organisations in both United States 
and Europe are working systematically on this. Despite this, there is still a lack 
of basic empirical knowledge about the existing policies, knowledge and 
capability of INGOs to handle hostage incidents. 
Unfortunately, due to the increasing trends, INGOs are getting more experienced 
in managing hostage crises, but there is still a considerable level of confusion 
and uncertainty about the way these crises have been solved and the way their 
success can be seen in relation to other crises. As there are no international 
hostage management standards, the study aimed to understand how INGOs 
prepare themselves for hostage incidents, whether policies, procedures are in 
place, how they manage hostage situations, and also how INGO staff on an 
individual basis are trained and prepared.  
The literary review was extensive for this study, as the scope of this study, 
hostage management for INGOs, spans several disciplines and sub-topics. The 
most important research to aid this study has been that of Abby Stoddard and 
Adele Harmer. Since 2002, their extensive research has made an important 
contribution to widening and deepening the collective knowledge related to 
humanitarian security management. Stoddard and Harmer’s publications tackle a 
number of different sub-topics pertaining to the field of humanitarian security 
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and have been widely distributed within the aid community, contributing to 
increasing awareness on the issue and shaping discussions around it. 
In the field of crisis management, W. Timothy Coombs was an important 
influence, as outlined in the theoretical framework of this study. This study 
follows the crisis management framework of Coombs, where hostage taking is 
categorised as an attack on the organisation from the outside. Coombs suggests 
that the managers of a crisis should aim to match their crisis responses to the 
level of responsibility and threat posed by a crisis, and a hostage case is without 
doubt a serious threat for most organisations. However, the most useful 
framework for this study in terms of crisis management is an approach designed 
by Dennis Smith in 1990 that has a three-stage approach that follows a pre-
crisis, crisis, and post-crisis format. 
The contributors in the specific field of hostage management were also 
numerous. The research by Randall G. Rogan on emotions and hostage crises 
formed an instrumental part in understanding the inter-personal dynamics in 
play during negotiations, and Romano’s research on personal communication 
was important to understand the paradoxes of a hostage negotiation. 
The methodology adopted for this study was qualitative in nature. It comprised 
conducting interviews with sixteen INGOs and ten industry experts; review of 
INGO documents, policies and plans; and meeting with respondents in hostage 
management. The qualitative method was required to gain a continuously 
created, deductive experience, as there are some sub-fields of hostage incident 
management that are challenging to research using official data and survey 
methods in a quantitative way, such as kidnap and ransom insurance (for which 
admitting to having a policy may render the insurance null and void) and duty of 
care in actual cases. 
6.3 Conclusions of findings 
INGOs are prepared at a higher level than the researcher expected, but there are 
still gaps identified through this study that would benefit both organisations and 
hostages should they be addressed. The most unexpected element of the study 
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was the relative common use of Kidnap and Ransom insurance. INGOs put 
forward a public stand of not paying ransom, but it  appears increasingly 
common to take advantage of ransom payment to secure the release of staff. In 
essence, if each INGO see their Duty of Care and accountability in a Micro 
environment, they are responsible only to ensure the safe release of their staff as 
quickly and safely as possible. However, in a Macro or global setting, each 
action by an INGO to a degree could influence the security of other INGOs and 
their staff, and the payment of one INGO could lead to a more negative 
environment for another INGO. The solution to this problem is not within the 
scope of this study, and each INGO will have to examine their own ethical and 
legal guidelines and procedures. 
There appear to be no lack of willingness of INGOs to cover the cost of 
responding to hostage cases, both in financial and human terms. However, it 
appears more complicated to invest in prevention, individual training, and crisis 
management rehearsals and exercises. Most INGOs have a limited capacity to 
systematically engage into a structure hostage negotiation process, especially 
with the added element of staying on top of trends and patterns that could assist 
in a positive outcome of the case. Hence, the INGOs use K&R insurance to gain 
access to experts to manage and prepare for such crises. 
While most INGOs have a core policy in place for managing a hostage crisis, 
only some have the detailed policy that is required. Many INGOs group hostage 
together with their generic crisis management plan, with the added public 
statement of no ransom payment. However, the researcher believes both 
organisations, family of staff, and hostages will benefit from more extensive 
details in the policy, such as the duration of after care and insurance coverage of 
family of staff.     
6.3.1 Contributions 
The following are the main research contributions of this thesis: 
A comprehensive database of humanitarian hostage cases. The researcher has 
compiled, merged, verified, and analysed data from a range of open sources as 
well as from a few restricted organisational sources. The researcher makes no 
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claim to have identified all hostage cases, but believes the data represents the 
most comprehensive data set available. 
Trend towards financially motivated abductions. This study has showed that 
the trend for humanitarian hostage cases was towards financially motivated 
abductions. In financially motivate cases, the NGO can influence the outcome 
through payment, something not always possible in politically motivated hostage 
cases. This can have direct implications for negotiation models and INGO policy 
development. 
Increased willingness to engage external assistance. INGOs were in general 
open to obtaining outside assistance to help manage a hostage case. This has in 
the past been little discussed, and the INGO community could benefit from 
information sharing and group frameworks to lower the cost of such assistance. 
A larger volume of NGOs approaching the insurance or security industry would 
likely lower the premium, while at the same time ensure a minimum standard in 
crisis preparedness for the subscribers to such services.  
Increasing use of ransom payment. In the past, discussing ransom payments 
have been taboo, but this study has shown that it is increasingly a reality of 
operating in complex operations, with a large number of staff, in a high risk 
environment. Each INGO likely see their duty of care through a legal 
perspective only towards their own staff, and not towards the broader 
perspective of the INGO community as a whole. 
Discrepancy between stated training requirement and delivery of training. 
The study has shown that there is a discrepancy between the seriousness INGOs 
place on training for staff in high risk environments, and the actual ability to 
deliver such training.  
6.4 Limitations 
Limitations are the potential weaknesses or problems with the study identified 
by the researcher. One potential limitation of the research was time. As the data 
was collected over a four month period, the data represents a snapshot dependent 
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on conditions occurring during that time. The researcher tried to mitigate this 
limitation by invit ing the most seasoned experts possible to participate, thus 
providing a more global view. A further potential limitation of the analysis 
relates directly to the topic of kidnap and ransom insurance. Since the insurance 
stipulates that revealing the fact that the INGO is a policy holder may render the 
insurance null and void, the participants may not have revealed the extent of 
their insurance coverage. The major potential limitation of the study was that the 
data were gathered only from a limited segment of the entire INGO community. 
The participants may, therefore, not be representative of the INGO population as 
a whole. 
6.5 Recommendations 
6.5.1 Recommendations for further research 
The researcher identified some topics that should be further explored through 
research to fill what the researcher perceives to be gaps in the existing 
knowledge.  
Revise negotiation models  
The first issue did not derive from participant interviews, but rather from the 
literature review combined with the researcher’s field experiences. The 
negotiation models that were explored in chapter 2 are mostly designed for short 
term cases, such as cases when someone is being held hostage by their spouse or 
sieges and barricade situations. While these models are generally designed to 
quickly establish a level of rapport with the hostage takers, they do not in 
themselves always take the negotiation forward from that point. The dynamics 
and intensity in contact between the hostage takers and the crisis management 
team is different in a two-day siege than a twelve-month hostage case.  
The model used mostly with police and the UN is that of the Behavioural 
Inﬂuence Stairway Model (BISM) developed by Vecchi in 2005 The BISM is a 
model of behaviour change grounded in the principles of active listening; it was 
adapted from a model developed by the FBI. The model is designed to reach a 
level where the hostage negotiators can begin to influence behaviour change in 
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the hostage takers, with the ultimate goal of releasing them unharmed.  
However, the researcher found that there is little concrete action to take once the 
top of the stairway (the behavioural change plateau) has been reached.  The 
researcher, albeit not an expert in negotiation theory, suggest a merging of the 
stairway model with that of the Cylindrical Model of Crisis Negotiation devised 
by PJ Taylor in 2002. This model seems to operate mostly in the behavioural 
influence level, and the model proposes the existence of three different 
motivational emphases within negotiation behaviour, classifying these as 
instrumental, relational, and identity themes. The first theme refers to behaviour 
linked to the subject’s instrumental needs, which can be described as tangible 
commodities or wants. The second theme refers to behaviour linked to the 
relationship or affiliation between the negotiator and the subject; the third theme 
refers to the negotiating parties’ concern for self-preservation and ‘face’. This is 
in line with conflict management theory of recent, and outlined in the theoretical 
framework of the study, stating that emotions are increasingly valued as a key 
component in solving the conflict.  
The researcher believes the element of emotions need to be managed. Often, the 
hostage negotiator’s sole focus is the release of the hostage, and rightly so as an 
end goal. However, there will be no motivation for the hostage taker to release 
the hostage if he perceives the release as a “loss”. Hence, ‘face’ and emotions, 
in the researcher’s opinion, form a key component in ensuring the safe release of 
the hostage.  
Improved database of NGO hostage cases 
Without an accurate database of incidents, it can be difficult to interpret trends 
and scope of hostage cases. At the moment the aid worker security database 
(AWSD), the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events database 
(ITERATE), and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) database are the most reliable, but with a 
significant focus on terrorism, or political hostage taking. As the trends in this 
study points towards financially motivated abductions, many of these events 
may not be registered. Investment, both in financial and human resource terms, 
to research and maintain a database would allow sufficiently high quality data to 
begin developing pattern analysis, a significant element in preventing hostage 
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cases taking place. Further, knowing patterns and location specific modus 
operandi by hostage takers would possibly reduce error margins for the 
negotiation team. This, however, would require that the INGO community report 
their cases to the database. 
6.5.2 Recommendations for policy 
Training 
The importance of pre-deployment training was emphasised by the participants, 
and matches that of former hostages the researcher has spoken to. Training will 
assist on many levels; in detecting surveillance, in identifying gaps in procedures, 
and in surviving a period of captivity. The researcher recommends that all staff 
going to an operation with a realistic hostage threat should undertake some level 
of hostile environment training before deployment, or immediately upon arrival to 
the duty station. Further, in environments with a realistic risk of abductions, 
refresher trainings should be organised regularly to limit complacency. This is in 
line with statements from aid practitioners interviewed for the 2013 Aid worker 
security report, which made the point that kidnappings generally happen to 
‘individuals who are not following SOPs for  risk avoidance – often because they 
have grown complacent after working in the context for a long time.’ (Harmer, 
Stoddard, and Toth, p. 9)   
The more synchronised the NGO staff is in their security management, the easier 
it  will be to detect surveillance and reduce the number of abductions. Detecting 
surveillance offers the only opportunity to prevent the attack, after this, one is 
simply managing an abduction. The Aid worker security report for 2013 also 
mentions this as a key point: ‘Counter-surveillance is also critical: agencies must 
remain on the lookout for anyone who appears to be observing their facilit ies and 
staff movements. This can be aided by a strong local network of supporters and 
informants.’ (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, p. 9)  
INGO hostages have an alarmingly high casualty rate in hostage cases, 17 per cent 
versus the global rate of 9 per cent. There are likely many causes behind this high 
level, and lack of training may be one of these. Especially dangerous is the 
capture phase, where adrenaline runs high on all sides, and mistakes are often 
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punished immediately with violence. Practical training and simulations can to a 
degree mitigate unpredictability from the hostages’ perspectives. 
At the crisis management level training is also important. Training will, to a 
degree, add a level of predictability to a crisis, as many elements would have 
emerged and been managed during the crisis. This underscores the importance of 
advanced preparation for managing a hostage incident, both from the perspective 
of the crisis team and that of the hostage. There is support in research for ensuring 
training for the crisis management team as part of the preparation. Romano and 
Rugala, in their 2011 study ‘Workplace Violence: Survival Mind-Set’ identified 
great disparities in responses between those who have and those who have not 
been trained to deal with any type of critical situations (Figure 6.1 below).  
 
Figure 6.1: Untrained and trained responses 
Both groups initially react by being startled and experiencing fear. Then, they 
begin to diverge: the untrained panic, whereas the trained experience controllable 
anxiety. From that point on, the trained group members begin to recall what they 
should do next, prepare, and act. The untrained, however, experience disbelief that 
eventually leads to denial and, ultimately, helplessness.  
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Saving Lives Together 
United Nations and INGOs should review the Saving Lives Together (SLT) 
framework to see whether providing advice to a crisis management group during 
a hostage case could be feasible. While there may be legal concerns, both the 
INGOs and United Nations could benefit from such an arrangement. The main 
purpose of the SLT is to ‘improve coordination and cooperation between the UN 
and NGOs’, and hostage management is a field where United Nations has far 
better experience and management capacity than most, if not all, INGOs, and 
can therefore contribute to improve their security. 
Kidnap and ransom insurance 
Few of the INGO participants had in-house capacity to engage directly with 
hostage takers through negotiation. This is a specialist skill that needs repeated 
practice, and more importantly, a constant awareness of trends and practices for 
abductions in the area of operations. It can, quite literally, be a matter of life 
and death to understand the finer dynamics of threats and demands. If such 
demands or communications are misunderstood by the crisis management the 
risk to the hostage can increase. Only an organisation that is fully engaged with 
mapping trends and practices will have a realistic chance of being aware of what 
it will take to ensure a safe release of the hostage. The United Nations have a 
few centrally placed persons that are involved in almost all cases, and therefore 
learn from each case. In addition, because of the large organisational structure, 
with influence in literary every country in the world, access to intermediaries 
that can influence the outcome of a case is often easier. Only a few INGOs can 
claim the same, simply because their respective organisations and security 
structures are much smaller, so a realistic alternative is to use an external 
expertise. 
It would have to be a policy decision based on existing capacity to which level 
each INGO would require insurance coverage. Factors to consider include 
negotiation capacity and post-release assistance capacity. The post release 
assistance can be substantial: ‘despite perceptions of  significant sums being 
paid in ransom, in fact ransom (when it is paid) is often the smallest expense of 
all the expenses covered by the policy, compared to the sizable post-release 
expenses, such as medical and psychological care, and litigation expenses’ and 
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‘K&R insurance policies cover ransom payments as well as ‘ancillary benefits’ 
including crisis management costs such as a negotiation advisor,  rehabilitation 
expenses for former hostages, the costs of reconnecting family and friends, and 
dismemberment benefits, if relevant. Legal liability is also an important element 
in many of these policies, as lawsuits often follow cases where international 
staff have been kidnapped’ (Harmer, Stoddard, and Toth, 2013, p. 11). For an 
organisation without internal capacity, the use of kidnap and ransom insurance, 
whether the ransom reimbursement component is included or not, would aptly 
augment their capacity to respond to an incident as well as show a level of Duty 
of Care for the staff of the organisation.  
6.5.3 Recommendations for practitioners 
Conflict mapping 
Practitioners managing a case that is prolonged may struggle to clearly identify 
dynamics of all the actors, and especially notice change over time. Conflict 
mapping focuses on actors and their interrelationships, and using such a tool can 
bring clarity in which relationships can be engaged and approached, and which 
should not be. Especially visual, or spatial, learners will benefit  from having the 
core issues mapped out using this tool. Therefore, hostage incident managers and 
negotiators should gain knowledge in conflict mapping techniques. 
Information sharing 
The researcher recommends that the INGOs establish a forum for their hostage 
incident managers or negotiators where information can be shared. It is typically 
the same group of hostage takers, or at least groups using the same procedures 
and tactics, behind most hostage takings in an area. One INGO can therefore 
learn much from another case that has been concluded, no matter what the 
outcome. This provides a negotiator with a significant tactical advantage when 
starting the negotiation for a new case; instead of starting without any 
knowledge, some shortcuts can be made towards establishing rapport and the 
ability to influence the case towards a positive outcome. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
The sensitivit ies of researching hostage management added a level of 
complexity to the already task of researching any field of knowledge.  Hostage 
cases generally affect organisations in a number of negative ways, such as in the 
loss of operational tempo, medical expenses, and potentially death or severe 
trauma.  Most importantly, however, a hostage case affects real people, whether 
that be the hostage, friends and family of the hostage, the crisis management 
team, or colleagues of the hostage.  The stakes are high, and can literally be a 
matter of life and death. As such, collecting information on this topic was not an 
easy task. However, the findings from this study should assist INGOs to improve 
management of hostage cases and therefore reduce the trauma, or even save the 
lives, of hostages. 
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Appendix 1: Interview guide 
 
a. I want to thank you for taking the time to talk to me today. My name is Kjell 
Lauvik and I would like to talk to you about your views on Hostage 
Management for International NGOs.  
b. The interview should take less than an hour.  
c. I will be taping the session because I don’t want to miss any of your 
comments. Although I will be taking some notes during the session, I can’t 
possibly write fast enough to get it all down. Because we’re on tape, 
please be sure to speak up so that we don’t miss your comments. 
d. All responses will be kept confidential. This means that your interview 
responses will only be shared with research team members and we will 
ensure that any information we include in our report does not identify you 
as the respondent.  
e. Remember, you don’t have to talk about anything you don’t want to and 
you may end the interview at any time. 
f. Are there any questions about what I have just explained? 
g. Are you willing to participate in this interview? 
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Semi-structured Interview Guide – NGO staff 
 
Demographics 
Name: 
What category of NGO staff are you: 
HQ Security 
Professional  
Field Security 
Professional 
Field Security 
Focal point 
Not involved in 
Security - HQ 
Not involved in 
Security - Field 
 
How many employees (approx) in the organization? 
How many full time security professionals (international and local) 
Where does your organization work? (countries, capitals, etc) 
General Characteristics 
1. What trends do you see in abduction of NGO staff? 
a.  (Probe: How many staff from Non-Governmental Organizations do 
you believe to be kidnapped or taken hostage globally per year?) 
 
External Assistance 
2. What are the advantages or disadvantages of obtaining kidnap and 
ransom insurance for NGOs 
3. What do you think about Kidnap and Ransom insurance as a realistic 
private option for staff, as well as for family and dependents of staff, 
working for an International NGO 
4. What are your thought around pros and cons of utilizing a commercial 
entity in managing a hostage crisis for NGOs. 
 
Preparedness & Policy 
5. What are the advantages or disadvantages of having a clear policy, plans 
and procedures in place for managing hostage cases? 
a. (Probe: Does your organization have such clear policy, plans and 
procedures in place for managing hostage cases?) 
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6. What resources (human and financial) would be required to typically 
manage a hostage crisis for more than 4 weeks? (Example: Two 
international staff abducted in Darfur) 
a. (Probe: Does your organization have such resources available in 
case of a hostage crisis?) 
7. To which extent do you believe that your organization should take an 
active role in perusing legal justice against the hostage takers after the 
release of the hostages?  
8. What responsibilities or accountability do you feel the NGO has to respond 
to hostage taking of family or dependents of their staff? 
a. (Probe: Does your organization have a clear policy in place for 
managing hostage cases of family or dependents?) 
9. Who should cover the cost of managing a hostage situation for NGO staff? 
 
Managing the crisis 
10. United Nations has a pool of trained Hostage Incident Managers, and 
these are deployed on a cost-share basis in a crisis. Is there a way for the 
NGO community to do something similar? 
11. How important is it for staff (both in HQ and in the operations) to manage 
the first contacts from the hostage takers correctly? 
a. (Probe: Does your organization know how to manage first contact 
from hostage takers) 
12. How do you feel about having a stress counsellor / psychologist as a 
member of the Hostage Incident Management team? How would you 
best use such a resource? 
13. How do you feel about having a media management expert as a member 
of the Hostage Incident Management team? 
14. How would you describe the importance of having a hostage Reception 
Plan in place in each operation, clearly outlining the immediate steps to 
be taken upon release of a hostage? 
a. (Probe: Does your organization have reception plans in place?) 
15. What is the key role of the organization’s security professionals in a hostage 
crisis? 
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16. What do you consider to be the key role of the executive officer in the 
operations (i.e Head of Office, Country Representative, etc) during a 
hostage crisis? 
17. What do you consider to be the key role of the host government during a 
hostage crisis? 
18. What do you consider to be the key role of the home nation / embassy of 
the abducted staff during a hostage crisis? 
19. To which degree do you think the family and dependents of the hostage 
should be consulted and informed throughout the incident? 
20. What assistance and follow-up should be provided to a former hostage 
after release? 
a. (Probe: Does your organization have procedures in place for post-
release follow-up?) 
 
Individual staff preparedness 
 
21. What personal training and preparation should staff working in medium-
high risk environments have? 
a. (Probe: Does your organization provide opportunity for your staff to 
obtain the necessary level of training and preparation? What 
percentage of staff receive such training?) 
22. What are the advantages or disadvantages of having completed personal 
profiles to aid any hostage recovery process (proof-of-life questions, 
photos, descriptions, etc). 
a. (Probe: Does your organization have a system in place to manage 
personal profiles for hostage cases?) 
Miscellaneous 
23.  What should staff of NGOs be able to “Reasonable expect” in terms of 
preparation and management of Hostage Incidents (What do you 
consider “minimum standards”). 
24. Do you have any other comments, recommendations or observations 
regarding Hostage management for NGOs? 
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Interview Guide Expert 
 
h. I want to thank you for taking the time to talk to me today. My name is Kjell 
Lauvik and I would like to talk to you about your views on Hostage 
Management for International NGOs.  
i. The interview should take less than an hour.  
j. I will be taping the session because I don’t want to miss any of your 
comments. Although I will be taking some notes during the session, I can’t 
possibly write fast enough to get it all down. Because we’re on tape, 
please be sure to speak up so that we don’t miss your comments. 
k. All responses will be kept confidential. This means that your interview 
responses will only be shared with research team members and we will 
ensure that any information we include in our report does not identify you 
as the respondent.  
l. Remember, you don’t have to talk about anything you don’t want to and 
you may end the interview at any time. 
m. Are there any questions about what I have just explained? 
n. Are you willing to participate in this interview? 
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Semi-structured Interview Guide – Industry Expert 
 
Demographics 
Name: 
What category of expert are you: 
Former 
Hostage 
Private or 
commercial 
solution 
Stress 
counselor / 
physiologist 
Hostage 
negotiator / 
manager 
Hostage 
survival 
trainer 
 
General Characteristics 
1. What trends do you see in abduction of NGO staff? 
a.  (Probe: How many staff from Non-Governmental Organizations do 
you believe to be kidnapped or taken hostage globally per year?) 
 
External Assistance 
2. What are the advantages or disadvantages of obtaining kidnap and 
ransom insurance for NGOs? 
a. (Probe: Do you think NGOs use K&R insurance?) 
3. What do you think about Kidnap and Ransom insurance as a realistic 
private option for staff, as well as for family and dependents of staff, 
working for an International NGO 
4. What are your thought around pros and cons of utilizing a commercial 
entity in managing a hostage crisis for NGOs. 
 
Preparedness & Policy 
5. What are the advantages or disadvantages of having a clear policy, plans 
and procedures in place for managing hostage cases? 
a. (Probe: Do you think NGOs in general have adequate policies, 
plans, and procedures in place?) 
6. What resources (human and financial) would be required to typically 
manage a hostage crisis for more than 4 weeks? (Example: Two 
international staff abducted in Darfur) 
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7. To which extent do you believe that an INGO should take an active role in 
perusing legal justice against the hostage takers after the release of the 
hostages?  
8. What responsibilities or accountability do you feel the NGO has to respond 
to hostage taking of family or dependents of their staff? 
9. Who should cover the cost of managing a hostage situation for NGO staff? 
 
Managing the crisis 
10. United Nations has a pool of trained Hostage Incident Managers, and 
these are deployed on a cost-share basis in a crisis. Is there a way for the 
NGO community to do something similar? 
11. How important is it for staff (both in HQ and in the operations) to manage 
the first contacts from the hostage takers correctly? 
12. How do you feel about having a stress counsellor / psychologist as a 
member of the Hostage Incident Management team? How would you 
best use such a resource? 
13. How do you feel about having a media management expert as a member 
of the Hostage Incident Management team? 
14. How would you describe the importance of  having a hostage Reception 
Plan in place in each operation, clearly outlining the immediate steps to 
be taken upon release of a hostage? 
15. What is the key role of the organizations security professionals in a hostage 
crisis? 
16. What do you consider to be the key role of the executive officer in the 
operations (i.e Head of Office, Country Representative, etc) during a 
hostage crisis? 
17. What do you consider to be the key role of the host government during a 
hostage crisis? 
18. What do you consider to be the key role of the home nation / embassy of 
the abducted staff during a hostage crisis? 
19. To which degree do you think the family and dependents of the hostage 
should be consulted and informed throughout the incident? 
20. What assistance and follow-up should be provided to a former hostage 
after release? 
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Individual staff preparedness 
 
21. What personal training and preparation should NGOs have? 
22. What are the advantages or disadvantages of having completed personal 
profiles to aid any hostage recovery process (proof-of-life questions, 
photos, descriptions, etc). 
 
Miscellaneous 
23.  What should staff of NGOs be able to “Reasonable expect” in terms of 
preparation and management of Hostage Incidents (What do you 
consider “minimum standards”). 
24. Do you have any other comments, recommendations or observations 
regarding Hostage management for NGOs? 
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Appendix 2: List of documents reviewed 
 
# Document title Author Year 
    
 NGO SECURITY   
1 Understanding NGOs and why government may fund them Good Practice 
Funding 
2013 
2 Global community : the role of international organizations 
in the making of the contemporary world  
Iriye, Akira 2004 
3 New Conflicts, New Challenges: The Evolving Role for 
Non-Governmental Actors 
Farouk Mawlawi 2006 
4 A Note on NGOs and Policy Influence Covey, J.G 1992 
5 Globalisation and Civil Society: NGO Influence in 
International Decision-Making 
Krut, R. 1997 
6 Mission Impossible? Defining Nongovernmental 
Organizations 
Martens, Kerstin 2002 
7 NGOs, Government and Policy Park, Sang-pil 2002 
8 Understanding How the Identity of International Aid 
Agencies and Their Approaches to Security Are Mutually 
Shaped (PhD Thesis) 
Renouf, Jean S. 2011 
9 The growth of International Nongovernmental Organization 
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Skjelsbaek, K. 1971 
10 Kidnap response: immediate priorities for aid agencies Allison, M 2010 
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deaths 
Gidley, R. 2006 
12 Is terrorism an issue for humanitarian agencies? Wille, C., & Fast, 
L. 
2010 
13 The promise of acceptance Fast, L., Rowley, 
E., O’Neill, M., & 
Freeman, F. 
2011 
14 The Continued Threat of Kidnapping in Dadaab UNDSS 2013 
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Thani, F 
2008 
16 Risk Management and Insurance Trieschmann, J., 
Hoyt, R., & 
Sommer, D. 
2005 
17 Security Management in Humanitarian Agencies Shayan Mujawar 2009 
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Wheeler, V., and 
Harmer, A. 
2006 
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Alexandre Carle 
and Hakim Chkam 
2006 
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Information Security for Humanitarian Non-Governmental 
Organisations in the Field 
Ayre, R 2010 
22 Operational security management in violent environments Humanitarian 
Practice Network 
2010 
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Duffield, B. 2010 
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2010 
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